TAFT  PAPERS 

ON 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NKW  YORK    •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •   CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA*  LTD. 

TORONTO 


TAFT  PAPERS 

ON 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


EDITED  BY 

THEODORE  MARBURG,  M.A.,  LL.D. 

AND 

HORACE  E.  FLACK,  PH,D. 


Jfteto 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1920 

AU  riahu  reterved 


OOPYMGIHT,  1920. 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  electrotypcd.     Published  October,  igao. 


Speeches  and  articles  by  William  Howard  Taft, 
and  extracts  therefrom,  covering  period  from  May 
12,  1915,  to  the  adoption  of  the  revised  Paris 
Covenant,  April  28,  1919.  One  article  on  the 
revised  Covenant  is  added. 


FOREWORD 

These  addresses,  articles  and  editorials  were  written  when 
the  issue  was  purely  on  the  merits  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  and  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations  as  signed  by  President  Wilson  in 
Paris  and  by  him  submitted  to  the  Senate.  I  have  nothing 
to  recall  in  what  is  said  in  them.  But  the  present  issue  over 
the  League  is  very  different  from  that  when  these  papers 
were  written,  and  is  made  so  by  the  very  unfortunate  atti- 
tude of  President  Wilson  in  refusing  to  allow  the  United 
States  to  join  the  League  of  Nations  because  the  Senate 
would  not  consent  to  Article  X  as  he  had  drafted  it  and  put 
it  into  the  Covenant. 

It  is  conceded  that  the  other  members  of  the  League  would 
have  accepted  us  as  a  member  with  the  modification  of  Article 
X  insisted  on  by  a  sufficient  number  of  senators  to  prevent 
ratification.  The  Democratic  party  and  its  platform  adopt 
completely  Mr.  Wilson's  position  and,  if  Governor  Cox  is 
elected,  the  League  will  be  defeated  and  a  deadlock  ensue  just 
as  before. 

Two-thirds  of  the  Republican  senators  have  already  voted 
for  the  League  with  reservations  and  enough  Democrats 
have  expressed  themselves  in  the  Senate  and  elsewhere  on 
this  matter  to  ensure  a  ratification  of  the  League  with  the 
Republican  reservations  if  Mr.  Harding  is  elected  and  sub- 
mits the  German  Treaty  to  the  Senate.  The  doubt  on  this 
point  is  whether  Mr.  Harding  will  do  so,  arising  from  his 


FOREWORD 

failure  to  say,  in  his  letter  of  acceptance,  that  he  will  do  so. 
My  own  belief  is  that,  as  Mr.  Harding  has  already  twice 
voted  for  the  League  with  reservations,  and  will  find  that  a 
Democratic  minority  will  prevent  his  putting  through  a 
separate  treaty  with  Germany,  he  will  conclude  that  the  only 
satisfactory  solution  is  a  ratification  of  the  League  Covenant 
with  reservations. 

For  these  reasons  —  though  had  I  been  a  senator  I  would 
have  voted  for  the  League  Covenant  just  as  submitted  and 
also  for  it  with  the  reservations  —  I  shall  vote  for  Mr. 
Harding. 

WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT. 

Pointe  au  Pic, 

Province  of  Quebec,  Canada, 
July  23,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION ..     .  vii 

LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE .  I 

VICTORY  PROGRAM :.  2 

THE  PARIS  COVENANT  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  ...  4 

PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE  .     .  28 

PROPOSALS  OF  THE  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE     ...  46 

CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  THE  PROPOSALS 52 

A  CONSTRUCTIVE  PLAN  FOR  HUMAN  BETTERMENT  .     .     .  61 

THE  PURPOSES  OF  THE  LEAGUE 74 

STATEMENT  MADE  AT  RICHMOND,  VA.,  MARCH  21,  1917  .  79 

THE  MENACE  OF  A  PREMATURE  PEACE 81 

WORLD  PEACE  DEBATE 98 

VICTORY  WITH  POWER 132 

OUR  PURPOSE 133 

SELF  DETERMINATION 136 

PERIL  IN  HUN  PEACE  OFFER 138 

THE  OBLIGATIONS  OF  VICTORY 141 

WORKINGMEN  AND  THE  LEAGUE 152 

A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  OUR  NATIONAL  POLICY     .     .     .153 
WHY  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  Is  NECESSARY     .     .     .     .156 

LESSER  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 160 

DISARMAMENT  OF  NATIONS  AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS    .  163 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  THE  GERMAN  COLONIES     .  164 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY     .      .  166 

PRESIDENT  WILSON  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS     .      .  169 

SENATOR  LODGE  ON  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS    ....  174 

THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  How 177 

FROM  ARTICLE  IN  THE  PUBLIC  LEDGER,  JANUARY  i,  1919  194 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

REPRESENTATION  IN  THE  LEAGUE 195 

CRITICISM  SHOULD  BE  CONSTRUCTIVE 198 

ROOSEVELT'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  .  .  201 
THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  WHAT  IT  MEANS  AND  WHY  IT 

MUST  BE 205 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  ADVISERS  .  210 

"  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  Is  HERE  " 213 

THE  LEAGUE'S  "  BITE  " 217 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  THE  GERMAN  COLONIES  .  221 
FROM  ADDRESS  AT  ATLANTIC  CONGRESS  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF 

NATIONS,  NEW  YORK,  FEBRUARY  5,  1919  ....  225 

IRELAND  AND  THE  LEAGUE 225 

THE  GREAT  COVENANT  OF  PARIS 228 

To  BUSINESS  MEN 241 

FROM  ADDRESS  AT  SAN  FRANCISCO,  FEBRUARY  19,  1919  .  2.17 
FROM  ADDRESS  AT  SALT  LAKE  CITY,  FEBRUARY  22,  1919  .  249 
LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AS  BARRIER  TO  ANY  GREAT  WARS  IN 

FUTURE 257 

THE  PARIS  COVENANT  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  .  .  .  262 

ANSWER  TO  SENATOR  KN'OX'S  INDICTMENT 280 

PARIS  COVENANT  HAS  TEETH 290 

To  MAKE  PEACE  SECURE 295 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  HAS  NOT  DELAYED  PEACE  .  .  .  300 

"  OPEN  DIPLOMACY  "  SLOW 303 

RUSSIA,  FRANCE,  DANZIG 305 

THE  ROUND  ROBIN 307 

GUARANTIES  OF  ARTICLE  10 308 

RELIGIOUS  AND  RACIAL  FREEDOM 309 

SECRET  TREATY  PROVISIONS  THAT  ARE  AT  THE  ROOT  OF 

THE  CRISIS  AT  THE  PARIS  CONFERENCE  .  .  .  .  3!  I 
ANALYSIS  OF  THE  LEAGUE  COVENANT  AS  AMENDED  .  .313 
CORRESPONDENCE 321 


INTRODUCTION 

Here  in  the  United  States  the  main  attack  on  both  the 
preliminary  project  and  the  perfected  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  was  on  the  ground  that  the  League 
would  operate  as  an  interference  with  our  sovereignty  and 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  that  it  involved  abandonment  of 
our  traditional  policy  against  entangling  alliances,  and  that 
the  country  lacked  the  power,  under  its  Constitution,  to 
enter  into  such  a  treaty.  These  objections  are  fully  met 
by  Mr.  Taft  in  the  speeches  and  articles  embraced  in  this 
volume.  Sovereignty  is  shown  to  be  just  so  much  liberty 
of  action  on  the  part  of  States  as  is  consistent  with  their 
obligation,  under  international  law  and  morality,  to  permit 
of  the  exercise  of  equal  sovereignty  or  liberty  of  action  by 
their  sister  States.  The  League  Covenant  secures  all  States 
in  their  exercise  of  this  sovereignty  free  from  oppression 
by  other  States,  and  he  who  wants  more  is  really  seeking 
the  license  selfishly  to  disregard  these  obligations  —  to 
reject,  for  example,  the  just  judgments  of  a  properly  con- 
stituted tribunal  —  which  is  the  German  conception  of 
sovereignty. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  shown  to  be  strengthened,  not 
impaired,  by  the  Covenant.  In  its  original  form  the 
doctrine  opposed  future  colonization  on  the  American  conti- 
nents by  European  governments  and  all  interference  by 
Europe  with  the  free  governments  of  America.  Later  on, 
the  United  States,  under  the  Polk  and  under  the  Taft  admin- 


Viii  INTRODUCTION 

istrations,  voiced  its  opposition  to  the  transfer  of  American 
territory  by  sale  to  any  European  or  Asiatic  government. 
The  original  doctrine  is  strengthened  by  the  League 
Covenant  in  that  it  is,  for  the  first  time,  specifically  recog- 
nized by  the  nations,  and  is  extended  to  the  world  by  the 
provisions  of  Article  X,  which  preserves  "  against  external 
aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  independ- 
ence of  all  members  of  the  League."  Certainly  we  are  not 
authorized  by  that,  nor,  in  fact,  by  any  other  article  of  the 
Covenant,  to  acquire  territory  in  Europe  by  conquest  or 
purchase,  and  similarly  European  countries  are  not  author- 
ized by  the  Covenant  to  do  it  in  this  hemisphere. 

The  attitude  both  of  Secretary  Seward  and  of  President 
Roosevelt  is  cited  to  the  effect  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
does  not  forbid  non- American  Powers  from  justly  disciplin- 
ing American  countries  provided  the  action  does  not  extend 
to  the  point  of  interfering  with  the  latter' s  independence  and 
territorial  integrity.  Similarly  the  guaranties  of  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  under  Article  X  of  the 
Paris  Covenant  will  not  come  into  operation  until  the  char- 
acter of  a  war,  otherwise  legally  begun,  discloses  itself  as 
aggressive  in  this  respect.  Neither  are  wars^of  independ- 
ence within  the  legal  purview  of  the  League  though  it  will 
naturally  take  notice  of  them  and  invite  friendly  settlement. 

The  sale  of  American  territory  to  non-American  Powers 
is  not  specifically  forbidden  by  the  League  Covenant ;  but 
the  motive  for  such  attempted  action  is  lessened  by  the  very 
existence  of  the  League.  When  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
to  be  enforced  in  the  western  hemisphere,  it  is  natural  to 
expect  that  a  strong  American  State,  close  to  the  seat  of 
trouble,  will  be  selected  to  execute  the  mandate  of  the 
League.  Similar  reason  would  control  the  action  of  the 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

League  in  employing  the  forces  of  a  nearby  State  to  quell 
disturbances  in  other  parts  of  the  world ;  so  that,  unless  the 
struggle  be  formidable  or  unless  an  international  force  be 
needed  to  allay  fear  of  abuse  of  power,  the  forces  of  the 
United  States  will  rarely  be  called  upon  to  act  abroad. 

The  "  entangling  alliance  "  argument  is  met  by  a  whole 
series  of  facts  and  considerations.  The  detached  position 
of  the  United  States,  which  obtained  in  Washington's  day, 
is  shown  to  have  disappeared  with  the  spread  of  dominion 
and  interests  since  then.  From  a  country  limited  to  a 
comparatively  narrow  settlement  along  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board, the  United  States  has  extended  its  empire  over  the 
continent  to  the  Pacific,  has  acquired  Alaska,  Hawaii,  the 
Philippines,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Panama  Canal  strip,  while 
a  multiplied  commerce  and  social  intercourse  tie  up  her 
fortunes  intimately  with  the  fortunes  of  other  peoples.  The 
life  that  pulses  through  her  veins  today  is  the  life  of  the 
world  and  disease  in  the  body  politic  elsewhere  affects  her 
own  health.  We  have  seen  that  we  cannot  keep  out  of  a 
general  world  conflict  and  we  risk  less  by  assuming  the 
obligations  of  membership  in  the  family  of  nations  and 
throwing  our  great  influence  in  the  scale  for  the  preservation 
of  peace  than  if  we  were  to  attempt  isolation  and  play  the 
role  of  onlooker  until  the  conflagration  drew  us  irresist- 
ibly in. 

Our  presence  will  make  the  potential  strength  of  the 
League  so  overwhelming  that  the  hand  of  the  would-be 
aggressor  will  be  stayed,  making  serious  assault  on  the 
world's  peace  unlikely.  In  most  instances  the  need  for  the 
actual  use  of  force  will  be  avoided;  just  as  the  declared 
purpose  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  resulted  in  its  being  respected  without  our 


X  INTRODUCTION 

being  called  upon  to  fire  a  shot  or  sacrifice  the  life  of  a  single 
soldier  in  its  defence.  Accordingly  there  will  be  less  likeli- 
hood of  our  being  called  upon  to  go  to  war  than  if  we 
declined  the  commitments  of  the  League  with  a  view  to 
avoiding  war.  While  the  United  States,  in  entering  the 
League,  will  assume  new  responsibilities,  it  will  not  assume 
new  burdens.  The  League  will  prove  to  be  a  source  of 
economy  rather  than  of  new  expense  to  us;  for  it  should 
not  only  enable  us  to  escape  the  crushing  expense  of  actual 
warfare,  but,  in  course  of  time,  should  likewise  relieve  us  of 
part  of  the  present  burden  of  armaments. 

So  much  from  the  standpoint  of  self-interest.  But, 
irrespective  of  self-interest,  the  United  States,  having  become 
a  powerful  nation  in  point  of  numbers,  talent  and  resources, 
has  a  duty  to  perform  in  this  respect  to  her  sister  nations. 
Modern  ingenuity  has  so  multiplied  the  destructiveness  of 
war  that  the  very  preservation  of  the  race  is  dependent  on 
adequate  organization  to  suppress  war.  Such  organization 
cannot  come  about  without  the  participation  of  the  United 
States.  Unless  we  join,  other  important  countries  will 
remain  out  and  we  will  witness  the  world  divided  once  more 
in  hostile  groups.  Without  a  League  of  Nations,  the  many 
new  States  which  have  come  into  being,  lacking  experience 
and  the  self-restraint  which  makes  successful  self-govern- 
ment possible,  will  not  only  be  unable  to  maintain  their 
independence  but  will  be  a  source  of  danger  to  the  general 
peace,  by  reason  of  quarrels  among  themselves  and  quarrels 
with  the  States  of  which  they  were  formerly  a  part ;  for,  on 
the  one  hand,  racial  animosity  and  the  memory  of  the 
tyranny  formerly  practiced  against  them  "  will  prompt  them 
to  be  impatient  and  headstrong"  in  dealing  with  their 
former  masters,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  will 


INTRODUCTION  XI 

harbor  resentment  against  States  whose  independent  exist- 
ence will  remind  them  of  their  own  "  deserved  humiliation." 
Our  experience  in  Cuba  indicates  what  we  may  expect  of 
them.  After  three  years  of  existence  as  an  independent 
republic,  Cuba  indulged  in  a  revolution.  "  Mr.  Roosevelt 
sent  me  down  there  to  stop  it  and  launch  the  Republic  once 
more.  Well,  I  could  not  stop  it  except  by  sending  for  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States.  That  step  had  a 
wholesome,  conciliatory,  quieting  effect.  We  were  not 
called  upon  to  fight.  We  took  over  the  island  and  held  it 
for  two  years.  We  passed  a  lot  of  good  statutes,  among 
them  an  election  law,  held  a  fair  election  under  it  and  then 
turned  over  the  government  to  those  elected.  We  had 
launched  her  once  more.  If  she  ever  requires  it  we  will 
do  the  same  thing  over  again  and  launch  her  again,  and  then 
again,  until  she  gets  strong  enough  —  I  hope  she  is  now  — . 
to  stand  alone." 

This  unpretentious  and  good-natured  recital  of  the  accom- 
plishment of  a  task  which  for  another  might  have  proved 
difficult  indeed  —  and  lengthy,  if  not  bloody  —  shows, 
more  clearly  than  any  abstract  dissertation  possibly  could, 
exactly  the  patience  and  fatherly  concern  which  Mr.  Taft 
feels  will  be  required  of  us  in  starting  the  new  nations  of 
Europe  safely  on  their  way. 

Our  own  sacrifices  and  the  more  awful  sacrifices  of  our 
allies,  who  were  fighting  our  battle  long  before  we  awoke 
to  the  fact,  were  made  in  order  to  suppress  militarism,  to 
safeguard  democracy  and  to  make  peace  more  lasting. 

It  was  the  United  States,  acting  through  its  President, 
that  pointed  the  way  to  a  league  of  nations.  The  hope  of 
it  gave  ne\v  courage  to  the  armies  of  our  allies  and  to  the 
people  that  suffered  toil  and  hardship  at  home;  it  helped 


Xll  INTRODUCTION 

nerve  the  arm  of  our  own  boys  and  encouraged  the  masses 
in  the  enemy  country  to  revolt  against  their  leaders.  Shall 
we  now  disappoint  their  hope?  Prove  traitor  to  our  pro- 
fessions? Tell  the  maimed  and  the  mothers  of  the  dead, 
at  home  and  abroad,  that  we  did  not  mean  what  we  said? 
Suffer  conditions  to  grow  up  which  will  make  similar  — 
nay,  far  graver  —  sacrifices  necessary  in  the  future?  "I 
say  that  the  men  who  advocate  our  staying1  out  of  the 
League  by  reason  of  a  policy  against  entangling  alliances 
laid  down  by  Washington  for  a  small  nation  struggling  for 
existence,  whereas  today  we  are  one  of  the  most  powerful 
nations  in  the  world  —  I  say  deliberately  that  these  men 
are  little  Americans  and  belittle  the  United  States  and  its 
people."  Now  is  the  time  to  set  up  the  international  organ- 
ization which  for  generations  thinking  men  have  sought; 
now,  while  the  dreadful  character  of  war  has  so  impressed 
itself  on  nations  that  they  are  willing  to  make  the  concessions 
called  for.  4* 

Should  we  not,  then,  say  to  the  nations  of  Europe :  "  We 
realize  that  the  sea  no  longer  separates  us  but  is  become  a 
bond  of  union.  We  know  that  if  war  comes  to  you,  our 
neighbor,  it  is  apt  to  come  to  us,  and  we  are  ready  to  stand 
with  you  in  order  to  suppress  this  scourge  of  nations.  For 
love  of  our  brother  we  will  do  our  share  as  men  and  women 
conscious  of  the  responsibility  to  help  along  mankind,  a 
responsibility  which  God  has  given  this  nation  in  giving  it 
great  power." 

Led,  by  experience  in  furthering  new  measures,  to  expect 
violent  attack  on  the  proposed  League  from  the  side  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  Mr.  Taft  took  early  occasion  to  deal 
with  that  important  question.  His  full  and  satisfactory 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

treatment  of  it  is  among  his  most  valuable  contributions  to 
the  discussion  of  the  League  project. 

The   United    States   is  a   nation,   endowed   with   all   the 
powers,   so   far  as  external   relations  are  concerned,  that 
appertain  to  a  sovereign  nation.     Practice  and  legal  decisions 
are  cited  to  show  that  its  treaty-making  power  extends  to 
all  subjects  usually  dealt  with  in  treaties.     These  include,  in 
practice  and  in  law,  the  right  to  agree  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion not  only  existing  disputes  but  likewise  disputes  which 
may    arise    in    future.     Among    the    latter,    instance    the 
approval,  by  the  United  States  Senate,  of  the  Hague  conven- 
tion for  an  international  Court  of  Prize  and  of  the  Bryan 
treaties.     Such  agreements  may  apply  to  extra-legal  con- 
troversies as  well  as  to  justiciable  controversies.     The  latter 
are  defined  as  matters  resolvable  by  the  rules  of  law  and 
equity.     Precedent    for  instituting  an   international   Court 
of  Justice  to  pass  upon  the  latter  category  of  questions  is 
found  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  which  is 
called  upon  at   times  to  apply   international   law   in  con- 
troversies between  the  States  of  the  Union.     Settlement  of 
extra-legal  questions  by  a  tribunal  would  simply  be  arbi- 
tration as  we  commonly  know  it.     A  long  series  of  agree- 
ments of  this  nature,  beginning  with  the  Jay  Treaty  of  1/94, 
affirms  the  practice  of  the  country  in  respect  thereto.     Sub- 
mission of  an  issue  to  a  judge,  which  this  is,  is  not  a  dele- 
gation of  power  to  an  agent. 

Nor  is  the  Government  exceeding  its  constitutional  powers 
when  it  enters  into  an  agreement  to  go  to  war  under  certain 
conditions.  For  the  complete  act,  the  exercise  of  two  con- 
stitutional functions  is  required.  It  is  the  President  who, 
by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  makes  a  treaty. 
"  For  this  purpose  the  President  and  Senate  are  the  United 


INTRODUCTION 

States."  That  is  one  thing.  It  is  the  Congress  which, 
observing  the  requirements  of  the  treaty,  takes  supplemen- 
tary action.  That  is  quite  another  thing. 

A  treaty  calling  for  a  declaration  of  war  under  certain 
conditions  can  no  more  be  carried  out  without  action  on  the 
part  of  Congress  than  a  treaty  calling  for  the  payment  of 
money;  because  in  Congress  alone  resides  the  power  to 
declare  war  just  as  in  Congress  alone  resides  the  power  to 
make  appropriations  of  money  from  the  Treasury.  The 
requirements  of  the  Constitution  are  fulfilled  only  by  this 
double  action.  But  that  fact  cannot  be  interpreted  as  limit- 
ing the  constitutional  power  of  the  Government  to  make 
treaties.  The  treaty  we  made  with  France  during  the 
Revolution  was  of  that  character.  The  Senate  accepted  the 
principle  when  it  approved  the  treaties  under  which  we 
guaranteed  the  independence  of  Cuba  and  Panama.  '  The 
obligation  was  entered  into  in  the  constitutional  way  and  is 
to  be  performed  in  the  constitutional  way." 

Neither  can  the  constitutional  power  of  the  country  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  to  limit  armaments  be  questioned. 
This  power  was  exercised  early  in  the  history  of  the  country 
by  the  agreement  with  Canada  ( 1817)  to  abolish  armaments 
on  the  Great  Lakes  and  maintain  no  fortifications  along  our 
lengthy  common  border. 

The  charge  that  the  League  sets  up  a  Super-State  like- 
wise falls  before  an  examination  of  the  project.  The  central 
organs  of  the  League  recommend  —  they  do  not  command 
—  definite  courses  of  action  by  the  States  of  the  League. 
When  armaments  are  in  question,  the  limit  prescribed  for 
each  State  is  not  definitive  until  that  State  has  agreed  to  it. 
For  the  United  States,  it  is  the  Congress,  acting  under  the 
Constitution,  which  will  finallv  determine  what  our  arma- 


INTRODUCTION  XV 

ments  are  to  be.  When  mandates  for  administering  back- 
ward regions  are  assigned,  the  mandatory  is  free  to  accept 
or  reject  the  mandate.  When  the  use  of  force  is  required, 
each  State  of  the  League  will  decide  for  itself  whether  or 
not  it  will  observe  the  recommendation  of  the  central  organ 
of  the  League  that  force  be  used.  True,  among  the  positive 
agreements  which  may  not  be  ignored,  are  two  of  major 
importance,  namely,  the  agreement  to  institute  a  boycott 
against  a  member  of  the  League  which  resorts  to  war  in 
violation  of  its  covenants  and  the  agreement  to  "  afford 
passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces  "  engaged  in 
disciplining  the  recalcitrant.  These  provisions  abolish  neu- 
trality in  the  case  of  an  aggressive  war;  but  it  is  a  condi- 
tion which  arises  not  by  reason  of  any  command  of  the  cen- 
tral organs  of  the  League  but  by  reason  of  the  act  of  the 
recalcitrant  itself  in  waging  war  illegally. 

The  power  of  the  League  rests,  not  on  a  super-govern- 
ment, but  on  the  covenants  of  the  members  to  cooperate 
voluntarily  by  boycott  and  by  the  use  of  force,  to  punish 
aggression. 

Combatting  the  views  of  persons  who  object  to  the  ele- 
ment of  force  in  the  League  program,  Mr.  Taft  declares 
his  respect  for  the  motives  of  the  advocates  of  non-resist- 
ance but  doubts  whether  nations  are  as  yet  proof  against  the 
"  temptations  to  cupidity,  cruelty  and  injustice  "  manifested 
in  men,  and  whether,  on  that  account,  an  international  police 
is  not  as  requisite  as  the  constabulary  which  "  protects  the 
innocent  and  the  just  against  the  criminal  and  unjust " 
within  the  State. 

Mr.  Bryan,  in  the  written  debate  with  Mr.  Taft,  urges 
that  the  use  of  force  invites  violence,  and  cites  the  laying 
aside  of  weapons  by  private  persons  as  having  made  for  the 


xvj  INTRODUCTION 

peace  fulness  of  society.  Mr.  Taft  replies  that  the  instance 
is  not  well  chosen,  because  "  men  gave  up  weapons  when 
they  could  rely  on  the  police,  exercising  the  force  of  the 
community,  to  protect  them  against  violence.  .  .  .  Would 
Mr.  Bryan  dispense  with  the  police  in  city,  state  and  na- 
tion?" "There  is  no  means  of  suppressing  lawless  vio- 
lence except  lawful  force." 

Mr.  Bryan's  view  that  a  popular  referendum  should  be 
taken  before  a  nation  may  declare  war  is  met  by  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  people  of  one  country  to  a  dispute  might  well 
vote  for  war  while  that  of  the  other  country  voted  against 
it.  "  Shall  another  vote  be  taken  ?  In  which  country  ? 
Or  shall  it  be  in  both  ?  "  We  may  add  that  when  the  na- 
tional legislature  had  gone  so  far  as  to  submit  the  question 
of  peace  or  war  by  referendum  to  the  people,  what  likeli- 
hood is  there  that  the  prospective  enemy  would  await  the 
decision  before  striking?  Picture  any  of  the  great  Euro- 
pean countries  referring  to  popular  vote  the  question  of  war 
against  a  neighbor.  "How  long  would  the  latter  delay  war- 
like action?  The  debate  offers  an  interesting  comparison, 
throughout,  of  the  minds  of  the  two  participants. 

The  assertion,  made  in  certain  quarters,  that  the  League 
plan  has  little  value  because  nations  will  disregard  the  obli- 
gations of  the  pact  is  met  by  the  admission  that  nations  are 
sometimes  utterly  immoral  and  shamelessly  break  treaties 
on  the  plea  of  necessity  but  that  we  cannot,  on  that  account, 
abandon  treaty-making  "  any  more  than  we  can  give  up  com- 
mercial contracts  because  men  sometimes  dishonor  them- 
selves by  breaking  them."  Moreover,  flying  in  the  face  of 
an  organized  world  opinion  and  combined  world  power 
involves  very  different  consequences  from  those  which  fol- 
lowed breach  of  treaty  under  the  old  order. 


INTRODUCTION  XV11 

The  fear  that  judgments  of  an  international  tribunal  will 
affect  adversely  the  interests  of  the  United  States  is  dis- 
missed in  these  words:  "If  the  judgment  against  her  is 
just  she  ought  to  obey  it.  If  it  is  not,  why  assume  that  it 
will  be  rendered  at  all,  or,  that  if  rendered  all  nations 
would  join  in  world  war  to  enforce  it?  Indeed,  may  not 
our  imagination,  if  we  let  it  run  riot,  as  easily  conceive 
such  a  union  of  the  military  forces  of  the  world  against 
the  United  States  without  a  league  and  its  machinery  as 
with  them?"  No  inconsistency  is  recognized  between  in- 
tense love  of  country,  which  is  regarded  as  helpful  and 
right,  and  universal  brotherhood.  "  The  relation  of  one 
to  the  other  should  be  as  love  of  home  and  family  is  to 
love  of  country."  They  strengthen  each  other. 

A  league,  such  as  is  now  planned,  is  viewed  as  a  necessary 
and  natural  outgrowth  of  the  treaty  foreshadowed  by  the 
demands  of  the  Allies.  In  fact  the  proposed  treaty  is  im- 
possible of  fulfillment  without  the  aid  of  some  such  organi- 
zation. Even  though  drawn  "  by  the  ablest  lawyers  who 
ever  drew  a  contract  ''  its  numerous  provisions  will  call  for 
authoritative  interpretation.  What  instrument  is  there 
better  fitted  than  a  court  to  interpret  a  contract  authorita- 
tively? Next,  there  are  sure  to  be  conflicts  which  are  not 
justiciable  among  the  nations.  What  better  institution  for 
settling  such  questions  than  a  tribunal  of  inquiry  and  con- 
ciliation? Unruliness  on  the  part  of  backward  countries, 
or  of  those  children  among  the  nations  to  whom  reference 
has  already  been  made,  will  call  for  the  use  of  force  to  con- 
fine and  restrain  it.  "  You  do  not  always  have  to  use  the 
broad  hand  but  it  is  helpful  to  have  it  in  the  family." 
That  was  the  third  plank  in  the  platform  of  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace.  Lastly,  we  cannot  escape  the  task  of  de- 


XV111  INTRODUCTION 

veloping  and  defining  international  law,  and  that  is  the 
fourth  plank. 

As  the  discussion  proceeded  Mr.  Taft  was  led  to  change, 
in  the  direction  of  enlarging,  his  view  of  the  length  to 
which  nations  might  be  expected  to  go  in  conferring  powers 
on  a  central  organization.  Of  the  desirability  of  sanc- 
tion for  all  the  pronouncements  of  the  League  there  was 
never  a  question.  The  problem  was  to  avoid  wrecking 
the  project  by  demanding  more  than  the  nations  would  be 
willing  to  concede  at  this  time. 

It  will  be  observed,  for  example,  that  in  the  earliest 
speeches,  intention  to  enforce  the  judgment  of  an  interna- 
tional court  is  denied;  whereas,  later  on  and  with  Mr.  Taft's 
approval,  the  platform  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
moved  up  to  that  demand.  At  the  same  time  Mr.  Taft  has 
stood,  from  the  beginning,  for  the  power  to  hale  a  nation 
into  court.  The  framers  of  the  Paris  Covenant  were  mani- 
festly unwilling  to  confer  both  powers  conjointly  on  an  in- 
ternational tribunal.  They  neglected  to  confer  on  the 
League  the  power  to  hale  offenders  before  a  tribunal  or 
court  in  matters  suitable  for  arbitration  —  justiciable  mat- 
ters are  included  in  the  term  —  but,  having  once  submitted 
the  matter,  the  disputants  are  bound  to  respect  the  judg- 
ment or  award.  On  the  other  hand,  disputants  in  the  field 
of  extra-legal  matters,  including  conflicts  of  political  policy, 
may  be  haled  before  a  tribunal  —  the  Council  or  a  com- 
mittee thereof  —  while  the  recommendation  arrived  at  by 
the  tribunal  is  not  en  forcible.  Mr.  Taft  is  of  the  opinion 
that  there  is  still  a  way,  through  the  instrumentality  of  the 
Council,  to  bring  a  nation  into  the  Court  of  International 
Justice  under  the  Covenant.  Certainly  it  is  not  unreason- 


INTRODUCTION  XIX 

able  to  expect  further  development  of  the  powers  of  its 
tribunals,  as  well  as  of  the  general  powers  of  the  League, 
as  time  may  disclose  the  need  for  them. 

So,  too,  the  earlier  position  that  the  League  should  oper- 
ate only  on  its  own  members  was  abandoned  by  Mr.  Taft 
and  his  associates  in  favor  of  insistence  on  resort  to  inquiry 
in  the  hope  of  peaceful  settlement  before  even  nations  out- 
side the  League  were  suffered  to  go  to  war.  This  is  the 
attitude  of  the  Paris  Covenant.  The  messages  printed  at 
the  end  of  the  volume  reveal  the  part  played  by  Mr.  Taft 
in  securing  modification  of  the  covenant  originally  reported 
to  the  Paris  Conference  (February  14,  1919).  His  sug- 
gestions were  made  with  a  view  to  meeting  the  objections 
raised  against  the  instrument  by  members  of  the  United 
States  Senate.  The  attitude  of  the  latter,  after  the  ob- 
jections voiced  had  been  largely  met  by  these  modifications, 
indicates  the  true  nature  of  much  of  the  opposition,  namely, 
desire  to  destroy  the  Covenant  itself  —  a  fearful  responsi- 
bility in  view  of  future  consequences  to  the  welfare  of  man- 
kind. 

In  addition  to  meeting,  with  his  usual  touch  of  kindly 
humor  and  convincing  reasoning,  the  arguments  advanced 
against  the  League  project,  Mr.  Taft  discloses  in  these 
papers  a  deep  conviction  that  a  League  of  Nations  is  neces- 
sary and  that  within  it  lie  boundless  possibilities  for  good. 

Some  one  has  said  that  the  man  whom  we  are  inclined  to 
regard  as  wise  is  the  man  with  whose  views  we  happen  to 
agree.  Be  that  as  it  may,  in  reviewing  Mr.  Taft's  utter- 
ances one  is  struck  with  the  extent  to  which  the  things  he 
has  advocated  are  the  things  that  have  been  realized  or 
are  still  regarded  as  desirable.  His  basket  of  discarded  no- 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

tions  —  notions  discarded  for  him  by  the  public  —  is  ex- 
ceptionally small. 

Among  the  speeches  in  his  best  vein  is  that  of  Montreal 
(September  26,  1917)  analysing  German  motive  in  the  light 
of  Prussia's  history  and  reviewing  the  events  which  led  up 
inevitably  to  our  own  entry  into  the  war.  While  stamped 
with  his  characteristic  fairness,  it  constitutes  such  a  sweep- 
ing indictment  of  Germany,  is  so  eloquent  and  full  of  fire, 
so  exact,  comprehensive  and  satisfactory  that  it  should  live 
as  a  masterpiece  in  the  literature  of  the  war. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Papers  are  replete  with 
new  evidence  of  our  honored  ex-President's  grasp  of  the 
guiding  legal  principles  of  our  government,  gathered  on  the 
bench  and  in  executive  office,  and  of  the  attitude  of  mind 
which  the  best  thought  and  feeling  of  the  country  heartily 
accepts  as  true  Americanism. 

THEODORE  MARBURG. 

Baltimore,  November  n,  1919. 


TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE 
OF  NATIONS 

LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE 

The  League  to  Enforce  Peace  was  organized  in  Independ- 
ence Hall,  Philadelphia,  June  17,  1915.  Its  objects  are  set 
forth  in  the  following: 

PROPOSALS 

We  believe  it  to  be  desirable  for  the  United  States  to  join 
a  league  of  nations  binding  the  signatories  to  the  following: 

First:  All  justiciable  questions  arising  between  the 
signatory  powers,  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall,  subject 
to  the  limitations  of  treaties,  be  submitted  to  a  judicial  tri- 
bunal for  hearing  and  judgment,  both  upon  the  merits  and 
upon  any  issue  as  to  its  jurisdiction  of  the  question. 

Second:  All  other  questions  arising  between  the  signa- 
tories and  not  settled  by  negotiation  shall  be  submitted  to  a 
council  of  conciliation  for  hearing,  consideration  and  recom- 
mendation. 

Third:  The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  use  forth- 
with both  their  economic  and  military  forces  against  any 
one  of  their  number  that  goes  to  war,  or  commits  acts  of 
hostility,  against  another  of  the  signatories  before  any  ques- 
tion arising  shall  be  submitted  as  provided  in  the  forego- 
ing.1 

1  The  following  interpretation  of  Article  3  has  been  authorized 
by  the  Executive  Committee : 

"  The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  employ  diplomatic  and  economic 

i 


2  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 

Fourth:  Conferences  between  the  signatory  powers  shall 
be  held  from  time  to  time  to  formulate  and  codify  rules  of 
international  law,  which,  unless  some  signatory  shall  signify 
its  dissent  within  a  stated  period,  shall  thereafter  govern 
in  the  decisions  of  the  Judicial  Tribunal  mentioned  in  Article 
One. 


VICTORY  PROGRAM 

Adopted  at  a  meeting  of  the  Executive  Committee,  held  in 
New  York,  November  23,  1918,  as  the  official  platform 
of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  superseding  the  proposals 
adopted  at  the  organisation  of  the  League  in  Philadelphia, 
June  17, 1915. 

The  war  now  happily  brought  to  a  close  has  been  above 
all  a  war  to  end  war,  but  in  order  to  ensure  the  fruits  of 
victory  and  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  a  catastrophe 
there  should  be  formed  a  League  of  Free  Nations,  as  uni- 
versal as  possible,  based  upon  treaty  and  pledged  that  the 
security  of  each  state  shall  rest  upon  the  strength  of  the 
whole.  The  initiating  nucleus  of  the  membership  of  the 
League  should  be  the  nations  associated  as  belligerents  in 
winning  the  war. 

The  League  should  aim  at  promoting  the  liberty,  progress, 

pressure  against  any  one  of  their  number  that  threatens  war  against 
a  fellow  signatory  without  having  first  submitted  its  dispute  for  inter- 
national inquiry,  conciliation,  arbitration  or  judicial  hearing,  and 
awaited  a  conclusion,  or  without  having  in  good  faith  offered  so  to 
submit  it.  They  shall  follow  this  forthwith  by  the  joint  use  of  their 
military  forces  against  that  nation  if  it  actually  goes  to  war,  or  com- 
mits acts  of  hostility,  against  another  of  the  signatories  before  any 
question  arising  shall  be  dealt  with  as  provided  in  the  foregoing." 


VICTORY    PROGRAM  3 

and  fair  economic  opportunity  of  all  nations,  and  the  orderly 
development  of  the  world. 

It  should  ensure  peace  by  eliminating  causes  of  dissen- 
sion, by  deciding  controversies  by  peaceable  means,  and  by 
uniting  the  potential  force  of  all  the  members  as  a  standing 
menace  against  any  nation  that  seeks  to  upset  the  peace  of 
the  world. 

The  advantages  of  membership  in  the  League,  both 
economically  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  security,  should 
be  so  clear  that  all  nations  will  desire  to  be  members  of  it. 

For  this  purpose  it  is  necessary  to  create  — 

1.  For  the  decision  of  justiciable  questions,  an  impartial 
tribunal  whose  jurisdiction  shall  not  depend  upon  the  as- 
sent of  the  parties  to  the  controversy;  provision  to  be  made 
for  enforcing  its  decisions. 

2.  For  questions  that  are  not  justiciable  in  their  character, 
a  Council  of  Conciliation,  as  mediator,  which  shall  hear, 
consider,  and  make  recommendations ;  and  failing  acquies- 
cence by  the  parties  concerned,  the  League  shall  determine 
what  action,  if  any,  shall  be  taken. 

3.  An  administrate  organisation  for  the  conduct  of  af- 
fairs of  common  interest,  the  protection  and  care  of  back- 
ward regions  and  internationalized  places,  and  such  matters 
as  have  been  jointly  administered  before  and  during  the 
war.     We  hold  that  this  object  must  be  attained  by  methods 
and  through  machinery  that  will  ensure  both  stability  and 
progress ;  preventing,  on  the  one  hand,  any  crystallization  of 
the  status  quo  that  will  defeat  the  forces  of  healthy  growth 
and  changes,  and  providing,  on  the  other  hand,  a  way  by 
which  progress  can  be  secured  and  necessary  change  effected 
without  recourse  to  war. 

4.  A   representative  Congress  to   formulate  and  codify 


4  TAFT   PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

rules  of  international  law,  to  inspect  the  work  of  the  ad- 
ministrative bodies  and  to  consider  any  matter  affecting  the 
tranquility  of  the  world  or  the  progress  or  betterment  of 
human  relations.  Its  deliberations  should  be  public. 

5.  An  Executive  Body,  able  to  speak  with  authority  in  the 
name  of  the  nations  represented,  and  to  act  in  case  the  peace 
of  the  world  is  endangered. 

The  representation  of  the  different  nations  in  the  organs 
of  the  League  should  be  in  proportion  to  the  responsibilities 
and  obligations  they  assume.  The  rules  of  international 
law  should  not  be  defeated  for  lack  of  unanimity. 


[Similar  provisions  of  the  two  drafts  paralleled  for  comparison] 

Text  of  the  Plan  Adopted  by     Text  of  the  Plan  Presented 
the  Paris  Peace  Confer-  at  the  Paris  Peace  Con- 

ence  April  28,  ipip  ference  Feb.  14, 


PREAMBLE  PREAMBLE 

In    order    to    promote    inter-  In  order  to  promote  interna- 

national     cooperation     and     to  tional  cooperation  and  to  secure 

achieve  international  peace  and  international  peace  and  security 

security,   by  the  acceptance  of  by  the  acceptance  of  obligations 

obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the  pre- 

by  the  prescription  of  open,  just  scription    of     open,     just     and 

and  honorable  relations)  between  honorable  relations  between  na- 

nations,   by   the   firm   establish-  tions,  by  the  firm  establishment 

ment  of  the  understandings  of  of  the  understandings  of  inter- 

international  law  as  the  actual  national  law  as  the  actual  rule 

rule  of  conduct  among  Govern-  of  conduct  among  governments, 

ments,  and  by  the  maintenance  and  by  the  maintenance  of  jus- 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 


of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  re- 
spect for  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  organized 
peoples  with  one  another,  the 
high  contracting  parties  agree  to 
this  covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

ARTICLE  I 

The  original  members  of  the 
League  of  Nations  shall  be  those 
of  the  signatories  which  are 
named  in  the  annex  to  this 
covenant  and  also  such  of  those 
other  states  named  in  the  annex 
as  shall  accede  without  reserva- 
tion to  this  covenant.  Such  ac- 
cessions shall  be  effected  by  a 
declaration  deposited  with  the 
Secretariat  within  two  months 
of  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
covenant.  Notice  thereof  shall 
be  sent  to  all  other  members  of 
the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  state, 
dominion  or  colony  not  named 
in  the  annex  may  become  a 
member  of  the  League  if  its  ad- 
mission is  agreed  to  by  two- 
thirds  of  the  Assembly,  provided 
that  it  shall  give  effective  guar- 
antees of  its  sincere  intention 
to  observe  its  international  obli- 
gations and  shall  accept  such 
regulations  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  League  in  regard  to  its 
military,  naval  and  air  forces 
and  armaments. 

Any  member  of  the  League 
may,  after  two  years'  notice  of 


tice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for 
all  treaty  obligations  in  the  deal- 
ings of  organized  people  with 
one  another,  the  powers  signa- 
tory to  this  covenant  adopt  this 
constitution  of  the  League  of 
Nations : 

ARTICLE  VII 

Admission  to  the  League  of 
States,  not  signatories  to  the 
covenant  and  not  named  in  the 
protocol  hereto  as  States  to  be 
invited  to  adhere  to  the  cove- 
nant, requires  the  assent  of 
not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the 
States  represented  in  the  body 
of  delegates,  and  shall  be 
limited  to  fully  self-governing 
countries,  including  dominions 
and  colonies. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to 
the  League  unless  it  is  able  to 
give  effective  guarantees  of  its 
sincere  intention  to  observe  its 
international  obligations  and  un- 
less it  shall  conform  to  such 
principles  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  League  in  regard  to  its 
naval  and  military  forces  and 
armaments. 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 


its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw 
from  the  League,  provided  that 
all  its  international  obligations 
and  all  its  obligations  under  this 
covenant  shall  have  been  ful- 
filled at  the  time  of  its  with- 
drawal. 

ARTICLE  II 

The  action  of  the  League  un- 
der this  covenant  shall  be 
effected  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  an  Assembly  and  of  a 
Council,  with  a  permanent  Sec- 
retariat. 


ARTICLE  III 

The  Assembly  shall  consist  of 
representatives  of  the  members 
of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at 
stated  intervals,  and  from  time 
to  time  as  occasion  may  require, 
at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at 
such  other  place  as  may  be  de- 
cided upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its 
meetings  with  any  matter  within 
the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
League  or  affecting  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly 
each  member  of  the  League 
shall  have  one  vote,  and  may 


ARTICLE  I 

The  action  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  under  the  terms 
of  this  covenant  shall  be  effected 
through  the  instrumentality  of 
meetings  of  a  body  of  delegates 
representing  the  high  contract- 
ing parties,  of  meetings  at  more 
frequent  intervals  of  an  Execu- 
tive Council,  and  of  a  perma- 
nent international  secretariat  to 
be  established  at  the  seat  of  the 
League. 

ARTICLE  II 

Meetings  of  the  body  of  dele- 
gates shall  be  held  at  stated  in- 
tervals and  from  time  to  time, 
as  occasion  may  require,  for  the 
purpose  of  dealing  with  matters 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  League.  Meetings  of  the 
body  of  delegates  shall  be  held 
at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at 
such  other  places  as  may  be 
found  convenient,  and  shall  con- 
sist of  representatives  of  the 
high  contracting  parties.  Each 
of  the  high  contracting  parties 
shall  have  one  vote,  but  may 
have  not  more  than  three  repre- 
sentatives. 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 


have  not  more  than  three  repre- 
sentatives. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  Council  shall  consist  of 
representatives  of  the  principal 
allied  and  associated  powers,  to- 
gether with  representatives  of 
four  other  members  of  the 
League.  These  four  members 
of  the  League  shall  be  selected 
by  the  Assembly  from  time  to 
time  in  its  discretion.  Until  the 
appointment  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  four  members  of  the 
League  first  selected  by  the  As- 
sembly, representatives  of  Bel- 
gium, Brazil,  Spain  and  Greece 
shall  be  members  of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Assembly,  the 
Council  may  name  additional 
members  of  the  League,  whose 
representatives  shall  always  be 
members  of  the  Council;  the 
Council  with  like  approval  may 
increase  the  number  of  members 
of  the  League  to  be  selected  by 
the  Assembly  for  representation 
on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from 
time  to  time  as  occasion. may  re- 
quire, and  at  least  once  a  year, 
at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at 
such  other  place  as  may  be  de- 
cided upon. 


ARTICLE  III 

The  Executive  Council  shall 
consist  of  representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, the  British  Empire,  France, 
Italy,  and  Japan,  together  with 
representatives  of  four  other 
States,  members  of  the  League. 
The  selection  of  these  four 
States  shall  be  made  by  the 
body  of  delegates  on  such  prin- 
ciples and  in  such  manner  as 
they  think  fit.  Pending  the  ap- 
pointment of  these  representa- 
tives of  the  other  States,  repre- 
sentatives of shall  be  mem- 
bers of  the  Executive  Council. 

Meetings  of  the  council  shall 
be  held  from  time  to  time  as 
occasion  may  require,  and  at 
least  once  a  year,  at  whatever 
place  may  be  decided  on,  or,  fail- 
ing any  such  decision,  at  the  seat 
of  the  League,  and  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world  may  be  dealt 
with  at  such  meetings. 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to 
any  power  to  attend  a  meeting 
of  the  council,  at  which  matters 
directly  affecting  its  interests 
are  to  be  discussed,  and  no  de- 
cision taken  at  any  meeting  will 
be  binding  on  such  a  power  un- 
less so  invited. 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 


IV 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its 
meetings  with  any  matter  with- 
in the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
League  or  affecting  the  peace  of 
the  world. 

Any  member  of  the  League 
not  represented  on  the  Council 
shall  be  invited  to  send  a  repre- 
sentative to  sit  as  a  member  at 
any  meeting  of  the  Council  dur- 
ing the  consideration  of  matters 
specially  affecting  the  interests 
of  that  member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council, 
each  member  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  shall 
have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not 
more  than  one  representative. 

ARTICLE  V 

Except  where  otherwise  ex- 
pressly provided  in  this  cove- 
nant, or  by  the  terms  of  the 
present  treaty,  decisions  at  any 
meeting  of  the  Assembly  or  of 
the  Council  shall  require  the 
agreement  of  all  the  membersi  of 
the  League  represented  at  the 
meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at 
meetings  of  the  Assembly  or  the 
Council,  including  the  appoint- 
ment of  committees  to  investi- 
gate particular  matters,  shall  be 
regulated  by  the  Assembly  or  by 
the  Council  and  may  be  decided 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A   LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS       9 


by  a  majority  of  the  members  of 
the  League  represented  at  the 
meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  As- 
sembly and  the  first  meeting  of 
the  Council  shall  be  summoned 
by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America. 

ARTICLE  VI 

The  permanent  Secretariat 
shall  be  established  at  the  seat  of 
the  League.  The  Secretariat 
shall  comprise  a  Secretary  Gen- 
eral and  such  secretaries  and 
staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  Secretary  General 
shall  be  the  person  named  in  the 
annex;  thereafter  the  Secretary 
General  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  Council  with  the  approval 
of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly. 

The  secretaries  and  the  staff 
of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral with  the  approval  of  the 
Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall 
act  in  that  capacity  at  all  meet- 
ings of  the  Assembly  and  of  the 
Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secre- 
tariat shall  be  borne  by  the 
members  of  the  League  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  expenses  of  the  In- 
ternational Bureau  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union. 


ARTICLE  V 

The  permanent  secretariat  of 
the  League  shall  be  established 

at  ,  which  shall  constitute 

the  seat  of  the  League.  The 
secretariat  shall  comprise  such 
secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be 
required,  under  the  general  di- 
rection and  control  of  a  Secre- 
tary General  of  the  League,  who 
shall  be  chosen  by  the  Execu- 
tive Council.  The  secretariat 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secre- 
tary General  subject  to  con- 
firmation by  the  Executive 
Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall 
act  in  that  capacity  at  all  meet- 
ings of  the  body  of  delegates  or 
of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  secre- 
tariat shall  be  borne  by  the 
States  members  of  the  League, 
in  accordance  with  the  appor- 
tionment of  the  expenses  of  the 
International  Bureau  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union. 


10 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


ARTICLE  VII 

The  seat  of  the  League  is 
established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time 
decide  that  the  seat  of  the 
League  shall  be  established  else- 
where. 

All  positions  under  or  in  con- 
nection with  the  League,  includ- 
ing the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open 
equally  to  men  and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  and  officials 
of  the  League  when  engaged  on 
the  business  of  the  League  shall 
enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and 
immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  prop- 
erty occupied  by  the  League  or 
its  officers  or  by  representatives 
attending  its  meetings  shall  be 
inviolable. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  members  of  the  League 
recognize  that  the  maintenance 
of  a  peace  requires  the  reduc- 
tion of  national  armaments  to 
the  lowest  point  consistent  with 
national  safety  and  the  enforce- 
ment by  common  action  of  in- 
ternational obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account 
of  the  geographical  situation 
and  circumstances  of  each  state, 
shall  formulate  plans  for  such 
reduction  for  the  consideration 
and  action  of  the  several 
Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to 


ARTICLE  VI 

Representatives  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  and  officials 
of  the  League,  when  engaged  in 
the  business,  of  the  League,  shall 
enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and 
immunities,  and  the  buildings  oc- 
cupied by  the  League  or  its 
officials,  or  by  representatives 
attending  its  meetings,  shall  en- 
joy the  benefits  of  extra-terri- 
toriality. 


ARTICLE  VIII 

The  high  contracting  parties 
recognize  the  principle  that  the 
maintenance  of  peace  will  re- 
quire the  reduction  of  national 
armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  national  safety, 
and  the  enforcement  by  com- 
mon action  of  international  obli- 
gations, having  special  regard  to 
the  geographical  situation  and 
circumstances  of  each  State,  and 
the  Executive  Council  shall 
formulate  plans  for  effecting 
such  reduction.  The  Executive 
Council  shall  also  determine  for 
the  consideration  and  action  of 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        II 


reconsideration  and  revision  at 
least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have 
been  adopted  by  the  several 
Governments,  the  limits  of  arm- 
aments therein  fixed  shall  not  be 
exceeded  without  the  concur- 
rence of  the  Council. 

The  members  of  the  League 
agree  that  the  manufacture  by 
private  enterprise  of  muni- 
tions and  implements  of  war  is 
open  to  grave  objections.  The 
Council  shall  advise  how  the 
evil  effects  attendant  upon  such 
manufacture  can  be  prevented, 
due  regard  being  had  to  the 
necessities  of  those  members  of 
the  League  which  are  not  able 
to  manufacture  the  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  neces- 
sary for  their  safety. 

The  members  of  the  League 
undertake  to  interchange  full 
and  frank  information  as  to  the 
scale  of  their  armaments,  their 
military,  naval  and  air  programs 
and  the  condition  of  such  of 
their  industries  as  are  adaptable 
to  warlike  purposes. 


ARTICLE  IX 

A  permanent  commission  shall 
be    constituted    to    advise    the 


the  several  Governments  what 
military  equipment  and  arma- 
ment is  fair  and  reasonable  in 
proportion  to  the  scale  of  forces 
laid  down  in  the  program  of  dis- 
armament and  these  limits,  when 
adopted,  shall  not  be  exceeded 
without  the  permission  of  the 
Executive  Council. 

The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  the  manufacture  by 
private  enterprise  of  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  lends 
itself  to  grave  objections,  and 
direct  the  Executive  Council  to 
advise  how  the  evil  effects  at- 
tendant upon  such  manufacture 
can  be  prevented,  due  regard 
being  had  to  the  necessities  of 
those  countries  which  are  not 
able  to  manufacture  for  them- 
selves the  munitions  and  imple- 
ments of  war  necessary  for  their 
safety. 

The  high  contracting  parties 
undertake  in  no  way  to  conceal 
from  each  other  the  condition  of 
such  of  their  industries  as  are 
capable  of  being  adapted  to  war- 
like purposes  or  the  scale  of 
their  armaments,  and  agree  that 
there  shall  be  full  and  frank 
interchange  of  information  as 
to  their  military  and  naval 
programs^ 

ARTICLE  IX 

A  permanent  commission  shall 
be  constituted  to  advise  the 


12 


TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


Council  on  the  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  Articles  I  and 
VIII  and  on  military,  naval  and 
air  questions  generally. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  members  of  the  League 
undertake  to  respect  and  pre- 
serve as  against  external  ag- 
gression the  territorial  integrity 
and  existing  political  independ- 
ence of  all  members  of  the 
League.  In  case  of  any  such 
aggression  or  in  case  of  any 
threat  or  danger  of  such  aggres- 
sion, the  Council  shall  advise 
upon  the  means  by  which  this 
obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

ARTICLE  XI 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war, 
whether  immediately  ^affecting 
any  of  the  members  of  the 
League  or  not,  is  hereby  de- 
clared a  matter  of  concern  to 
the  whole  League,  and  the 
League  shall  take  any  action 
that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace 
of  nations.  In  case  any  such 
emergency  should  arise,  the  Sec- 
retary General  shall,  on  the  re- 
quest of  any  member  of  the 
League,  forthwith  summon  a 
meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the 
fundamental  right  of  each  mem- 
ber of  the  League  to  bring  to 
the  attention  of  the  Assembly  or 
of  the  Council  anv  circum- 


League  on  the  execution  of  the 
provisions!  of  Article  VIII  and 
on  military  and  naval  questions 
generally. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  high  contracting  parties 
shall  undertake  to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external 
aggression  the  territorial  integ- 
rity and  existing  political  inde- 
pendence of  all  States!  members 
of  the  League.  In  case  of  any 
such  aggression  or  in  case  of 
any  threat  or  danger  of  such  ag- 
gression the  Executive  Council 
shall  advise  upon  the  means  by 
which  the  obligation  shall  be 
fulfilled. 

ARTICLE  XI 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war, 
whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  or  not,  is  hereby  declared 
a  matter  of  concern  to  the 
League,  and  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  reserve  the  right  to 
take  any  action  that  may  be 
deemed  wise  and  effectual  to 
safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and 
agreed  to  be  the  friendly  right 
of  each  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  to  draw  the  attention  of 
the  body  of  delegates  or  of  the 
Executive  Council  to  any  cir- 
cumstance affecting  interna- 
tional intercourse  which  threat- 
ens to  disturb  international 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS        13 


stance  whatever  affecting  inter- 
national relations  which  threat- 
ens to  disturb  either  the  peace 
or  the  good  understanding  be- 
tween nations  upon  which  peace 
depends. 

ARTICLE  XII 

The  members  of  the  League 
agree  that  if  there  should  arise 
between  them  any  dispute  likely 
to  lead  to  a  rupture,  they  will 
submit  the  matter  either  to  arbi- 
tration or  to  inquiry  by  the 
Council,  and  they  agree  in  no 
case  to  resort  to  war  until  three 
months  after  the  award  by  the 
arbitrators  or  the  report  by  the 
Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article 
the  award  of  the  arbitrators 
shall  be  made  within  a  reason- 
able time,  and  the  report  of  the 
Council  shall  be  made  within 
six  months  after  the  submission 
of  the  dispute. 


ARTICLE  XIII 

The  members  of  the  League 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute 
shall  arise  between  them  which 


peace  or  the  good  understand- 
ing between  nations  upon  which 
peace  depends. 


ARTICLE  XII 

The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  should  disputes  arise 
between  them  which  cannot  be 
adjusted  by  the  ordinary  pro- 
cesses of  diplomacy  they  will  in 
no  case  resort  to  war  with- 
out previously  submitting  the 
questions  and  matters  involved 
either  to  arbitration  or  to  in- 
quiry by  the  Executive  Council 
and  until  three  months  after  the 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a 
recommendation  by  the  Execu- 
tive Council,  and  that  they  will 
not  even  then  resort  to  war  as 
against  a  member  of  the  League 
which  complies  with  the  award 
of  the  arbitrators  or  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Executive 
Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article 
the  award  of  the  arbitrators 
shall  be  made  within  a  reason- 
able time,  and  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Executive  Council 
shall  be  made  within  six  months 
after  the  submission  of  the  dis- 
pute. 

ARTICLE  XIII 

The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute 
or  difficulty  shall  arise  between 


TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for 
submission  to  arbitration  and 
which  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will 
submit  the  whole  subject  matter 
to  arbitration.  Disputes  as  to 
the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as 
to  any  question  of  international 
law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
fact  which  if  established  would 
constitute  a  breach  of  any  inter- 
national obligation,  or  as  to  the 
extent  and  nature  of  the  repara- 
tion to  be  made  for  any  such 
breach,  are  declared  to  be 
among  those  which  are  generally 
suitable  for  submission  to  arbi- 
tration. For  the  consideration 
of  any  such  dispute  the  court 
of  arbitration  to  which  the  case 
is  referred  shall  be  'the  court 
agreed  on  by  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  con- 
vention existing  between  them. 
The  members  of  the  League 
agree  that  they  will  carry  out 
in  full  good  faith  any  award 
that  may  be  rendered  and  that 
they  will  not  resort  to  war 
against  a  member  of  the  League 
which  complies  therewith.  In 
the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry 
out  such  an  award,  the  Council 
shall  propose  what  steps  should 
be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

ARTICLE  XIV 

The  Council   shall   formulate 
and  submit  to  the  members  of 


them,  which  they  recognize  to  be 
suitable  for  submission  to  arbi- 
tration and  which  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplo- 
macy, they  will  submit  the  whole 
matter  to  arbitration.  For  this 
purpose  the  court  of  arbitration 
to  which  the  case  is  referred 
shall  be  the  court  agreed  on  by 
the  parties  or  stipulated  in  any 
convention  existing  between 
them.  The  high  contracting 
parties  agree  that  they  will  carry 
out  in  full  good  faith  any  award 
that  may  be  rendered.  In  the 
event  of  any  failure  to  carry 
out  the  award  the  Executive 
Council  shall  propose  what  steps 
can  best  be  taken  to  give  effect 
thereto. 


ARTICLE  XIV 

The  Executive  Council  shall 
formulate  plans  for  the  estab- 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS       1 5 


the  League  for  adoption  plans 
for  the  establishment  of  a  perm- 
anent Court  of  International 
Justice.  The  court  shall  be 
competent  to  hear  and  determine 
any  dispute  of  an  international 
character  which  the  parties 
thereto  submit  to  it.  The  court 
may  also  give  an  advisory 
opinion  upon  any  dispute  or 
question  referred  to  it  by  the 
Council  or  by  the  Assembly. 

ARTICLE  XV 

If  there  should  arise  between 
members  of  the  League  any  dis- 
pute likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture, 
which  is  not  submitted  to  arbi- 
tration in  accordance  with 
Article  XIII,  the  members  of 
the  League  agree  that  they  will 
submit  the  matter  to  the 
Council.  Any  party  to  the  dis- 
pute may  effect  such  submission 
by  giving  notice  of  the  existence 
of  the  dispute  to  the  Secretary 
General,  who  will  make  all 
necessary  arrangements  for  a 
full  investigation  and  considera- 
tion thereof.  For  this  purpose 
the  parties  to  the  dispute  will 
communicate  to  the  Secretary 
General,  as  promptly  as  possible, 
statements  of  their  case,  all  the 
relevant  facts  and  papers ;  and 
the  Council  may  forthwith  direct 
the  publication  thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavor  to 
effect  a  settlement  of  any  dis- 


lishment  of  a  permanent  court 
of  international  justice,  and  this 
court  shall,  when  established,  be 
competent  to  hear  and  determine 
any  matter  which  the  parties 
recognize  as  suitable  for  sub- 
mission to  it  for  arbitration 
under  the  foregoing  article. 


ARTICLE  XV 

If  there  should  arise  between 
States,  members  of  the  League, 
any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a 
rupture,  which  is  not  submitted 
to  arbitration  as  above,  the  high 
contracting  parties  agree  that 
they  will  refer  the  matter  to  the 
Executive  Council;  either  party 
to  the  dispute  may  give  notice  of 
the  existence  of  the  dispute  to 
the  Secretary  General,  who  will 
make  all  necessary  arrangements 
for  a  full  investigation  and 
consideration  thereof.  For  this 
purpose  the  parties  agree  to 
communicate  to  the  Secretary 
General,  as  promptly  as  possible, 
statements  of  their  case,  with  all 
the  relevant  facts  and  papers, 
and  the  Executive  Council  may 
forthwith  direct  the  publication 
thereof. 

Where  the  efforts  of  the 
council  lead  to  the  settlement  of 
the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be 


i6 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 


pute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  suc- 
cessful, a  statement  shall  be 
made  public  giving  such  facts 
and  explanations  regarding  the 
dispute  and  terms  of  settlement 
thereof  as  the  Council  may  deem 
appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus 
settled,  the  Council  either  unani- 
mously or  by  a  majority  vote 
shall  make  and  publish  a  report 
containing  a  statement  of  the 
facts  of  the  dispute  and  the 
recommendations  which  are 
deemed  just  and  proper  in  re- 
gard thereto. 

Any  member  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  may 
make  public  a  statement  of  the 
facts  of  the  dispute  and  of  its 
conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is 
unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
members  thereof,  other  than  the 
representatives  of  one  or  more 
of  the  parties  to  the  dispute, 
the  members  of  the  League 
agree  that  they  will  not  go  to 
war  with  any  party  to  the  dis- 
pute which  complies  with  the 
recommendations  of  the  report. 

If  the  Council  fails  to  reach 
a  report  which  is  unanimously 
agreed  to  by  the  members 
thereof,  other  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  one  or  more  of  the 
parties  to  the  dispute,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  reserve  to 
themselves  the  right  to  take 


published,  indicating  the  nature 
of  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of 
settlement,  together  with  such 
explanations  as  may  be  appro- 
priate. If  the  dispute  has  not 
been  settled,  a  report  by  the 
council  shall  be  published,  set- 
ting forth  with  all  necessary 
facts  and  explanations  the 
recommendation  which  the 
council  think  just  and  proper  for 
the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  If 
the  report  is  unanimously  agreed 
to  by  the  members  of  the 
council,  other  than  the  parties 
to  the  dispute,  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  agree  that  they  will 
not  go  to  war  with  any  party 
which  complies  with  the  recom- 
mendations, and  that,  if  any 
party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply, 
the  council  shall  propose  meas- 
ures necessary  to  give  effect  to 
the  recommendations.  If  no 
such  unanimous  report  can  be 
made  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
majority  and  the  privilege  of  the 
minority  to  issue  statements,  in- 
dicating what  they  believe  to  be 
the  facts,  and  containing  the 
recommendations  which  they 
consider  to  be  just  and  proper. 
The  Executive  Council  may 
in  any  case  under  this  article 
refer  the  dispute  to  the  body  of 
delegates.  The  dispute  shall  be 
so  referred  at  the  request  of 
either  party  to  the  dispute,  pro- 
vided that  such  request  must  be 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


such  action  as  they  shall  con- 
sider necessary  for  the  main- 
tenance of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the 
parties  is  claimed  by  one  of 
them,  and  is  found  by  the 
Council,  to  arise  out  of  a  matter 
which  by  international  law  is 
solely  within  the  domestic  juris- 
diction of  that  party,  the 
Council  shall  so  report,  and  shall 
make  no  recommendation  as  to 
its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  in  any  case 
under  this  article  refer  the  dis- 
pute to  the  Assembly.  The  dis- 
pute shall  be  so  referred  at  the 
request  of  either  party  of  the 
dispute,  provided  that  such  re- 
quest be  made  within  fourteen 
days  after  the  submission  of  the 
dispute  to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the 
Assembly  all  the  provisions  of 
this  article  and  of  Article  XII 
relating  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  Council  shall 
apply  to  the  action  and  powers 
of  the  Assembly,  provided  that 
a  report  made  by  the  Assembly, 
if  concurred  in  by  the  represen- 
tatives of  those  members  of  the 
League  represented  on  the 
Council  and  of  a  majority  of  the 
other  members  of  the  League, 
exclusive  in  each  case  of  the 
representatives  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute,  shall  have  the  same 
force  as  a  report  by  the  Council, 


made  within  fourteen  days  after 
the  submission  of  the  dispute. 
In  any  case  referred  to  the  body 
of  delegates,  all  the  provisions 
of  this  article,  and  of  Article 
XII,  relating  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  Executive 
Council,  shall  apply  to  the  action 
and  powers  of  the  body  of  dele- 
gates. 


i8 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


concurred  in  by  all  the  members 
thereof  other  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  one  or  more  of  the 
parties  to  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  XVI 

Should  any  member  of  the 
League  resort  to  war  in  disre- 
gard of  its  covenants  under 
Article  XII,  XIII  or  XV,  it 
shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to 
have  committed  an  act  of  war 
against  all  the  other  members 
of  the  League,  which  hereby  un- 
dertake immediately  to  subject  it 
to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or 
financial  relations,  the  prohibi- 
tion of  all  intercourse  between 
their  nationals  and  the  nationals 
of  the  covenant-breaking  State 
and  the  prevention  of  all  finan- 
cial, commercial,  or  personal  in- 
tercourse between  the  nationals 
of  the  covenant-breaking  State 
and  the  nationals  of  any  other 
State,  whether  a  member  of  the 
League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
Council  in  such  case  to  recom- 
mend to  the  several  Govern- 
ments concerned  what  effective 
military,  naval  or  air  force  the 
members  of  the  League  shall 
severally  contribute  to  the  arma- 
ments of  forces  to  be  used  to 
protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League. 

The  members  of  the  League 
agree,  further,  that  they  will 


ARTICLE  XVI 

Should  any  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  break  or  disre- 
gard its  covenants  under  Article 
XII  it  shall  thereby  ipso  facto 
be  deemed  to  have  committed  an 
act  of  war  against  all  the  other 
members  of  the  League,  which 
hereby  undertakes  immediately 
to  subject  it  to  the  severance  of 
all  trade  or  financial  relations, 
the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse 
between  their  nationals  and  the 
nationals  of  the  covenant-break- 
ing State  and  the  prevention  of 
all  financial,  commercial,  or  per- 
sonal intercourse  between  the 
nationals  of  the  covenant-break- 
ing State  and  the  nationals  of 
any  other  State,  whether  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
Executive  Council  in  such  case 
to  recommend  what  effective 
military  or  naval  force  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  shall  sev- 
erally contribute  to  the  armed 
forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the 
covenants  of  the  League. 

The  high  contracting  parties 
agree,  further,  that  they  will 
mutually  support  one  another  in 
the  financial  and  economic  meas- 
ures which  may  be  taken  under 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        19 


mutually  support  one  another  in 
the  financial  and  economic 
measures  which  are  taken  under 
this  article,  in  order  to  minimize 
the  loss  and  inconvenience  re- 
sulting from  the  above  meas- 
ures, and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting 
any  special  measures  aimed  at 
one  of  their  number  by  the  cove- 
nant-breaking State,  and  that 
they  will  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  afford  passage  through 
their  territory  to  the  forces  of 
any  of  the  members  of  the 
League  which  are  cooperating 
to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League. 

Any  member  of  the  League 
which  has  violated  any  covenant 
of  the  League  may  be  declared 
to  be  no  longer  a  member  of  the 
League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council 
concurred  in  by  the  representa- 
tives of  all  the  other  members 
of  the  League  represented 
thereon. 

ARTICLE  XVII 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  be- 
tween a  member  of  the  League 
and  a  State  which  is  not  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League,  or  between 
States  not  members  of  the 
League,  the  State  or  States  not 
members  of  the  League  shall  be 
invited  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  League  for 
the  purposes  of  such  dispute, 
upon  such  conditions  as  the 


this  article  in  order  to  minimize 
the  loss  and  inconvenience  re- 
sulting from  the  above  meas- 
nres,  and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting 
any  special  measures  aimed  at 
one  of  their  number  by  the 
covenant-breaking  State  and 
that  they  will  afford  passage 
through  their  territory  to  the 
forces  of  any  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  who  are 
cooperating  to  protect  the  cove- 
nants of  the  League. 


ARTICLE  XVII 

In  the  event  of  disputes  be- 
tween one  State  member  of  the 
League  and  another  State  which 
is  not  a  member  of  the  League, 
or  between  States  not  members 
of  the  League,  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  agree  that  the 
State  or  States,  not  members  of 
the  League,  shall  be  invited  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  mem- 
bership in  the  League  for  the 


2O 


TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


Council  may  deem  just.  If  such 
invitation  is  accepted,  the  pro- 
visions of  Articles  XII  to  XVI 
inclusive  shall  be  applied  with 
such  modifications  as  may  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the 
Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being 
given,  the  Council  shall  imme- 
diately institute  an  inquiry  into 
the  circumstances  of  the  dispute 
and  recommend  such  action  as 
may  seem  best  and  most  effect- 
ual in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  State  so  invited  shall  re- 
fuse to  accept  the  obligations  of 
membership  in  the  League  for 
the  purposes  of  such  dispute, 
and  shall  resort  to  war  against 
a  member  of  the  League,  the 
provisions  of  Article  XVI  shall 
be  applicable  as  against  the 
State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute, 
when  so  invited,  refuse  to  ac- 
cept the  obligations  of  member- 
ship in  the  League  for  the  pur- 
poses of  such  dispute,  the 
Council  may  take  such  meas- 
ures and  make  such  recom- 
mendations as  will  prevent  hos- 
tilities and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 


purposes  of  such  dispute,  upcr 
such  conditions  as  the  Execu- 
tive Council  may  deem  just,  and 
upon  acceptance  of  any  such  in- 
vitation, the  above  provisions 
shall  be  applied  with  such  modi- 
fications as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being 
given,  the  Executive  Council 
shall  immediately  institute  ar 
inquiry  into  the  circumstances 
and  merits  of  the  dispute  and 
recommend  such  action  as  may 
seem  best  and  most  effectual  in 
the  circumstances. 

In  the  event  of  a  power  so  in- 
vited refusing  to  accept  the  obli- 
gations of  membership  in  the 
League  for  the  purposes  of  such 
dispute,  and  taking  any  action 
against  a  State  member  of  the 
League,  which  in  the  case  of  a 
State  member  of  the  League 
would  constitute  a  breach  of 
Article  XII,  the  provisions  of 
Article  XVI  shall  be  applicable 
as  against  the  State  taking  such 
action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute, 
when  so  invited,  refuse  to  ac- 
cept the  obligations  of  member- 
ship in  the  League  for  the  pur- 
poses of  such  dispute,  the 
Executive  Council  may  take 
such  action  and  make  such 
recommendations  as  will  prevent 
hostilities  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS        21 


ARTICLE  XVIII 
Every  convention  or  interna- 
tional engagement  entered  into 
henceforward  by  any  member  of 
the  League  shall  be  forthwith 
registered  with  the  Secretariat 
and  shall  as  soon  as  possible  be 
published  by  it.  No  such  treaty 
or  international  engagement 
shall  be  binding  until  so  regis- 
tered. 


ARTICLE  XIX 

The  Assembly  may  from  time 
to  time  advise  the  reconsidera- 
tion by  members  of  the  League 
of  treaties  which  have  become 
inapplicable,  and  the  considera- 
tion of  international  conditions 
whose  continuance  might  en- 
danger the  peace  of  the  world. 


ARTICLE  XX 

The  members  of  the  League 
severally  agree  that  this  cove- 
nant is  accepted  as  abrogating 
all  obligations  or  understandings 
inter  se  which  are  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  thereof,  and 
solemnly  undertake  that  they 
will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any 
engagements  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  members  of  the 
League  shall,  before  becoming  a 
member  of  the  League,  have 
undertaken  any  obligations  in- 


ARTICLE  XXIII 
The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  every  treaty  or  inter- 
national engagement  entered 
into  hereafter  by  any  State 
member  of  the  League  shall  be 
forthwith  registered  with  the 
Secretary  General  and  as  soon 
as  possible  published  by  him,  and 
that  no  such  treaty  or  interna- 
tional engagement  shall  be  bind- 
ing until  so  registered. 

ARTICLE  XXIV 
It  shall  be  the  right  of  the 
body  of  delegates  from  time  to 
time  to  advise  the  reconsidera- 
tion by  States  members  of  the 
League  of  treaties  which  have 
become  inapplicable  and  of  in- 
ternational conditions  of  which 
the  continuance  may  endanger 
the  peace  of  "the  world. 

ARTICLE  XXV 

The  high  contracting  parties 
severally  agree  that  the  present 
covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogat- 
ing all  obligations  inter  se  which 
are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
thereof,  and  solemnly  engage 
that  they  will  not  hereafter 
enter  into  any  engagement  in- 
consistent with  the  terms 
thereof.  In  case  any  of  the 
powers  signatory  hereto  or  sub- 
sequently admitted  to  the 
League  shall,  before  becoming  a 
party  to  this  covenant,  have 


22 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 


consistent  with  the  terms  of  this 
covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
such  member  to  take  immediate 
steps  to  procure  its  release  from 
such  obligations. 

ARTICLE  XXI 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall 
be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity 
of  international  engagements 
such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or 
regional  understandings  like  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  securing 
the  maintenance  of  peace. 

ARTICLE  XXII 

To  those  colonies  and  terri- 
tories which  as  a  consequence 
of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to 
be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 
states  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by 
peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by 
themselves  under  the  strenuous 
conditions  of  the  modern  world, 
there  should  be  applied  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  well  being  and  de- 
velopment of  such  peoples  form 
a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and 
that  securities  for  the  perform- 
ance of  this  trust  should  be  em- 
bodied in  this  covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving 
practicable  effect  to  this  prin- 
ciple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such 
peoples  should  be  intrusted  to 
advanced  nations  who,  by 
reasons  of  their  resources,  their 
experience  or  their  geographi- 
cal position,  can  best  undertake 


undertaken  any  obligations 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  such  power,  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  procure 
its  release  from  such  obligations. 


ARTICLE  XIX 

To  those  colonies  and  terri- 
tories which,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  late  war,  have  ceased  to 
be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by 
peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by 
themselves  under  the  strenuous 
conditions  of  the  modern  world, 
there  should  be  applied  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  well-being  and  de- 
velopment of  such  peoples  form 
a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and 
that  securities  for  the  perform- 
ance of  this  trust  should  be  em- 
bodied in  the  constitution  of  the 
League. 

The  best  method  of  giving 
practical  effect  to  this  principle 
is  that  the  tutelage  of  such 
peoples  should  be  intrusted  to 
advanced  nations,  who  by  reason 
of  their  resources,  their  exper- 
ience, or  their  geographical  posi- 


THE   PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        23 


this  responsibility,  and  who  are 
willing  to  accept  it,  and  that 
this  tutelage  should  be  exercised 
by  them  as  mandataries  on  be- 
half of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate 
must  differ  according  to  the 
stage  of  the  development  of  the 
people,  the  geographical  situa- 
tion of  the  territory,  its  eco- 
nomic condition  and  other 
similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly 
belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire 
have  reached  a  stage  of  develop- 
ment where  their  existence  as 
independent  nations  can  be  pro- 
visionally recognized,  subject  to 
the  rendering  of  administrative 
advice  and  assistance  by  a  man- 
datary until  such  time  as  they 
are  able  to  stand  alone.  The 
wishes  of  these  communities 
must  be  a  principal  considera- 
tion in  the  selection  of  the  man- 
datary. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those 
of  Central  Africa,  are  at  such 
a  stage  that  the  mandatary  must 
be  responsible  for  the  admin- 
istration of  the  territory  under 
conditions  which  will  guarantee 
freedom  of  conscience  and  re- 
ligion, subject  only  to  the  main- 
tenance of  public  order  and 
morals,  the  prohibition  of 
abuses,  such  as  the  slave  trade, 
the  arms  traffic  and  the  liquor 
traffic  and  the  prevention  of  the 


tion,  can  best  undertake  this  re- 
sponsibility, and  that  this  tute- 
lage should  be  exercised  by  them 
as  mandatories  on  behalf  of  the 
League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate 
must  differ  according  to  the 
stage  of  the  development  of  the 
people,  the  geographical  sit- 
uation of  the  territory,  its 
economic  conditions  and  other 
similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities,  form- 
erly belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire,  have  reached  a  stage 
of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations 
can  be  provisionally  recognized, 
subject  to  the  rendering  of  ad- 
ministrative advice  and  assist- 
ance by  a  mandatory  power  until 
such  time  as  they  are  able  to 
stand  alone.  The  wishes  of 
these  communities  must  be  a 
principal  consideration  in  the 
selection  of  the  mandatory 
power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those 
of  Central  Africa,  are  at  such 
a  stage  that  the  mandatory  must 
be  responsible  for  the  admini- 
stration of  the  territory,  subject 
to  conditions  which  will  guar- 
antee freedom  of  conscience  or 
religion,  subject  only  to  the 
maintenance  of  public  order  and 
morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses 
such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms 
traffic,  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 


establishment  of  fortifications  or 
military  and  naval  bases  and  of 
military  training  of  the  natives 
for  other  than  police  purposes 
and  the  defense  of  territory,  and 
will  also  secure  equal  opportuni- 
ties for  the  trade  and  commerce 
of  other  members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as 
Southwest  Africa  and  certain  of 
the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which, 
owing  to  the  sparseness  of  their 
population  or  their  small  size  or 
their  remoteness  from  the  cen- 
ters of  civilization  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  mandatary  and 
other  circumstances,  can  be  best 
administered  under  the  laws  of 
the  mandatary  as  integral 
portions  of  its  territory,  subject 
to  the  safeguards  above  men- 
tioned in  the  interests  of  the  in- 
digenous population.  In  every 
case  of  mandate,  the  mandatary 
shall  render  to  the  Council  an 
annual  report  in  reference  to  the 
territory  committed  to  its 
charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  con- 
trol or  administration  to  be  ex- 
ercised by  the  mandatary  shall, 
if  not  previously  agreed  upon  by 
the  members  of  the  League,  be 
explicitly  defined  in  each  case  by 
the  Council. 

A  permanent  commission  shall 
be  constitued  to  receive  and  ex- 
amine the  annual  reports  of  the 


the  prevention  of  the  establish- 
ment of  fortifications  or  military 
and  naval  bases  and  of  military 
training  of  the  natives  for  other 
than  police  purposes  and  the  de- 
fense of  territory,  and  will  also 
secure  equal  opportunities  for 
the  trade  and  commerce  of  other 
members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as 
Southwest  Africa  and  certain  of 
the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which, 
owing  to  the  sparseness  of  the 
population,  or  their  small  size, 
or  their  remoteness  from  the 
centers  of  civilization,  or  their 
geographical  contiguity  to  the 
mandatory  State  and  other  cir- 
cumstances, can  be  best  admin- 
istered under  the  laws  of  the 
mandatory  States  as  integral 
portions  thereof,  subject  to  the 
safeguards  above  mentioned  in 
the  interests  of  the  indigenous 
population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the 
mandatory  State  shall  render  to 
the  League  an  annual  report  in 
reference  to  the  territory  com- 
mitted to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  con- 
trol, or  administration,  to  be  ex- 
ercised by  the  mandatory  State, 
shall,  if  not  previously  agreed 
upon  by  the  high  contracting 
parties  in  each  case,  be  ex- 
plicitly defined  by  the  Executive 
Council  in  a  special  act  or 
charter. 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        25 


mandataries  and  to  advise  the 
Council  on  all  matters  relating 
to  the  observance  of  the  man- 
dates. 


ARTICLE  XXIII 
Subject  to  and  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  interna- 
tional conventions  existing  or 
hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the 
members  of  the  League  (a)  will 
endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain 
fair  and  humane  conditions  of 
labor  for  men,  women  and  chil- 
dren both  in  their  own  countries 
and  in  all  countries  to  which 
their  commercial  and  industrial 
relations  extend,  and  for  that 
purpose  will  establish  and  main- 
tain the  necessary  international 
organizations;  (b)  undertake  to 
secure  just  treatment  of  the 
native  inhabitants  of  territories 
under  their  control;  (c)  will  in- 
trust the  League  with  the  gen- 
eral supervision  over  the  execu- 
tion of  agreements  with  regard 
to  the  traffic  in  women  and  chil- 
dren, and  the  traffic  in  opium 
and  other  dangerous  drugs;  (d) 
will  intrust  the  League  with  the 
general  supervision  of  the  trade 
in  arms  and  ammunition  with 
the  countries  in  which  the  con- 
trol of  this  traffic  is  necessary 


The  high  contracting  parties 
further  agree  to  establish  at  the 
seat  of  the  League  a  mandatory 
commission  to  receive  and  ex- 
amine the  annual  reports  of  the 
mandatory  powers,  and  to  assist 
the  League  in  insuring  the  ob- 
servance of  the  terms  of  all 
mandates. 

ARTICLE  XX 

The  high  contracting  parties 
will  endeavor  to  secure  and 
maintain  fair  and  humane  con- 
ditions of  labor  for  men,  women, 
and  children,  both  in  their  own 
countries  and  in  all  countries  to 
which  their  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial relations  extend ;  and  to 
that  end  agree  to  estalish  as  part 
of  the  organization  of  the 
League  a  permanent  bureau  of 
labor. 


ARTICLE  XVIII 
The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  the  League  shall  be 
intrusted  with  the  general  su- 
pervision of  the  trade  in  arms 
and  ammunition  with  the 
countries  in  which  the  control 
of  this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the 
common  interest. 


ARTICLE  XXI 
The  high  contracting  parties 


26 


TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


in  the  common  interest;  (e)  will 
make  provision  to  secure  and 
maintain  freedom  of  communi- 
cation and  of  transit  and  equit- 
able treatment  for  the  commerce 
of  all  members  of  the  League. 
In  this  connection  the  special 
necessities  of  the  regions  devas- 
tated during  the  war  of  1914- 
1918  shall  be  in  mind;  (f)  will 
endeavor  to  take  steps  in  matters 
of  international  concern  for  the 
prevention  and  control  of  dis- 
ease. 

ARTICLE  XXIV 

There  shall  be  placed  under 
the  direction  of  the  League  all 
international  bureaus  already 
established  by  general  treaties 
if  the  parties  to  such  treaties 
consent.  All  such  international 
bureaus  and  all  commissions  for 
the  regulation  of  matters  of  in- 
ternational interest  hereafter 
constituted  shall  be  placed  under 
the  direction  of  the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international 
interest  which  are  regulated  by 
general  conventions  but  which 
are  not  placed  under  the  control 
of  international  bureaus  or  com- 
missions, the  Secretariat  of  the 
League  shall,  subject  to  the  con- 
sent of  the  Council  and  if  de- 
sired by  the  parties,  collect  and 
distribute  all  relevant  informa- 
tion, and  shall  render  any  other 
assistance  which  may  be  neces- 
sary or  desirable. 


agree  that  provision  shall  be 
made  through  the  instrument- 
ality of  the  League  to  secure 
and  maintain  freedom  of  transit 
and  equitable  treatment  for  the 
commerce  of  all  States  members 
of  the  League,  having  in  mind, 
among  other  things,  special  ar- 
rangements with  regard  to  the 
necessities  of  the  regions  devas- 
tated during  the  war  of  1914- 
1918. 


ARTICLE  XXII 

The  high  contracting  parties 
agree  to  place  under  the  control 
of  the  League  all  international 
bureaus  already  established  by 
general  treaties,  if  the  parties  to 
such  treaties  consent.  Further- 
more, they  agree  that  all  such 
international  bureaus  to  be  con- 
stituted in  future  shall  be  placed 
under  control  of  the  League. 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 


The  Council  may  include  as 
part  of  the  expenses  of  the  Sec- 
retariat the  expenses  of  any 
bureau  or  commission  which  is 
placed  under  the  direction  of 
the  League. 

ARTICLE  XXV 

The  members  of  the  League 
agree  to  encourage  and  promote 
the  establishment  and  coopera- 
tion of  duly  authorized  volun- 
tary national  Red  Cross  organi- 
zations having  as  purposes  im- 
provement of  health,  the  preven- 
tion of  disease  and  the  mitiga- 
tion of  suffering  throughout  the 
world. 

ARTICLE  XXVI 
Amendments  to  this  covenant 
will  take  effect  when  ratified  by 
the  members  of  the  League 
whose  representatives  compose 
the  Council  and  by  a  majority  of 
the  members  of  the  League 
whose  representatives  compose 
the  Assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind 
any  member  of  the  League 
which  signifies  its  dissent  there- 
from, but  in  that  case  it  shall 
cease  to  be  a  member  of  the 
League. 

ANNEX  TO  THE  COVENANT 
One.     Original    members    of 

the  League  of  Nations. 

Signatories  of  the  Treaty  of 

Peace. 


ARTICLE  XXVI 
Amendments  to  this  covenant 
will  take  effect  when  ratified  by 
the  States  whose  representatives 
compose  the  Executive  Council 
and  by  three-fourths  of  the 
States  whose  representatives 
compose  the  body  of  delegates. 


28        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

United  States  of  America, 
Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  British 
Empire,  Canada,  Australia, 
South  Africa,  New  Zealand, 
India,  China,  Cuba,  Ecuador, 
France,  Greece,  Guatemala, 
Haiti,  Hedjaz,  Honduras,  Italy, 
Japan,  Liberia,  Nicaragua, 
Panama,  Peru,  Poland,  Portu- 
gal, Rumania,  Serbia,  Siam, 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Uruguay. 

States  invited  to  accede  to  the 
covenant. 

Argentine  Republic,  Chile, 
Colombia,  Denmark,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Paraguay,  Per- 
sia, Salvador,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Venezuela. 

Two.  First  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  League  of  Nations, 
The  Honorable  Sir  James  Eric 
Drummond,  K.C.M.G.',  C.B. 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 
TO  ENFORCE  PEACE1 

Institutional  advances  in  the  progress  of  the  world  are 
rarely  made  abruptly.  They  are  not  like  Minerva  who 
sprang  full  armed  from  the  brain  of  Jove.  If  they  are  to 
have  the  useful  feature  of  permanence,  they  must  be  a 
growth  so  that  the  communities  whose  welfare  they  affect 
may  come  to  regard  them  as  natural,  and  so  accept  them. 
Our  so-called  Anglo-Saxon  civil  liberty  with  its  guaranties 
of  the  Magna  Carta,  the  Petition  of  Right,  the  Bill  of 

1  Address  before   the  World   Court   Congress,   at   Cleveland,   Ohio, 
May  12,  1915. 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE       29 

Rights,  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  and  the  Independence  of  the 
Judiciary,  constituting  the  unwritten  British  Constitution, 
made  our  American  people  familiar  with  a  body  of  moral 
restraints  upon  executive  and  legislative  action  to  secure  the 
liberty   of   the    individual.     The  written   limitations   upon 
legislative  action  in  colonial  charters  granted  by  the  Crown 
and  their  enforcement  by  the  Privy  Council  of  England, 
probably  suggested  to  the  framers  of  our  Federal  Constitu- 
tion that  the  principles  of  British  Constitutional  liberty  be 
given  written  form  and  be  committed  to  a  supreme  and  inde- 
pendent Court  to  enforce  them,  as  against  the  Executive  and 
Congress,  its  coordinate  branches  in  the  Government.     The 
step,   epochal  as   it   was,    from  judicially  enforcing   such 
limitations  against  a  subordinate  legislature  under  a  written 
charter  of  its  powers,  to  a  judicial  enforcement  of  the  limita- 
tions imposed  by  the  sovereign  people  on  the  legislature  and 
executive  that  they,  the  people,  had  created  in  the  same 
instrument,  was  not  radical  but  seemed  naturally  to  follow. 
The  revolted  colonies  after  the  Revolution,  though  united  by 
a  common  situation  and  a  common  cause  in  their  struggle 
with  Great  Britain,  and  acting  together  through  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  in  a  loose  and  voluntary  alliance,  were 
sovereigns  independent  of  one  another.    The  Articles  of  Con- 
federation which  declared  their  union  to  be  permanent  were 
not  agreed  to  and  ratified  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  binding 
until  some  five  years  after  the  Declaration  of  Independence. 
Meantime,  it  had  become  increasingly  evident  that,  strong  as 
were  their  common  interests,  they  had  divergent  ones,  too, 
which  might  embarrass  their  kindly  relations.     The  leagues 
of  Greece  had  furnished  an  example  of  confederations  of 
small  states   forced  together  by  a  common  oppressor  and 
foe,  which  had  found  it  wise  to  settle  their  own  differences 
by  some  kind  of  an  arbitral  tribunal.     The  office  which  the 


3<3  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Privy  Council  and  the  Crown  had  performed  in  settling 
intercolonial  controversies  suggested  an  analogy  less  remote 
than  those  in  Grecian  history  and  prompted  the  adoption  of 
a  substitute.  So  there  was  inserted  in  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation a  provision  for  a  "  court  to  determine  disputes 
and  differences  between  two  or  more  States  of  the  Con- 
federation concerning  boundary  jurisdiction  or  any  other 
cause  whatever."  The  complainant  state  was  authorized  to 
present  a  petition  to  Congress  stating  the  matter  in  question, 
and  praying  for  a  hearing.  Notice  of  this  was  to  be  given 
by  order  of  Congress  to  the  other  state  in  the  controversy 
and  a  day  was  assigned  for  the  appearance  of  the  two  parties 
by  their  lawful  agents  who  should  agree  upon  judges  to 
constitute  a  court  for  hearing  the  matter  in  question.  If 
they  could  not  agree,  Congress  was  then  to  name  three 
persons  out  of  each  of  the  thirteen  states.  From  this  list 
each  party  was  required  alternately  to  strike  out  one  until 
the  number  was  reduced  to  thirteen,  and  from  these  thirteen 
not  less  than  seven  or  more  than  nine  names,  as  Congress 
should  direct,  were  in  the  presence  of  Congress  to  be  drawn 
by  lot,  and  the  persons  whose  names  were  so  drawn,  or  any 
five  of  them,  constituted  the  court  to  hear  and  finally  de- 
termine the  controversy. 

Proceedings  were  instituted  under  this  provision  before 
the  Constitution  by  New  Jersey  against  Vermont,  by  New 
York  against  Vermont,  by  Massachusetts  against  Vermont, 
by  Pennsylvania  against  Virginia,  by  Pennsylvania  against 
Connecticut,  by  New  Jersey  against  Virginia,  by  Massachu- 
setts against  New  York,  and  by  South  Carolina  against 
Georgia.  Only  one  of  these  cases  came  to  hearing  and  deci- 
sion by  a  court  selected  as  provided.  That  was  the  case  of 
Pennsylvania  against  Connecticut  involving  the  govern- 
mental jurisdiction  over  the  Valley  of  Wyoming  and  Luzerne 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      3! 

County.  The  court  met  and  held  a  session  of  forty-one  days 
at  Trenton,  in  New  Jersey.  Able  counsel  represented  the 
parties,  and  the  court  made  a  unanimous  decision  in  favor  of 
Pennsylvania,  without  giving  reasons.  A  compromise  is 
suspected,  because  Connecticut  promptly  acquiesced  and  soon 
thereafter,  with  the  approval  of  the  Pennsylvania  delega- 
tion, Congress  passed  an  act  accepting  a  cession  by  Connecti- 
cut of  all  the  lands  claimed  by  it  west  of  the  west  line  of 
Pennsylvania,  except  the  Western  Reserve,  now  in  Ohio, 
which  Connecticut  was  thus  given  ownership  of,  and  which 
it  sold  and  settled.  A  number  of  the  other  cases  were  com- 
promised and,  in  some,  no  proceedings  were  taken  after  the 
initial  ones. 

In  the  Constitutional  Convention  the  necessity  for  some 
tribunal  to  preserve  peace  and  harmony  between  the  states 
was  fully  conceded  by  all,  but  the  form  of  the  court  was 
the  subject  of  some  discussion.  One  proposal  was  that  the 
Senate  should  be  a  court  to  decide  between  the  states  all 
questions  disturbing  peace  and  harmony  between  the  states 
while  the  Supreme  Court  was  given  only  jurisdiction  in  con- 
troversies over  boundaries.  Ultimately,  however,  the  judi- 
cial power  of  the  United  States  exercised  through  the  Su- 
preme Court  was  extended  to  "  controversies  between 
States,"  without  exception. 

To  those  who  do  not  closely  look  into  this  jurisdiction 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  it  seems  no  different  from  that  of 
the  ordinary  municipal  court  over  controversies  between  in- 
dividuals. The  states  are  regarded  merely  as  municipal  or 
private  corporations  subject  to  suit  process,  trial  and  judg- 
ment to  be  rendered  on  principles  of  municipal  law  declared 
by  statute  of  State  Legislature  or  Congress,  or  established 
as  the  common  law.  It  is  assumed  that  the  Constitution 
destroyed  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  the  states 


32        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

and  made  the  arrangement  a  mere  domestic  affair.  This 
is  a  misconception.  The  analogy  between  the  function  of 
the  Supreme  Court  in  hearing  and  deciding  controversies 
between  states  and  that  of  an  international  tribunal  sitting 
to  decide  a  cause  between  sovereign  nations  is  very  close. 
When  the  suit  by  one  state  against  another  presents  a  case 
that  is  controlled  by  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
of  course  there  is  nothing  international  about  it.  But  most 
controversies  between  states  are  not  covered  by  the  Federal 
Constitution.  That  instrument  does  not,  for  instance,  fix 
the  boundary  line  between  two  states.  It  does  not  fix  the 
correlative  rights  of  two  states  in  the  water  of  a  non-nav- 
igable stream  that  flows  from  one  of  the  states  into  another. 
It  does  not  regulate  the  use  which  the  state  up  stream  may 
make  of  the  water,  either  by  diverting  it  for  irrigation,  or  by 
using  it  as  a  carrier  of  noxious  sewage.  Nor  has  Congress 
any  power  under  the  Constitution  to  lay  down  principles  by 
Federal  Law  to  govern  such  cases.  The  legislature  of 
neither  state  can  pass  laws  to  regulate  the  right  of  the  other 
states.  In  other  words,  there  is  nothing  but  international 
law  to  govern.  There  is  no  domestic  law  to  settle  this  class 
of  cases  any  more  than  there  would  be  if  a  similar  con- 
troversy were  to  arise  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States. 

For  many  purposes  the  states  are  independent  sovereigns 
and  not  under  Federal  control.  They  have  lost  the 
powers  which  the  people  in  the  Constitution  gave  to  the 
Central  Government;  but  in  the  field  of  powers  left  to 
them,  each  is  supreme  within  its  own  limits,  and  by  the 
exercise  of  that  power  may  trespass  on  the  exercise  of  sim- 
ilar power  by  its  neighbor.  How  is  such  a  conflict  to  be 
settled?  It  may  be  by  diplomacy,  i.  e.,  by  negotiation  and 
compromise  agreement;  but  this,  under  the  Constitution, 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      33 

must  be  with  the  consent  of  Congress.  It  might  be  settled  by 
war;  but  the  Constitution  forbids.  And  the  state  invaded 
by  the  forces  of  another  state  can  appeal  to  the  General 
Government  to  resist  and  suppress  the  invasion,  no  matter 
what  the  merits  of  the  quarrel.  In  other  words,  one  of  the 
attributes  of  sovereignty  and  independence  which  the  people 
in  ordaining  the  Constitution  took  away  from  the  states 
was  the  unlimited  power  to  make  agreements  between  each 
other  as  to  their  respective  rights,  and  the  other  was  that  of 
making  war  on  each  other  when  other  means  of  settlement 
failed. 

What  did  the  people  through  the  constitution  substitute 
for  these  attributes  of  unrestricted  diplomatic  negotiation 
and  compromise  and  the  right  to  go  to  war  over  such  in- 
terstate issues?  The  right  of  the  complaining  state  to  hale 
the  offending  state  before  the  Supreme  Court  and  have  the 
issue  decided  by  a  binding  judgment. 

Now,  can  the  complaining  state  bring  every  issue  between 
it  and  another  state  before  the  Supreme  Court?  No.  The 
only  issues  which  the  Court  can  hear  and  decide  are  questions 
which  in  their  nature  are  capable  of  judicial  solution.  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley  first  called  such  questions  "  justiciable  "  * 
and  Chief  Justice  Fuller  and  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  used  the 
same  terms.  There  are  issues  between  states  of  a  character 
which  would  be  likely  to  lead  to  high  feeling  and  to  war  if 
they  arose  between  independent  sovereignties,  and  which  the 
Supreme  Court  can  not  decide  because  they  are  not  capable 
of  judicial  solution.  In  such  cases  between  states,  of  course 
there  can  be  no  war  because  the  Federal  Government  would 
suppress  it.  Therefore,  if  an  amicable  understanding  can 
not  be  reached,  the  states  are  left  with  an  unsettled  dispute 

*A  conventional  French  word  [Ed.]. 


'34        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

between  them  and  no  way  of  deciding  it.  They  must  put 
up  with  the  existing  state  of  things. 

There  have  been  several  interesting  cases  before  our 
Supreme  Court  illustrating  the  character  of  the  jurisdiction 
I  have  been  describing.  Chicago  built  a  sewage  canal  to 
drain  her  sewage  with  the  aid  of  the  waters  of  Lake  Mich- 
igan into  the  Desplaines  River,  thence  into  the  Illinois  and 
thence  into  the  Mississippi  from  which  St.  Louis  and  other 
Missouri  towns  derived  their  water  supply.  The  State  of 
Missouri  brought  suit  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  to  enjoin  the  State  of  Illinois  and  the  Sanitary  Dis- 
trict of  Chicago  from  continuing  the  flow,  on  the  ground 
that  the  impurities  added  to  the  Mississippi  water  had 
greatly  increased  the  typhoid  fever  in  Missouri.  It  was  held 
that  this  was  a  subject  matter  capable  of  judicial  solution, 
that  Missouri  was  the  guardian  of  her  people's  welfare  and 
had  a  right  to  bring  such  a  suit  and,  if  she  made  a  clear  case, 
to  enjoin  such  use  of  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries. 

Mr.  Justice  Shiras,  in  upholding  the  jurisdiction  (Mis- 
souri v.  Illinois,  180  U.  S.  208,  241),  spoke  of  the  court  as 
follows : 

"  The  cases  cited  show  that  such  jurisdiction  has  been  exercised 
in  cases  involving  boundaries  and  jurisdiction  over  land  and  their 
inhabitants,  and  in  cases  directly  affecting  the  property  rights  and 
interests  of  a  state.  But  such  cases  manifestly  do  not  cover  the 
entire  field  in  which  such  controversies  may  arise,  and  for  which 
the  Constitution  has  provided  a  remedy ;  and  it  would  be  objection- 
able, and  indeed  impossible,  for  the  court  to  anticipate  by  definition 
what  controversies  can  and  what  cannot  be  brought  within  the 
original  jurisdiction  of  this  court. 

"  An  inspection  of  the  bill  discloses  that  the  nature  of  the  injury 
complained  of  is  such  that  an  adequate  remedy  can  only  be  found 
in  this  court  at  the  suit  of  the  State  of  Missouri.  It  is  true  that 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE       35 

no  question  of  boundary  is  involved,  nor  of  direct  property  rights 
belonging  to  the  complainant  state.  But  it  must  surely  be  con- 
ceded that,  if  the  health  and  comfort  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  state 
are  threatened,  the  state  is  the  proper  party  to  represent  and  de- 
fend them.  If  Missouri  were  an  independent  and  sovereign  state, 
all  must  admit  that  she  could  seek  a  remedy  by  negotiation,  and, 
that  failing,  by  force.  Diplomatic  powers  and  the  right  to  make 
war  having  been  surrendered  to  the  general  government,  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  upon  the  latter  would  be  devolved  the  duty  of 
providing  a  remedy  and  that  remedy,  we  think  is  found  in  the  con- 
stitutional provisions  we  are  considering." 

This  hearing  was  on  demurrer.  When  the  case  came  be- 
fore the  court  again  on  the  merits,  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  de- 
livered the  judgment  of  the  court  and,  while  affirming  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  points  out  the  difficulties  the 
court  has  in  exercising  it  and  the  care  it  must  take  in  doing 
so.  He  said  in  the  course  of  his  opinion: 

"  It  may  be  imagined  that  a  nuisance  might  be  created  by  a 
state  upon  a  navigable  river  like  the  Danube  which  would  amount 
to  a  casus  belli  for  a  state  lower  down  unless  removed.  If  such 
a  nuisance  were  created  by  a  state  upon  the  Mississippi,  the 
controversy  would  be  resolved  by  the  more  peaceful  means  of 
a  suit  in  this  court." 

Speaking  of  this  provision  in  the  Constitution  extend- 
ing the  judicial  power  to  controversies  between  states,  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley  in  Hans  v.  Louisiana  ( 134  U.  S.  1-15)  said: 

"  Some  things,  undoubtedly,  were  made  justiciable  which  were 
not  known  as  such  at  the  common  law ;  such,  for  example,  as 
controversies  between  states  as  to  boundary  lines,  and  other  ques- 
tion admitting  of  judicial  solution.  And  yet  the  case  of  Penn 
v.  Lord  Baltimore  (i  Ves.  Sen.  444),  shows  that  some  of  these 
unusual  subjects  for  litigation  were  not  unknown  to  the  courts 
«ven  in  colonial  times;  and  several  cases  of  the  same  general 


36        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

character  arose  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  were 
brought  before  the  tribunal  provided  for  that  purpose  in  those 
articles  (131  U.  S.  App.  i).  The  establishment  of  this  new 
branch  of  jurisdiction  seemed  to  be  necessary  from  the  extin- 
guishment of  diplomatic  relations  between  the  states.  Of  other 
controversies  between  a  state  and  another  state,  or  its  citizens, 
which,  on  the  settled  principles  of  public  law,  are  not  subjects 
of  judicial  cognizance,  this  court  has  often  declined  to  take  juris- 
diction." 

A  very  satisfactory  discussion  of  the  scope  of  the  power 
of  the  Supreme  Court  to  settle  controversies  between  states 
is  contained  in  Mr.  Justice  Brewer's  opinion  in  the  suit 
brought  by  Kansas  against  Colorado  to  restrain  the  latter 
from  absorbing  so  much  of  the  water  of  the  Arkansas  River 
flowing  from  Colorado  into  Kansas  as  to  interfere  seri- 
ously with  the  supply  of  water  from  the  river  for  irrigation 
purposes  in  Kansas.  He  said  (206  U.  S.  95,  99)  : 

"  When  the  States  of  Kansas  and  Colorado  were  admitted  into 
the  Union  they  were  admitted  with  the  full  powers  of  local  sov- 
ereignty which  belonged  to  other  states,  Pollard  v.  Hagan,  supra; 
Shively  v.  Bowlby,  supra;  Hardin  v.  Shedd,  190  U.  S.  508,  519; 
and  Colorado  by  its  legislation  has  recognized  the  right  of  ap- 
propriating the  flowing  waters  to  the  purposes  of  irrigation. 
Now  the  question  arises  between  the  states,  one  recognizing  gen- 
erally the  common  law  rule  of  riparian  rights  and  the  other  pre- 
scribing the  doctrine  of  the  public  ownership  of  flowing  water. 
Neither  state  can  legislate  for  or  impose  its  own  policy  upon 
the  other.  A  stream  flows  through  the  two  and  a  controversy 
is  presented  as  to  the  flow  of  that  stream.  It  does  not  follow, 
however,  that  because  Congress  can  not  determine  the  rule  which 
shall  control  between  the  two  states  or  because  neither  state 
can  enforce  its  own  policy  upon  the  other,  that  the  controversy 
ceases  to  be  one  of  a  justiciable  nature,  or  that  there  is  no  power 
which  can  take  cognizance  of  the  controversy  and  determine  the 
relative  rights  of  the  two  states.  Indeed,  the  disagreement, 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      37 

coupled  with  its  effect  upon  a  stream  passing  through  the  two 
states,  makes  a  matter  for  investigation  and  determination  by  this 
court.  .  .  . 

"  As  Congress  cannot  make  compacts  between  the  states,  as 
it  cannot,  in  respect  to  certain  matters,  by  legislation  compel 
their  separate  action,  disputes  between  them  must  be  settled 
either  by  force  or  else  by  appeal  to  tribunals  empowered  to  de- 
termine the  right  and  wrong  thereof.  Force  under  our  system  of 
Government  is  eliminated.  The  clear  language  of  the  Constitution 
vests  in  this  court  the  power  to  settle  those  disputes.  We  have 
exercised  that  power  in  a  variety  of  instances,  determining  in  the 
several  instances  the  justice  of  the  dispute.  Nor  is  our  juris- 
diction ousted,  even  if,  because  Kansas  and  Colorado  are  states 
sovereign  and  independent  in  local  matters,  the  relations  between 
them  depend  in  any  respect  upon  principles  of  international  law. 
International  law  is  no  alien  in  this  tribunal. 

"  One  cardinal  rule,  underlying  all  the  relations  of  the  states  to 
each  other,  is  that  of  equality  of  right.  Each  state  stands  on  the 
same  level  with  all  the  rest.  It  can  impose  its  own  legislation 
on  no  one  of  the  others,  and  is  bound  to  yield  its  own  views 
to  none.  Yet,  whenever,  as  in  the  case  of  Missouri  v.  Illinois, 
180  U.  S.  208,  the  action  of  one  state  reaches  through  the  agency 
of  natural  laws  into  the  territory  of  another  state,  the  question 
of  the  extent  and  the  limitations  of  the  rights  of  the  two  states 
becomes  a  matter  of  justiciable  dispute  between  them,  and  this 
court  is  called  upon  to  settle  that  dispute  in  such  a  way  as  will 
recognize  the  equal  rights  of  both  and  at  the  same  time  estab- 
lish justice  between  them.  In  other  words,  through  these  succes- 
sive disputes  and  decisions  this  court  is  practically  building  up 
what  may  not  improperly  be  called  interstate  common  law." 

Controversies  between  one  state  and  another  or  its  citizens 
which  are  not  justiciable  or  capable  of  judicial  solution  find 
examples  in  the  suits  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court. 
One  case  of  which  the  Supreme  Court  refused  to  take  juris- 
diction was  Wisconsin  v.  The  Pelican  Insurance  Company 


38       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

(i  U.  S.)>  in  which  the  State  of  Wisconsin  sought  to  enforce 
against  a  Louisiana  Insurance  Company  a  judgment 
rendered  in  a  Wisconsin  court  for  penalties  by  a  Wisconsin 
Statute  upon  Foreign  Insurance  Companies  for  failure  to 
comply  with  statutory  regulations  of  its  business.  It  was 
held  that  neither  under  international  comity  nor  law  was  one 
nation  required  to  enforce  extraterritorially  the  criminal  law 
of  another  nation  and  therefore  that  the  controversy  pre- 
sented was  not  one  of  which,  as  between  the  states  of  the 
Union,  the  Supreme  Court  could  take  cognizance.  Again 
in  Louisiana  v.  Texas,  176  U.  S.  i,  Louisiana  sought  to 
restrain  the  Governor  of  Texas  from  so  enforcing  a  quaran- 
tine law  as  to  injure  the  business  of  the  people  of  Louisiana. 
The  law  itself  on  its  face  was  a  proper  one  for  the  protection 
of  Texas.  In  dismissing  the  suit  the  court  said : 

"  But  in  order  that  a  controversy  between  states,  justiciable 
in  this  court,  can  be  held  to  exist,  something  more  must  be  put  for- 
ward than  that  the  citizens  of  one  state  are  injured  by  the  mal- 
administration of  the  laws  of  another.  The  states  cannot  make 
war,  or  enter  into  treaties,  though  they  may,  with  the  consent  of 
Congress,  make  compacts  and  agreements.  When  there  is  no 
agreement,  whose  breach  might  create  it,  a  controversy  between 
states  does  not  arise  unless  the  action  complained  of  is  state 
action,  and  acts  of  state  officers  in  abuse  or  excess  of  their  powers 
cannot  be  laid  hold  of  as  in  themselves  committing  one  state  to 
distinct  collision  with  a  sister  state. 

"In  our  judgment  this  bill  does  not  set  up  facts  which  show 
that  the  State  of  Texas  has  so  authorized  or  confirmed  the  alleged 
action  of  her  health  officer  as  to  make  it  her  own,  or  from  which 
it  necessarily  follows  that  the  two  states  are  in  controversy  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Constitution." 

Controversies  between  independent  nations  suggest  them- 
selves which  are  not  capable  of  judicial  solution  and  yet  are 
quite  capable  of  leading  to  war. 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      39 

Thus  suppose  C  nation  in  the  exercise  of  its  conceded 
powers  admits  to  its  shores  and  indeed  to  its  citizenship 
the  citizens  or  subjects  of  A  nation  and  excludes  those  of  B 
nation  from  both.  The  discrimination  is  certainly  within 
the  international  right  of  C  nation,  but  it  may  lead  to 
acrimony  and  war.  This  is  not  a  justiciable  question  nor 
one  that  could  be  settled  by  a  court. 

The  so-called  General  Arbitration  Treaties  negotiated  by 
Secretary  Knox  with  France  and  England  used  the  word 
"  justiciable  "  to  describe  the  kind  of  questions  which  the 
parties  bound  themselves  to  submit  to  arbitration.  They 
defined  this  to  include  all  issues  that  could  be  decided  on 
principles  of  law  or  equity.  The  issue  whether  a  question 
arising  was  justiciable  and  arbitrable  was  to  be  left  to  the 
decision  of  a  preliminary  investigating  commission.  The 
term  justiciable  and  indeed  the  whole  scheme  of  these 
treaties  were  suggested  by  the  provision  for  settling  con- 
troversies between  states  in  the  Federal  Constitution  and  the 
construction  of  it  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  controversies 
between  states,  decision  of  which  was  not  determined  by 
rules  furnished  by  the  Constitution  or  by  congressional 
regulation,  were  strictly  analogous  to  questions  arising  be- 
tween independent  nations  and  were  to  be  divided  into 
justiciable  and  non-justiciable  questions  by  the  same  line  of 
distinction. 

The  treaties  were  not  ratified  but  their  approval  by  Eng- 
land and  France  and  by  the  Executive  of  this  country  con- 
stitute a  valuable  and  suggestive  precedent  for  the  framing 
of  the  constitution  and  jurisdiction  of  an  arbitral  court  to 
be  one  of  the  main  features  of  a  League  of  Peace  between 
the  great  nations  of  the  world. 

Is  it  idle  to  treat  such  a  league  as  possible?     Well,  let  us 


4O        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

take  England  and  Canada.  For  a  hundred  years  we  have 
been  at  peace.  For  that  period  of  time  the  frontier  between 
us  and  Canada,  four  thousand  miles  long,  has  been  entirely 
undefended  by  forts  or  navies.  \Ye  have  had  issue  after 
issue  between  the  two  peoples  that,  because  of  their  nature, 
might  have  led  to  war.  But  we  have  settled  them  by  negotia- 
tion or,  when  that  has  failed,  by  arbitration,  until  now  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  the  "  habit  "  of  arbitration  between 
us  is  so  fixed  that  a  treaty  to  secure  such  a  settlement  in 
future  issues  would  not  make  it  more  certain  than  it  is.  I 
concede  that  conditions  have  been  favorable  for  the  creat- 
ing of  such  a  customary  practice.  The  two  peoples  have 
the  same  language  and  literature,  the  same  law  and  civil 
liberty  and  the  same  origin  and  history.  Each  has  had  a 
wide  domain,  in  the  settlement  and  development  of  which 
their  energies  and  ambitions  have  been  absorbed.  The 
jealousies  and  encroachments  of  neighbors  in  the  thickly  pop- 
ulated regions  of  Europe  have  not  been  present  to  stir  up 
strife.  And  yet  we  ought  not  to  minimize  the  beneficent 
significance  of  this  century  of  peace  by  ignoring  the  fact  that 
many  of  the  issues  which  we  have  settled  peaceably  seemed 
at  the  time  to  be  difficult  of  settlement  and  likely  to  lead  to 
war.  The  Alabama  Claims  issue  and  the  Oregon  Boundary 
dispute  were  two  of  this  kind. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  we  now  have  two  permanent 
arbitral  English-American  Commissions  settling  questions. 
One  of  them  is  to  determine  the  equitable  rules  to  govern 
the  use  of  waters  on  our  national  boundary,  in  which  both 
nations  and  their  citizens  have  an  interest,  and  to  apply  them 
to  causes  arising.  The  analogy  between  the  function  which 
the  Supreme  Court  performed  in  the  Kansas  and  Colorado 
case  in  regard  to  the  use  of  the  Arkansas  River  and  that 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      41 

of  this  Commission  in  respect  to  rivers  traversing  both  coun- 
tries and  crossing  the  border  is  perfect.  Having  thus 
reached  what  is  practically  the  institution  of  a  League  and 
Arbitral  Court  with  England  and  Canada  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace  between  us,  may  we  not  hope  to  enlarge  its 
scope  and  membership  and  give  its  benefits  to  the  world  ? 

Will  not  the  exhaustion  in  which  all  the  belligerents, 
whether  victors  or  vanquished,  find  themselves  after  this 
awful  sacrifice  of  life  and  wealth  make  them  wish  to  make 
the  recurrence  of  such  a  war  less  probable  ?  Will  they  not 
be  in  a  mood  to  entertain  any  reasonable  plan  for  the  settle- 
ment of  international  disputes  by  peaceable  means?  Can 
we  not  devise  such  a  plan  ?  I  think  we  can. 

The  Second  Hague  Conference  has  proposed  a  perma- 
nent court  to  settle  questions  of  a  legal  nature  arising  be- 
tween nations.  But  the  signatories  to  the  convention  would, 
under  such  a  plan,  not  be  bound  to  submit  such  questions. 
Nor  were  the  conferring  nations  able  to  agree  on  the  consti- 
tution of  the  court.  But  the  agreement  on  the  recommenda- 
tion for  the  establishment  of  such  a  court  shows  that  the 
idea  is  within  the  bounds  of  the  practical. 

To  constitute  an  effective  League  of  Peace,  we  do  not 
need  all  the  nations.  Such  an  agreement  between  eight  or 
nine  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  Asia  and  America 
would  furnish  a  useful  restraint  upon  possible  wars.  The 
successful  establishment  of  a  Peace  League  between  the 
Great  Powers  would  draw  into  it  very  quickly  the  less  power- 
ful nations. 

What  should  be  the  fundamental  plan  of  the  League?1 

1  This  is  the  earliest  public  utterance  of  these  four  principles  which 
correspond  to  the  four  articles  of  the  program  of  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace  as  formally  adopted  at  Phila.,  June  17,  1915.  The  prin- 
ciples were  worked  out  at  a  series  of  meetings  —  the  last  of  which, 


42  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

It  seems  to  me  that  it  ought  to  contain  four  provisions. 
First:  It  ought  to  provide  for  the  formation  of  a  court, 
which  would  be  given  jurisdiction  by  the  consent  of  all  the 
members  of  the  League  to  consider  and  decide  justiciable 
questions  between  them  or  any  of  them,  which  have  not 
yielded  to  negotiation,  according  to  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law  and  equity,  and  that  the  court  should  be  vested 
with  power,  upon  the  application  of  any  member  of  the 
League,  to  decide  the  issue  as  to  whether  the  question  arising 
is  justiciable. 

Second:  A  Commission  of  Conciliation  for  the  con- 
sideration and  recommendation  of  a  solution  of  all  non- 
justiciable  questions  that  may  arise  between  the  members  of 
the  League  should  be  created,  and  this  Commission  should 
have  power  to  hear  evidence,  investigate  the  causes  of  differ- 
ence, mediate  between  the  parties  and  then  make  its  recom- 
mendation for  a  settlement. 

Third:  Conferences  should  be  held  from  time  to  time 
to  agree  upon  principles  of  international  law,  not  already 
established,  as  their  necessity  shall  suggest  themselves. 
When  the  conclusions  of  the  Commission  shall  have  been 
submitted  to  the  various  parties  of  the  League  for  a  reason- 
able period  of  time,  say  a  year,  without  calling  forth  objec- 
tion, it  should  be  deemed  that  they  acquiesce  in  the  principles 
thus  declared. 

Fourth:  The  members  of  the  League  shall  agree  that 
if  any  member  of  the  League  shall  bring  war  against  any 
other  member  of  the  League,  without  first  having  submitted 
the  question,  if  found  justiciable,  to  the  arbitral  court  pro- 
April  9,  1915,  was  attended  by  Mr.  Taft  — were  formulated  by  a 
small  group  on  April  loth  and  immediately  submitted  to  Mr.  Taft  who 
gave  them  the  final  form  substantially  embodied,  later  on,  in  the 
Phila.  platform.  (Editor.) 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      43 

vided  in  the  fundamental  campact,  or  without  having  sub- 
mitted the  question,  if  found  non- justiciable,  to  the  Commis- 
sion of  Conciliation  for  its  examination,  consideration  and 
recommendaton,  then  the  remaining  members  of  the  League 
agree  to  join  in  the  forcible  defense  of  the  member  thus 
prematurely  attacked. 

First:  The  first  feature  involves  the  principles  of  the 
general  arbitration  treaties  with  England  and  France,  to 
which  England  and  France  agreed,  and  which  I  submitted 
to  the  Senate,  and  which  the  Senate  rejected  or  so  mutilated 
as  to  destroy  their  vital  principle.  I  think  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  it  should  be  embraced  in  any  effective 
League  of  Peace.  The  successful  operation  of  the  Supreme 
Court  as  a  tribunal  between  independent  states  in  deciding 
justiciable  questions  not  in  the  control  of  Congress,  or  under 
the  legislative  regulation  of  either  state,  furnishes  a  prece- 
dent and  justification  for  this  that  I  hope  I  have  made  clear. 
Moreover,  the  inveterate  practice  of  arbitration,  which  has 
now  grown  to  be  an  established  custom  for  the  disposition  of 
controversial  questions  between  Canada,  and  the  United 
States,  is  another  confirmation  of  the  practical  character  of 
such  a  court 

Second  :  We  must  recognize,  however,  that  the  questions 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  a  court  would  certainly  not 
include  all  the  questions  which  might  lead  to  war,  and  that, 
therefore,  we  should  provide  some  other  instrumentality 
for  helping  the  solution  of  those  questions  which  are  non- 
justiciable.  This  might  well  be  a  Commission  of  Concilia- 
tion, a  commission  to  investigate  the  facts,  to  consider  the 
arguments  on  both  sides,  to  mediate  between  the  parties,  to 
see  if  some  compromise  cannot  be  effected,  and  finally  to 
formulate  and  recommend  a  settlement.  This  may  involve 


44  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

time;  but  the  delay,  instead  of  being  an  objection,  is  really 
one  of  the  valuable  incidents  of  the  performance  of  such  a 
function  by  a  commission.  We  have  an  example  of  such  a 
Commission  of  Conciliation  in  the  controversy  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  over  the  Seal  Fisheries. 
The  case  on  its  merits  as  a  judicial  question  was  decided 
against  the  United  States;  but  the  world  importance  of  not 
destroying  the  Pribilof  Seal  Herd  by  pelagic  sealing  was 
recognized,  and  a  compromise  was  formulated  by  the  arbitral 
tribunal,  which  was  ultimately  embodied  in  a  treaty  between 
England,  Russia,  Japan  and  the  United  States.  Similar 
recommendations  were  made  by  the  court  of  arbitration 
which  considered  the  issues  arising  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  in  respect  to  the  Newfoundland 
Fisheries. 

Third:  Periodical  conferences  should  be  held  between 
the  members  of  the  League  for  the  declaration  of  principles 
of  international  law.  This  is  really  a  provision  for  some- 
thing in  the  nature  of  legislative  action  by  the  nations  con- 
cerned in  respect  to  international  law.  The  principles  of  in- 
ternational law  are  based  upon  custom  between  nations 
established  by  actual  practice,  by  their  recognition  in  treaties 
and  by  the  consensus  of  great  law  writers.  Undoubtedly 
the  function  of  an  arbitral  court  established  as  proposed  in 
the  first  of  the  above  suggestions  would  lead  to  a  good  deal 
of  valuable  judge-made  international  law.  But  that  would 
not  cover  the  whole  field.  Something  in  the  nature  of 
legislation  on  the  subject  would  be  a  valuable  supplement  to 
existing  international  law.  It  would  be  one  of  the  very 
admirable  results  of  such  a  League  of  Peace,  that  the  scope 
of  international  law  could  be  enlarged  in  this  way.  Mr. 
Justice  Holmes,  in  the  case  of  Missouri  v.  Illinois,  to  which 


PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE      45 

I  have  already  referred,  points  out  that  the  Supreme  Court, 
in  passing  on  questions  between  the  states,  and  in  laying 
down  the  principles  of  international  law  that  ought  to 
govern  in  controversies  between  them,  should  not  and  can- 
not make  itself  a  legislature.  But  in  a  League  of  Peace, 
there  is  no  limit  to  the  power  of  international  conferences  of 
the  members,  except  the  limit  of  the  wise  and  the  practical. 
Fourth :  The  fourth  suggestion  is  one  that  brings  in  the 
idea  of  force.  In  the  League  proposed,  all  members  are 
to  agree  that  if  any  one  member  violates  its  obligation  and 
begins  war  against  any  other  member,  without  submitting 
its  cause  for  war  to  the  arbitral  court,  if  it  is  a  justiciable 
question,  or  to  the  Commission  of  Conciliation,  if  it  is  other- 
wise, all  the  members  of  the  League  will  unite  to  defend  the 
member  attacked  against  a  war  waged  in  breach  of  plighted 
faith.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  does  not  involve  mem- 
bers of  the  League  in  an  obligation  to  enforce  the  judgment 
of  the  court  or  the  recommendation  of  the  Commission  of 
Conciliation.  It  only  furnishes  the  instrumentality  of  force 
to  prevent  attack  without  submission.  It  is  believed  that  is 
more  practical  than  to  attempt  to  enforce  judgment  after  the 
hearing.  One  reason  is  that  the  failure  to  submit  to  one  of 
the  two  tribunals  the  threatening  cause  of  war  for  the  con- 
sideration of  one  or  the  other  is  a  fact  easily  ascertained, 
and  concerning  which  there  can  be  no  dispute,  and  it  is  a 
palpable  violation  of  the  obligation  of  the  members.  It  is 
wiser  not  to  attempt  too  much.  The  required  submission 
and  the  delay  incident  thereto,  will  in  most  cases  lead  to 
acquiescence  in  the  judgment  of  the  court  or  in  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Commission  of  Conciliation.  The  threat 
of  force  against  plainly  unjust  war,  for  that  is  what  is  in- 
volved in  the  provision,  will  have  a  most  salutary  deterrent 


46        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

effect.  I  am  aware  that  membership  in  this  League  would 
involve,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  an  obligation  to 
take  part  in  European  and  Asiatic  wars,  it  may  be,  and  that 
in  this  respect  it  would  be  a  departure  from  the  traditional 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  avoiding  entangling  alliances 
with  European  or  Asiatic  countries.  But  I  conceive  that  the 
interests  of  the  United  States,  in  view  of  its  close  business 
and  social  relations,  with  the  other  countries  of  the  world, 
much  closer  now  than  ever  before,  would  justify  it,  if  such 
a  League  could  be  formed,  in  running  the  remote  risk  of 
such  a  war  in  order  to  make  more  probable  the  securing  of 
the  inestimable  boon  of  peace  to  the  world,  an  object  of 
desire  that  now  seems  so  far  away. 


PROPOSALS  OF  THE  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE 
.  PEACE1 

In  calling  this  meeting  my  associates  and  I  have  not  been 
unaware  that  we  might  be  likened  to  the  Tailors  of  Tooley 
Street  who  mistook  themselves  for  the  people  of  England. 
We  wish,  first,  to  say  that  we  do  not  represent  anybody  but 
ourselves.  We  are  not  national  legislators,  nor  do  we  con- 
trol the  foreign  policy  of  this  Government.  But  we  are 
deeply  interested  in  devising  a  plan  for  an  international 
agreement  by  which,  when  the  present  war  shall  cease,  a 
recurrence  of  such  a  war  will  be  made  less  possible. 

We  are  not  here  to  suggest  a  means  of  bringing  this  war 
to  an  end ;  much  as  that  is  to  be  desired  and  much  as  we 

1  Address  delivered  at  the  Convention  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  which  was  held  at  Philadelphia,  June  17,  1915. 


PROPOSALS    OF    THE   LEAGUE   TO    ENFORCE   PEACE          47 

would  be  willing  to  do  to  secure  peace,  that  is  not  within 
the  project  of  the  present  meeting. 

We  hope  and  pray  for  peace,  and  our  hope  of  its  coming 
is  sufficient  to  make  us  think  that  the  present  is  a  good  time 
to  discuss  and  formulate  a  series  of  proposals  to  which  the 
assent  of  a  number  of  the  Great  Powers  could  be  secured. 
We  think  a  League  of  Peace  could  be  formed  which  would 
enable  nations  to  avoid  war  by  furnishing  a  practical  means 
of  settling  international  quarrels  or  suspending  them  until 
the  blinding  heat  of  passion  had  cooled. 

When  the  world  conference  is  held,  our  country  will  have 
its  official  representatives  to  speak  for  us.  We,  Tailors  of 
Tooley  Street,  shall  not  be  there;  but,  if  in  our  post-prandial 
leisure  we  shall  have  discussed  and  framed  a  practical  plan 
for  a  League  of  Peace,  our  official  representatives  will  be 
aided  and  may  in  their  discretion  accept  it  and  present  it  to 
the  Conference  as  their  own. 

There  are  Tooley  Streets  in  every  nation  to-day  and  the 
minds  of  earnest  men  are  being  stirred  with  the  same  thought 
and  the  same  purpose  —  we  have  heard  from  them  through 
various  channels.  The  denizens  of  those  Tooley  Streets 
will  have  their  influence  upon  their  respective  official  repre- 
sentatives. No  man  can  measure  the  effect  upon  the  peoples 
of  the  belligerent  countries  and  upon  the  peoples  of  the 
neutral  countries  which  the  horrors  and  exhaustion  of  this 
unprecedented  war  are  going  to  have.  It  is  certain  that 
they  all  will  look  with  much  more  favorable  eye  to  leagues 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  than  ever  before.  In  no  war, 
moreover,  has  the  direct  interest  that  neutrals  have  in  pre- 
venting a  war  between  neighbors  been  so  clearly  made 
known.  This  interest  of  neutrals  has  been  so  forced  upon 
them  that  it  would  require  only  a  slight  development  and 


48  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

growth  in  the  law  of  international  relations  to  develop  that 
interest  into  a  right  to  be  consulted  before  such  a  war  among 
neighbors  can  be  begun.  This  step  we  hope  to  have  taken  by 
the  formation  of  a  Peace  League  of  the  Great  Powers, 
whose  primary  and  fundamental  principle  shall  be  that  no 
war  can  take  place  between  any  two  members  of  the  League 
until  they  have  resorted  to  the  machinery  that  the  League 
proposes  to  furnish  to  settle  the  controversy  likely  to  lead 
to  war. 

If  any  member  of  the  League  refuses  to  use  this  ma- 
chinery, and  attacks  another  member  in  breach  of  his  League 
obligation,  all  members  of  the  League  agree  to  defend  the 
member  attacked  by  force. 

We  do  not  think  the  ultimate  resort  to  force  can  be  safely 
omitted  from  an  effective  League  of  Peace.  We  sincerely 
hope  that  it  may  never  become  necessary,  and  that  the  deter- 
rent effect  of  its  inevitable  use  in  case  of  a  breach  of  the 
League  obligation  will  help  materially  to  give  sanction  to 
the  laws  of  the  League  and  to  render  a  resort  to  force  avoid- 
able 

We  are  not  peace-at-any-price  men,  because  we  do  not 
think  we  have  reached  the  time  when  a  plan  based  on  the 
complete  abolition  of  war  is  practicable.  As  long  as  nations 
partake  of  the  frailties  of  men  who  compose  them,  war  is  a 
possibility  and  that  possibility  should  not  be  ignored  in  any 
League  of  Peace  that  is  to  be  useful.  We  do  not  think  it 
necessary  to  call  peace-at-any-price  men  cowards,  or  apply 
other  epithets  to  them.  We  have  known  in  history  the  most 
noble  characters  who  adhered  to  such  a  view  and  yet  the  ex- 
ample of  their  physical  and  moral  courage  is  a  heritage  of 
mankind.  To  those  who  differ  with  us  in  our  view  of  the 
necessity  for  this  feature  of  possible  force  in  our  plan,  we  say 


PROPOSALS    OF    THE    LEAGUE    TO    ENFORCE    PEACE  49 

we  respect  your  attitude.  We  admit  your  claim  to  sincere 
patriotism  to  be  as  just  as  ours.  We  do  not  ascribe  your  de- 
sire to  avoid  war  to  be  a  fear  of  death  to  yourselves  or  your 
sons ;  but  rather  to  your  sense  of  the  horror,  injustice  and 
ineffectiveness  of  settling  any  international  issue  by  such  a 
brutal  arbitrament.  Nevertheless,  we  differ  with  you  in 
judgment  that,  in  the  world  of  nations  as  they  are,  war  can 
be  completely  avoided.  We  believe  it  is  still  necessary  to  use 
a  threat  of  overwhelming  force  of  a  great  League  with  a 
willingness  to  make  the  threat  good  in  order  to  frighten  na- 
tions into  a  use  of  rational  and  peaceful  means  to  settle  their 
issues  with  their  associates  of  the  League.  Nor  are  we 
militarists  or  jingoes  —  we  are  trying  to  follow  a  middle 
and  practical  path. 

Now  what  is  the  machinery,  a  resort  to  which  we  wish  to 
force  on  an  intending  belligerent  of  the  League?  It  consists 
of  two  tribunals,  to  one  of  which  every  issue  must  be  sub- 
mitted. Issues  between  nations  are  of  two  classes :  — 

ist.  Issues  that  can  be  decided  on  principles  of  international 
law  and  equity,  called  justiciable. 

2nd.  Issues  that  cannot  be  decided  on  such  principles  of  law  and 
equity,  but  which  might  be  quite  as  irritating  and  provocative 
of  war,  called  non-justiciable. 

The  questions  of  the  Alaskan  Boundary,  of  the  Bering  Sea 
Seal  Fisheries,  and  of  the  Alabama  Claims  were  justiciable 
issues  that  could  be  settled  by  a  court,  exactly  as  the  Supreme 
Court  would  settle  claims  between  States. 

The  questions  whether  the  Japanese  should  be  naturalized, 
whether  all  American  citizens  should  be  admitted  to  Russia 
as  merchants  without  regard  to  religious  faith,  are  capable 
of  causing  great  irritation  against  the  nation  denying  the 
privilege ;  and  yet  such  nations,  in  the  absence  of  a  treaty  on 


5O        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  subject,  are  completely  within  their  international  right 
and  the  real  essence  of  the  trouble  can  not  be  aided  by  a 
resort  to  a  court.  The  dispute  is  non-justiciable. 

We  propose  that  for  justiciable  questions  we  shall  have  an 
impartial  court  to  which  all  questions  arising  between  mem- 
bers of  the  League  shall  be  submitted.  If  the  court  finds  the 
question  justiciable,  it  shall  decide  it.  If  it  does  not,  it  shall 
refer  it  to  a  Commission  of  Conciliation  to  investigate,  con- 
fer, hear  argument  and  recommend  a  compromise. 

We  do  not  propose,  in  our  plan,  to  enforce  compliance 
either  with  the  Court's  judgment  or  the  Conciliation  Com- 
mission's recommendation.  We  feel  that  we  ought  not  to 
attempt  too  much.  We  believe  that  the  forced  submission, 
the  truce  taken  to  investigate  and  the  judicial  decision,  or 
the  conciliatory  compromise  recommended,  will  form  a  ma- 
terial inducement  to  peace.  It  will  cool  the  heat  of  passion 
and  will  give  the  men  of  peace  in  each  nation  time  to  still 
the  jingoes. 

The  League  of  Peace  will  furnish  a  great  opportunity  for 
more  definite  formulation  of  the  principles  of  international 
law.  The  arbitral  court  will  amplify  it  and  enrich  it  in  their 
application  of  its  general  principles  to  particular  cases. 
They  will  create  a  body  of  judge-made  laws  of  the  highest 
value. 

Then  the  existence  of  the  League  will  lead  to  ever  recur- 
ring congresses  of  the  League,  which,  acting  in  a  quasi- 
legislative  capacity,  may  widen  the  scope  of  international  law 
in  a  way  that  a  court  may  not  feel  able  or  competent  to  do. 

This  is  our  plan.  It  is  not  complicated,  at  least  in  state- 
ment. In  its  practical  application,  difficulties  now  unfore- 
seen may  arise,  but  we  believe  it  offers  a  working  hypothesis 
upon  which  a  successful  arrangement  can  be  made. 


PROPOSALS    OF    THE    LEAGUE   TO    ENFORCE    PEACE  5! 

\Ye  are  greeted  first  by  the  objection  that  no  treaties  can 
prevent  war.  We  are  not  called  upon  to  deny  this  in  order 
to  justify  or  vindicate  our  proposals  as  useful.  We  realize 
that  nations  are  sometimes  utterly  immoral  in  breaking 
treaties  and  shamelessly  bold  in  avowing  their  right  to  do  so 
on  the  ground  of  necessity.  But  this  is  not  always  the  case. 
We  cannot  give  up  treaties  because  sometimes  they  are 
broken  any  more  than  we  can  give  up  commercial  contracts 
because  men  sometimes  dishonor  themselves  by  breaking 
them.  We  decline  to  assume  that  all  nations  are  always 
dishonorable  or  that  a  solemn  treaty  obligation  will  not  have 
some  deterrent  effect  upon  a  nation  which  has  plighted  its 
faith,  to  prevent  its  breach.  In  every  nation  there  are  people 
who  are  in  favor  of  peace  and  opposed  to  war,  and  when  you 
furnish  a  treaty  that  binds  the  nation  not  to  go  to  war,  you 
strengthen  the  hands  of  the  people  in  that  nation  that  do 
not  want  to  go  to  war  and  are  in  favor  of  preserving  the 
honor  of  the  nation.  When  we  add  to  this  the  sanction  of 
an  agreement  by  a  number  of  powerful  nations  to  enforce 
the  obligation  of  the  recalcitrant  and  faithless  member,  we 
think  \ve  have  a  treaty  that  is  much  more  than  a  "scrap  of 
paper  " —  and  we  base  our  faith  in  this  on  a  common  sense 
view  of  human  nature. 

We  have  got  to  depart  from  the  traditional  policy  of  this 
country,  I  agree.  But  this  war  has  borne  in  on  us  the  fact 
that  we  are  so  near  to  all  the  nations  of  the  world  to-day 
that  we  are  vitally  interested  in  keeping  war  down  as  far  as 
we  can,  and  that  we  had  better  step  forward  and  assume 
certain  obligations  in  the  interest  of  the  world  and  in  the 
interest  o'f  mankind,  because  there  is  a  utilitarian  reason  for 
it  —  we  are  likely  to  be  drawn  in  ourselves.  Therefore  we 
ought  to  depart  from  the  policy  of  isolation  that  heretofore 


52  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

has  served  us  so  well,  because  we  are  a  strong  nation.  We 
must  bear  our  share  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  moment, 
and  we  must  help  along  the  world,  and  incidentally  help 
along  ourselves,  for  I  believe,  even  if  you  view  it  from  a 
selfish  standpoint,  in  the  long  run  it  will  be  a  better  policy. 
It  is  objected  that  we  only  propose  to  include  the  more 
powerful  nations.  We'll  gladly  include  them  all.  But  we 
don't  propose  to  have  the  constitution  of  our  court  compli- 
cated by  a  demand  for  equal  representation  of  the  many 
smaller  nations.  We  believe  that  when  we  have  a  League 
initiated  by  the  larger  powers,  the  smaller  powers  will  be 
glad  to  come  in  and  enjoy  the  protection  that  the  League  will 
afford  against  the  unjust  aggression  of  the  strong  against 
the  weak. 


CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  THE  PROPOSALS  x 

To  me  has  been  assigned  the  discussion  of  the  constitu- 
tional objections  to  the  proposals  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.  These  objections,  so  far  as  I  understand  them,  are 
directed  against  the  first  and  third  planks  in  our  platform. 
The  first  plank  reads  as  follows : 

"First:  All  justiciable  questions  arising  between  the  signatory 
powers,  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall,  subject  to  the  limitations 
of  treaties,  be  submitted  to  a  judicial  tribunal  for  hearing  and 
judgment,  both  upon  the  merits  and  upon  any  issues  as  to  its 
jurisdiction  of  the  question." 

This  looks  to  an  organization  of  a  permanent  court  by 

1  Address  delivered  at  the  First  Annual  Assemblage  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace,  Washington,  D.  C,  May  26,  1916. 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    THE    PROPOSALS  53 

the  signatories  to  the  League.  It  contemplates  the  oppor- 
tunity of  any  member  of  the  League,  having  a  cause  of  com- 
plaint against  any  other  member  of  the  League,  to  sue  such 
member  in  this  court  and  bring  it  into  court  by  proper  pro- 
cess. The  complainant's  pleading  will,  of  course,  state  its 
cause  of  action.  The  defendant  may  wish  to  question  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  on  the  ground,  for  instance,  that 
the  cause  of  action  stated  by  the  complainant  does  not  involve 
a  justiciable  issue;  that  it  can  not  be  decided  on  principles 
of  law  or  equity. 

The  court,  upon  this  preliminary  question,  must  decide 
upon  its  jurisdiction.  If  it  finds  the  question  not  to  be 
justiciable,  it  must  dismiss  the  complaint ;  but  it  may  properly 
refer  its  investigation  to  the  Commission  of  Conciliation. 
If  it  finds  that  it  is  justiciable,  it  must  require  the  defendant 
nation  to  answer. 

What  I  have  to  discuss  is  whether  the  President  and  the 
Senate,  constituting  the  treaty-making  power  for  this 
Government,  may  consent,  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States,  to  the  settlement  of  any  justiciable  issue  arising  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  any  other  member  of  the  League 
by  this  permanent  court;  and  whether  it  may  leave  to  that 
court  the  power  to  decide  whether  the  issue  raised  is  a  jus- 
ticiable one.  It  was  argued  against  a  similar  provision  in 
the  general  arbitration  treaties  with  England  and  France  that 
such  a  stipulation  constituted  a  delegation  by  the  President 
and  Senate  of  the  authority  reposed  in  them  over  the  foreign 
relations  of  our  Government  and  therefore  that  it  was  ultra- 
vires.  Both  upon  reason  and  authority  this  objection  is 
untenable.  The  United  States  is  a  nation,  and,  from  a 
foreign  standpoint,  a  sovereign  nation,  without  limitation 
of  its  sovereignty  It  may,  therefore,  through  its  treaty- 


54  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

making  power,  consent  to  any  agreement  with  other  powers 
relating  to  subject  matter  that  is  usually  considered  and  made 
the  subject  of  treaties.  The  well-known  language  of  Mr. 
Justice  Field,  in  the  case  of  Geofrey  v.  Riggs,  133  U.  S. 
258,  leaves  no  doubt  upon  this  point.  It  is  as  follows : 

"  That  the  treaty  power  of  the  United  States  extends  to  all 
proper  subjects  of  negotiations  between  our  Government  and  the 
Governments  of  other  nations,  is  clear.  .  .  .  The  treaty  power,  as 
expressed  in  the  Constitution,  is  in  terms  unlimited,  except  by 
those  restraints  which  are  found  in  that  instrument  against  the 
action  of  the  Government,  or  of  its  Departments,  and  those  aris- 
ing from  the  nature  of  the  Government  itself,  and  of  that  of  the 
States.  It  would  not  be  contended  that  it  extends  so  far  as  to 
authorize  what  the  Constitution  forbids,  or  a  change  in  the  char- 
acter of  the  Government,  or  in  that  of  one  of  the  States,  or 
a  cession  of  any  portion  of  the  territory  of  the  latter  without 
its  consent.  But  with  these  exceptions,  it  is  not  perceived  that 
there  is  any  limit  to  the  questions  which  can  be  adjusted  touch- 
ing any  matter  which  is  properly  the  subject  of  negotiation  with 
a  foreign  country." 

Issues  that  can  be  settled  on  principles  of  law  and  equity 
are  proper  subjects  for  decision  by  a  judicial  tribunal.  Such 
issues  have  been  settled  by  Boards  of  Arbitration,  agreed 
to  by  independent  sovereigns  since  there  were  governments. 
The  first  provision  agreed  to  by  the  United  States  for  an 
arbitration  of  this  kind  was  in  the  Jay  Treaty  in  1794;  and 
since  that  time  there  have  been  eighty-four  international 
arbitrations  to  which  an  American  nation  was  a  party.  In 
forty,  or  nearly  one-half  of  these,  the  other  party  was  an 
European  Power,  while  the  arbitrations  between  American 
nations  were  forty-four.  To  about  two-thirds  of  all  of  these 
the  United  States  was  a  party,  the  number  of  arbitrations  be- 
tween other  American  powers  being  fourteen.  Of  this 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    THE    PROPOSALS  55 

number,  there  were  ten  that  related  to  questions  of  boundary, 
which  are,  of  course,  questions  capable  of  solution  on  princi- 
ples of  law  and  equity. 

In  such  cases,  it  was  never  suggested  that  the  Govern- 
ment was  delegating  any  power  at  all  to  the  tribunal.  A 
submission  to  a  judicial  decision  is  not  a  delegation  of  power 
as  to  an  agent.  It  is  a  submission  of  an  issue  to  a  judge. 
It  is  an  error  to  call  such  a  submission  a  delegation,  or  to 
determine  its  validity  on  principles  of  delegation  of  power 
as  that  is  limited  in  constitutional  law.  In  the  discussion  of 
the  general  arbitration  treaties  in  the  Senate,  there  was  a 
suggestion  that  the  agreement  to  submit  to  a  court  questions 
which  had  not  yet  arisen  described  only  by  definition  and 
classification,  with  power  in  the  court  to  take  jurisdiction, 
was  more  of  a  delegation  of  power  than  the  mere  submis- 
sion of  an  existing  question  to  arbitrators.  There  is,  how- 
ever, not  the  slightest  difference  in  principle  between  the  two. 
If  one  is  a  delegation,  the  other  is.  If  one  is  invalid,  the 
other  is ;  and  if  one  is  not  invalid,  the  other  is  not. 

Nor  does  the  right  to  determine  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
involve  in  principle  any  more  of  a  delegation  than  the  mere 
voluntary  submission  of  the  issue  to  the  court.  It  only 
somewhat  enlarges  the  issues  to  be  submitted.  The  question 
whether  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  an  issue  is  dependent 
on  the  question  of  law,  involving  the  construction  of  the 
treaty,  and  such  a  subject  matter  is  the  commonest  instance 
of  the  class  of  questions  submitted  to  arbitration  or  a  court. 
More  than  this,  the  Senate  has  consented  from  time  to  time 
to  arbitrations  on  issues  which  may  arise  in  the  future  and 
defined  by  language  of  the  treaty  of  submission. 

The  last  notable  instance,  and  the  one  which  involved  a 
really  permanent  court  is  the  advice  and  consent  by  our 


56  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Senate  to  the  Hague  International  Prize  Court  Convention 
in  which  a  permanent  international  prize  court  was  estab- 
lished, and  the  United  States  bound  itself  to  submit  all 
questions,  arising  between  it  and  foreign  nations  in  respect 
to  questions  of  prize  in  naval  warfare,  to  this  international 
prize  court,  and  to  abide  the  decision,  even  though  that  de- 
cision might  involve,  as  it  generally  would,  the  reconsidera- 
tion of  an  issue  already  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States.  The  treaty  is  not  in  force  because  Eng- 
land did  not  finally  approve,  but  our  Senate  approved  it. 
The  International  Prize  Court  must  of  necessity  pass  upon 
its  own  jurisdiction,  and  by  agreement  between  the  parties, 
its  decision  is  to  be  accepted  and  to  be  carried  out  in  good 
faith.  The  question  as  to  whether  commissioners  of  arbi- 
tration, under  the  Jay  Treaty,  had  power  to  determine  their 
own  jurisdiction  was  brought  by  Rufus  King,  American 
Minister  in  London,  to  the  attention  of  Lord  Grenville  who 
submitted  the  question  to  Lord  Chancellor  Loughbo rough. 
The  Lord  Chancellor  resolved  the  difficulty  by  declaring : 

"  That  the  doubt  respecting  the  authority  of  the  Commissioners 
to  settle  their  own  jurisdiction  was  absurd;  and  that  they  must 
necessarily  decide  upon  cases  being  within,  or  without,  their  com- 
petency." 

A  similar  question  was  raised  by  the  British  Government 
in  regard  to  the  power  of  the  Geneva  Tribunal  to  deal  with 
what  were  known  as  the  "  indirect  claims,"  and  her  arbi- 
trators decided  that  they  did  not  have  jurisdiction  of  the 
indirect  claims,  and  this  was  acquiesced  in  by  both  Govern- 
ments. 

In  correspondence  with  the  Chilean  Minister  over  an  arbi- 
tration between  this  country  and  Chile,  Mr.  Olney,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  used  this  language : 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF    THE    PROPOSALS  5/ 

"  But  the  question  whether  any  particular  claim  is  a  proper  one 
for  the  consideration  and  decision  of  an  international  commis- 
sion is  necessarily  one  which  the  commission  itself  must  deter- 
mine. The  conventions  under  which  such  commissions  are 
organized  usually  describe  in  general  terms  the  class  of  cases  of 
which  the  commission  is  to  take  jurisdiction,  and  whether  any 
particular  case  presented  to  it  comes  within  this  class  the  com- 
mission must,  of  course,  determine.  The  decisions  of  the  late 
commission,  both  interlocutory  and  final,  are  binding  upon  both 
Governments,  the  latter  absolutely  so,  the  former  unless  reversed, 
after  proper  proceedings  for  a  rehearing." 

I  come  now  to  the  other  objection.  The  third  plank  of 
the  platform  is  as  follows: 

"Third:  The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  use  forthwith 
both  their  economic  and  military  forces  against  any  one  of  their 
number  that  goes  to  war,  or  commits  acts  of  hostility,  against 
another  of  the  signatories  before  any  question  arising  shall  be  sub- 
mitted as  provided  in  the  foregoing." 

It  is  objected  to  this  clause  that  it  violates  the  Constitution 
in  that  the  effect  of  such  a  treaty  signed  by  the  United  States 
would  take  away  from  Congress  the  power,  conferred  upon 
it  by  section  eight  of  article  one,  to  declare  war. 

I  had  the  pleasure  and  privilege  of  hearing  Mr.  Bryan 
advance  this  argument  at  the  Lake  Mohonk  Conference. 
He  said  that  we  should  need  an  amendment  to  the  Consti- 
tution before  we  could  agree  to  any  such  provision.  He  said 
that  in  order  to  carry  out  the  provision  we  must  have  a  joint 
council  of  the  powers  to  determine  when  the  time  had  arrived 
for  military  action  and  war,  and  that  this  would  substitute 
the  action  of  the  council  for  the  constitutional  discretion  of 
Congress. 

I  venture  to  think  that  this  view  is  wholly  without  founda- 


58  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

tion.  Although  it  is  not  necessary,  I  am  willing  to  accept 
the  assumption  that  some  kind  of  a  council  would  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  powers  to  make  the  announcements  when  the 
time  had  come  for  the  use  of  economic  and  military  forces 
against  the  recalcitrant  member.  Does  that  take  away  from 
Congress  the  power  to  declare  war?  It  does  not.  If  the 
war  is  a  foreign  war,  it  could  not  be  begun  under  the  Consti- 
tution until  Congress  had  declared  war.  The  President 
would  not  be  authorized  to  direct  the  Army  and  the  Navy  to 
begin  war  until  Congress  had  declared  it. 

What,  then,  would  be  the  situation  if  the  fact  were  an- 
nounced upon  which  the  obligation  of  the  United  States  to 
make  war  arose  under  this  treaty?  It  would  be  to  make 
war  by  Constitutional  means,  that  is,  by  the  preliminary 
declaration  of  Congress  that  war  existed.  Congress  might 
decline  to  exercise  that  power  and  refuse  to  declare  war. 
What  would  be  the  effect  of  that?  It  would  merely  be  a 
breach  of  faith  on  the  part  of  Congress,  and  so  a  breach  of 
faith  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  and  we  would  not  go 
to  war.  The  treaty-making  power  under  the  Constitution 
creates  the  obligation  to  declare  war  in  certain  contingencies. 
That  obligation  is  to  be  discharged  by  Congress  under  its 
Constitutional  power  to  declare  war.  If  it  fails  to  do 
so,  and  thus  comply  with  the  binding  obligation  created  by 
the  treaty-making  power,  then  it  merely  breaks  the  contract 
of  the  Government.  It  is  left  to  Congress  to  carry  out  that 
which  we  in  a  Constitutional  way  have  agreed  to  do.  Thus 
to  impose  in  a  Constitutional  way  by  treaty  an  obligation  on 
Congress  is  not  to  take  away  its  power  to  discharge  it  or  to 
refuse  to  discharge  it. 

In  1904  we  entered  into  a  treaty  with  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  the  first  article  of  which  is: 


CONSTITUTIONALITY   OF    THE    PROPOSALS  59 

"  The  United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Republic  of  Panama." 

What  is  the  necessary  effect  of  this  guaranty?  It  neces- 
sarily means  that  if  any  nation  attacks  Panama  and  attempts 
to  take  territory  from  her  or  to  subvert  her  Government,  the 
United  States  is  under  treaty  obligation  to  make  war  to  de- 
fend Panama.  Was  it  ever  supposed  that  such  an  obligation 
took  away  from  Congress  the  power  to  declare  war?  This 
treaty  obligation  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  Government  to 
declare  war  under  certain  conditions  that  may  arise,  creates 
a  contract  obligation  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  that  it  shall 
do  so,  and  this  duty  can  only  be  discharged  through  the  action 
of  Congress  in  declaring  war.  Does  that  deprive  Congress 
of  its  Constitutional  power  to  declare  war?  It  seems  to  me 
the  question  answers  itself. 

In  our  relations  with  Cuba  we  find  in  the  present  treaty: 

ARTICLE   I 

"  The  Government  of  Cuba  shall  never  enter  into  any  treaty  or 
other  compact  with  any  foreign  power  or  powers  which  will  im- 
pair or  tend  to  impair  the  independence  of  Cuba,  nor  in  any 
manner  authorize  or  permit  any  foreign  power  or  powers  to  obtain 
by  colonization  or  for  military  or  naval  purposes  or  otherwise, 
lodgment  in  or  control  over  any  portion  of  said  Island." 

ARTICLE   II 

"  The  Government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United  States  may 
exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  in- 
dependence, the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for  the 
protection  of  life,  property  and  individual  liberty,  and  for  dis- 
charging the  obligation  with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States  now  to  be  assumed  and  under- 
taken by  the  Government  of  Cuba." 

ARTICLE   III 

"  To  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  independence  of 


6O        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as  well  as  for  its  own  de- 
fense, the  Government  of  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  to  the  United 
States,  lands  necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations  at 'certain 
specific  points  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  President  of  the  United 
States." 

It  is  quite  clear  from  these  three  articles  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  binds  itself  to  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba  and  to  exclude  other  governments  from 
lodgment  in  the  Island.  If  any  Government  attempts  to 
filch  territory  from  Cuba  or  to  subvert  the  government,  it 
becomes  .the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  make  war  and 
defend  against  such  invasion.  Does  this  treaty  obligation 
thus  created  take  away  from  Congress  the  power  to  declare 
war?  It  only  creates  the  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  wage  war,  and  in  discharging  this  obliga- 
tion Congress  must  act,  or  the  Government  must  be  recreant 
to  its  agreement. 

Thus,  by  reason  and  precedent,  it  would  appear  clear  that 
this  third  plank  of  the  platform  of  the  League  is  not  in  any 
way  an  attempt  to  take  from  Congress  the  power  which  it 
has  to  declare  war  under  the  Constitution.  The  suggestion 
that  in  order  to  carry  out  such  an  obligation  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  it  would  be  necessary  to  amend  the  Con- 
stitution, grows  out  of  a  confusion  of  ideas  and  a  failure  to 
analyze  the  differences  between  the  creation  of  an  obligation 
of  the  United  States  to  do  a  thing  and  the  due,  orderly  and 
Constitutional  course  to  be  taken  by  it  in  doing  that  which 
it  has  agreed  to  do. 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT        6l 


A  CONSTRUCTIVE  PLAN  FOR  HUMAN 
BETTERMENT  * 

What  is  International  Law?  It  is  the  body  of  rules 
governing  the  conduct  of  the  nations  of  the  world  toward 
one  another,  acquiesced  in  by  all  nations.  It  lacks  scope 
and  definiteness.  It  is  found  in  writings  of  international 
jurists,  in  treaties,  in  the  results  of  arbitration,  and  in  the 
decisions  of  those  municipal  courts  which  apply  international 
law,  like  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  courts 
that  sit  in  prize  cases  to  determine  the  rules  of  international 
law  governing  the  capture  of  vessels  in  naval  warfare.  It 
is  obvious  that  a  Congress  of  the  League  with  quasi-legisla- 
tive powers  could  greatly  add  to  the  efficacy  of  international 
law  by  enlarging  its  application  and  codifying  its  rules.  It 
would  be  greatly  in  the  interest  of  the  world  and  of  world 
peace  to  give  to  such  a  code  of  rules  the  express  sanction  of 
the  family  of  nations. 

As  to  the  submission  of  all  questions  at  issue  of  a  legal 
nature  to  a  permanent  international  court,  it  is  sufficient  to 
point  out  that  the  proposal  is  practical  and  is  justified  by 
precedent.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  Unted  States.,  exer- 
cising the  jurisdiction  conferred  on  it  by  the  Constitution, 
sits  as  a  permanent  international  tribunal  to  decide  issues 
between  the  States  of  the  Union.  The  law  governing  the 
settlement  of  most  of  the  controversies  between  the  States 
cannot  be  determined  by  reference  to  the  Constitution,  to 
statutes  of  Congress,  or  to  the  legislation  of  the  States. 
Should  Congress  in  such  cases  attempt  to  enact  laws  they 
would  be  invalid.  The  only  law  which  applies  is  that  which 

1  Address  delivered  before  the  National  Educational  Association, 
New  York  City,  July  3,  1916. 


62  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

applies  between  independent  governments,  to  wit:  Inter- 
national Law.  Take  the  case  of  Kansas  against  Colorado, 
heard  and  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court.  Kansas  com- 
plained that  Colorado  was  using  more  of  the  water  of  the 
Arkansas  River  which  flowed  through  Colorado  into  Kansas 
than  was  equitable  for  purposes  of  irrigation.  The  case 
was  heard  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  decided,  not  by  a  law 
of  Congress,  not  by  the  law  of  Kansas,  not  by  the  law  of 
Colorado,  for  the  law  of  neither  applied.  It  was  decided 
by  principles  of  International  Law. 

Many  other  instances  of  similar  decisions  by  the  Supreme 
Court  could  be  cited.  But  it  is  said  that  stick  a  precedent 
lacks  force  here  because  the  States  are  restrained  from  going 
to  war  with  each  other  by  the  power  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment. Admitting  that  this  qualifies  the  precedent  to  some 
extent,  we  need  go  no  further  than  Canada  to  find  a  com- 
plete analogy  and  a  full  precedent.  There  is  now  sitting 
to  decide  questions  of  boundary  waters  (exactly  such 
questions  as  were  considered  in  Kansas  and  Colorado)  a 
permanent  court,  consisting  of  three  Americans  and  three 
Canadians,  to  settle  the  principles  of  international  law  that 
apply  to  the  use  of  rivers  constituting  a  boundary  between 
the  two  countries  and  of  rivers  crossing  the  boundary.  The 
fact  is,  that  we  have  gotten  so  into  the  habit  of  arbitration 
with  Canada  that  no  reasonable  person  expects  that  any  issue 
arising  between  us  and  that  country,  after  a  hundred  years 
of  peace,  will  be  settled  other  than  by  arbitration. 

If  this  be  the  case  between  ourselves  and  Canada  and 
England,  why  may  it  not  be  practical  with  every  well- 
established  and  ordered  government  of  the  Great  Powers? 
The  Second  Hague  Conference,  attended  by  all  nations, 
recommended  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  International 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT       63 

Court  to  decide  questions  of  a  legal  nature  arising  between 
nations. 

The  second  proposal  of  the  League  involves  the  submis- 
sion to  a  Commission  of  Conciliation  of  all  questions  that 
cannot  be  settled  in  court  on  principles  of  law  or  equity. 
There  are  such  questions  which  may  lead  to  war,  and  fre- 
quently do,  and  there  are  no  legal  rules  for  decision.  We 
have  such  questions  giving  rise  to  friction  in  our  domestic 
life.  If  a  lady  who  owns  a  lawn  permits  children  of  one 
neighbor  to  play  upon  that  lawn  and  refuses  the  privilege  to 
the  children  of  another  neighbor  because  she  thinks  the 
latter  children  are  badly  trained  and  will  injure  her  lawn  or 
her  flowers,  it  requires  no  imagination  to  understand  that 
there  may  arise  a  neighborhood  issue  that  will  lead  to  friction 
between  the  families.  The  issue  is,  however,  a  non-jus- 
ticiable one.  Courts  cannot  settle  it,  for  the  reason  that 
the  lady  owning  the  lawn  has  the  right  to  say  who  shall 
come  on  it  and  who  shall  be  excluded  from  it.  No  jus- 
ticiable issue  can  arise,  unless  one's  imagination  goes  to  the 
point  of  supposing  that  the  husbands  of  the  two  differing 
ladies  came  together  and  clashed,  and  then  the  issue  in  court 
will  not  be  as  to  the  comparative  training  of  the  children  of 
the  families. 

We  have  an  analogous  question  in  our  foreign  relations 
with  reference  to  the  admission  of  the  Chinese  and  Japanese. 
We  discriminate  against  them  in  our  naturalization  and  im- 
migration laws  and  extend  the  benefit  of  those  laws  only  to 
whites  and  persons  of  African  descent.  This  discrimina- 
tion has  caused  much  ill-feeling  among  the  Japanese  and 
Chinese.  \Ve  are  within  our  international  right  in  exclud- 
ing them ;  but  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  resentment,  be- 
cause of  such  discrimination,  might  be  fanned  into  a  flame, 


64  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

if  through  lawless  violence  or  unjust  State  legislation  the 
Japanese  should  be  mistreated  within  the  United  States. 

We  have  had  instances  of  the  successful  result  of  com- 
missions of  conciliation  where  the  law  could  not  cover  the 
differences  between  the  two  nations.  Such  was  the  case 
of  the  Bering  Sea  controversy.  l  We  sought  to  prevent  the 

1  In  an  address  before  the  National  Geographic  Society  in  Wash- 
ington, D.  C.,  Jan.  17,  1919,  Mr.  Taft  has  the  following  to  say  in  re- 
gard to  this  arbitration : 

"  The  United  States,  by  a  transfer  from  Russia,  became  the  owner 
of  the  Pribiloff  Islands,  in  the  middle  of  the  Bering  Sea.  Upon  those 
islands  was  the  breeding  place  of  the  largest  herd  of  fur-bearing  seals 
in  the  world.  They  were  a  valuable  property  ami  a  considerable  annual 
income  was  derived  by  the  United  States  from  the  sale  of  the  fur. 
Canadian  schooners  began  what  was  called  pelagic  scaling.  They  shot 
the  seals  in  the  open  Bering  Sea.  This  indiscriminate  hunting  killed 
the  females  of  the  herd  and  was  destroying  it.  Revenue  cutters  of  the 
United  States,  by  direction  of  the  government,  scixed  such  sealing 
vessels,  brought  them  into  a  port  of  the  United  States,  where  were 
instituted  proceedings  to  forfeit  them.  Great  Britain  objected  on  the 
ground  that  the  United  States  had  no  legal  jurisdiction.  The  case  was 
submitted  to  an  arbitration.  The  treaty  contained  a  provision  that  the 
arbitrators,  should  they  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  United  States 
had  no  legal  right,  might  recommend  a  basis  of  compromise.  The 
United  States  asserted  its  right,  on  the  ground,  first,  that  it  had  terri- 
torial jurisdiction  over  the  open  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea  by  transfer 
from  Russia,  which  had  asserted,  maintained,  and  enjoyed  such  juris- 
diction, and,  second,  that  it  owned  the  seals  while  in  the  sea  in  such 
a  way  that  the  Canadian  schooners  were  despoiling  its  personal  prop- 
erty. The  court  of  arbitration  held  against  the  United  States  on  both 
points,  deciding  that  Russia  never  had  any  territorial  jurisdiction  over 
the  open  Bering  Sea  to  transfer  to  the  United  States,  and  that  when 
the  seals  left  the  islands  and  swam  out  into  the  open  sea  they  were 
the  property  of  no  one  and  were  subject  to  capture  by  any  one.  The 
judgment  of  the  court,  therefore,  was  against  the  United  States  and 
awarded  damages.  Pursuing,  however,  the  recommendation  of  the 
treaty,  the  court  made  itself  into  a  council  of  mediation.  It  said  that 
while  the  killing  of  seals  in  the  open  sea  was  not  a  violation  of  the 
legal  rights  of  the  United  States  of  which  that  country  could  legally 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT  65 

killing  of  female  seals  in  the  Bering  Sea  and  asserted  our 
territorial  jurisdiction  over  that  sea  for  this  purpose.  The 
question  was  submitted  to  international  arbitrators  and  the 
decision  was  against  us ;  but  the  arbitrators,  in  order  to  save 
to  the  world  the  only  valuable  and  extensive  herd  of  fur 
seals,  recommended  a  compromise  by  treaty  between  the  na- 
tions concerned,  and  accordingly  treaties  have  been  made 
between  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  Russia  and  Japan 
which  have  restored  the  herd  to  its  former  size  and  value. 
So  much,  therefore,  for  the  practical  character  of  the  first 
two  proposals. 

The  third  proposal  is  more  novel  than  the  others  and 
gives  to  the  whole  plan  a  more  constructive  character.  It 
looks  to  the  use  of  economic  means  first,  and  military  force 
if  necessary,  to  enforce  the  obligation  of  every  member  of 

complain,  it  was  nevertheless  a  great  injury  to  the  common  welfare 
of  the  world  to  destroy  this  greatest  seal  herd  of  the  world,  first,  because 
the  fur  was  valuable  and  useful  for  the  garments  of  men  and  women, 
and,  second,  because  the  destruction  of  the  herd  would  destroy  valuable 
and  useful  industries  in  the  preparation  of  the  seal  pelts  for  use. 
Therefore,  they  said  it  was  good  form  and  in  the  interest  of  the  world 
that  the  four  nations  concerned  should  agree  upon  a  compromise  by 
which  the  United  States  might  continue  to  maintain  the  herd  and  sell 
the  seal  pelts  gathered  on  the  islands  and  that  pelagic  sealing  should 
be  stopped,  but  that  the  United  States,  in  consideration  of  the  other 
three  nations  restricting  their  citizens  from  pelagic  sealing,  should 
divide  with  the  other  three  nations  some  of  the  profits  of  the  herd. 
Accordingly,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Japan,  and  the  United  States 
made  such  a  treaty,  which  is  still  in  force  and  under  which  the  herd 
has  been  restored  to  its  former  size  and  value.  Here  we  have  an 
example  of  a  court  passing  on  questions  of  legal  right  and  deciding 
them  against  the  United  States.  Then  we  have  the  court  changing 
itself  into  a  council  of  mediation  and  recommending  a  compromise, 
prompted  by  considerations  of  decency  and  good  form  and  the  public 
welfare  of  the  world,  which  the  nations  appealed  to  have  adopted 
and  embodied  in  a  treaty." 


66        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  League  to  submit  any  complaint  it  has  to  make  against 
another  member  of  the  League,  either  to  the  permanent  inter- 
national court,  or  to  the  Commission  of  Conciliation,  and  to 
await  final  action  by  that  tribunal  before  beginning  hostili- 
ties. It  will  be  observed  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  pro- 
gram to  use  the  economic  boycott  or  the  jointly  acting  armies 
of  the  League  to  enforce  the  judgment  declared  or  the  com- 
promise recommended.  These  means  are  used  only  to  pre- 
vent the  beginning  of  war  before  there  has  been  a  com- 
plete submission,  hearing  of  evidence,  argument  and  de- 
cision or  recommendation.  We  sincerely  believe  that  in 
most  cases,  with  such  a  delay  and  such  a  winnowing  out  of 
the  issues  and  such  an  opportunity  for  the  peoples  of  the 
different  countries  to  understand  the  position  of  each  other, 
war  would  generally  not  be  resorted  to.  Our  ambition  is 
not  to  propose  a  plan,  the  perfect  working  out  of  which  will 
absolutely  prevent  war;  first,  because  we  do  not  think  such 
a  plan  would  work;  and  second,  because  we  are  willing  to 
concede  that  there  may  be  governmental  and  international 
injustice  which  cannot  be  remedied  except  by  force.  If, 
therefore,  after  a  full  discussion  and  decision  by  impartial 
judges  or  a  recommendation  by  earnest,  sincere  and  equit- 
able compromisers,  a  people  still  thinks  that  it  must  vindicate 
its  rights  by  war,  we  do  not  attempt  in  this  plan  to  prevent 
it  by  force. 

Having  thus  explained  what  the  plan  is,  let  us  consider  the 
objections  which  have  been  made  to  it. 

The  first  objection  is  that,  in  a  dispute  between  two  mem- 
bers of  the  League,  it  would  be  practically  difficult  to  de- 
termine which  one  was  the  aggressor  and  which  one,  there- 
fore, in  fact,  began  actual  hostilities.  There  may  be  some 
trouble  in  this,  I  can  see ;  but  what  we  are  dealing  with  is  a 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT       67 

working  hypothesis,  a  very  general  plan.  The  details  are 
not  worked  out.  One  can  suggest  that  an  International 
Council  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  mediate  the  differences 
might  easily  determine  for  the  League  which  nation  was  at 
fault  in  beginning  hostilities.  It  would  doubtless  be  neces- 
sary where  some  issues  arise  to  require  a  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  until  the  issues  were  submitted  and  decided  in  one 
tribunal  or  the  other;  but  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  these 
suggested  difficulties  are  insuperable  or  may  not  be  com- 
pletely met  by  a  detailed  procedure  that,  of  course,  must  be 
fixed  before  the  plan  of  the  League  shall  become  operative. 
The  second  objection  is  to  the  use  of  the  economic  boycott 
and  the  army  and  the  navy  to  enforce  the  obligations  entered 
into  by  the  members  of  the  League.  I  respect  the  views 
of  Pacifists  and  those  who  advocate  the  doctrine  of  non- 
resistance  as  the  only  Christian  doctrine.  Such  is  the  view 
of  that  Society  of  Friends  which,  with  a  courage  higher  than 
that  possessed  by  those  who  advocate  forcible  means,  are 
willing  to  subject  themselves  to  the  injustice  of  the  wicked 
in  order  to  carry  out  their  ideal  of  what  Christian  action 
should  be.  They  have  been  so  far  in  advance  of  the  general 
opinions  of  the  world  in  their  history  of  three  hundred  years, 
and  have  lived  to  see  so  many  of  their  doctrines  recognized 
by  the  world  as  just,  that  I  always  differ  from  them  with 
reluctance.  Still,  it  seems  to  me  that  in  the  necessity  of 
preserving  our  civilization  and  saving  our  country's  freedom 
and  individual  liberty  maintained  now  for  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  years,  we  have  no  right  to  assume  that  we  have 
passed  beyond  the  period  in  history  when  nations  are  affected 
by  the  same  frailties  and  the  same  temptations  to  cupidity, 
cruelty  and  injustice  as  men.  In  our  domestic  communities 
we  need  a  police  force  to  protect  the  innocent  and  the  just 


68        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

against  the  criminal  and  the  unjust,  and  to  maintain  the 
guaranty  of  life,  liberty  and  property.  The  analogy  be- 
tween the  domestic  community  and  that  of  nations  is  suf- 
ficently  close  to  justify  and  require  what  is  in  fact  an  inter- 
national police  force.  The  attitude  of  those  who  oppose 
using  force  or  a  threat  of  force  to  compel  nations  to  keep 
the  peace  is  really  like  that  of  the  modern  school  of  theoreti- 
cal anarchists,  who  maintain  that  if  all  restraint  were  re- 
moved and  there  were  no  government,  and  the  children  and 
youth,  and  men  and  women  were  trained  to  self-responsibil- 
ity, every  member  of  society  would  know  what  his  or  her 
duty  was  and  would  perform  it.  They  assert  that  it  is  the 
existence  of  restraint  that  leads  to  the  violation  of  right.  I 
may  be  permitted  to  remark  that  with  modern  fads  of  educa- 
tion we  have  gone  far  in  the  direction  of  applying  this  prin- 
ciple of  modern  anarchy  in  the  discipline  and  education  of 
our  children  and  youth,  but  I  do  not  think  the  result  can  be 
said  to  justify  the  theory  if  we  can  judge  from  the  strikes  of 
school  children  or  from  the  general  lack  of  discipline  and 
respect  for  authority  that  the  rising  generation  manifests. 
The  time  has  not  come  when  we  can  afford  to  give  up  the 
threat  of  the  police  and  the  use  of  force  to  back  up  and  sus- 
tain the  obligation  of  moral  duty. 

The  third  objection  is  that  it  would  be  unconstitutional  for 
the  United  States,  through  its  treaty-making  power,  to  enter 
into  such  a  League.  This  objection  is  based  on  the  fact  that 
the  Constitution  vests  in  Congress  the  power  to  declare  war. 
It  is  said  that  this  League  would  transfer  the  power  to  de- 
clare war  away  from  Congress  to  some  foreign  council,  in 
which  the  United  States  would  only  have  a  representative. 
This  objection  grows  out  of  a  misconception  of  the  effect  of 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT        <X) 

a  treaty  and  a  confusion  of  ideas.  The  United  States  makes 
its  contract  with  other  nations  under  the  Constitution 
through  the  President  and  two-thirds  of  the  Senate,  who 
constitute  the  treaty-making  power.  The  President  and  the 
Senate  have  a  right  to  bind  the  United  States  to  any  contract 
with  any  other  nation  covering  the  subject  matter  within 
the  normal  field  of  treaties  For  this  purpose  the  President 
and  the  Senate  are  the  United  States.  When  the  contract 
comes  to  be  performed,  the  United  States  is  to  perform  it 
through  that  department  of  the  government  which,  by  the 
Constitution,  should  perform  it,  should  represent  the  govern- 
ment and  should  act  for  it  Thus,  the  treaty-making  power 
may  bind  the  United  States  to  pay  to  another  country  under 
certain  conditions  a  million  dollars.  When  the  conditions 
are  fulfilled,  then  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
to  pay  the  million  dollars.  Under  the  Constitution,  only 
Congress  can  appropriate  the  million  dollars  from  the 
treasury.  Therefore,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  Congress  to 
make  that  appropriation.  It  may  refuse  to  make  the  appro- 
priation. If  it  does  so,  it  dishonors  the  written  obligation 
of  the  United  States.  It  has  the  power  either  to  perform 
the  obligation  or  to  refuse  to  perform  it.  That  fact,  how- 
ever, does  not  make  the  action  of  the  treaty  power  in  bind- 
ing the  United  States  to  pay  the  money  unconstitutional. 
So  the  treaty-making  power  may  bind  the  United  States 
under  certain  conditions  to  make  war.  When  the  conditions 
arise  requiring  the  making  of  war,  then  it  becomes  the  duty 
of  Congress  honorably  to  perform  the  obligation  of  the 
United  States.  Congress  may  shirk  this  duty  and  exercise 
its  power  to  refuse  to  declare  war.  It  thus  dishonors  a  bind- 
ing obligation  of  the  United  States.  But  the  obligation  was 


7O  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

entered  into  in  the  constitutional  way  and  it  is  to  be  per- 
formed in  the  constitutional  way. 

It  is  said  that  to  enter  into  such  a  compact  would  require 
us  to  maintain  a  standing  army.  I  do  not  think  this  fol- 
lows at  all.  If  we  become,  as  we  should  become,  reason- 
ably prepared  to  resist  unjust  military  aggression,  and  have 
a  navy  sufficiently  large,  and  coast  defenses  sufficiently  well 
equipped  to  constitute  a  first  line  of  defense,  and  an  army 
which  we  could  mobilize  into  half  a  million  trained  men 
within  two  months,  we  would  have  all  the  force  needed  to 
do  our  part  of  the  police  work  in  resisting  the  unlawful  ag- 
gression of  any  one  member  of  the  League  against  another. 

Fourth,  it  has  been  urged  that  for  us  to  become  a  party  to 
this  League  is  to  give  up  our  Monroe  Doctrine,  under  which 
we  ought  forcibly  to  resist  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Euro- 
pean or  Asiatic  powers  to  subvert  an  independent  govern- 
ment in  the  Western  Hemisphere  or  to  take  from  such  a 
government  any  substantial  part  of  its  territory.  It  is  a 
sufficient  answer  to  this  objection  to  say  that  a  question 
under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  come  under  that  class  of 
issues  which  must  be  submitted  to  a  Council  of  Conciliation. 
Pending  this,  of  course,  the  status  quo  must  be  maintained. 
An  argument  and  recommendation  of  compromise  would  fol- 
low. If  we  did  not  agree  to  the  compromise  and  proceeded 
forcibly  to  resist  violation  of  the  Doctrine,  we  should  not  be 
violating  the  terms  of  the  League  by  hostilities  thereafter. 
More  than  this,  as  Professor  Wilson,  of  Harvard,  the  well- 
known  authority  upon  international  law,  has  pointed  out, 
we  are  already  under  a  written  obligation  to  delay  a  year 
before  beginning  hostilities  in  respect  to  any  question  arising 
between  us  and  most  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  this  neces- 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT        71 

sarily  includes  questions  relating  to  a  violation  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  It  is  difficult  to  see,  therefore,  how  the  obli- 
gation of  such  a  League  as  this  would  put  us  in  any  different 
position  from  that  which  we  now  occupy  in  regard  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Finally,  I  come  to  the  most  formidable  objection,  which 
is  that  entering  into  such  a  League  by  the  United  States 
would  be  a  departure  from  the  policy  that  it  has  consistently 
pursued  since  the  days  of  Washington,  in  accordance  with 
the  advice  of  his  farewell  address  that  we  enter  into  no 
entangling  alliances  with  European  countries.  Those  of  us 
who  support  the  proposals  of  the  League  believe  that  were 
Washington  living  to-day  he  would  not  consider  the  League 
as  an  entangling  alliance.  He  had  in  mind  such  a  treaty 
as  that  the  United  States  made  with  France,  by  which  we 
were  subjected  to  great  embarrassment  when  France 
attempted  to  use  our  ports  as  bases  of  operation  against 
England  while  we  were  at  peace  with  England.  He  cer- 
tainly did  not  have  in  mind  a  union  of  all  the  Great  Powers 
to  enforce  peace ;  and  while  he  did  dwell,  and  properly  dwelt, 
on  the  very  great  advantage  that  the  United  States  had  in 
her  isolation  from  European  disputes,  it  was  an  isolation 
which  does  not  now  exist.  In  his  day  we  were  only  three 
and  a  half  millions  of  people,  with  thirteen  States  strung 
along  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  We  were  five  times  as  far 
from  Europe  as  we  are  now  in  speed  of  transportation,  and 
many  times  as  far  in  speed  of  communication.  We  are  now 
one  hundred  millions  of  people  between  the  two  oceans  and 
between  the  Canada  line  and  the  Gulf.  We  face  the  Pacific 
with  California,  Oregon  and  Washington,  which  alone  makes 
us  a  Pacific  power.  We  own  Alaska,  the  northwestern 
corner  of  our  continent,  a  dominion  of  immense  extent  with 


72        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

natural  resources  as  yet  hardly  calculable  and  with  a  country 
capable  of  supporting  a  considerable  population.  This 
makes  us  a  close  neighbor  of  Russia  across  the  Bering 
Straits;  while  ownership  of  islands  in  that  sea  brings  us 
close  to  Japan.  We  own  Hawaii,  2,000  miles  out  to  sea 
from  San  Francisco,  with  75,000  Japanese  laborers  consti- 
tuting the  largest  element  of  its  population.  We  own  the 
Philippine  Islands,  140,000  square  miles,  with  eight  millions 
of  people,  under  the  eaves  of  Asia.  We  are  properly 
anxious  to  maintain  an  open  door  to  China,  and  to  share 
equally  in  the  enormous  trade  which  that  country,  with  her 
400  teeming  millions,  is  bound  to  furnish  when  organized 
capital  and  her  wonderful  laboring  populations  shall  be 
intelligently  directed  toward  the  development  of  her  rich 
natural  resources.  Our  discrimination  against  the  Japanese 
and  the  Chinese  presents  a  possible  cause  of  friction,  since 
the  resentment  that  they  feel  may  lead  to  untoward  incidents. 
We  own  the  Panama  Canal  in  a  country  which  was  recently 
a  part  of  a  South  American  confederation.  We  have  in- 
vested 400  millions  in  that  great  world  enterprise  to  unite 
our  Eastern  and  Western  seaboards  by  cheap  transportation, 
to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  our  navy  and  to  make  a  path 
for  the  world's  commerce  between  the  two  great  oceans. 

We  own  Porto  Rico,  with  a  million  people,  and  we  owe 
to  those  people  protection  at  home  and  abroad,  as  they  owe 
allegiance  to  us. 

We  have  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  Cuba,  and  have 
reserved  the  right  to  enter  and  maintain  the  guaranty  of  life, 
liberty  and  property  and  to  repress  insurrection  in  that 
island.  Since  originally  turning  over  the  island  to  its  people 
we  have  had  once  to  return  there  and  restore  peace  and 
order.  We  have  on  our  southern  border  the  international 


A    CONSTRUCTIVE    PLAN    FOR    HUMAN    BETTERMENT        73 

nuisance  of  Mexico,  and  nobody  can  foresee  the  complica- 
tions that  will  arise  out  of  the  anarchy  there  prevailing. 
We  have  the  Monroe  Doctrine  still  to  maintain.  Our  rela- 
tions to  Europe  have  been  shown  to  be  very  near  by  our 
experience  in  pursuing  lawfully  our  natural  rights  in  our 
trade  upon  the  Atlantic  Ocean  with  European  countries. 
Both  belligerents  have  violated  our  rights,  and  in  the  now 
nearly  two  years  which  have  elapsed  since  the  war  began 
we  have  been  close  to  war  in  the  defense  of  those  rights. 
Contrast  our  present  world  relations  with  those  we  had  in 
Washington's  time.  It  would  seem  clear  that  the  conditions 
have  so  changed  as  to  justify  a  seeming  departure  from 
advice  directed  to  such  a  different  state  of  things.  One 
may  reasonably  question  whether  the  United  States,  by 
uniting  with  the  other  great  powers  to  prevent  the  recur- 
rence of  future  world  war,  may  not  risk  less  in  assuming 
the  obligations  of  a  member  of  the  League  than  by  refusing 
to  become  such  a  member  in  view  of  her  world-wide  in- 
terests. But  even  if  the  risk  of  war  to  the  United  States 
would  be  greater  by  entering  the  League  than  by  staying 
out  of  it,  does  not  the  United  States  have  a  duty,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  family  of  nations,  to  do  its  part  and  run  its  neces- 
sary risk  to  make  less  probable  the  coming  of  such  another 
war  and  such  another  disaster  to  the  human  race  ? 

We  are  the  richest  nation  in  the  world,  and  in  the  sense  of 
what  we  could  do  were  we  to  make  reasonable  preparation 
we  are  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world.  We  have 
been  showered  with  good  fortune.  Our  people  have  enjoyed 
a  happiness  known  to  no  other  people.  Does  not  this  im- 
pose upon  us  a  sacred  duty  to  join  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  in  a  fraternal  spirit  and  with  a  willingness  to  make 
sacrifices  if  we  can  promote  the  general  welfare  of  men? 


74  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

At  the  close  of  this  war  the  governments  and  the  people 
of  the  belligerent  countries,  under  the  enormous  burdens  and 
suffering  from  the  great  losses  of  the  war,  will  be  in  a  con- 
dition of  mind  to  accept  and  promote  such  a  plan  for  the 
enforcement  of  future  peace.  President  Wilson,  at  the  head 
of  this  administration  and  the  initiator  of  our  foreign 
policies  under  the  Constitution;  Senator  Loclge,  the  senior 
Republican  member  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
and  therefore  the  leader  of  the  opposition  on  such  an  issue, 
have  both  approved  of  the  principles  of  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace.  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Lord  Bryce  have  indi- 
cated their  sympathy  and  support  of  the  same  principles, 
and  we  understand  that  M.  Briand,  of  France,  has  similar 
views. 


THE  PURPOSES  OF  THE  LEAGUE  * 

The  purpose  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  is,  after  the 
present  war,  to  organize  the  world  politically  so  as  to  enable 
it  to  use  its  power  to  prevent  the  hotheadedness  of  any  nation 
from  lighting  a  fire  of  war  which  shall  spread  into  another 
general  conflagration.  It  proposes  to  effect  this  by  securing 
membership  in  the  League  of  all  the  great  nations  of  the 
world.  The  minor  stable  nations  will  then  certainly  join 
because  of  the  protection  which  the  League  would  afford 
them  against  sudden  attack  by  a  great  power.  The  League 
will  then  become  a  World  League.  If  it  does  not,  it  will 
fail  of  its  purpose.  No  member  of  the  League  is  to  begin 

1  Address  delivered  at  the  dinner  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
the  Borough  of  Queens,  New  York  City,  Saturday  evening,  January 
20,  1917. 


THE    PURPOSES    OF    THE    LEAGUE  75 

war  against  any  other  member  until  after  the  question  be- 
tween them  shall  have  been  submitted  to  a  Court,  if  the 
question  is  of  a  legal  nature,  or  a  Commission  of  Concilia- 
tion, if  it  can  not  be  settled  on  principles  of  law.  The  mem- 
bers agree  to  await  the  judgment  in  the  one  case  or  the 
recommendation  of  a  compromise  in  the  other,  before  begin- 
ning hostilities.  If  any  member  violates  this  agreement  and 
begins  hostilities  before  the  appointed  time,  the  whole  power 
of  the  League,  by  the  joint  use  of  the  military  and  naval 
force  of  its  members,  is  to  be  exerted  to  defend  the  nation 
prematurely  attacked  against  the  nation  attacking  it.  The 
compulsion  thus  to  be  exercised  is  directed  only  to  securing 
deliberation  and  delay  sufficient  to  permit  a  hearing  and 
judgment  on  questions  of  a  legal  nature,  and  a  hearing  and 
recommendation  of  compromise  on  other  questions. 

There  would  be  practical  difficulties  in  attempting  to  en- 
force judgments,  difficulties  which  may  some  day  be  over- 
come but  which  the  League  has  now  no  purpose  to  attempt 
to  solve.  It  would  be  still  more  difficult  to  enforce  com- 
promises. The  League  contents  itself,  and  believes  that  it 
will  make  a  long  step  forward  if  it  succeeds,  in  securing  a 
world  agreement  by  which  hearings  of  the  irritating  issues 
may  be  had  and  a  decision  rendered  before  war  is  allowed  to 
begin.  It  is  confident  that,  in  most  cases,  a  war  thus  delayed 
for  a  full  discussion  of  the  issues  and  a  fair  decision  will 
never  come. 

Mr.  Roosevelt  objects  to  the  League  with  great  emphasis. 
It  would  have  added  to  the  usefulness  of  his  criticism  if  he 
had  read  carefully  the  proposals  of  the  League.  He  as- 
sumes that  the  League  proposes  that  the  judgments  and 
recommendations  of  compromise  reached  shall  be  enforced 


76        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

by  the  League.  This  is  a  fundamental  error.  We  may 
therefore  dismiss  further  consideration  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
objections. 

Senator  Borah  objects  to  the  League  because  he  says  it 
will  involve  the  United  States  in  a  surrender  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  in  momentous  obligations  which  he  does  not 
think  the  people  would  be  willing  to  assume.  I  quite  agree 
that  the  League  will  involve  momentous  consequences,  and 
I  also  quite  agree  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  ought 
to  understand  exactly  what  those  consequences  are  and  the 
burdens  that  they  would  assume  in  entering  such  a  League. 
It  would  be  a  great  deal  better  not  to  enter  such  a  League 
than  to  suffer  the  humiliation  of  having  made  an  agreement 
and  then  repudiate  it.  There  is  no  disposition  on  the  part 
of  those  who  are  urging  the  adoption  of  the  League  to  avoid 
a  discussion  of  its  necessary  consequences.  They,  on  the 
contrary,  seek  the  fullest  discussion  because  it  would  be  idle 
for  the  treaty-making  power  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  this 
kind  until  after  Congress  and  all  the  people  of  the  United 
States  shall  know  and  fully  approve  our  participation  in 
such  a  movement. 

Senator  Borah  supposes  three  cases  to  show  its  dangers. 
In  the  first,  Russia  and  Japan,  being  members  of  the  League 
with  all  the  other  great  nations  of  the  World,  have  a  con- 
troversy over  a  matter  in  Manchuria.  Russia  refuses  sub- 
mission to  a  Court  or  Commission,  and  begins  hostilities 
against  Japan.  Under  the  League,  England,  France,  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Italy  and  the  United  States  would  unite 
forces  with  Japan  to  defeat  Russia's  attack.  The  United 
States  would  have  to  contribute  men  and  vessels  according 
to  some  equitable  rule  prescribed  in  the  Treaty,  proportioned 
to  resources  and  geographical  location.  This  is  the  extreme 


THE    PURPOSES    OF    THE    LEAGUE  77 

responsibility  which  the  United  States  must  face.  This  is 
the  burden  she  might  have.  But  it  is  improbable.  With  a 
knowledge  of  this  union  of  tremendous  forces  against  her, 
Russia  would  not  be  likely  to  violate  her  plighted  faith. 
The  moral  effect  of  the  power  of  the  world  would  prevent 
her.  Ought  the  United  States  not  be  willing  to  run  the  risk 
of  being  called  upon  to  contribute  her  quota  in  such  a  remote 
contingency  in  order  that  the  power  of  the  world  may  be- 
come effective  without  actual  use  of  force  to  stop  war? 
Each  instance  of  its  successful  exercise  would  strengthen  its 
future  moral  influence. 

The  second  case  suggested  by  Senator  Borah  is  this. 
Mexico  transfers  part  of  her  territory  to  Japan,  and  Japan 
takes  it.  Thus  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  violated.  The 
United  States  protests  and  Japan  demands  a  submission 
under  the  League.  The  question  is  a  political  one;  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  involve  or  rest  on  principles  of 
international  law.  It  would  be  submitted  to  the  Commission 
of  Conciliation  which  would,  after  needed  time,  recommend 
a  compromise.  The  United  States,  if  it  did  not  subscribe 
to  the  compromise,  might  honorably  refuse  to  accept  it  and 
begin  hostilities  against  Japan.  Under  the  thirty  treaties 
initiated  by  Mr.  Bryan,  and  consented  to  by  the  Senate,  the 
United  States  could  not  even  now  begin  such  hostilities 
within  a  year.  In  what  respect,  therefore,  is  the  United 
States  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine? 

The  third  case  supposed  by  Senator  Borah  is  that  Argen- 
tine and  a  European  government  have  a  dispute  and  Argen- 
tine refuses  to  submit.  If  Argentine  begins  war  against  the 
European  country,  then  the  powers  of  the  League  must  be 
used  against  her,  and  European  forces  jointly  with  our  own 


78  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

will  punish  her  for  violating  her  plighted  faith  and  treaty 
obligations.  This  is  said  to  involve  an  abandonment  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Why?  Mr.  Seward  in  1866,  and  Mr. 
Roosevelt  in  his  administration,  said  most  emphatically  that 
the  Doctrine  can  not  be  used  to  shelter  South  American 
countries  against  punishment  by  European  countries  for 
their  shortcomings.  The  only  limitation  set  by  the  Doctrine 
is  that  the  punishment  inflicted  shall  not  involve  subverting 
the  independence  of  Argentine  or  appropriating  and  coloniz- 
ing her  territory.  I  submit,  therefore,  that  the  three  cases 
suggested  by  Senator  Borah  do  not  present  the  difficulties  he 
supposes. 

The  two  questions  for  us  are  whether  the  League  is  prac- 
tical and  whether  the  United  States  ought  to  enter  it.  Of 
course  it  is  only  a  general  plan,  and  the  details  would  have 
to  be  worked  out  in  a  world  conference.  That  it  is  feasible, 
and  that  such  details  may  be  worked  out,  is  indicated  by  the 
approval  which  the  League  has  received  from  Germany,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  from  the  Allies,  on  the  other.  There  are 
of  course  very  great  difficulties  in  a  practical  union  of  the 
forces  of  the  world  to  accomplish  a  definite  single  purpose, 
but  they  are  not  insuperable.  The  League  is  only  applying 
to  the  international  community  the  same  principle  that  has 
been  applied  to  the  domestic  community,  that  of  using  the 
force  of  all  to  suppress  the  lawless  force  of  the  few  for  the 
common  good. 

We  are  now  entering  upon  a  policy  of  preparation  to  de- 
fend ourselves  against  the  unjust  aggression  of  any  nation. 
I  believe  this  to  be  absolutely  essential  to  our  country's  in- 
terest. The  League  has  officially  recognized  that  such 
preparation  is  necessary  to  its  progress.  When  we  have 


THE    PURPOSES   OF   THE   LEAGUE  79 

made  this  preparation  and  have  the  forces  of  our  army  and 
navy  adequate  to  it,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  contribute 
our  share  to  any  force  that  we  may  be  called  upon  to  furnish 
in  a  joint  exercise  of  power  by  the  world  to  suppress  war. 
President  Wilson  has  said  that  in  the  next  war  there  will  be 
no  neutrals.  If  the  science  of  war  advances  in  the  next  war 
as  much  as  it  has  advanced  in  this  over  the  last  war,  he  is 
certainly  right  —  there  will  be  no  room  for  neutrals.  In 
this  aspect,  and  from  a  selfish  standpoint,  therefore,  our 
membership  in  the  League  in  the  future  would  prove  to  be 
safer  for  our  interests  than  if  we  stayed  out  of  it. 

But  is  the  selfish  standpoint  the  only  one  from  which  we 
should  view  this  question  ?  We  are  potentially  the  strongest 
nation  in  the  world.  We  have  a  vast  population  with  high 
intelligence,  solidarity  and  homogeneity.  We  have  enor- 
mous resources  and  incomparable  wealth.  We  are  so 
situated  that  our  position  between  the  nations  of  Europe 
and  between  those  of  Asia  is  an  impartial  one  and  we  could 
therefore  exercise  a  just  and  commanding  influence  in  a 
council  of  nations.  We  do  not  realize  our  power  in  this 
respect.  Lord  Grey  says  that  we  are  necessary  to  the  suc- 
cessful launching  of  such  a  League.  We  must  lead  it. 
Have  we  any  right,  therefore,  to  stay  out  of  a  world-ar- 
rangement calculated  to  make  a  world- war  improbable,  be- 
cause we  shall  risk  having  to  contribute  our  share  to  an 
international  police  force  to  suppress  the  disturbers  of  peace? 
To-day  war  in  any  part  of  the  world  may  rapidly  manifest 
itself  in  another  part,  and  the  advantage  of  suppressing  it 
or  hedging  it  about  so  as  to  prevent  its  spread  is  inestimable. 

[The  following  statement  was  made  on  the  occasion  of  a  mass  meeting 
at  Richmond,  Va.,  Wednesday  evening,  March  21,  1917:] 

The  break  with   Germany  and  the  imminence  of   war 


8O  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

furnish  the  strongest  arguments  for  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace. 

Preparedness  is  one  of  the  watchwords  of  the  hour.  The 
Executive  Committee  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  has 
pronounced  more  than  once  in  favor  of  national  prepared- 
ness to  meet  all  emergencies  and  pointed  out  the  fact  that  the 
plan  it  puts  forward  makes  preparedness  a  necessity. 

The  duty  to  support  the  President  in  his  foreign  policy 
is  plain.  The  League  has  declared  a  thousand  times  that 
it  is  not  a  stop-the-war  movement,  and  has  pledged  its  sup- 
port in  the  defense  of  civilization  and  the  rights  of  our 
citizens. 

The  reason  we  have  protested  against  Germany's  ruthless 
submarine  warfare  and  broken  off  relations  with  her  is  be- 
cause her  conduct  is  subversive  of  any  peace  that  is  worth 
having. 

As  we  are  forced  into  the  war,  our  sole  purpose  must  be 
to  secure  the  right  kind  of  a  peace  after  the  war,  for  our- 
selves and  for  the  whole  world  —  a  permanent  and  righteous 
peace. 

This  fact  is  fundamental  to  the  whole  situation,  and  ought 
to  be  kept  constantly  before  the  minds  of  all  our  people. 
We  are  contending  for  a  righteous  and  permanent  peace 
and  for  nothing  else  whatsoever.  Preparation  for  such  a 
peace  is  the  most  important  part  of  preparedness.  The 
President  has  this  strongly  in  mind.  If,  through  the  growth 
of  hatred  and  the  cry  for  vengeance,  the  world  should  lose 
sight  of  its  real  purpose  and  come  to  the  end  of  the  war  not 
knowing  what  it  most  wants  and  needs,  and  so  should  fail 
to  roll  the  burden  of  militarism  off  its  shoulders  and  to 
establish  lasting  peace,  it  would  be  a  tragedy  in  the  history 
of  the  world. 


THE    MENACE   OF   A    PREMATURE    PEACE  8l 

The  League  to  Enforce  Peace  presents  the  elements  of  a 
program  that  has  been  recognized  as  having  in  it  promise 
of  a  better  future,  a  program  that  has  the  support  in  general 
terms  not  only  of  the  President  but  of  leading  statesmen  in 
all  or  nearly  all  of  the  leading  nations.  The  latter  have 
espoused  it  while  their  countries  were  at  war  and  both  they 
and  the  President  are  watching  the  growth  and  expression 
of  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  as  the  deciding  factor 
in  the  formation  of  a  league. 

During  the  present  crisis  and  throughout  the  war  which 
is  at  hand,  the  duty  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  is  to 
stimulate  military  preparedness  on  the  one  hand,  and  on 
the  other  to  spread  its  gospel  of  world  organization  for 
permanent  peace  after  this  conflict  is  over. 


THE  MENACE  OF  A  PREMATURE  PEACE  1 

We  are  engaged  in  the  greatest  war  of  history  to  secure 
permanent  world  peace.  We  are  fighting  for  a  definite 
purpose,  and  that  is  the  defeat  of  German  militarism.  If  the 
Prussian  military  caste  retains  its  power  to  control  the  mili- 
tary and  foreign  policy  of  Germany  after  the  war,  peace 
will  not  be  permanent,  and  war  will  begin  again  when  the 
chauvinistic  advisers  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  deem  a 
conquest  and  victory  possible. 

Our  Allies  have  made  a  stupendous  effort  and  have 
strained  their  utmost  capacity.  Unready  for  the  war,  they 
have  concentrated  their  energy  in  preparation.  In  this  im- 

1  Address  delivered  at  General  Conference  of  Unitarian  and  other 
Christian  Churches  at  Montreal,  September  26,  1917. 


82        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

portant  respect  they  have  defeated  the  plan  of  Germany  "  in 
shining  armor  "  to  crush  her  enemies  in  their  unreadiness. 

But  the  war  has  not  been  won.  Peace  now,  even  though 
it  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo, 
"  without  indemnities  and  without  annexations,"  would  be 
a  failure  to  achieve  the  great  purpose  for  which  the  Allies 
have  made  heartrending  sacrifice.  Armaments  would  con- 
tinue for  the  next  war,  and  this  war  would  have  been  fought 
in  vain.  The  millions  of  lives  lost  and  the  hundreds  of 
billions'  worth  of  the  product  of  men's  labor  would  be 
wasted. 

He  who  proposes  peace  now,  therefore,  either  does  not 
see  the  stake  for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting,  or  wishes  the 
German  military  autocracy  still  to  control  the  destinies  of 
all  of  us  as  to  peace  or  war.  Those  who  favor  permanent 
world  peace  must  oppose  with  might  and  main  the  proposals 
for  peace  at  this  juncture  in  the  war,  whether  made  in 
socialistic  councils,  in  pro-German  conferences  or  by  Pope 
Benedict.  That  the  Pontiff  of  the  greatest  Christian  Church 
should  wish  to  bring  to  an  end  a  war  in  which  millions  of 
its  communion  are  on  both  sides  is  to  be  expected.  That 
he  should  preserve  a  difficult  neutrality  is  also  natural. 
That  his  high  purpose  is  to  save  the  world  from  further 
suffering  goes  without  saying.  But  the  present  is  not  the 
opportunity  of  an  intervening  peacemaker  who  must  assume 
that  compromise  is  possible. 

The  Allies  are  fighting  for  a  principle  the  maintenance 
of  which  affects  the  future  of  civilization.  If  they  do  not 
achieve  it  they  have  sacrificed  the  flower  of  their  youth  and 
mortgaged  their  future  for  a  century,  and  all  for  nothing. 
This  is  not  a  war  in  which  the  stake  is  territory  or  sphere 
of  influence.  The  Allies  cannot  concede  peace  until  they 


THE    MENACE    OF    A    PREMATURE    PEACE  83 

conquer  it.  When  they  do  so,  it  will  be  permanent. 
Otherwise  they  fail. 

There  are  wars  like  that  between  Japan  and  Russia,  in 
which  President  Roosevelt  properly  and  successfully  inter- 
vened to  bring  about  a  peace  that  helped  the  parties  to  a 
settlement.  The  principle  at  stake  and  the  power  and  ter- 
ritory were  of  such  a  character  that  a  settlement  might  be 
made  substantially  permanent.  But  the  present  issue  is  like 
that  in  our  Civil  War,  which  was  whether  the  Union  was  to 
be  preserved  and  the  cancer  of  slavery  was  to  be  cut  out. 
Peace  proposals  to  President  Lincoln  were  quite  as  numer- 
ous as  those  of  to-day,  and  were  moved  by  quite  as  high 
motives.  But  there  was  no  compromise  possible.  Either 
slavery  and  disunion  lost  or  won.  So  to-day  the  great  moral 
object  of  the  war  must  be  achieved  or  defeated. 

An  organization  of  citizens  in  the  United  States,  known 
as  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  has  been  active  for  three 
years  past  in  promoting  its  propaganda.  There  is  a  similar 
association  in  England.  In  that  League  are  many  persons 
who  for  years  urged  the  settlement  of  all  international  con- 
troversies by  arbitration  or  judicial  decision.  The  vortex 
of  death  and  destruction  for  the  peoples  of  the  world,  which 
the  breaking  out  of  the  war  portended,  roused  these  peace 
lovers  and  promoters  to  devise  a  plan  for  avoiding  war  after 
this  should  end.  The  English  plan  is  more  ambitious  in 
providing  that  if  the  council  of  nations  so  decide  they  must 
enforce  the  judgment  or  settlement. 

Whatever  the  detailed  stipulations  of  such  a  league,  its 
operation  and  success  must  depend  on  the  obligations  of  the 
treaty  stipulations.  Unless  their  binding  effect  is  recognized 
by  the  nations  as  a  sacred  principle,  the  stipulations  of  the 


84  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

league  will  be  "  writ  in  water."  The  revelations  and  dis- 
closures of  this  war  will  satisfy  the  members  of  the  league 
that  as  long  as  the  present  military  caste  controls  the  German 
military  and  foreign  policy,  the  league  is  impracticable,  and 
would  not  be  worth  the  parchment  on  which  its  obligations 
would  be  recorded.  Why  have  they  reached  this  conclusion  ? 
Why,  as  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  as  citizens  of  the 
world  anxious  to  promote  peace,  do  they  feel  that  any  pro- 
posal of  peace  in  the  present  situation  would  defeat  perm- 
anent world  peace  and  should  be  opposed  by  them  with  all 
the  energy  they  can  command  ?  The  answer  to  this  question 
must  be  found  in  the  causes  of  this  war  and  the  revelations 
it  has  made  of  Germany's  purpose,  stripped  of  confusing 
pretence  and  naked  for  the  whole  world  to  see. 

Germany  was  long  divided  into  little  states,  kingdoms, 
duchies  and  other  forms  of  one-man  rule.  She  was  the 
prey  of  political  intrigue  and  manipulation  of  other  powers. 
All  her  well-wishers  hoped  for  and  looked  forward  to  her 
union.  The  Germans  of  yore  had  loved  freedom.  We 
Anglo-Saxons  were  Germans  once  and  our  representative 
system  can  be  traced  back  to  institutions  found  first  in  the 
forests  of  Germany.  In  the  wars  of  the  first  Napoleon, 
Prussia  and  other  German  states  were  subjected  to  a  great 
humiliation.  But  *he  German  youth  rebelled,  organized 
themselves  into  military  reserves,  and  finally  contributed 
much  to  the  defeat  of  the  man  whose  lust  for  universal 
power  finds  its  counterpart  in  the  aim  of  the  Hohenzollerns 
of  to-day.  Later,  the  Holy  Alliance,  retaining  the  principle 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  and  supporting  it  in  all  of 
Germany,  left  no  opportunity  for  the  free  exercise  of  politi- 
cal power  by  these  liberty-loving  German  youths.  In  1848 
democratic  revolutions  occurred  throughout  Germany  and 


THE    MENACE   OF   A    PREMATURE    PEACE  85 

in  Austria,  but  they  were  overcome.  Many  of  the  leaders 
came  to  the  United  States  and  with  their  followers  became 
our  best  adopted  citizens.  When  our  Civil  War  came  on, 
their  hatred  of  slavery  led  them  to  volunteer  for  their 
adopted  country,  and  every  battlefield  of  the  war  was  wet 
with  German  blood. 

In  Germany  itself,  however,  the  liberal  element  was  not 
allowed  to  work  out  its  hopes.  It  had  looked  to  a  united 
and  liberal  Germany  with  a  government  based  on  the  repre- 
sentative system.  It  was  not  to  be.  Under  the  first  Wil- 
liam with  his  Prime  Minister  Bismarck,  who  came  to  power 
in  1862,  a  definite  plan  was  adopted  of  perfecting  the 
already  well-disciplined  Prussian  army  so  that  by  "  blood 
and  iron  "  the  unity  of  Germany  should  be  achieved.  The 
whole  Prussian  nation  was  made  into  an  army,  and  it  soon 
became  a  machine  with  a  power  of  conquest  equaled  by  no 
other.  The  cynical,  unscrupulous,  but  effective,  diplomacy 
of  Bismarck  first  united  Prussia  with  Austria  to  deprive 
Denmark  of  Schleswig-Holstein  by  force,  then  secured  a 
quarrel  with  Austria  over  the  spoils,  and  deprived  her  of 
all  influence  over  the  German  states  by  humiliating  defeat  in 
the  six  weeks'  war  of  1866.  After  this  war,  several  Ger- 
man states  were  annexed  forcibly  to  Prussia  and  offensive 
and  defensive  alliances  were  made  with  others. 

Then  in  1870  the  occasion  was  seized,  when  it  was  known 
that  France  was  not  prepared,  to  strike  at  her.  France  was 
beaten,  and  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  taken  from  her.  The 
German  Empire  was  established  with  a  Prussian  King  at  its 
head.  France  was  made  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  one  billion 
dollars,  with  which  the  military  machine  of  Germany  was 
strengthened  and  improved.  Then  Germany  settled  down 
to  a  period  of  peace  to  digest  the  territory  which  by  these 


86  TAFT   PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 

three  wars  had  been  absorbed.  Bismarck's  purpose  in  main- 
taining the  superiority  of  his  army  was  to  retain  what  had 
been  taken  by  blood  and  iron,  and  at  the  same  time  by  a 
period  of  prolonged  peace  to  give  to  Germany  a  full  oppor- 
tunity for  industrial  development  and  the  self-discipline 
necessary  for  the  highest  efficiency. 

The  marvelous  work  which  the  Germans  have  accom- 
plished in  their  field  of  industrial  activity  is  known  to  all. 
The  prosperity  which  followed  increased  the  population  of 
Germany  and  crowded  her  borders.  Bismarck  was  dis- 
missed by  the  present  Emperor,  but  his  policy  of  maintain- 
ing the  highest  efficiency  of  the  army  was  continued.  And 
then,  as  the  success  of  the  German  system  in  the  material 
development  of  the  Empire  showed  itself  and  became  the 
admiration  of  the  world,  the  destiny  of  Germany  grew  larger 
in  the  eyes  of  her  Emperor  and  her  people,  and  the  blood 
and  iron  policy  which  had  been  directed  first  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  unity  of  Germany  and  then  to  the  defense  of 
the  German  Empire  in  the  enjoyment  of  what  had  been  taken 
in  previous  wars,  expanded  into  a  dream  of  Germanizing  the 
world.  The  German  people  were  impregnated  with  this 
idea  by  every  method  of  official  instruction.  A  cult  of 
philosophy  to  spread  the  propaganda  developed  itself  in  the 
universities  and  schools.  The  principle  was  that  the  state 
could  do  no  wrong,  that  the  state  was  an  entity  that  must 
be  sustained  by  force ;  that  everything  else  must  be  sacrificed 
to  its  strength ;  that  the  only  sin  the  state  could  commit  was 
neglect  and  failure  to  maintain  its  power. 

With  that  dogmatic  logic  which  pleases  the  German  mind, 
and  to  which  it  readily  adapts  itself,  this  proposition  easily 
led  to  the  further  conclusion  that  there  could  be  no  inter- 
national morality;  that  morality  and  its  principles  applied 


THE    MENACE   OF    A    PREMATURE    PEACE  87 

only  to  individuals,  but  that  when  the  action  of  the  state  was 
involved,  considerations  of  honor,  of  the  preservation  of  ob- 
ligations solemnly  made,  must  yield  if  the  interests  of  the 
state  required.  These  were  the  principles  taught  by 
Treitschke  in  the  University  of  Berlin  and  maintained  by 
German  economic  philosophers  and  by  the  representative  of 
the  military  regime  in  the  person  of  Bernhardi. 

Bismarck  had  been  keen  enough  in  his  diplomacy  to  await 
the  opportunity  that  events  presented  for  seeming  to  be 
forced  into  a  war  which  he  had  long  planned.  This  was  the 
case  with  Denmark.  This  was  the  case  with  Austria. 
This  was  the  case  with  France.  German  diplomacy  has  lost 
nothing  of  this  characteristic  in  the  present  war.  Germany 
did  not  plan  the  killing  of  the  Austrian  Archduke  and  his 
consort ;  but  the  minute  that  that  event  presented  the  likeli- 
hood of  war,  Germany  accepted  it  as  the  opportunity  for  her 
to  strike  down  her  neighbors,  Russia  and  France,  and  to 
enlarge  her  power.  She  gladly  gave  her  consent  to  the  ulti- 
matum of  Austria  to  Servia  that  was  sure  to  bring  on  war, 
and  then  posed  as  one  driven  into  war  by  the  mobilization  of 
Russia. 

She  knew  that  Russia  was  utterly  unprepared.  She  knew 
that  France  was  unprepared.  She  knew  that  Great  Britain 
was  unprepared.  She  herself  was  ready  to  the  last  cannon 
and  the  last  reservist.  Therefore,  when  appealed  to  by 
Great  Britain  and  by  all  the  other  Powers  to  intervene  and 
prevent  Austria  from  forcing  a  universal  war,  Germany 
declined  to  act.  Not  a  telegram  or  communication  between 
Germany  and  Austria  has  ever  been  given  to  the  public  to 
show  the  slightest  effort  to  induce  delay  by  Austria.  While 
Germany  would  pose  as  having  acted  only  as  Austria's  ally 
and  as  unwilling  to  influence  her  against  her  interest  and 


88       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

independent  judgment,  the  verdict  of  history  unquestionably 
will  be  that  the  war  is  due  to  Germany's  failure  to  prevent 
it  and  to  her  desire  to  accept  the  opportunity  of  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Austrian  Archduke  as  a  convenient  time  to  begin 
a  war  she  long  intended.  The  revelation  of  their  unpre- 
paredness  is  sufficient  to  show  that  England,  France  and 
Russia  did  not  conspire  to  bring  on  the  war.  On  the  other 
hand,  before  the  war  began  Germany  had  constructed  a 
complete  system  of  strategic  railways  on  her  Belgian  border, 
adapted  not  to  commercial  uses,  but  only  to  the  quick  in- 
vasion of  Belgium. 

Indeed,  every  fact  as  the  war  has  developed  forms  one 
more  circumstance  in  the  irrefragable  case  against  Germany 
as  the  Power  responsible  for  this  world-disaster.  The 
preparation  of  fifty  years,  the  false  philosophy  of  her  destiny 
and  of  the  exaltation  of  force,  had  given  her  a  yearning  for 
conquest,  for  the  expansion  of  her  territory,  the  extension 
of  her  influence,  an4  the  Germanization  of  the  world.  She 
alone  is  responsible  for  the  incalculable  destruction  of  this 
war.  She  led  on  in  the  armament  of  the  world  that  she 
might  rule  it.  She  promoted  therefore  the  armament  of 
other  nations.  Her  system  was  followed,  though  not  as 
effectively,  by  other  countries  in  pure  defense  of  their  peace 
and  safety. 

And  now  her  Emperor,  her  Prussian  military  caste,  and 
her  wonderful  but  blinded  people,  have  the  blood  of  the 
millions  who  have  suffered  in  this  world  catastrophe  on  their 
heads.  The  German  military  doctrine,  that  when  the  in- 
terests of  the  state  are  concerned,  the  question  is  one  of 
power  and  force,  and  not  of  honor  or  obligation  or  moral 
restraint,  finds  its  most  flagrant  examples  in  Germany's 
conduct  of  this  war. 


THE    MENACE    OF   A    PREMATURE    PEACE  89 

Her  breach  of  a  solemn  obligation  entered  into  by  her  and 
all  the  powers  of  Europe,  in  respect  to  Belgium's  neutrality, 
was  its  first  exhibition.  It  was  followed  by  the  well-proven 
deliberate  plan  of  atrocities  against  the  men,  women  and 
children  of  a  part  of  Belgium  in  order  to  terrorize  the  rest 
of  the  population  into  complete  submission.  It  was  shown 
in  the  prompt  dropping  of  bombs  on  defenceless  towns  from 
Zeppelins  and  other  aircraft;  in  the  killing  of  non-combat- 
ant men,  women  and  children  by  the  naval  bombardment  of 
unfortified  towns;  in  the  use  of  liquid  fire  and  poison  gases 
in  battle.  All  of  these  had  been  condemned  as  improper 
in  declarations  in  the  Hague  treaties. 

The  Reptile  Fund,  which  was  used  under  Bismarck  for  the 
bribery  of  the  press  and  for  the  maintenance  of  a  spy  system, 
has  been  enlarged  and  elaborated,  so  that  German  bribery  has 
extended  the  world  over,  and  the  German  espionage  has 
exceeded  anything  known  to  history.  The  medieval  use 
by  the  Hohenzollerns  of  dynastic  kinship  has  paralyzed  the 
action  of  the  peoples  of  Greece  and  Russia.  And  now  we 
know,  by  recent  revelation,  of  the  aid  that  Swedish  diplomats 
are  furnishing  to  Germany  in  her  submarine  warfare  against 
neutral  ships,  and  that  it  is  made  possible  by  the  influence 
of  the  German  consort  of  the  Swedish  King. 

Intrigue,  dishonor,  cruelty,  have  characterized  the  entire 
military  policy  of  Germany.  The  rules  of  international 
law  have  been  cast  to  the  winds.  The  murderous  submarine 
has  sunk  without  warning  the  non-combatant  commercial 
vessels  of  the  enemy  and  sent  their  officers,  their  crews  and 
their  passengers,  men,  women  and  children,  to  the  bottom 
without  warning.  Not  only  has  this  policy  been  pursued 
against  enemy  commercial  vessels,  but  also  against  neutral 
commercial  vessels,  and  parts  of  the  crew  have  been 


9O        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

assembled  on  the  submarines  and  then  the  submarine  has 
been  submerged  and  the  victims  left  struggling  in  the  ocean's 
waste  to  drown.  We  find  a  German  diplomat  telegraphing 
from  a  neutral  port  to  the  German  headquarters  advising 
that  if  the  submarine  be  used  against  the  vessels  of  that 
neutral  Power  it  leave  no  trace  of  the  attack.  In  other 
words,  the  murder  of  the  crews  must  be  complete,  because 
"  dead  men  tell  no  tales." 

Having  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  having  broken 
its  sacred  obligations  to  that  country  and  her  people,  it  is 
now  enslaving  them  by  taking  them  from  Belgium  and  en- 
forcing their  labor  in  Germany.  This  is  contrary  to  every 
rule  of  international  law,  and  is  in  the  teeth  of  the  plainest 
principles  of  justice  and  honor.  All  these  things  are  done 
for  the  state.  It  is  not  that  the  nature  of  the  German  people 
generally  is  cruel  —  that  is  not  the  case.  But  the  minds  of 
the  German  people  have  been  poisoned  with  this  false 
philosophy ;  and  the  ruling  caste  in  Germany,  in  its  desperate 
desire  to  win,  has  allowed  no  consideration  of  humanity  or 
decency  or  honor  to  prevent  its  use  of  any  means  which  in 
any  way  could  by  hook  or  crook  accomplish  a  military  pur- 
pose. 

When  the  war  began,  Germany  was  able  to  convince  her 
people  and  to  convince  many  in  the  world  that  the  issue  in 
the  war  was  not  the  exaltation  of  the  military  power  of 
Germany  and  the  expansion  of  her  plan  of  destiny,  but  that 
it  was  a  mere  controversy  between  the  Teuton  and  the  Slav, 
and  Germany  asked  with  great  plausibility,  "  Will  you  have 
the  world  controlled  by  the  Slav  or  by  the  German  ? " 
Those  who  insisted  that  the  issue  was  one  of  militarism 
against  the  peace  of  the  world,  of  democracy  against  military 
autocracy,  of  freedom  against  military  tyranny,  were  met 


THE   MENACE   OF  A   PREMATURE   PEACE  91 

with  the  argument :  "  Russia  is  an  ally.  She  is  a  greater 
despotism  and  a  greater  military  autocracy  than  Germany." 
As  the  war  wore  on,  the  real  issue  was  cleared  of  this  con- 
fusion. Russia  became  a  democracy.  The  fight  was  be- 
tween governments  directed  by  their  people  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  military  dynasties  of  Germany,  Austria  and  Turkey, 
on  the  other. 

President  Wilson  says  the  Allies  are  fighting  to  make 
the  world  safe  for  democracy.  Some  misconception  has 
been  created  on  this  head.  The  Allies  are  not  struggling  to 
force  a  particular  form  of  government  on  Germany.  If  the 
German  people  continue  to  prefer  an  Emperor  it  is  not  the 
purpose  of  the  Allies  to  require  them  to  have  a  republic. 
Their  purpose  is  to  end  the  military  policy  and  foreign  policy 
of  Germany  that  looks  to  the  maintenance  of  a  military  and 
naval  machine,  with  its  hair-trigger  preparation  for  use 
against  her  neighbors.  If  this  continues,  it  will  entail  on 
every  democratic  government  the  duty  of  maintaining  a 
similar  armament  in  self-defense,  and,  what  is  likely,  the 
duty  will  be  wholly  or  partly  neglected.  Thus  the  policy 
of  Germany,  with  her  purpose  and  destiny,  will  threaten 
every  democracy.  This  is  the  condition  which  it  is  the 
determined  purpose  of  the  Allies,  as  interpreted  by  President 
Wilson,  to  change. 

How  is  the  change  to  be  effected  ?  By  defeating  Germany 
in  this  war.  The  German  people  have  been  very  loyal  to 
their  Emperor,  because  his  leadership  accords  with  the  false 
philosophy  of  the  state  and  German  destiny,  with  which 
they  have  been  indoctrinated  and  poisoned.  A  defeat  of 
the  military  machine,  a  defeat  of  the  Frankenstein  of  the  mil- 
itary dynasty  to  which  they  have  been  sacrificed,  must  open 
their  eyes  to  the  hideous  futility  of  their  political  course. 


92        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

The  German  Government  will  then  be  changed,  as  its  people 
will  have  it  changed,  to  avoid  a  recurrence  of  such  a  tragedy 
as  they  have  deliberately  prepared  for  themselves. 

Men  who  see  clearly  the  kind  of  peace  which  we  must 
have,  in  order  to  be  a  real  and  lasting  peace,  can  have  no 
sympathy  therefore  with  a  patched-up  peace,  one  made  at 
a  council  table,  the  result  of  diplomatic  chaffering  and 
bargaining.  Men  who  look  forward  to  a  League  of  the 
World  to  Enforce  Peace  in  the  future  can  have  no  patience 
with  a  compromise  that  leaves  the  promoting  cause  of  the 
present  awful  war  unaffected  and  unremoved.  This  war 
is  now  being  fought  by  the  Allies  as  a  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.  Unless  they  compel  it  by  victory,  they  do  not 
enforce  it.  They  do  not  make  the  military  autocracies  of 
the  world  into  nations  fit  for  a  World  League,  unless  they 
convince  them  by  a  lesson  of  defeat. 

When  the  war  came  on,  there  were  a  few  in  the  United 
States  who  felt  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  required  a 
protest  on  the  part  of  our  government,  and  some  indeed  who 
felt  that  we  should  join  in  the  war  at  once.  But  the  great 
body  of  the  American  people,  influenced  by  our  traditional 
policy  of  avoiding  European  quarrels,  stood  by  the  Admini- 
stration in  desiring  to  maintain  a  strict  neutrality.  I  think 
it  is  not  unfair  to  say  that  a  very  large  proportion  of  the 
intelligent  and  thinking  people  of  the  United  States  —  and 
that  means  a  great  majority  —  sympathized  with  the  Allies 
in  the  struggle  which  they  were  making.  But  many  of  Ger- 
man birth  and  descent,  prompted  by  a  pride  in  the  notable 
advance  in  the  world  of  German  enterprise,  German  in- 
genuity, German  discipline,  German  efficiency,  and  regard- 
ing the  struggle  as  an  issue  between  Teuton  and  Slav, 
extended  their  sympathy  to  their  Fatherland. 


THE    MENACE   OF   A    PREMATURE   PEACE  93 

As  conscientiously  as  possible,  the  Administration  and  the 
country  pursued  the  course  laid  down  by  international  law 
as  that  which  a  neutral  should  take.  International  lav/  is 
the  rule  of  conduct  of  nations  toward  one  another  accepted 
and  acquiesced  in  by  all  nations.  It  is  not  always  as  definite 
as  one  would  like,  and  the  acquiescence  of  all  nations  is  not 
always  as  clearly  established  as  it  ought  to  be.  But  in  the 
law  of  war  as  to  capture  at  sea  of  commercial  vessels,  the 
principles  have  been  established  clearly  by  the  decision  of 
prize  courts  of  all  nations,  English,  American,  Prussian  and 
French.  The  right  of  non-combatants  on  commercial  ves- 
sels, officers,  crew  and  passengers,  either  enemy  or  neutral, 
to  be  secure  from  danger  of  life,  has  always  been  recognized 
and  never  contested.  Nevertheless,  by  submarine  attack  on 
English  and  American  merchant  ships  without  warning, 
Germany  sent  to  their  death  one  hundred  and  fifty  American 
men,  women  and  children.  We  protested  and  Germany 
halted  for  a  time.  We  thought  that  if  we  condoned  the 
death  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  we  might  still  maintain  peace 
with  that  Power. 

But  it  was  not  to  be,  and  after  more  than  a  year  Germany 
announced  her  purpose  to  resume  this  murderous  and  illegal 
course  toward  innocent  Americans.  Had  we  hesitated,  we 
would  have  lost  our  independence  as  a  people;  we  would 
have  subscribed  abjectly  to  the  doctrine  that  might  makes 
right.  Germany  left  no  door  open  to  us  as  a  self-respecting 
nation  except  that  which  led  to  war.  She  deliberately 
forced  us  into  the  ranks  of  her  enemies,  and  she  did  it  be- 
cause she  was  obsessed  with  the  belief  that  the  submarine 
was  the  instrument  of  destruction  by  which  she  might  win 
the  war.  She  recked  not  that,  as  she  used  it,  it  was  a  weapon 
of  murder.  Making  military  efficiency  her  god,  and  exalt- 


94        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ing  the  appliances  of  science  in  the  killing  of  men,  she 
ignored  all  other  consequences. 

Germany's  use  of  the  submarine  brought  us  into  the  war. 
But  being  in,  we  recognized  as  fully  as  any  of  our  Allies  do 
that  its  far  greater  issue  is  whether  German  militarism  shall 
continue  after  this  war  to  be  a  threat  to  the  peace  of  the 
world,  or  whether  we  shall  end  that  threat  by  this  struggle 
in  which  we  are  to  spend  our  life's  blood.  We  must  not 
therefore  be  turned  from  the  stern  necessity  of  winning  this 
war. 

When  the  war  began  and  its  horrible  character  was  dis- 
closed, there  were  many  religious  persons  who  found  their 
faith  in  God  shaken  by  the  fact  that  millions  of  innocent 
persons  could  be  headed  into  this  vortex  of  blood  and 
destruction  without  the  saving  intervention  of  their  Creator. 
But  the  progress  of  the  war  has  revealed  much,  and  it  has 
stimulated  our  just  historic  sense.  It  shows  that  the  world 
had  become,  through  the  initiative  of  Germany  and  the  fol- 
lowing on  of  the  other  nations,  afflicted  with  the  cancer  of 
militarism.  God  reveals  the  greatness  of  His  power  and 
His  omnipotence  not  by  fortuitous  and  sporadic  intervention, 
but  by  the  working  out  of  His  inexorable  law.  A  cancer, 
if  it  is  not  to  consume  the  body,  must  be  cut  out,  and  the 
cutting  out  necessarily  involves  suffering  and  pain.  The 
sacrifices  of  lives  and  treasure  are  inevitable  in  the  working 
out  of  the  cure  of  the  world  malady.  But  we  must  win  the 
war  to  vindicate  this  view. 

We  are  now  able  to  see  the  providential  punishment  and 
weakness  that  follows  the  violation  of  moral  law.  The 
crass  materialism  of  the  German  philosophy  that  exalts  force 
above  morality,  power  above  honor  and  decency,  success 
above  humanity,  has  blinded  the  German  ruling  caste  to 


THE    MENACE    OF    A    PREMATURE    PEACE  95 

the  strength  of  moral  motives  that  control  other  peoples,  and 
involved  them  in  the  fundamental  mistakes  that  will  cause 
their  downfall.  They  assumed  that  England,  burdened  with 
Ireland,  would  violate  her  own  obligation  and  abandon  Bel- 
gium and  would  leave  her  ally  France  to  be  deprived  of  all 
her  colonial  possessions.  They  assumed  that  France  was 
decadent,  permeated  with  socialism,  and  unable  to  make  a 
contest  in  her  state  of  unpreparedness.  They  assumed  that 
England's  colonies,  attached  only  by  the  lightest  tie,  and 
entirely  independent,  if  they  chose  to  be,  would  not  sacrifice 
themselves  to  help  the  mother  land  in  her  struggle.  How 
false  the  German  conclusion  as  to  England's  national  con- 
science and  fighting  power,  as  to  France's  supposed  deca- 
dence and  her  actual  patriotic  fervor  and  strength,  and  as 
to  the  filial  loyalty  of  England's  daughters! 

England  and  France  since  1914  have  been  fighting  the 
battle  of  the  world  and  fighting  for  us  of  America.  The 
war  has  drained  their  vitality,  strained  their  credit,  exhausted 
their  man-power,  subjected  many  of  their  non-combatants  to 
suffering  and  destruction,  and  they  have  the  war  weariness 
which  dulls  the  earlier  eager  enthusiasm  for  the  principles  at 
stake.  Now,  specious  proposals  for  peace  are  likely  to  be 
most  alluring  to  the  faint-hearted,  and  most  powerful  in  the 
hands  of  traitors. 

The  intervention  of  the  United  States,  by  her  financial  aid, 
has  helped  much;  but  her  armies  are  needed  and  she,  a 
republic  unprepared,  required  time  to  prepare.  The  war 
is  now  to  be  determined  by  the  active  tenacity  of  purpose  of 
the  contestants.  England  showed  that  tenacity  in  the  wars 
of  Napoleon.  Napoleon  succumbed.  General  Grant,  in  his 
Memoirs,  says  that  the  battle  is  won  not  in  the  first  day,  but 
by  the  commander  and  the  army  which  is  ready,  even  after 


96        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

apparent  defeat,  to  begin  the  next  day.  It  is  the  side  which 
has  the  nerve  that  will  win.  The  intervention  of  the  United 
States  has  strengthened  that  nerve  in  England,  France  and 
Italy.  But  delay  and  disappointment  give  full  opportunity 
to  the  lethargic,  the  cowardly,  the  factious,  to  make  the  task 
of  the  patriot  and  the  loyal  men  doubly  heavy.  This  is  the 
temper  of  the  situation  among  our  European  Allies. 

With  us  at  home  the  great  body  of  our  people  are  loyal 
and  strong  for  the  war.  Of  course,  it  takes  time  to  con- 
vince a  people,  however  intelligent,  when  very  prosperous 
and  comfortable  and  not  well  advised  as  to  the  vital  concern 
they  have  in  the  issue  of  a  war  across  a  wide  ocean,  thou- 
sands of  miles  away.  But  we  have,  for  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  our  republic,  begun  a  war  right.  We  have  begun 
with  a  conscription  law  which  requires  service  from  men  of 
a  certain  age  from  every  walk  of  life.  It  is  democratic  in 
principle,  and  yet  it  offers  to  the  Government  the  means  of 
selection  so  that  those  who  shall  be  sent  to  the  front  may 
be  best  fitted  to  represent  the  nation  there,  and  those  best 
able  to  do  the  work  in  field  and  factory,  essential  to  our 
winning  at  the  front,  may  be  retained.  We  have  adopted 
a  merit  system  of  selecting  from  the  intelligent  and  educated 
youth  of  the  country  the  company  officers.  The  machinery 
of  the  draft  naturally  creaked  some  because  it  had  to  be  so 
hastily  constructed,  but  on  the  whole  it  has  worked  well. 
Those  who  devised  it  and  have  carried  it  through  are  entitled 
to  great  credit. 

The  lessons  of  the  war  are  being  learned  and  applied  in 
our  war  equipment  and  in  neutralizing,  by  new  construction, 
the  submarine  destruction  of  commercial  transports.  Ade- 
quate measures  for  the  raising  of  the  money  needed  to 
finance  our  Allies  have  been  carried  through  Congress. 


THE    MENACE   OF    A    PREMATURE    PEACE  97 

Food  conservation  is  provided  for.  But  of  course  it  took 
time  for  a  hundred  million  of  peace  lovers  and  non-mili- 
tarists to  get  ready,  however  apt,  however  patriotic,  how- 
ever determined. 

"  It  is  '  dogged  '  that  does  it."  Reject  all  proposals  of 
peace  as  ill  advised  or  seditious,  and  then  time  will  make  for 
our  certain  victory. 

While  there  has  been  pro-German  sentiment  in  the  United 
States,  and  while  the  paid  emissaries  of  Germany  have  been 
busy  trying  to  create  as  much  opposition  to  the  war  as  pos- 
sible and  have  found  a  number  of  weak  dupes  and  unin- 
telligent persons,  who  don't  understand  the  importance  of 
the  war,  to  aid  them,  our  Allies  should  know  that  the  whole 
body  of  the  American  people  will  earnestly  support  the 
President  and  Congress  in  carrying  out  the  measures  which 
have  been  adopted  by  the  United  States  to  win  this  war. 

When  the  war  is  won,  the  United  States  will  wish  to  be 
heard  and  will  have  a  right  to  be  heard  as  to  the  terms  of 
peace.  The  United  States  will  insist  on  a  just  peace,  not 
one  of  material  conquest.  It  is  a  moral  victory  the  world 
should  win.  I  think  I  do  not  mistake  the  current  of  public 
sentiment  throughout  our  entire  country  in  saying  that  our 
people  will  favor  an  international  agreement  by  which  the 
peace  brought  about  through  such  blood  and  suffering  and 
destruction  and  enormous  sacrifice  shall  be  preserved  by  the 
joint  power  of  the  world.  Whether  the  terms  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace,  as  they  are,  will  be  taken  as  a  basis  for 
agreement,  or  a  modified  form,  something  of  the  kind  must 
be  attempted. 

Meantime,  let  us  hope  and  pray  that  all  the  Allies  will 
reject  proposals  for  settlement  and  compromise  of  every 
nature;  that  they  will  adhere  rigidly  and  religiously  to  the 


98        TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

principle  that,  until  a  victorious  result  gives  security  that 
the  world  shall  not  again  be  drenched  in  blood  through  the 
insanely  selfish  policy  of  a  military  caste  ruling  a  deluded 
people  intoxicated  with  material  success  and  power,  there 
will  be  no  peace. 


WORLD  PEACE  DEBATE  * 

A.  Is  the  Platform  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
Feasible? 

I 

The  platform  is  not  a  program  to  stop  the  present  war. 
It  looks  to  a  treaty  to  be  adopted  at  or  after  its  close.  Its 
purpose  is  to  enforce  deliberation,  impartial  investigation 
and  judgment  of  a  cause  of  international  quarrel  before 
hostilities.  It  does  not  seek  to  enforce  the  decision  after  it 
is  rendered ;  but  by  making  clear  to  the  threatening  nations 
and  to  the  world  what  the  real  issue  is,  and  what  an  impartial 
Tribunal  thinks  about  it,  the  enforced  procedure  and  the 
necessary  delay  will  prevent  most  wars. 

To  make  the  platform  work,  the  eight  or  nine  great 
Powers  should  join  the  League.  The  weaker  nations  will 
then  be  glad  to  secure  the  benefit  of  its  protection.  Will 
the  great  belligerent  Powers  join?  Lord  Grey  and  Mr. 
Asquith  of  Great  Britain,  M.  Briand  of  France,  and  Dr. 
Bethmann-Hollweg  of  Germany  are  representative  of  them. 
They  have  approved  the  principles  of  the  League.  Lord 
Grey  says  that  the  war  should  not  end  without  it.  President 

1  Written  debate  between  Mr.  Taft  and  Mr.  Bryan  during  the  first 
four  months  of  1917.     World  Peace  (Doran). 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  99 

Wilson,  Mr.  Hughes  and  Mr.  Lodge  uphold  it.  These 
personal  expressions  do  not  bind  the  Nations;  but  they 
show  that  the  general  plan  is  feasible  and  supplies  a  want 
which  the  world  feels. 

The  platform  only  lays  down  broad  lines.  Its  machinery 
must  be  worked  out  in  International  Conference.  Its  feasi- 
bility is  not  successfully  attacked  by  exceptional  hypotheses 
under  which  it  would  fail  of  its  purpose.  The  most  practical 
plan  of  government  may  thus  be  shown  to  be  futile.  If  the 
platform  will  work  in  most  cases,  the  value  of  the  result 
justifies  its  adoption. 

Are  the  four  planks  considered  in  detail  feasible  ? 

1.  A  Court  to  administer  international  justice  is  not  new. 
Our  own  Supreme  Court  is  one.     Questions  arise  between 
States  not  settled  by  the  Federal  Constitution  or  Federal 
statutes.     In  the  Kansas-Colorado  case,  Congress  had  no 
power  to  control  Colorado.     International  Law  alone  fixed 
the  rights  between  the  States;  and  the  Supreme  Court  en- 
forced these  rights. 

Our  relations  with  Canada  are  such  that  we  settle  all 
questions  by  negotiation  or  arbitration.  We  have  now  two 
permanent  Tribunals  to  decide  controversies  between  us  — 
one  to  adjudge  questions  of  boundary  waters  like  that  be- 
tween Kansas  and  Colorado,  and  the  other  to  pass  upon 
claims  of  the  citizens  of  one  country  against  the  other.  We 
have  thus  contracted  the  habit  of  arbitration ;  and,  when 
negotiation  fails,  no  one  expects  anything  else.  In  our 
League,  the  quarrelling  nations,  moved  by  their  obligation, 
sanctioned  by  the  threat  of  compulsion  by  their  associates, 
will  contract  the  same  habit. 

2.  There  may  be,  however,  political  or  other  irritating 
and   threatening   issues   between   nations   which  cannot   be 


IOO  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 

settled  on  principles  of  law.  They  are  to  be  submitted  under 
the  second  plank  for  hearing  and  recommendation  of  com- 
promise just  as  our  Fur  Seal  Arbitration  with  England. 

3.  The  third  or  Force  plank  gives  vitality  to  the  platform. 
It   appeals   to   practical   men.     It   provides    for   economic 
pressure  and  a  Police  Force  to  hold  off  members  of  the 
League  from  war  until  the  cooling  and  curative  influence  of 
the  League's  judicial  procedure  may  have  time  to  operate, 

No  matter  how  law-abiding  a  community,  neither  the 
statutes  nor  judgments  of  the  Courts  enforce  themselves  so 
as  to  dispense  with  police  or  sheriffs.  The  latter  may  be 
called  on  infrequently  to  suppress  disorder  or  to  remove 
obstruction  to  judicial  decree.  The  fact  that  they  are 
present,  however,  in  the  community,  or  in  the  Court,  with 
the  power  to  act  and  the  intention  to  act  when  necessary, 
stays  would-be  disturbers  or  obstructors.  Fear  of  police 
action  is  usually  effective  without  actual  use  of  force. 
"  They  also  serve  who  only  stand  and  wait." 

4.  No  one  will  doubt  the  feasibility  of  the  fourth  plank. 
Successful  Congresses  for  declaring  the  principles  of  Inter- 
national Law  and   enlarging  their   scope  have  been  held 
before.     Such  was  the  Congress  at  Paris  in  1856  in  which 
privateering  was  abolished. 

The  agreement  of  all  the  powerful  nations  of  the  world 
to  unite  their  armies  and  their  navies  to  resist  the  prema- 
ture hostilities  of  one  or  more  nations  against  another  must 
increase  the  binding  effect  of  the  obligation  of  the  League 
members  not  to  rush  into  sudden  war.  The  fear  of  forcible 
restraint  would  thus,  in  most  cases,  render  actual  resort  to  it 
unnecessary. 

The  League  is  to  be  a  world  alliance.     We  have  had 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  IOI 

precedents  of  successful  alliances  for  the  purpose  of  protect- 
ing the  parties  to  them  against  outside  attack.  In  various 
junctures  in  the  past,  these  alliances  have  preserved  peace. 
The  fear  of  their  united  force  has  prevented  others  from 
attacking  a  single  member. 

Moreover,  the  binding  effect  of  such  alliances  has  shown 
itself.  France,  with  no  interest  in  Servia,  and  with  the 
danger  of  being  crushed  by  Germany,  keeps  the  letter  of  her 
agreement  with  Russia.  England,  with  no  interest  in 
Servia,  maintains  her  obligation  to  Belgium ;  while  Germany, 
without  interest  in  Servia,  upholds  her  word  to  Austria. 
Treaties  may  sometimes  be  broken ;  but  as  the  best  hope  of 
securing  international  progress,  we  should  not  abandon  them. 
The  fear  of  another  World  War,  which  will  lead  the  great 
Powers  into  our  League,  will  also  lead  them  to  meet  its 
obligation. 

II 

The  League  is  not  a  defensive  league  against  outside 
nations.  It  does  not  defend  its  members  against  non-mem- 
bers. Its  purpose  is  to  furnish  a  means  of  keeping  peace 
among  its  own  members  only.  It  proposes  to  secure  World 
Peace  by  attracting  to  its  membership,  first,  all  the  Great 
Powers,  and  then  the  lesser  Powers  which  will  surely  follow. 
The  logic  of  circumstances  must  inevitably  force  the  Great 
Powers  engaged  in  this  war  to  membership.  In  seeking 
permanent  peace,  whether  they  wish  it  or  not,  the  League 
must  be  their  common  goal. 

The  Allies  proclaim  their  purpose  to  be  to  secure  a  perma- 
nent basis  for  peace,  safeguarded  by  practical  guaranties, 
that  is,  of  superior  force.  What  is  that  but  the  League? 

Germany's  Chancellor  avows  her  willingness  to  join  a 


IO2       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

league  to  "  suppress  disturbers  of  peace."  The  League  is 
only  a  wise  preparation  of  the  members,  by  organization  of 
their  united  potential  force,  to  frighten  from  its  purpose  a 
would-be  disturber  of  the  World's  Peace,  and  thus  probably 
make  the  use  of  actual  force  unnecessary. 

Germany  now  proposes  peace  with  suggestion  of  a  limita- 
tion of  armaments.  In  the  Hague  conferences,  Germany 
declined  to  consider  such  a  limitation.  Such  a  suggestion 
by  her  now  looks  necessarily  to  a  continuing  "  Bund  "  to 
exact  the  limitation.  This  is  only  a  logical  corollary  to  our 
proposals.  Our  League  must  deal  with  armaments  and  fix 
a  minimum  to  secure  effective  joint  action.  Why  not  a 
maximum  ? 

Again,  whether  Germany's  present  proposals  are  now  to 
lead  to  peace  or  not,  serious  negotiations  must  sometime 
come ;  and  then  conditions  will  make  for  a  League  like  ours. 
One  of  Germany's  motives  in  offering  peace  is,  of  course,  her 
desire  to  satisfy  her  own  people  that  their  Government  is 
anxious  to  end  their  almost  unbearable  burdens.  In  Russia, 
the  power  of  control  is  passing  from  the  Bureaucracy  to  the 
Council  and  the  Duma.  When  whole  peoples  constitute 
the  armies  and  the  makers  of  war  supplies,  as  never  before, 
and  all  of  them  are  enduring  the  sweat  and  woe  and  blood, 
their  will  determines  policies.  Otherwise,  dynasties  fall. 
In  all  history,  no  time  can  find  the  contending  peoples  so 
anxious  for  guaranties  of  permanent  peace  as  at  the  end 
of  this  war.  Lord  Grey's  words,  that  the  war  cannot  and 
should  not  end  without  such  a  League,  will  find  an  echo 
in  all  their  hearts. 

It  is  these  circumstances  that  make  the  League  feasible. 
Difficulties  are  suggested.  They  concern  the  detail  of 
operation  rather  than  the  main  principles.  If  the  nations 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  103 

are  determined  to  create  such  a  League,  as  they  will  be.  they 
can  arrange  the  details. 

Of  course,  a  council  or  other  joint  body  of  representatives 
of  the  League  must  act  in  case  of  strained  relations  between 
League  members.  It  will  naturally  use  diplomatic  pressure 
to  prevent  a  rupture.  Such  a  body  in  negotiation  with  them 
will  have  excellent  opportunity  to  learn  which  of  the  con- 
testants intends  a  breach  of  its  plighted  faith.  Upon  the 
decision  of  such  a  council,  all  members  of  the  League,  in 
compliance  with  the  third  article,  will  withhold  commerce  or 
dealing  with  the  recalcitrant.  A  boycott  of  this  kind  would 
be  a  powerful  deterrent  weapon  and  probably  make  resort 
to  force  unnecessary. 

But  it  is  said  that  force  is  not  a  feasible  means  of  securing 
and  maintaining  peace.  To  say  so  is  to  ignore  history  and 
experience,  domestic  and  international.  Fear  of  forcible 
restraint  and  punishment  is  often  an  indispensable  motive  to 
strengthen  moral  impulse  to  obey  the  law  and  follow  the 
right.  That  it  may  not  be  needed  by  some  does  not  render 
it  safe  to  dispense  with  it  in  the  case  of  others.  If  we  need 
restraint  to  keep  men  in  paths  of  peace  and  law,  why  not 
nations  ?  Nations  are  only  men  united  in  communities  ;  and 
they  have  not  the  moral  self-restraint  of  the  average  man. 
Force  used  for  selfish,  vicious  or  improper  ends  is,  of  course, 
to  be  deplored.  But  is  there  any  method  of  defeating  force 
used  for  such  ends,  except  superior  force  threatened  or 
applied  for  the  common  good?  Has  force,  or  fear  of  it, 
never  done  any  good  among  the  nations  ?  What  was  it  that 
kept  Louis  XIV's  greedy  hand  out  of  the  Spanish  Nether- 
lands but  the  fear  of  the  league  of  England,  Holland  and 
Sweden?  What  was  it  that  stopped  Napoleon  in  his  mad 
lust  for  universal  domination  but  a  league  of  all  Europe, 


104       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

welded  by  England,  against  him?  The  fact  that,  after  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  this  league  degenerated,  as  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, into  a  selfish  plot  of  an  inner  ring  to  promote  the  divine 
right  of  kings,  does  not  detract  from  the  useful  purpose  it 
originally  served.  What  was  it  but  force  that  cut  out  the 
cancer  of  slavery  in  our  body  politic?  What  was  it  but 
force  that  freed  Cuba  from  oppression  ?  Have  men  changed 
since  these  wars,  that  force  or  fear  of  force  is  not  now 
needed  at  times  to  help  a  just  cause  to  prevail? 

Before  the  present  war,  the  Triple  Alliance  on  the  one  side 
and  the  Triple  Entente  on  the  other,  divided  Europe  into 
two  vast  and  powerful  camps ;  and  men  spoke  of  their  pro- 
moting peace  on  the  theory  that  one  sword  would  keep  the 
other  in  its  scabbard.  These  leagues  did  for  a  time  prevent 
attack  upon  single  members ;  but  ultimately  they  failed. 
This  war  was  precipitated  because  they  were  divided  against 
each  other;  and  there  were  other  motives  in  their  main- 
tenance than  a  mere  preservation  of  peace.  Their  failure 
offers  no  argument  against  the  feasibility  and  success  of  our 
League.  Its  members  could  not  organize  separate  leagues 
and  be  honest  or  consistent  members  of  ours.  The  League's 
simple  plan  of  unity  of  power,  with  but  one  purpose  of 
forcibly  maintaining  World  Peace  by  deliberation,  hearing 
and  decision  before  hostilities,  distinguishes  it  in  its  aim 
and  practical  moderation  from  all  others. 

Ill 

Mr.  Bryan  objects  that  if  only  a  part  of  the  nations 
entered  the  League,  there  would  ensue  a  test  of  military 
strength  between  the  League  group  of  nations  and  other 
groups.  This  objection  finds  no  warrant  in  our  plan  because 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  1 05 

the  League  deals  not  at  all  with  non-members,  but  only  with 
differences  between  League  members.  Of  course,  if  but  a 
part  of  the  nations  consented  to  join  the  League,  the  plan 
would  not  work.  To  be  useful  and  accomplish  its  purpose, 
it  must  have  world  membership.  In  my  last  paper,  I  showed 
why  it  would  have  this,  because  the  great  Powers  now  in  war, 
and  then  the  lesser  Powers,  would  and  must  seek  such  a 
League  when  peace  comes. 

Mr.  Bryan  objects  that  confidence  in  the  armed  support 
of  the  League  would  prompt  a  League  member  to  acts 
rendering  peaceful  settlement  impossible  and  precipitating 
war.  This  rests  on  the  same  misconception  as  to  the 
League's  attitude  toward  non-members.  As  between  mem- 
bers, such  motive  would  be  slight.  The  Council  of  the 
League,  in  using  diplomatic  pressure  to  prevent  a  rupture 
between  two  members,  would  have  full  opportunity  to  know 
and  report  which  was  really  forcing  hostilities;  and  the 
League  would  act  accordingly. 

He  also  objects  to  a  League  with  force  in  it  because  we 
have  already  made  thirty-one  treaties  agreeing  to  investiga- 
tion before  war  which  contain  no  provision  for  force.  An 
agreement  for  investigation  and  orderly  procedure  before 
war  and  a  subsequent  agreement  providing  a  world  police 
force  to  compel  such  procedure  are  not  inconsistent. 

Mr.  Bryan  asks  what  is  meant  by  "  economic  pressure." 
I  answer  —  a  boycott  of  the  unruly  nation  —  an  embargo 
threatened  or  imposed  by  all  the  members  of  the  League  on 
their  trade  with  the  recalcitrant  member.  Such  an  embargo 
must  of  necessity  accompany  war,  because  war  means  the 
cessation  of  commerce  between  the  belligerent  parties.  The 
boycott  or  embargo  may,  however,  precede  war  and  prevent 
it.  This  is  the  part  which  it  is  intended  to  play  in  our  plan. 


IO6       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Mr.  Bryan's  whole  argument  thus  far  against  the  League 
is  an  argument  against  the  evils  of  war.  But  I  submit  this 
is  not  to  the  point  if  war  persists.  The  use  of  force  to  sup- 
press a  small  war,  however  undesirable,  is  better  than  a 
world  war,  and  is  justified  in  avoiding  it.  Mr.  Bryan  says, 
"  Why  not  test  the  friendship  plan  among  nations?  "  His- 
tory has  oftentimes  tested  it  and  found  that  it  did  not  work. 
While  peaceful  means  of  avoiding  war  are  becoming  more 
successful  than  in  the  past,  the  present  war  has  convinced  the 
world  that  a  plan  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  international 
quarrels  will  be  more  certainly  effective  if  the  nations  of  the 
world  unite  in  their  own  interest  to  compel  the  working  of 
the  plan.  The  present  war  has  brought  home  to  them  their 
deep  interest  in  stopping  every  war,  however  remote,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  conflagration's  spread. 

Mr.  Bryan  says  that  force  breeds  violence  and  cites  the 
useful  change  from  the  time  when  all  men  carried  weapons 
to  the  time  when  they  gave  up  the  practice.  The  instance  is 
not  helpful  to  his  argument.  Men  gave  up  weapons  when 
they  could  rely  on  the  police,  exercising  the  force  of  the 
community,  to  protect  them  against  violence.  By  analogy, 
if  our  plan  becomes  effective,  it  will  offer  a  strong  induce- 
ment to  limit  armaments  —  a  proposal  that  Germany  has 
already  unofficially  given  out. 

Would  Mr.  Bryan  dispense  with  the  police  in  city,  state 
and  nation?  Does  he  think  a  state  or  national  prohibition 
law  would  enforce  itself  without  the  arrest  of  offenders  and 
their  restraint  and  punishment?  Will  "the  friendship 
plan,"  without  any  public  force  in  the  background,  work 
well  in  any  of  our  communities,  however  law-abiding?  If 
not,  why  should  it  among  the  nations  ? 

I  agree  that  the  analogy  between  the  domestic  police  force 


WORLD    PEACE    DEBATE  1 07 

and  the  union  of  the  forces  of  the  nations  of  the  world  is 
not  complete  because  of  the  difficulty  of  effective  interna- 
tional cooperation ;  but  the  essential  principle  which  justifies 
and  requires  the  use  of  force  in  each  case  is  the  same,  to 
wit,  that  all  the  people  have  a  right  and  duty  to  exert  their 
united  force  to  suppress  violence  between  individuals  dis- 
turbing the  community,  and  that  all  nations  have  a  right 
and  duty  to  use  their  united  forces  to  suppress  a  disturbance 
of  international  peace  which  may  involve  the  whole  world. 

Mr.  Bryan  questions  whether  the  President's  words  or 
those  of  Mr.  Hughes,  in  respect  to  the  League,  are  suf- 
ficiently specific  to  justify  my  use  of  them.  They  were  used 
by  the  speakers  with  the  League's  proposals  in  mind,  not 
only  to  approve  them  all,  but  especially  the  third  or  force 
proposal,  which  is  the  one  to  which  Mr.  Bryan  chiefly 
objects. 

Of  course,  if  the  United  States  or  any  other  nation  is  to 
join  the  League,  its  principles  will  be  embodied  in  a  treaty 
with  all  the  necessary  working  details.  This  treaty  should 
not  be  ratified  unless  it  is  approved,  after  full  knowledge 
and  consideration  of  the  details,  not  only  by  the  treaty-mak- 
ing agency  of  each  power,  but  also  by  the  great  body  of  its 
people  and  its  legislature  or  congress,  upon  whom  must  fall 
the  serious  burden  of  performance  of  the  treaty  obligations. 
This  would  be  needed  to  give  assurance  that  the  League 
would  really  hold  the  nations  when  the  strain  comes. 

B.  Does  the  League  Platform  Offer  the  Most  Practical 
Plan  for  Securing  Permanent  Peace ? 

IV 

Is  the  platform  of  the  League  the  most  practical  plan  for 
securing  permanent  peace  after  the  war? 


IO8       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Should  the  League  attempt  more  than  it  does  ?  Should  it 
enforce  the  judgments  of  the  Court  and  the  recommenda- 
tions for  compromise  by  the  Commission?  The  two  must 
be  distinguished.  A  judgment  between  nations,  like  a 
domestic  judgment,  might  be  enforced.  But  nations  will 
reasonably  object  to  final  submission  of  vital  interests  to 
the  discretion  of  arbitrators,  however  impartial,  in  recom- 
mending compromise  of  an  issue  -not  covered  by  principles 
of  law.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  renders 
and  enforces  judgments  between  the  States  on  justiciable 
issues ;  but,  although  given  broad  authority  to  hear  "  con- 
troversies between  States,"  it  refuses  to  decide  issues  not 
involving  the  application  of  principles  of  law.  They  must 
be  settled  by  agreement  or  go  unsettled.  A  judgment  binds 
the  parties  in  honor  to  its  terms.  This  helps  to  secure 
acquiescence.  But  a  recommendation  of  compromise  im- 
plies no  such  moral  sanction.  The  League  has  deemed  it 
best  not  to  attempt  the  enforcement  of  either  judgments  or 
compromises.  It  is  wise  for  it  not  to  try  too  much,  lest 
being  over  ambitious,  it  fail. 

There  are  said  to  be  wrongs  which  only  war  can  remedy. 
If  so,  our  plan  does  not  prevent  such  a  remedy.  It  enforces 
investigation,  discussion,  deliberation  and  impartial  decision 
before  war  is  begun  and  avoids  most  wars.  If  a  war  be- 
tween members  of  the  League  is  inevitable  and  necessary, 
the  delay  secured  will  enable  the  remainder  of  the  League 
to  hedge  it  about  so  as  not  to  permit  its  spread. 

Is  a  plan  without  force  in  it  more  practical  than  that  of 
the  League?  It  is  not  practical  at  all  because  the  present 
belligerent  powers  could  not  be  induced  to  adopt  it.  They 
demand  effective  guaranties  of  future  peace.  They  will  not 
trust  to  the  security  of  a  League  which  depends  for  its  main- 


WORLD    PEACE    DEBATE  109 

tenance  of  peace  on  the  mere  promises  of  its  members  to  abide 
a  judicial  settlement.  In  their  minds,  nothing  will  be  effec- 
tive which  will  not  unite  the  superior  force  of  all  for  the 
common  good  to  secure  the  world  against  the  aggression  of 
reckless  and  faithless  disturbers  of  its  peace.  Without  such 
a  result,  the  war  will,  in  their  view,  have  been  fought  in  vain. 

The  psychological  effect  of  this  war  upon  the  world  has 
not  been  to  vindicate  the  purely  non-resistant  pacifists  or  to 
increase  their  number.  It  has  been  to  increase  "  the  militant 
pacifists,"  to  use  a  paradox,  who  are  now  willing  to  consent 
to  the  use  of  force  if  it  be  directed  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
just  peace  of  the  world. 

Mr.  Bryan  objects  to  the  obligation  of  every  member  of 
the  League  to  be  ready  to  do  its  share  in  creating  the  police 
force.  What  good  could  come  from  a  police  force  if  it  had 
to  be  organized  after  the  riot  alarm  was  turned  in?  Each 
nation,  therefore,  must  know  what  force  it  should  furnish, 
and  should  in  good  faith  keep  in  a  state  of  reasonable 
preparation  to  respond  to  a  call.  The  share  of  each  member 
will  have  to  be  generally  prescribed  in  the  fundamental 
agreement  of  the  League,  and  must  vary  in  number  and 
kind  with  the  geographical  location  and  resources  of  the 
member  and  other  circumstances.  A  self-respecting  nation, 
bound  jointly  with  others  to  constitute  an  international 
police  force,  may  agree  without  the  least  sacrifice  of  dignity, 
to  keep  ready  a  force  to  fulfil  its  obligation.  It  could  well 
afford  to  do  so,  because  the  security  afforded  by  the  joint 
forces  of  the  League  will  reduce  the  reasonable  preparation 
needed  for  its  own  defence. 

Mr.  Bryan  insists  that  our  League  with  its  obligation  will 
increase  armaments.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  reduce  them 
and  the  taxes  necessary  to  maintain  them.  Indeed  the  work- 


IIO       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ing  out  of  our  plan  must  inevitably  furnish  the  strongest 
motive  for  an  agreement  to  reduce  and  limit  armaments,  in 
accord  with  the  intimation  of  Germany  already  referred  to. 

Mr.  Bryan  objects  to  the  surrender  by  each  member  of 
its  control  over  its  own  military  and  naval  policy.  If  so, 
he  objects  to  the  reduction  and  limitation  of  maximum 
armaments  supervised  by  the  League, —  a  plan  which  I  sup- 
posed had  the  approval  of  the  most  extreme  pacifists.  Every 
treaty  between  two  nations  which  accomplishes  any  good 
involves  a  surrender  on  the  part  of  each  of  some  right  which 
it  is  willing  to  limit  to  accomplish  a  greater  benefit. 

The  fear,  expressed  by  Mr.  Bryan  and  others  that  such 
a  league  would  degenerate  into  a  trap  for  the  peaceful 
nations,  causing  them  to  serve  the  purpose  of  designing  and 
ambitious  warlike  members,  has  little  to  justify  it.  The 
unity,  strength  and  permanence  of  the  League  must  depend 
on  its  justice  and  fairness.  The  perversion  of  its  high 
purpose,  shown  in  the  action  of  any  group  attempting  its 
control,  must  inevitably  and  promptly  lead  to  its  dissolution. 

A  league  for  judicial  settlement  of  international  disputes 
without  force  would  prove  a  step  forward;  but  it  would  be 
far  short  of  our  League  in  efficacy  and  scope.  It  would 
cover  only  questions  of  legal  nature.  Many  issues  likely 
to  provoke  war  would  not  come  within  its  scope.  The 
element  of  force  in  our  League  gives  it  an  advantage  not 
measured  solely  by  the  sanction  it  adds  to  its  obligations. 
It  will  give  to  every  member  of  the  League  a  sense  of  respon- 
sibility for  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  will  create  a  union  of 
interest  among  the  members,  wholly  absent  in  a  league  for 
judicial  settlement  in  which  a  refusal  to  submit  to  the  court 
concerns  only  the  refusing  member  and  its  opponent  and 
involves  the  other  members  of  the  league  in  no  responsibility. 


WORLD   PEACE  DEBATE  HI 

Our  League,  through  the  active  and  stimulated  concern  of 
every  member  in  the  continuing  friendship  of  all,  would 
bring  the  nations  much  nearer  to  "  the  Parliament  of  Man 
and  the  Federation  of  the  World." 


V 

Mr.  Bryan  suggests  a  League  of  Nations  of  which  the 
members  agree  to  delay  war  for  a  year  of  investigation  and 
report  by  a  permanent  tribunal.  This  is  on  the  basis  of  the 
stipulations  of  treaties  negotiated  by  him  as  Secretary  of 
State  with  thirty-one  separate  nations.  Our  League's  pro- 
posals recognize  the  value  of  delay  and  investigation  in 
avoiding  hotheaded  resort  to  war.  But  Mr.  Bryan's  plan 
did  not  include  a  judgment  by  a  Court  or  a  recommendation 
of  compromise  by  a  Commission.  Thus  he  has  advanced 
some,  but  little.  He  suggests  that  an  arbitral  judgment  or 
recommendation  after  investigation  and  hearing  is  less  likely 
to  secure  a  peaceful  adjustment  than  a  mere  investigation 
and  report  without  conclusion  and  decision.  This  is  not 
sound.  The  decision  of  an  impartial  tribunal  must  always 
be  of  some  moral  weight  in  securing  from  the  disputing 
parties  peaceful  acquiescence  in  a  settlement.  He  says  that 
investigators  will  appeal  to  the  reason  and  sense  of  justice 
of  the  parties,  while  arbitrators,  in  dealing  with  parties 
bound  to  abide  their  decision,  are  not  so  likely  to  do  so.  On 
the  contrary,  the  most  searching  and  just  criticism  of  inter- 
national arbitrations  is  that  their  judgments  are  com- 
promises, intended  to  appeal  to  the  acquiescence  of  the 
parties,  rather  than  straight  decisions  on  principles  of  law. 

Mr.  Bryan  urges  that  a  treaty  obligation  of  two  nations  to 
maintain  a  period  of  delay  and  investigation  before  hos- 


112       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tilities,  is  inconsistent  with  a  compact  of  all  other  nations 
forcibly  to  require  the  two  nations  to  keep  their  engagement. 
Why  should  this  make  the  delay  and  investigation  less  likely 
than  when  dependent  on  the  naked  promises  of  the  two 
nations  in  the  heat  of  quarrel  ?  How  is  the  insistence  of  all 
other  nations  upon  the  delay  likely  to  create  war  between 
the  quarrelling  nations?  Mr.  Bryan  says  "the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace  violates  the  spirit  of  our  treaty  plan;  it 
would  send  forth  a  dove  of  peace,  to  be  sure,  but  its  dove 
would  carry  a  sword  instead  of  an  olive  branch."  With 
deference,  this  is  mere  rhetoric.  It  is  not  dealing  with  facts 
as  they  are,  or  with  human  nature  as  it  is.  If  it  be  a  logical 
argument,  then  the  presence  of  a  policeman  in  a  community 
to  arrest  law  breakers  and  of  a  court  to  punish  them  violates 
the  spirit  of  the  law  which  all  are  under  a  moral  obligation 
to  obey.  Mr.  Bryan  says  that  when  two  neighbors  fall  out 
they  call  in  their  friends  and  allow  time  for  investigation 
and  friendly  advice,  each  party  reserving  the  right  of  inde- 
pendent action  after  the  conference,  and  that  the  prospect  of 
settlement  is  much  lessened  if  the  conference  is  opened  with 
a  display  of  weapons.  This  is  not  the  usual  way  of  settling 
such  disputes,  but  assume  that  it  is.  Would  Mr.  Bryan  con- 
tend that  the  prospect  of  a  settlement  would  be  improved  if 
the  disputants  knew  that,  in  their  failure  to  agree,  there  were 
no  law  and  no  courts  and  no  police  to  enforce  their  mutual 
rights  and  duties?  In  our  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  there 
is  no  display  of  weapons  by  one  party  to  the  controversy 
against  the  other.  The  element  of  world  force  in  the  third 
article  is  no  more  obtrusive  and  no  more  provocative  of 
temper  or  heat  than  the  machinery  of  justice  in  the  domestic 
environment  of  the  two  supposed  neighbors. 

There  is  no  proof  of  the  feasibility  of  Mr.  Bryan's  World 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  113 

League  in  his  thirty-one  treaties  between  other  nations  and 
the  United  States.  Many,  but  not  all,  nations  were  willing 
to  sign  such  treaties  because  they  were  revocable  within  a 
short  period,  and  because  they  were  made  with  the  United 
States  which  is  notoriously  unprepared  for  war.  They 
would,  doubtless,  decline  to  make  such  an  agreement  with 
their  immediate  and  powerful  neighbors;  and  no  such 
treaties  have  been  made  between  other  important  nations. 
Mr.  Bryan  says  that  all  nations  would  enter  such  a  League 
if  they  would  enter  ours.  On  the  contrary,  the  sanction  of 
the  world's  united  command  in  securing  performance  of  the 
promises  under  our  League  will  induce  nations  to  yield  their 
power  to  strike  at  once  for  their  rights  in  the  confidence  that 
any  opponent,  however  tricky  or  faithless,  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  take  advantage  of  their  concession.  What  the 
belligerent  nations,  in  ending  this  war,  "are  yearning  for  is 
a  guaranty  of  peace,  not  only  in  the  promise  of  each  nation 
but  in  the  assurance  of  the  sanction  of  a  superior  force  of  all 
for  the  common  good  to  compel  observance  of  its  promise. 
Mr.  Bryan's  proposal  in  this  aspect  would  seem  to  them  a 
rope  of  sand ;  and  they  would  have  none  of  it  as  a  practical 
object  in  ending  the  war. 

Mr.  Bryan  thinks  that  the  present  war  demonstrates  the 
fallacy  of  what  he  calls  "  peace  by  terrorism."  What  the 
present  war  really  demonstrates  is  the  truth  of  the  conclusion 
of  Immanuel  Kant,  the  great  philosopher,  that  universal 
peace  cannot  be  expected  until  the  world  is  politically  organ- 
ised, that  is,  until  the  nations  of  the  world  use  the  prestige 
and  force  of  all  for  the  common  good  to  suppress  disturbers 
of  peace.  The  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  if  it  becomes  an 
accomplished  fact,  will  be  a  step  in  this  world  political  organ- 
ization. 


114       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Mr.  Bryan's  League  would  be  nothing  but  a  series  of 
treaties  between  "  couples  "of  nations.  If  two  nations  fell 
out,  the  nations  of  the  world  other  than  the  disputants, 
would  have  no  active  function  except  to  watch  the  two 
quarrelling  nations  keep  or  break  their  promises  to  wait  a 
year.  There  would  be  no  "  political  organisation  "  of  the 
world  to  preserve  and  secure  peace.  Our  League  makes 
every  member  active  and  selfishly  interested  in  maintaining 
peace  to  escape  the  burden  of  acting  as  policeman.  Thus  we 
have  the  "  team  work  "  of  the  world. 


VI 

Mr.  Bryan  proposes  four  plans  which  he  thinks  more 
practical  than  that  of  our  League.  The  first  one  I  have 
already  considered. 

The  second  is  a  World  Court,  in  which  all  nations  are  to 
be  represented,  to  consider  and  decide  justiciable  issues,  and 
to  investigate  and  make  findings  on  non-justiciable  issues, 
the  judgment  or  finding  to  be  enforceable  only  by  the  parties. 
This  is  similar  to  the  first  two  proposals  of  our  League,  with 
the  force  article  left  out.  There  is  no  sanction,  beyond  its 
agreement,  that  any  nation  will  delay  hostilities  until  hear- 
ing and  judgment.  It  does  not  differ  from  Mr.  Bryan's 
first  proposal  except  that  his  tribunal  gives  a  decision  here; 
and,  in  his  first,  it  did  not.  This  is  an  improvement;  but, 
with  that  exception,  it  is  open  to  the  same  objections.  It 
lacks  the  essential  quality  of  world  organization  and  pressure 
for  peace.  It  is  a  mere  combination  of  separate  treaties  of 
arbitration  between  every  two  nations.  This  suggestion  of 
force  adds  nothing.  The  optional  use  of  force  by  one  party 
to  an  arbitration  to  compel  performance  by  the  other  of  an 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE 

award  would  be  implied.  Mr.  Bryan  says,  "If  the  nations 
agreed  to  such  a  plan,  the  chances  against  war  would  be 
a  hundred  to  one,  if  not  a  thousand  to  one."  Mr.  Bryan's 
"  If  "  is  a  formidable  obstacle.  The  view  of  both  the  Allies 
and  the  Central  Powers,  shown  in  the  peace  correspondence, 
is  clear.  They  both  demand  sanctions  of  force.  Germany 
will  enter  a  league  to  suppress  disturbers  of  peace.  The 
Allies  declare  in  favor  of  "  international  agreements  imply- 
ing the  sanctions  necessary  to  insure  their  execution  and  thus 
prevent  an  apparent  security  from  only  facilitating  new 
aggressions."  Lloyd  George,  in  his  Guildhall  speech  on 
January  nth,  said:  "The  peace  and  security  for  peace 
will  be  that  the  nations  will  band  themselves  together  to 
punish  the  first  peace  breaker  who  comes  out.  As  to  the 
armies  of  Europe,  every  weapon  will  be  a  sword  of  justice 
in  the  Government  of  men ;  every  army  will  be  a  constabulary 
of  peace." 

Mr.  Bryan's  third  plan  is  that  all  the  nations  shall  agree 
to  a  referendum  before  declaring  war.  Mr.  Bryan  can 
hardly  think  that  the  Great  Powers,  Russia,  Germany, 
France,  England,  Austria,  Japan  and  Italy,  or  any  of  them, 
whose  consent  is  necessary  to  form  as  effective  league,  would 
agree  not  to  begin  a  war  until  the  question  should  be  left  to 
a  vote  of  their  respective  electorates  and  an  affirmative  vote 
given.  If  not,  his  proposal  is  not  feasible.  Suppose  the 
electorate  of  one  country  decides  for  war  and  that  of  the 
other  does  not.  Shall  another  vote  be  taken?  In  which 
country  ?  Or  shall  it  be  in  both  ?  The  difficulty  in  answer- 
ing these  questions  shows  how  chimerical  the  proposal  is, 
and  how  ill  adapted  to  the  settlement  of  a  pressing  interna- 
tional issue  between  two  governments.  The  Federal  Con- 


Il6  TAFT    PAPERS. ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

stitution  gives  to  Congress  the  power  to  declare  war. 
Without  amendment,  Mr.  Bryan's  proposal  could  not  be 
seriously  entertained.  Such  an  amendment  is  not  likely 
before  this  war  ends. 

As  a  fourth  plan,  Mr.  Bryan  suggests  a  reduction  of  arma- 
ments. We  all  strongly  favor  this.  But  Mr.  Bryan  offers 
no  plan  for  securing  and  maintaining  the  reduction.  Until 
all  strongly-armed  nations  reduce  their  armaments,  every 
wise  nation  will  insist  on  providing  and  maintaining  an 
armament  enabling  it  to  make  effective  defence  against  the 
possible  unlawful  aggression  of  any  other  armed  nation. 
A  general  reduction  of  armaments  is  entirely  impractical 
under  a  league  unless  the  league  offers  to  each  country  a 
security  of  peace  equivalent  to  the  armament  it  abandons. 
I  have  already  pointed  out  that  Germany  has  expressed  a 
willingness  to  consent  to  a  limitation  of  armament.  The 
Allies,  in  their  answer  to  President  Wilson,  have  intimated 
that  agreements  as  to  armament  should  be  one  of  the 
sanctions  of  a  secure  peace.  How  is  the  reduction  to  be  con- 
tinuously maintained  unless  by  the  united  and  enforceable 
command  of  all  the  members  of  the  League?  An  agreed 
reduction  of  armament  is  a  corollary  to  our  League's  pro- 
posals, because  a  world  compact  embodying  them  will  fur- 
nish the  security  to  each  nation  it  requires,  and  justify  a 
lessening  of  its  self-protection.  But  Mr.  Bryan  suggests  no 
such  security. 

Mr.  Bryan,  irrelevantly,  as  it  seems  to  me,  charges  that 
all  army  and  navy  officers,  including  our  own,  "  make  it 
their  business  to  imperil  peace."  This  is  prompted  by  their 
insistence  on  due  preparedness.  Applied  to  our  officers,  it 
is  a  grave  injustice  to  a  fine  body  of  men,  fully  imbued  with 
the  true  American  spirit  of  subordination  of  the  military 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  117 

to  the  civil.  If  war  were  to  come,  our  sudden  sense  of  de- 
pendence on  their  tried  skill,  courage  and  high  patriotism 
would  cause  us  deep  humiliation  for  such  words,  uttered 
merely  because  they  had  warned  their  countrymen  truly. 

The  practical  advantage  of  the  League  is  in  its  organizing 
the  political,  economic  and  military  forces  of  the  world  to 
command  resort  to  impartial  tribunals  for  the  decision  and 
settlement  of  all  irritating  questions  between  nations  before 
they  begin  war.  The  educational  effect  of  this  practice  will 
accustom  them  to  such  a  mode  of  settlement. 

They  will  acquire  the  habit  of  arbitration  as  Canada  and 
the  United  States  have  done.  The  sanction  of  world  force, 
though  present,  will  thus  become  less  compulsive  upon  the 
nations ;  and  they  will,  as  a  matter  of  due  course,  as  a  habit 
and  by  preference,  seek  only  a  peaceful  form. 

C.  Should  the  United  States  Become  a  Member  of  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace? 

VII 

The  war  in  Europe  will  have  weakened  all  nations  engaged 
in  it  by  the  loss  of  the  flower  of  their  youth  and  by  the 
destruction  of  industries  and  homes  in  the  thousands  of 
miles  in  its  train,  the  cost  of  the  rehabilitation  of  which  can 
hardly  be  measured.  The  belligerents  will  stagger  under 
a  stupendous  debt  and  interest  charge.  The  primacy  of  the 
United  States  among  the  nations  of  the  world  will  thus 
become  clearer  than  it  ever  was ;  and  this,  taken  with  its  real 
neutrality,  must  give  it  a  great  influence  in  a  council  of  na- 
tions which  can  and  ought  to  be  exerted  for  the  world's 
benefit.  Its  advocacy  of  such  a  League  will  strongly  make 


I  1 8  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

for  its  acceptance  by  the  other  Great  Powers,  but  only  on 
condition  that  it  becomes  a  member  and  bears  its  share  of 
the  risk  and  receives  its  share  of  the  benefit  of  membership. 

Our  wealth  in  the  last  three  years  has  been  added  to  by 
billions  in  the  profits  that  have  been  reaped  from  the  sale  of 
war  material  and  war  equipment  to  the  nations  of  Europe 
and  thus  from  the  blood  and  the  suffering  of  the  people  of 
these  stricken  countries.  We  had  the  right  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  situation  for  which  we  were  not  responsible;  but 
the  fact  should  make  us  sensitive  to  our  duty  when  occasion 
and  opportunity  arise  for  us  to  help  our  brethern  of  Europe 
to  avoid  a  recurrence  of  such  woe.  We  have  been  blessed 
beyond  any  other  nation.  Our  good  fortune  seems  to  have 
no  limit.  We  shall  not  be  worthy  of  it  unless  we  recognize 
our  responsibility  and  run  our  share  of  risk  in  securing  the 
world  from  a  return  of  the  scourge  visiting  it  now.  Of 
course,  the  first  duty  of  a  nation  is  to  its  own  people  and 
to  itself;  and  it  shquld  not,  out  of  a  mere  ideal  of  self-sac- 
rifice, endanger  the  integrity  of  its  government  or  its  civiliza- 
tion. But  it  has  a  duty  as  a  member  of  the  family  of 
nations;  and  that  duty  is  commensurate  with  its  power  for 
good  to  the  world. 

Moreover  the  risk  which  the  United  States  would  run  in 
joining  such  a  League  should  not  be  exaggerated.  If  the 
United  States  makes  adequate  preparation,  as  it  intends  to 
do,  to  defend  itself  against  the  unlawful  aggression  of  any 
nation,  the  army  and  navy  which  it  has  projected  will  furnish 
ample  constabulary  force  to  fill  any  quota  which  may  be 
allotted  to  it  in  the  formation  of  the  world  police  to  suppress 
the  beginnings  of  war  in  violation  of  the  regulations  of  the 
League. 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  1 19 

In  the  preliminary  conference  as  to  the  proposals  of  the 
League,  one  member  present  put  this  question  to  another: 
Would  you  be  willing  that  your  boy,  the  apple  of  your  eye 
and  the  pride  of  your  heart,  should  lay  down  his  life  in  a 
struggle  over  a  question  between  Servia  and  Austria  in 
which  America  has  no  concern?  The  answer  was:  "If 
the  suppression  of  that  struggle  by  the  police  force  of  the 
world  would  prevent  a  spread  of  the  local  fire  into  a  general 
world  conflagration,  my  boy's  life  could  not  be  sacrificed  in 
a  higher  cause."  It  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States,  in  its 
own  interest  and  in  the  interest  of  mankind,  to  lead  the 
nations  into  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

VIII 

Washington's  advice  has  no  application  to  the  League. 
The  alliances  which  he  condemned  were  like  that  with  France 
during  the  Revolution  because  of  which  we  were  called  on 
twenty  years  later  to  serve  the  selfish  motive  of  our  ally. 
Jefferson  advocated  a  permanent  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
to  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Our  League  is  a  league 
of  all  nations  to  support  the  selfish  purposes  of  none.  It 
has  only  one  object :  to  prevent  unnecessary  wars. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  rests  ultimately  on  force.  The 
traditions  of  ninety-three  years  strengthen  it;  but  the  Zim- 
mermann  note  advises  us  that  they  may  not  be  sufficient. 
Indeed  our  interests  the  world  over  require  us  to  protect 
and  maintain  them.  Our  enormous  trade  with  all  the 
countries  of  Europe  makes  it  most  difficult,  in  a  European 
war,  to  preserve  our  rights  and  interests  as  neutrals,  and  is 
most  likely  to  involve  us  in  the  war.  We  are  now  on  the 


12O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

brink  of  hostilities  with  Germany.  Why,  then,  should 
Washington's  advice  be  controlling,  advice  given  us  in  a  day 
of  small  things,  based  on  an  isolation  and  a  remoteness  from 
the  rest  of  the  world  which  has  ceased?  Our  coming  war 
with  Germany  demonstrates,  from  the  selfish  point  of  view 
alone,  the  wisdom  of  our  joining  in  a  world  movement  to 
prevent  the  recurrence  of  another  European  war,  even 
though  it  imposes  on  us  the  burden  of  contributing  our  quota 
to  an  international  police  force. 

But  Mr.  Bryan  says  that  in  joining  the  League  we  would 
abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Monroe  Doctrine, 
shortly  described,  is  our  national  policy  of  preventing,  by 
protest  and  by  force  if  necessary,  any  non-American  Power 
from  subverting  any  independent  American  government  and 
from  colonizing,  by  such  means  or  by  purchase,  American 
territory  under  a  government  of  its  own.  Our  reason  for 
maintaining  the  Doctrine  is  that  we  think  such  a  course  by 
a  non-American  Power  would  endanger  our  interests.  The 
Doctrine  does  not  rest  on  International  Law.  Should  a 
question  arise  as  to  its  enforcement  between  us  and  a  non- 
American  Power,  therefore,  it  would  be  non-justiciable  and 
must  go  to  the  Commission  under  the  second  article  for  a 
recommendation  of  compromise  in  which  we  would  not  be 
bound  in  honor  to  acquiesce.  We  would  then  have  the  same 
opportunity  to  maintain  the  Doctrine  by  force  as  if  there 
were  no  league.  Under  the  thirty-one  treaties  of  Mr. 
Bryan,  we  would  now  have  to  abide  a  year  of  investigation 
before  using  force.  The  disadvantage  to  us,  if  any,  of 
delay,  therefore,  will  certainly  be  no  greater  under  the  terms 
of  the  League. 

Instead  of  hampering  our  maintenance  of  the  Doctrine, 
the  League  would  help  us  in  any  case  where  its  violation 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  121 

might  be  attempted,  for  by  the  terms  of  the  League,  the  non- 
American  Power  must  submit  its  cause  for  hearing  to  one 
of  the  Tribunals  of  the  League  before  hostilities;  and,  if  it 
failed  to  do  so,  we  could  summon  the  international  police 
force  to  drive  it  off  American  shores. 

But  it  is  said  that,  if  we  mix  in  European  politics  to  the 
extent  required  by  this  League,  we  cannot  exclude  European 
Powers  from  taking  part  in  those  of  this  hemisphere. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  League  requiring  us  or  authorizing 
us  to  participate  in  the  internal  politics  of  any  European 
country  or  to  do  other  than  to  use  our  good  offices  to  prevent 
a  war  between  any  two  of  such  countries.  We  are  to  fur- 
nish our  quota  to  suppress  a  premature  war  between  them. 
They  are  to  exercise  the  same  functions  in  this  hemisphere. 
In  what  respect  does  that  violate  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 
The  League  does  not  enable  us  nor  authorize  us  to  acquire 
and  colonize  territory  in  Europe  by  purchase  or  conquest 
any  more  than  it  authorizes  a  European  nation  to  do  so  on 
this  side ;  and  that  is  all  the  Monroe  Doctrine  forbids. 

Mr.  Bryan  suggests  that  we  should  not  join  a  World 
League  because  our  citizens  of  foreign  nativity  would  divide 
in  their  sympathies  as  between  European  nations.  If  our 
foreign  policies,  needed  for  our  protection  and  for  that  of 
the  world,  are  to  be  abandoned  because  of  race  prejudice  in 
a  comparatively  small  group  of  our  foreign-born  citizens,  we 
have  failed  in  our  experiment  of  naturalization.  I  cannot 
acquiesce  in  such  a  view.  This  would  indeed  be  a  humiliat- 
ing surrender  to  the  so-called  "  hyphen." 

IX 

Mr.  Bryan's  eighth  article  commends  the  attitude  of  the 
President  in  his  message  read  to  the  United  States  Senate  on 


122  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

January  22nd.  I  have  altogether  misinterpreted  the  notes 
of  the  President  to  the  belligerent  powers,  his  speech  at  the 
dinner  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  in  May,  1916,  as 
well  as  the  message  of  January  22nd  last,  if  he  has  not,  in 
all  of  these,  intended  to  approve  the  general  principles  of  our 
League.  His  reference  to  "  the  major  force  of  the  world  " 
was  certainly  an  approval  of  the  political  organization  of  the 
world  to  the  extent  of  creating  an  international  police  force 
to  secure  compliance  with  a  peaceable  procedure  for  the  set- 
tlement of  international  questions  likely  otherwise  to  lead  to 
war.  Mr.  Bryan's  citation  of  the  President  as  authority 
does  not  sustain  his  contention. 

The  question  who  shall  command  the  joint  military  force 
in  a  campaign  is  not  material,  provided  it  be  understood  in 
advance,  as  it  must  be,  what  the  purpose  of  the  campaign  is. 
The  United  States  has  had  no  difficulty  in  the  past  in  acting 
with  other  nations  to  carry  out  a  common  purpose  of  a  mili- 
tary character,  as  the  taking  of  Pekin  by  the  Allied  force 
during  the  Boxer  trouble  proves.  Nations  have  acted 
together  often  in  history;  and  the  question  who  shall  have 
the  military  command  or  how  the  joint  armies  should  be 
directed  is  a  practical  military  question  to  be  agreed  upon  by 
the  joint  powers  in  war  council.  The  purpose  of  League 
campaigns  would  be  settled  by  the  terms  of  the  League 
before  the  mobilization  begins.  It  would  be  to  restrain  the 
warlike  activities  of  a  nation  unlawfully  breaking  a  peace 
to  which  it  is  pledged.  To  characterize  this  as  placing  the 
destiny  of  the  toiling  millions  of  the  United  States  in  the 
hands  of  aliens  for  their  selfish  purposes  is  to  reveal  a  com- 
plete misunderstanding  of  the  normal  operation  of  the 
League.  The  United  States  retains  complete  control  of  its 


WORLD    PEACE  DEBATE  123 

forces  and  can  withdraw  them  whenever  the  lawful  and  com- 
mendable purpose  of  preserving  the  peace  of  the  world  shall 
cease  to  be  the  object  of  the  military  campaign. 

Those  who  are  promoting  the  League  are  not  committed 
to  any  particular  means  by  which  the  necessary  military 
preparation  shall  be  secured.  Personally,  I  favor  universal 
compulsory  military  training,  for  a  year,  of  our  youth 
between  the  ages  of  nineteen  and  twenty- four  as  the  most 
effective  and  most  democratic  plan  that  can  be  adopted.  It 
will  fall  equally  upon  the  rich  and  poor.  It  will  give  a  year 
of  valuable  disciplinary  education  to  our  youth  who  need  it 
much.  It  will  furnish  a  citizenship  from  which  we  can  sum- 
mon a  trained  army  to  defend  our  country.  I  repeat,  how- 
ever, this  is  not  a  part  of  the  League  plan. 

The  war  with  Germany  which  we  now  face,  after  every 
effort  to  escape  it  and  when  our  national  conscience  is  wholly 
void  of  offence  toward  her,  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  Mr. 
Bryan's  view  that  love  is  all  that  is  needed  to  make  effective 
a  world  league  to  insure  peace.  If  this  war  teaches  us  any- 
thing, it  is  that  our  civilization  has  not  advanced  beyond 
the  time  when  the  major  force  of  the  world  is  sometimes 
needed  for  defense  against  selfish  greed  and  ambition  on  the 
part  of  nations.  If  we  fail  to  prepare  ourselves  to  defend 
our  rights  against  lawless  aggression  by  ruthless  military  and 
naval  power,  we  are  blind  to  the  simplest  lessons  of  current 
history.  If  we  can  avail  ourselves  of  the  same  preparation 
to  do  our  part  in  defending  the  peace  of  the  world,  should 
we  not  seize  the  opportunity? 


124       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


X 

We  have  now  reached  the  end  of  the  discussion.  This 
tenth  article  offers  an  opportunity  for  a  summary  of  the 
positions  taken  in  the  previous  papers.  The  program  of 
the  League  looks  to  a  treaty  binding  all  nations  to  adopt,  in 
the  settlement  of  controversies  likely  to  lead  to  war  between 
them,  a  peaceable  procedure  for  the  hearing  and  decision 
of  issues  capable  of  being  settled  on  principles  of  law  and 
of  issues  that  may  not  be  so  settled.  It  does  not  attempt 
to  enforce  the  decisions.  The  aim  of  the  League  is,  by 
elucidation  of  the  facts  and  arguments  on  both  sides  of  the 
issue  and  by  a  decision  of  it  by  an  impartial  tribunal,  to 
practice  nations  in  the  art  of  settling  irritating  questions  by 
judicial  investigation  and  conclusion.  The  example  of  our 
relations  with  Canada  and  the  constant  use  of  arbitration  to 
settle  our  difficulties  —  which  has  become  a  habit  —  offer  a 
precedent  from  which  we  believe  that,  when  such  a  proced- 
ure is  enforced,  it  will  train  all  nations  to  adopt  it  rather 
than  to  resort  to  war.  .  .  .  The  force  of  the  world  is  to  be 
used  to  compel  nations  to  adopt  this  procedure  before  resort- 
ing to  hostilities.  ...  A  pacifist  who  will  admit  a  police- 
man to  be  a  proper  official  in  the  community  yields  the  whole 
case  against  the  creation  of  an  international  police  force  in 
our  League. 

Mr.  Bryan  attempts  to  meet  this  argument  by  saying  that 
the  analogy  is  misleading  and  uses  these  words : 

"  The  nations  cannot,  in  fairness,  be  likened  to  criminals, 
although  we  often  describe  their  public  acts  as  criminal,  especially 
in  time  of  war.  The  criminal  is  one  who  intentionally  violates 
a  law  duly  enacted  by  those  having  authority  to  make  laws.  He 
disregards  an  obligation  confessedly  binding  upon  him ;  and  the 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE 


125 


policeman,  acting  for  the  outraged  community,  arrests  the  guilty 
party  and  brings  him  before  the  bar  of  justice.  There  is  no  in- 
ternational law-making  power;  and,  if  such  a  law-making  power 
existed,  there  are  certain  questions  upon  which  it  would  not  as- 
sume to  act  —  certain  questions  upon  which  each  nation,  whether 
large  or  small,  is  conceded  the  right  to  decide  for  itself  without 
regard  to  the  views  or  interests  of  other  nations.  Our  arbitra- 
tion treaties,  the  most  advanced  in  the  world,  contain  excep- 
tions, questions  of  honor,  questions  of  independence,  vital  in- 
terests and  the  interests  of  third  parties.  These  questions  are 
not  to  be  submitted  to  arbitration;  and  yet  these  are  the  very 
questions  out  of  which  wars  grow." 

Of  all  men  in  the  world,  Mr.  Bryan,  by  reason  of  his 
general  views,  is  the  one  least  entitled  to  put  forth  these 
reasons  in  order  to  escape  the  analogy  of  state  police.  No 
one  has  spoken  more  eloquently  against  war  as  a  crime  than 
Air.  Bryan.  No  one  has  upheld  more  fully  international 
law  as  a  binding  force  upon  the  nations.  International  law 
is  the  law  of  nations  agreed  to  between  the  nations  and 
deriving  its  sanction  from  their  general  acquiescence.  A 
nation  which  violates  international  law  is  a  criminal  before 
the  bar.  The  exceptions  from  our  existing  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration of  questions  of  vital  interest  and  national  honor,  to 
which  Mr.  Bryan  refers,  were  exceptions  which  were  not 
recognized  in  the  unratified  general  arbitration  treaties  made 
with  France  and  Great  Britain  which  Mr.  Bryan  approved 
and  to  which  he  gave  effective  support.  More  than  that, 
the  Senate  itself  did  not  seek,  in  its  proposed  amendments, 
to  except  questions  of  honor  and  vital  interest  from  arbitra- 
tion. Mr.  Bryan's  distinction  is  a  forced  one  and  has  no 
foundation,  certainly  as  applied  to  the  plan  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace.  The  treaty  forming  the  League  is  an 
agreement  by  all  nations  to  comply  with  its  stipulations  and 


126       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

not  only  to  comply  with  its  stipulations,  but,  in  case  of  non- 
compliance  by  any  member,  to  contribute  their  quotas  to  an 
international  police  to  restrain  and  punish  that  member  for 
non-compliance.  In  other  words,  it  furnishes  an  interna- 
tional constitution.  It  creates  an  international  law  and 
denounces  as  a  crime  violation  of  the  legal  obligations  into 
which  the  nations  voluntarily  enter.  The  very  object  of 
the  League  is  to  organize  the  world  politically;  and  that 
means  to  enact  law  and  to  provide  for  its  enforcement. 
I  submit  that  the  analogy  of  the  state  police  is  not  only  a  fair 
one  but  a  clinching  and  convincing  one  in  showing  the  funda- 
mental fallacy  and  error  of  those  who  have  the  international 
pacifist  views  of  Mr.  Bryan  and  still  are  in  favor  of  a  state 
and  city  police. 

That  the  League  is  practical  may  be  inferred  from  the 
approval  which  its  general  principles  have  received  from  the 
leading  statesmen  of  the  Great  Powers  in  answer  to  direct 
questions  upon  the.  subject,  and  also  in  official  expression 
in  the  correspondence  between  President  Wilson  and  the 
belligerent  Powers  engaged  in  the  present  war.  It  is  prac- 
tical because  there  is  precedent  for  every  detail  in  the  League, 
and  because  it  embodies  the  elemental  principle  of  govern- 
ment as  it  should  be  in  city,  state,  and  nation  and  in  the 
world:  to  wit,  the  organization  of  the  force  of  all  to  sup- 
press lawless  force  of  the  few.  The  lines  upon  which  the 
League  has  been  framed  are  very  general;  the  plan  is  only 
a  working  hypothesis.  That  it  may  be  changed  in  inter- 
national conference  in  detail  goes  without  saying.  But  that 
it  furnishes  a  broad  and  correct  foundation  for  the  political 
organization  of  the  world,  as  Kant  foresaw  it,  I  submit,  is 
clear. 

The  United  States  should  enter  the  League ;  first,  because 


WORLD    PEACE    DEBATE  127 

of  all  nations  in  the  world,  it  wishes  to  avoid  war  and  to 
make  it  as  remote  as  possible;  second,  because  its  interests 
have  now  become  so  world-wide  and  it  has  become  so  close 
a  neighbor  of  all  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  and  of  Asia 
that  a  general  war  must  involve  the  United  States.  It  is 
therefore  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  United  States, 
viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  self-interest,  to  secure  the 
joint  effort  of  the  world  to  prevent  such  a  war  or  to  confine 
it  to  a  local  struggle.  The  present  difficulty  with  Germany  is 
a  most  striking  demonstration  of  the  danger  in  which  the 
United  States  will  be  involved  in  every  general  war  in  the 
future,  struggle  as  it  may  to  escape  being  drawn  in. 

Nor  does  the  League  involve  the  delegation  to  an  inter- 
national council,  in  which  the  United  States  has  but  one 
vote,  of  the  power  to  hurry  this  country  into  war.  The 
President  and  the  Senate  sign  the  treaty  of  the  League  and 
bind  the  United  States  to  its  obligations.  Congress  is  the 
authority  which  will  decide  whether  the  fact  exists,  calling 
for  action  by  the  United  States,  and  then  will  take  such 
action  as  the  obligation  requires.  Should  the  purpose  of 
the  International  Police  under  the  League  be  perverted  to 
anything  other  than  enforcing  the  peaceable  procedure  in  the 
settlement  of  international  controversies,  Congress  will  have 
full  power  to  withdraw  the  United  States  forces  and  decline 
further  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings. 

With  the  blessings  which  God  has  showered  on  this 
country,  it  should  not  hesitate  to  help  the  world  and  the 
family  of  nations  to  protect  itself  against  the  recurrence  of 
such  an  awful  disaster  and  retrograde  movement  in  Christian 
civilization  as  the  present  war. 


128  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

XI 

Since  this  discussion  began,  and  indeed  since  the  tenth 
paper  was  written,  the  plot  of  the  world  drama  now  being 
enacted  has  developed  with  startling  rapidity.  Even  as  we 
have  been  arguing,  a  World  League  to  Enforce  Peace  has 
been  formed;  and  the  United  States  has  taken  its  proper 
place  therein.  The  absolutism  of  Russia  has  toppled  over 
in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye ;  and  the  Russia  people  have  taken 
charge.  Germany,  in  a  ruthless  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
American  citizens,  has  forced  the  United  States,  as  a  self- 
respecting  nation,  to  take  up  the  sword  against  her.  The 
United  States  is  thus  driven  into  an  alliance  with  the  Entente 
Allies.  The  democracies  of  Russia,  Italy,  France,  England 
and  the  United  States  are  now  engaged  in  a  death  struggle 
with  the  dynasties  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and  the  Hapsburgs 
to  end  the  only  substantial  military  absolutism  remaining  in 
the  world.  Military  dynasties  are  a  threat  against  the  peace 
of  the  world.  With  their  lust  for  power  and  the  selfish 
considerations  that  affect  their  policies,  their  respect  for  the 
solemn  obligations  of  a  treaty  are  much  less  than  that  of 
democracies.  Democracies  are  not  perfect  in  their  sense  of 
justice,  in  the  certainty  of  peaceful  policies,  nor  in  their  exact 
observance  of  treaty  obligations;  but  they  are  a  vast  im- 
provement in  these  respects  over  an  autocracy  dependent  on 
military  force. 

The  Prussian  autocracy  of  Germany  is  the  great  interna- 
tional criminal.  It  has  sacrificed  honor;  it  has  murdered 
men  and  women  and  has,  in  numberless  ways,  violated  with 
ruthless  cruelty  the  principles  of  international  law  to  accom- 
plish its  dynastic  purposes.  It  has  dragged  its  allies  with 
it,  and  made  them  participes  criminis.  The  League  of  the 


WORLD   PEACE   DEBATE  1 29 

United  States  and  the  Entente  Allies,  and  the  Central  and 
South  American  countries  that  may  join  us,  is  an  organiza- 
tion of  world  power  to  visit  destruction  on  the  dynasties 
whose  continued  existence  constitutes  an  obstruction  to  Law 
and  Peace.  We  are  properly  separating  the  Hohenzollerns 
and  the  Hapsburgs,  from  the  great  German  people  and  the 
great  people  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  If  we  succeed,  as  we 
must,  the  war,  dreadful  as  it  has  been  in  the  losses  and  suf- 
fering it  has  entailed,  painful  and  destructive  as  it  is  likely 
to  be,  will  be  worth  all  it  cost.  It  will  make  the  future  of 
the  world  depend  upon  the  rule  of  the  peoples  of  the  world, 
will  exalt  the  reign  of  international  justice,  and  will  organize 
the  joint  forces  of  the  world  to  maintain  it.  With  the  Ger- 
man and  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  peoples  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  American,  English,  French,  Italian  and 
Russian  peoples  on  the  other,  in  an  international  conference, 
none  will  hesitate  to  enter  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  The 
popular  character  of  all  the  governments,  in  and  of  itself, 
will  render  war  between  them  less  probable,  will  give  greater 
sanction  to  their  promises,  and  will  make  more  practical  and 
less  burdensome  a  League  having  for  its  purpose  compulsory 
procedure  for  the  settlement  of  irritating  international  dis- 
putes. 

"  Whom  the  gods  wish  to  destroy  they  first  make  mad." 
The  people  of  the  United  States,  immersed  in  business, 
lethargic  with  prosperity,  naturally  averse  to  war  and  its  new 
horrors  as  shown  in  the  present  struggle,  have  been  loath 
to  take  up  the  sword.  They  have  made  every  honorable 
effort  to  keep  out  of  the  vortex.  But  Germany,  in  her  mad 
desperation  and  with  a  lack  of  foresight  that  has  charac- 
terized all  her  diplomatic  policies,  has  forced  an  unwilling 
people  to  join  the  league  of  her  opponents.  The  triumph 


I3O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

of  Democracy  in  Russia  and  the  entry  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war  make  clear  to  the  world  and  to  history  that  this 
is  a  war  for  the  benefit  of  mankind. 

The  rulers  of  Germany  have  undervalued  the  power  of 
the  United  States.  They  have  made  military  efficiency  their 
national  god.  A  country  which  has,  up  to  this  time,  ignored 
military  science,  and  failed  to  maintain  a  trained  army, 
arouses  in  them  contempt.  In  their  mad  rage  at  England 
and  in  their  desire  to  starve  her  people,  they  have  stupidly 
aroused  against  themselves  the  only  dangerous  antagonist 
remaining.  When  money  and  food  and  supplies  are  more 
clearly  the  determining  factor  in  the  war  than  ever  before, 
they  deliberately  make  an  enemy  of  the  country  which  has 
greater  capacity  to  furnish  them  than  all  other  countries 
combined.  The  military  unpreparedness  of  the  United 
States  blinds  them  to  the  enormous  advantage  which  her 
accession  to  the  ranks  of  their  opponents  gives  in  the  test 
of  endurance  which  must  decide  the  struggle.  Within  a 
month  after  her  declaration  of  war,  the  United  States  will 
place  at  the  disposal  of  her  allies  the  enormous  sum  of  three 
billions  of  dollars  to  replenish  their  depleted  treasuries  and 
to  strengthen  the  effectiveness  of  their  serried  hosts.  Her 
resources  in  the  production  of  food  and  war  supplies  are 
being  promptly  organized  so  that  the  energies  of  this  country 
will  be  directed  to  feeding  the  peoples  of  her  allies  and  sup- 
porting and  maintaining  the  equipment  of  their  armies. 
The  skill  and  courage  of  her  navy,  with  the  ingenuity  of  her 
inventors,  will  be  directed  to  the  suppression  of  the  sole  hope 
of  the  Prussian  military  hierarchy,  their  cruel,  lawless  and 
murderous  submarine. 

The  broad  conception  of  the  world-cause  for  which  the 
United  States  is  fighting  will  send  the  blood  tingling  through 


WORLD    PEACE   DEBATE  13 I 

her  giant  limbs  and  awaken  in  her  that  moral  strength  which 
the  Hohenzollern  in  his  plan  to  conquer  the  world  has  con- 
sistently ignored. 

The  struggle  may  be  a  long  one.  We  do  not  aid  our 
cause  by  under-estimating  the  power  of  our  enemy  or  the 
perfection  attained  by  her  in  the  organization  and  use  of 
physical  and  material  resources,  and  of  a  people  educated 
and  moulded  to  the  needs  of  a  military  autocracy.  We  hope 
the  contest  may  end  in  a  year.  It  may  last  double  that  or 
longer;  but  however  long  it  lasts,  the  end  is  not  in  doubt. 
We  were  slow  in  getting  in.  We  will  never  quit  until  our 
high  purpose  is  attained;  and  the  cause  of  Democracy  is 
triumphant.  We  should  not  rely  on  the  pleasing  hope  that 
our  losses  will  chiefly  be  in  money.  We  should  organize  our 
efforts  and  make  our  plans  with  the  stern  thought  that  many 
of  our  best  lives  and  the  flower  of  our  youth  will  figure 
largely  in  the  cost  of  our  victory ;  but  the  greatness  of  our 
cause  should  reconcile  us  to  every  sacrifice.  When  we,  by 
our  intervention,  shall  have  contributed  largely  to  the  vic- 
tory, when  our  real  enemies  shall  have  disappeared  in  the 
deposition  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and  the  Hapsburgs,  the 
influence  for  good  that  we,  without  motive  of  aggrandize- 
ment, without  hope  or  wish  to  increase  our  territory  or 
power,  can  wield  in  the  councils  of  the  world  will  be  com- 
manding and  will  make  for  a  just  peace  and  a  world  league 
to  maintain  it. 

"  God  works  in  mysterious  ways  his  wonders  to  perform." 
It  would  seem  that  there  was  now  being  disclosed  the 
providential  plan  for  securing  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 
Everything  that  has  happened  is  forcing  on  the  adoption  of 
a  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  Events  are  shaping  themselves 
so  that  when  the  Congress  of  Nations  meets,  after  the  end 


132  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

shall  have  come,  the  League  will  be  as  natural  a  result  as 
peace  itself.  How  futile  in  the  face  of  the  facts  of  to-day 
seem  the  arguments  that  we  must  preserve  our  isolation  and 
avoid  entangling  alliances !  How  inapplicable  Washing- 
ton's words,  wise  when  uttered,  become  to  the  needs  and 
policy  of  the  present!  The  League  to  Enforce  Peace  is 
formed;  and  we  have  joined  it.  On  its  success  and  perma- 
nence depends  the  future  peace  of  the  sons  of  men. 


VICTORY  WITH  POWER l 

No  one  in  the  wildest  flight  of  his  imagination  now  can 
think  of  undefeated  Germany  yielding  either  proper  in- 
demnity to  Belgium  or  justice  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  each  of 
which  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  have  made  a  sine 
qua  non.  Nor  will  the  unconquered  German  ruling  class 
consent  to  lift  the  German  paw  and  remove  its  crushing 
weight  from  prostrate  Russia  or  give  over  to  decent  rule  the 
blood-stained  Christian  provinces  of  Turkey.  If  the  wrongs 
of  Belgium  and  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  of  Russians,  Italians, 
Poles,  Armenians,  Serbians  and  other  Slav  peoples  are  not 
righted,  the  sacrifices  of  the  war  will  have  been  for  naught. 
We  must,  therefore,  conquer  the  Germans  if  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  is  to  be  secured.  Therefore,  the  slogan  of  the  Allies, 
and  the  cry  of  this  country  must  be  "  Victory  with  Power." 

Our  Society  was  organized  to  make  this  war  an  instru- 
ment for  the  promotion  of  peace.  It  holds  that  the  horrors 
of  the  war  and  the  awful  misery  it  involves  must  make  the 

1  Extracts  from  an  address  before  League  to  Enforce  Peace  Con- 
vention, Phila.,  May,  1918. 


OUR   PURPOSE  133 

nations  bind  themselves  to  a  common  obligation  for  the 
future  to  suppress  war.  We  call  for  a  primitive  political 
organization  of  the  world,  affording  judicial  and  mediating 
agencies  and  an  international  police  to  stamp  out  the  begin- 
nings of  every  riot  of  world  violence.  A  member  of  the 
family  of  nations  which  looks  upon  war  as  a  normal  means 
of  acquiring  power  and  a  justifiable  condition  of  growth 
destroys  hope  for  the  future.  Such  member  must  be 
whipped  into  a  different  view  and  into  conformity  with  the 
public  opinion  of  the  world.  Nothing  but  force  can  cure 
the  brutality  and  ruthlessness  of  force.  In  such  a  case  the 
maxim,  "  Similia  similibus  curantur"  has  full  application. 
The  peaceful  countries  of  the  world  are  obliged  to  assume 
the  habits  and  the  panoply  of  war.  When  they,  in  spite  of 
their  lack  of  preparation,  in  spite  of  their  peace-loving 
instincts,  shall  strike  down  in  battle  a  people  that  makes  war 
its  god,  the  cure  of  that  people  will  be  complete,  the  scales 
will  fall  from  their  eyes,  and  with  a  clear  vision  they  will 
see  that  he  whom  they  have  ignorantly  worshipped  is  the 
devil  and  not  God.  Until  so  cured,  the  Central  Powers  can 
never  be  amenable  and  law-abiding  members  of  a  peaceful 
world  community. 


OUR  PURPOSE  x 

We  are  in  the  war  first  of  all  to  make  the  world  safer 
and  a  better  place  to  live  in.  We  are  fighting  to  bring  about 
a  lasting  peace.  There  was  a  time  when  many  cherished 
the  hope  that  such  a  peace  could  be  established  by  the  moral 

1  Newspaper  article,  June  30,  1918. 


134      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

force  of  public  opinion.  Now  we  know  that  peace  has  a 
more  terrible  price,  and  we  are  ready  to  pay  the  price. 

We  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  politics  of  Europe; 
but  this  war  is  not  a  matter  of  European  politics.  It  is 
world  politics;  and  we  announced  ourselves  as  citizens  of 
the  world  when  we  declared  war  against  Germany.  World 
politics,  after  all,  are  only  fundamental  questions  of  right 
and  wrong.  We  are  for  the  right  against  the  wrong. 

We  are  righting  to  make  it  impossible  for  military  autoc- 
racy ever  again  to  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world.  Re- 
publics make  mistakes,  but  this  war  has  proved  that  they  are 
slow  to  fight. 

One  thing  this  war  will  accomplish:  when  it  is  over  we 
shall  hear  no  more  talk  about  the  advantages  of  national 
isolation.  In  taking  our  place  among  the  nations  we  have 
come  with  an  international  policy  already  prepared  and  we 
have  made  it  clear  to  the  world  that  the  success  of  this  policy 
is  our  main  purpose.  We  are  fighting,  as  our  President  has 
put  it,  "  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy." 

We  have  not  tried  to  set  a  price  upon  our  participation  in 
the  war.  We  have  made  no  bargain.  Europe  knows  our 
purpose.  When  the  war  is  over  we  expect  to  cast  our  vote 
at  the  peace  council  for  what  the  President  called  "  such 
cooperation  of  force  among  the  great  nations  as  may  be 
necessary  to  maintain  peace  and  freedom  throughout  the 
world." 

The  war  has  demonstrated  the  weakness  of  international 
law  unsupported  by  force.  Such  support  can  be  furnished 
by  a  system  of  international  police. 

I  do  not  pretend  to  know  just  what  our  views  will  be 


OUR   PURPOSE  135 

when  the  war  is  over.  Nobody  realized  where  the  Spanish 
war  would  carry  us.  We  went  into  it  in  Cuba  and  came 
out  in  the  Philippines.  But  this  is  how  the  thing  looks  now. 
The  policy  and  the  purpose  I  have  explained  are  so  broad 
and  their  application  so  universal  that  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  any  event  can  change  them. 

In  principle  this  policy  and  purpose  have  been  endorsed 
by  many  of  the  leading  European  statesmen  who  may  sit  at 
the  peace  council  beside  the  delegates  from  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  In  his  speech  before  the  United  States  Senate, 
M.  Viviani,  the  former  premier  of  France  and  head  of  the 
French  mission,  said : 

"  Together  we  will  carry  on  that  struggle ;  and  when  by 
force  we  have  at  last  imposed  military  victory,  our  labors 
will  not  be  concluded.  Our  task  will  be  —  I  quote  the  noble 
words  of  President  Wilson  —  to  organize  the  society  of 
nations.  .  .  .  We  will  shatter  the  ponderous  sword  of  mili- 
tarism; we  will  establish  guarantees  of  peace;  and  then  we 
can  disappear  from  the  world's  stage,  since  we  shall  leave 
at  the  cost  of  our  common  immolation  the  noblest  heritage 
future  generations  can  possess." 

And  Russia  has  joined  the  consensus  of  the  enlightened 
nations  with  this  declaration  by  Prof.  Milyukoff,  first 
Foreign  Minister  of  the  young  Republic : 

"  The  definition  by  President  Wilson  of  the  purposes  of 
the  war  corresponds  entirely  with  the  declarations  of  the 
statesmen  of  the  allied  powers:  M.  Briand,  Mr.  Asquith 
and  Viscount  Grey  all  expressed  themselves  continually  on 
the  necessity  of  seeking  to  prevent  conflicts  of  armed  forces 
by  providing  peaceful  methods  of  solution  for  international 
disputes  and  creating  a  new  organization  of  nations  based 


136       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

upon  order  and  justice  in  international  life.  The  democracy 
of  free  Russia  is  able  to  associate  itself  completely  with  these 
declarations." 

Our  allies  have  accepted  the  definition  of  the  high  purpose 
of  the  war  as  it  came  to  them  from  this  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
Now  let  us  show  them  that  we  can  wage  war  as  well  as 
analyze  and  define  it. 


SELF  DETERMINATION * 

The  task  of  the  League  of  Nations  called  to  decide  the 
terms  of  peace  will  be  as  huge  as  that  of  the  war  which  the 
peace  will  end.  The  issues  as  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  the 
Trentino  and  Trieste  will  be  simple  as  compared  with  the 
Czecho-Slovak  and  Jugo-Slav  questions.  The  restrictions 
of  the  Turkish  domain,  the  protection  and  freedom  of 
Armenia,  the  Balkan  boundaries  and  the  government  of 
Albania  will  try  the  ingenuity  of  statesmen  in  working  out 
a  just  result.  Above  all  in  difficulty  will  be  the  settlement 
of  the  questions  as  to  Russia.  Shall  it  be  a  confederation  of 
States  like  ours,  or  shall  they  be  independent?  Who  shall 
determine  this? 

"  Let  the  people  themselves  decide,"  it  is  said.  Every  one 
agrees  that  this  general  rule  should  prevail  in  post-war 
arrangements.  But  how  large  or  how  small  shall  the  unit 
of  a  people  for  such  decision  be?  Shall  units  be  racial  or 
geographical  ?  Suppose  a  people  as  small  in  number  as  the 
Belfast  Orangemen  compared  with  the  whole  population  of 
Ireland  insists  on  a  separate  government,  though  geography, 

1  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger  Oct.  3,  1918. 


SELF    DETERMINATION  137 

trade  conditions  and  every  consideration  but  religious  differ- 
ence and  tradition  require  that  the  whole  island  be  under  one 
Government  ? 

It  becomes  apparent  at  once  that  the  general  principle  of 
popular  rule  is  not  a  panacea  and  that  many  issues  will  have 
to  be  settled  by  the  Congress  of  Nations,  according  to  ex- 
pedient and  practical  justice,  over  the  objection  of  some  part 
of  the  people  affected.  The  result  will  illustrate  the  in- 
herent error  in  the  frequent  assumption  that  a  Government 
by  the  people  is  a  Government  in  which  that  which  is  done 
is  the  will  of  each  one.  A  practical  Government  by  the 
people  is  a  Government  by  a  majority  of  the  voters.  The 
rest  of  the  people  must  yield  their  will  to  the  will  of  this 
majority.  However,  in  the  purest  democracy,  the  voters 
are  not  a  half  of  the  population,  and  the  prevailing  majority 
is  usually  not  more  than  20  per  cent,  of  all.  The  guide  of 
the  popular  will  is  still  less  helpful  when  the  issue  is  the  fix- 
ing of  the  proper  self-governing  unit.  In  the  intoxicating 
fumes  of  a  new  freedom,  municipal  Councils  in  Russia  de- 
clared themselves  independent  governments.  Should  Lithu- 
ania, Esthonia,  the  Ukraine  and  Great  Russia  be  separate 
entities  ?  This  cannot  be  certainly  and  properly  determined 
by  a  plebiscite  of  the  population  of  the  particular  district,  if 
its  relation  to  the  neighboring  communities  or  to  Russia 
as  a  whole  make  it  best  for  all  concerned  that  they  be  united. 
More  than  this,  an  ignorant  people  without  the  slightest 
experience  in  the  restraints  necessary  in  successful  self- 
government  and  subject  to  the  wildest  imaginings  under  the 
insidious  demagoguery  of  venal  leaders  may  well  not  know 
what  is  best  for  them. 

Thus,  flowing  phrases  as  to  liberty  and  the  rule  of  the 
people  do  not  offer  a  complete  solution  for  all  the  problems 


138  TAFT    PAPERS   OX    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

which  the  world's  peacemakers  will  face.  Still,  if  we  can 
make  the  adjustment  to  depend  on  just  provision  for  the 
welfare  of  the  peoples  affected  instead  of  on  the  greed  of 
the  parties,  we  shall  secure  an  enormous  advance  over  past 
international  settlements. 


PERIL  IN  HUN  PEACE  OFFER l 

The  European  situation  is  working  out  exactly  as  one 
might  have  anticipated.  Indeed,  when  we  read  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  adopted  in  the  con- 
vention which  the  League  held  in  this  city  in  May.  their 
language  is  like  a  prophecy.  The  league  in  its  platform 
said:  — 

"  Apprehensive  of  the  lure  of  an  inconclusive  peace,  which 
would  enable  the  present  masters  of  Germany  to  continue 
their  dominion  of  Central  Europe  and  sooner  or  later  again 
to  menace  the  peace  and  freedom  of  the  world,  the  league 
feels  that  our  people  should  be  forewarned  in  case  Germany 
should  propose  to  make  peace  on  terms  that  might  well 
deceive  the  unsuspecting.  Suppose  she  should  offer  to  retire 
from  Belgium  and  France;  to  cede  the  Trentino  to  Italy; 
even  to  relinquish  all  claims  to  her  captured  colonies  and  to 
promise  some  kind  of  antonomy  to  the  various  races  of 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Such  an  offer  would  be  highly 
seductive,  and  if  we  are  not  prepared  to  understand  what  it 
means  might  well  beguile  the  Allies  into  a  peace  which  would 
be  inconclusive,  because  unless  the  principle  of  militarism  is 
destroyed  the  promise  would  be  kept  no  better  than  those 

1  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger  Oct  8,  1918. 


PERIL  IN  HUN  PEACE  OFFER  139 

broken  in  the  past.  Autonomy  of  the  other  races  would 
mean  their  organization  for  the  strengthening  of  Germany 
until  she  had  control  of  the  resources  of  200,000,000  for  her 
next  war.  .  .  .  Such  a  settlement  would  be  a  mere  truce 
pending  a  strife  more  fierce  hereafter.  So  long  as  pre- 
datory militarism  is  not  wholly  destroyed  no  lasting  peace 
can  be  made." 

Germany  now  proposes  an  armistice  in  order  to  enable 
the  representatives  of  the  Central  Powers  and  the  Allies  to 
negotiate  a  peace  on  the  general  basis  of  peace  indicated  by 
President  \Yilson  in  his  address  to  Congress  on  January  8, 
1918.  This  does  not  really  commit  Germany  to  anything 
except  that  she  is  willing  to  talk  about  the  subject  matter 
covered  in  the  fourteen  points  by  President  Wilson  in  that 
address.  It  involves  an  interminable  discussion  of  what  his 
fourteen  points  mean  and  include.  That  address  was  made 
nearly  nine  months  ago.  It  was  made  before  the  Czecho- 
slovak and  Jugoslav  movements  had  crystalized  into  a  de- 
mand for  independent  governments.  The  President  in  his 
reference  to  a  settlement  of  an  Austrian  peace  asked  for  '  the 
freest  opportunity  for  autonomous  development.'  Austria 
evidently  looks  to  a  confederation  under  the  dual  monarchy. 
\Ye  have  now  gone  further  as  to  the  Czecho-Slavs  and 
recognized  their  independence.  The  message  of  January  8 
was  made  before  the  full  revelations  as  to  Germany's  poli- 
cies in  respect  to  Russian  and  the  Baltic  provinces,  which 
reek  with  bad  faith,  cruelty  and  a  murderous  plotting 
with  the  insane  Bolsheviki  against  the  decent  people  of 
Russia. 

The  President's  fourteen  points  are  stated  in  general 
words,  the  only  ones  which  he  could  use  at  such  a  time. 
They  are  not  stated  in  the  specific  terms  upon  which  a  treaty 
of  peace  could  be  formulated  or  upon  which  any  offer  of  the 


I4O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Germans  could  be  accepted.  The  Germans  do  not  agree  to 
submit  to  the  terms  stated  by  the  President,  general  as  they 
are.  All  they  agree  to  is  to  negotiate  after  an  armistice,  a 
treaty  "  on  the  basis  "  of  the  President's  address.  Nothing 
could  be  more  unsatisfactory  and  uncertain. 

The  attitude  of  the  German  Kaiser  is  important  only  as  it 
shows  the  iron  ring  closing  about  him.  He  sees  the  hand- 
writing on  the  wall,  and  he  struggles  in  a  peace  offensive  for 
a  halt  which  shall  enable  him  to  rehabilitate  his  forces. 
Then,  if  he  does  not  secure  peace,  with  the  Hohenzollern 
dynasty  still  in  the  saddle,  he  can  resist  with  a  rested  army 
to  the  last.  He  sets  his  snare  in  the  sight  of  the  bird.  His 
offer  should  be  rejected  with  the  same  curt  rejoinder  as  that 
which  met  the  Austrian  approach.  We,  of  course,  should 
not  deceive  ourselves.  A  prompt  and  decided  refusal  on 
our  part  to  accept  this  offer  of  the  Kaiser  will  be  used  by 
him  to  arouse  his  people  to  further  resistance.  This  is  the 
great  alternative  object  which  he  has  in  mind.  He  will  say 
that  this  refusal  indicates  that  the  Allies  seek  to  annihilate 
the  German  people.  He  hopes  that  this  will  stiffen  all  his 
subjects  to  further  effort.  In  his  dire  extremity  he  has 
called  on  the  most  peaceful  and  the  most  liberal  of  the  promi- 
nent political  personages  in  his  empire. 

But  this  personage  is  a  cousin  of  the  Emperor,  is  a 
Hohenzollern  and  would,  of  course,  maintain  the  dynasty. 
His  speech  reads  well,  but  we  who  have  at  hand  the  damning 
evidence  of  the  militaristic  treachery  and  the  wicked  ambi- 
tion of  the  Kaiser  and  his  crew  know  that  the  Prince  is  but 
a  pawn  advanced  now  for  the  single  purpose  of  securing  a 
negotiated  peace.  The  Prince  will  not  sit  at  the  council 
table  to  carry  out  his  own  ideas.  Surrounding  him  and  at 
his  back  will  be  the  Kaiser,  Hindenburg,  Ludendorff  and  the 


THE    OBLIGATIONS   OF    VICTORY  141 

Crown  Prince,  the  leaders  of  Junkerclom,  ready  to  refuse 
any  terms  in  the  treaty  which  will  hamstring  the  dynasty  or 
prevent  the  possihility  of  the  resurrection  of  the  German 
army  and  a  future  renewal  of  the  Potsdam  conspiracy. 

We  should  read  the  spirit  of  the  Kaiser's  offer  in  the  light 
of  burning  Douai  and  the  cruel  looting  and  devastation  of 
Belgium  and  Northern  France.  He  says  he  will  consent 
only  to  "  an  honorable  peace."  What  does  that  mean?  It 
means  a  settlement  which  assures  for  the  German  High 
Command  and  the  Kaiser  the  position  of  honorable  and 
trustworthy  foes.  This,  in  view  of  their  conduct,  is  im- 
possible if  we  are  to  achieve  what  this  war  is  fought  for. 
The  Kaiser's  offer  should  be  sternly  rejected  and  he  and 
Austria  should  be  advised  that  in  the  present  situation  we 
can  have  no  armistice  and  no  negotiation  except  upon  the 
same  terms  as  those  which  were  meted  out  to  Bulgaria. 
Any  other  resub  will  be  a  profound  disappointment  to  the 
American  people  and  our  allies. 


THE  OBLIGATIONS  OF  VICTORY  1 

The  international  compact  which  is  to  follow  this  war 
is  to  be  more  ambitious  than  any  ever  made  before.  The 
world  is  larger,  the  nations  are  more  numerous,  the  field  of 
war  has  been  greater,  and  the  political  changes  are  to  be 
far  more  extensive  than  the  world  has  ever  known. 

The  only  peace  comparable  with  this  is  that  which  was 
made  after  Napoleon's  fall  by  the  monarchs  who  constituted 

1  Address  delivered  at  Convention  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
Madison,  Wisconsin,  under  the  auspices  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin, 
November  9,  1918. 


142  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

the  Holy  Alliance.  That  was  a  League  of  Nations,  with  a 
high  sounding  declaration  of  disinterestedness  and  love  of 
peace.  It  was  a  failure  because  the  real  purposes  which 
governed  its  formation  and  life  were  wrong  and  unstable. 
It  rested  on  the  divine  right  of  kings,  and  its  objects  were 
to  recognize  dynastic  claims  and  to  establish  and  maintain 
them.  It  took  into  consideration  neither  the  interest  nor 
the  will  of  the  peoples  under  the  governments  which  it  was 
setting  up  and  proposed  to  maintain.  After  a  few  years  it 
became  a  by-word  of  reproach. 

The  difference  between  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  League 
of  Nations  we  now  propose  is  in  the  purpose  and  principle 
of  its  formation.  Our  League  looks  to  a  union  of  the 
democratic  nations  of  the  world,  to  the  will  of  the  peoples, 
expressed  through  their  governments,  as  its  basis  and 
sanction.  It  looks  to  the  establishment  of  new  governments 
by  popular  choice  and  control.  It  is  to  be  founded  on  jus- 
tice, impartially  administered,  and  not  on  the  interests  of 
kings  or  emperors  or  dynasties.  It  is  to  rise  as  a  structure 
built  upon  the  ashes  of  militarism,  and  it  is  to  rest  on  the 
pillars  of  justice  and  equality  and  the  welfare  of  peoples. 

I  have  referred  to  the  Holy  Alliance  not  only  to  answer 
an  argument,  but  also  as  a  precedent  to  prove  that  a  treaty 
of  peace  rearranging  the  map  of  Europe  can  not  be  made 
without  a  League  of  Nations.  Think  of  what  this  present 
peace  has  to  compass.  We  can  realize  it  by  considering  the 
points  of  President  Wilson's  message  of  January  8th,  out- 
lining the  terms  of  the  future  peace. 

In  the  first  place,  we  are  to  have  disposition  of  the  German 
colonies  in  accord  with  the  interests  of  the  people  who  live 
in  them.  Germany  has  made  such  cruel  despotisms  of  her 
colonies  that  it  is  quite  likely  the  Allies  will  insist  that  they 


THE   OBLIGATIONS   OF    VICTORY  143 

shall  be  put  under  some  other  power  more  to  be  trusted  in 
securing  the  welfare  of  backward  peoples.  Thus  we  are  to 
set  up  a  new  government  in  East  and  West  Africa,  in 
Australasia,  in  China,  and  in  some  of  the  islands  of  the 
Pacific.  Then  we  are  to  deal  with  Russia.  If  we  separate 
from  her  the  Ukraine,  and  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  Finland, 
there  are  three  or  four  new  nations  to  establish.  Great 
Russia  is  now  under  the  domination  of  bloody  anarchists, 
and  we  must  free  her  and  give  to  her  good  people  the  oppor- 
tunity to  organize  and  establish  a  free  and  useful  govern- 
ment. This  is  a  problem  of  the  utmost  complexity.  In 
Austria  we  are  to  create  a  nation  of  the  Czecho-Slavs,  em- 
bracing Bohemia,  Moravia  and  Slovakia.  We  are  to  cut 
this  nation  out  of  the  Dual  Empire,  and  take  it  from  Austria 
and  from  Hungary.  Wre  are  to  do  the  same  thing  with  the 
Jugo-Slavs  on  the  south  of  Austria  and  Hungary  and 
establish  new  boundaries  there.  We  are  to  settle  the  bound- 
aries of  the  Balkans.  We  are  likely  to  give  to  Rumania 
the  Rumanians  of  Hungary  and  of  Bessarabia.  We  are  to 
establish  a  new  state  of  Poland  out  of  Russian,  Austrian  and 
German  Poland,  and  we  are  to  give  this  state  access  to  the 
sea.  The  fixing  of  these  boundaries  and  the  determination 
of  the  method  of  reaching  the  sea  present  issues  of  the 
utmost  delicacy  and  difficulty.  We  are  to  determine  the 
status  of  Constantinople  and  the  small  tract  now  known  as 
Turkey  in  Europe.  We  are  to  fix  the  limits  of  Turkey  in 
Asia,  to  set  up  a  new  government  in  Palestine,  to  recognize 
a  new  government  of  Arabia,  to  father,  it  may  be,  the 
creation  of  a  new  state  in  the  Caucasus  and  to  establish  the 
freedom  of  Armenia. 

The  mere   recital   of   them   is   most   convincing  of   the 
intricacy  of  these  problems.     The  Congress  of  Nations  will 


144  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

probably  find  it  impossible  definitely  to  settle  them  all.  It 
will  have  to  create  Commissions,  with  judicial  and  concilia- 
tory powers,  able  to  devote  time  enough  to  make  proper  in- 
vestigation and  thus  to  reach  just,  defensible  and  practical 
conclusions.  When  the  boundaries  are  all  fixed,  when  the 
innumerable  rights  growing  out  of  access  to  the  Baltic, 
access  to  the  Danube,  access  to  the  Black  Sea  and  access  to 
the  Aegean,  together  wtih  rights  of  way  across  neighboring 
states  for  freedom  of  trade,  are  defined,  with  as  much  clarity 
as  possible,  there  still  will  arise,  in  the  practical  operation 
of  the  treaty,  a  multitude  of  irritating  questions  of  interpre- 
tation. In  fixing  boundaries  on  distinctions  of  race  and 
language,  the  Congress  will  encounter  the  obstruction  of 
racial  prejudice  and  blindness  to  reasonable  conclusions. 
Lines  of  race  and  of  language  are  not  always  so  clearly 
drawn  that  convenient  and  compact  states  may  be  estab- 
lished within  them.  To  attempt  in  a  great  world-agree- 
ment to  settle  the  boundaries  and  mutual  rights  of  so  many 
new  nations,  without  providing  a  tribunal  whose  decisions 
are  to  control  and  are  to  be  enforced  by  the  major  force  of 
the  world,  will  be  to  make  a  treaty  that  will  become  a  laugh- 
ing stock. 

We  know  that  we  have  got  to  rearrange  the  map  of 
Europe,  and,  in  so  far  as  it  is  practicable  in  that  arrange- 
ment, to  follow  popular  choice  of  the  peoples  to  be  governed. 
But  such  a  flowing  phrase  will  not  settle  the  difficulty.  It  is 
merely  a  general  principle  that  in  its  actual  application  often 
does  not  offer  a  completely  satisfactory  solution ;  and  after 
the  Congress  shall  have  made  the  decisions,  sore  places  will 
be  left,  local  enmities  will  arise,  and  if  that  permanent  peace 
which  is  to  justify  the  war  is  to  be  attained,  the  world  com- 
pact must  itself  contain  the  machinery  for  settlement  of  such 


THE   OBLIGATIONS   OF    VICTORY  145 

inevitable  disputes.  In  other  words,  we  do  not  have  to 
argue  in  favor  of  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace  —  the  nations 
which  enter  this  Congress  can  not  do  otherwise  than  establish 
it.  It  faces  them  as  the  only  possible  way  to  achieve  their 
object. 

Germany  and  Austria  and  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  are  to 
indemnify  the  countries  which  they  have  outraged  and  de- 
vastated. Commissions  must  be  created,  judicial  in  their 
nature,  to  pass  upon  what  the  amount  of  the  indemnity  shall 
be,  and  then  an  international  force  must  exist  to  levy  execu- 
tion if  necessary  for  the  judgment  upon  the  countries  whose 
criminal  torts  are  to  be  indemnified.  We  must,  therefore, 
not  only  have,  as  a  result  of  the  Congress,  the  machinery  of 
justice  and  conciliation,  but  we  must  retain  a  combined  mili- 
tary force  of  the  Allies  and  victors  to  see  to  it  that  these 
just  judgments  are  carried  out.  Moreover,  the  Congress 
can  not  meet  without  enlarging  the  scope  of  international 
law  and  making  more  definite  its  provisions.  The  very 
functions  which  the  Congress  is  to  exercise  in  fixing  the 
terms  of  peace  will  necessitate  a  statement  of  the  principles 
upon  which  it  has  been  guided.  That  will  lead  to  a  broaden- 
ing of  the  scope  of  existing  principles  of  international  law 
and  a  greater  variety  in  their  applications.  Therefore, 
whether  those  who  are  in  the  Congress  wish  it  or  not,  they 
can  not  solve  the  problems  which  are  set  before  them  with- 
out adopting  the  principles  of  our  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
as  embodied  in  the  four  planks  of  our  original  platform  — 
Court,  Commission  of  Conciliation,  enforcement  of  submis- 
sion and  a  Legislative  International  Congress  to  make  Inter- 
national Law.  They  will  have  to  create  such  machinery  for 
the  administration  and  enforcement  of  the  treaty  as  to  the 
Central  Powers,  the  new  nations  created  and  Russia. 


146      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Having  gone  so  far  as  they  must,  can  they  fail  to  extend 
their  work  only  a  little  to  include  the  settlement  of  all  future 
differences  between  all  the  nations  that  are  parties  to  the 
League?  A  League  for  such  future  purposes  will  be  no 
more  difficult  to  make  and  maintain  than  the  temporary 
League  into  which  they  are  driven  by  the  necessities  of  the 
situation. 

Now  I  want  to  take  up  some  of  the  arguments  made 
against  the  League.  In  the  first  place,  a  good  many  have 
created  a  straw  League  which  they  have  knocked  down  with- 
out difficulty.  They  have  attributed  to  us  the  views  and 
principles  held  by  extremists  who  perhaps  support  our 
League,  but  whose  extreme  views  we  do  not  and  need  not 
adopt.  Thus  it  is  said  that  we  favor  internationalism,  that 
we  are  opposed  to  nationalism,  that  we  wish  to  dilute  the 
patriotic  spirit  into  a  vague  universal  brotherhood.  That 
there  are  socialists  and  others  who  entertain  this  view,  and 
who  perhaps  support  .the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  may  be 
true ;  but  the  assumption  that  such  views  are  necessary  to  a 
consistent  support  of  the  League  is  entirely  without  war- 
rant. I  believe  in  nationalism  and  patriotism,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  universal  brotherhood  as  firmly  as  any  one 
can.  I  believe  that  the  national  spirit  and  the  patriotic  love 
of  country  are  as  essential  in  the  progress  of  the  world  as 
the  family  and  the  love  of  family  are  essential  in  domestic 
communities.  But  as  the  family  and  the  love  of  family  are 
not  inconsistent  with  the  love  of  country,  but  only  strengthen 
it,  so  a  proper,  pure  and  patriotic  nationalism  stimulates  a 
sense  of  international  justice  and  does  not  detract  in  any 
way  from  the  spirit  of  universal  brotherhood. 

Again,  it  is  said  that  in  the  League  we  injure  nationalism 
by  abridging  the  sovereignty  of  our  country  in  that  we  are 


THE   OBLIGATIONS   OF   VICTORY  147 

to  yield  to  an  international  council  and  an  international 
tribunal,  in  which  we  have  only  one  representative,  the  de- 
cisions of  questions  of  justice  and  of  national  policy.  l 

1  Mr.  Taft  has  expressed  himself  elsewhere  on  this  topic  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  Certainly  we  do  not  wish  to  contend  for  a  sovereignty  that  shall  not 
be  limited  by  international  law.  That  law  should  prevail  in  a  decent 
community  of  nations  —  I  mean  the  law  of  good  form,  the  law  of  uni- 
versal brotherhood,  the  law  of  neighborly  feeling,  which  is  over  and 
above  the  absolute  rules  of  international  law.  All  that  this  League 
proposes  is  that  every  nation  shall  enjoy  complete  sovereignty  within 
the  limitations  of  that  international  law  and  that  good  form  among 
nations. 

"What  is  this  League  of  Nations  to  do  to  uphold  that  sovereignty? 
It  agrees  to  give  sanction  to  law  that  regulates  sovereignty.  That 
sovereignty,  regulated  by  law,  is  to  be  clinched  through  the  organized 
action  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 

"Any  other  view,  any  objection  to  that  view,  savors  of  what?  It 
savors  of  the  desire  to  use  the  sovereignty  of  our  nation  to  achieve 
purposes  that  will  be  defeated  by  the  restraints  which  the  League 
offers.  That  is  what  it  means.  It  is  the  German  idea  of  sovereignty  — 
the  power  to  use  that  sovereignty  to  achieve  your  purpose  even  when 
that  purpose  transgresses  international  law  or  moral  law." —  The 
Atlantic  Congress  for  a  League  of  Nations,  New  York,  Feb.  5,  1919. 

"To  recur  again  to  the  objections  which  run  as  a  thread  through  all 
of  Senator  Poindexter's  attacks  upon  the  constitution  of  the  League, 
namely,  that  the  League  minimizes  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States 
and  of  every  nation  which  joins  it,  there  is  a  misconception  in  the 
mind  of  the  Senator  as  to  sovereignty  that  needs  to  be  pointed  out. 
No  reasonable  and  patriotic  and  properly  self-respecting  citizen  of  the 
United  States  can  claim  that  our  sovereignty  should  be  more  than  a 
right  to  freedom  of  action  within  the  limitations  of  international  law, 
international  morality,  and  a  due  regard  for  the  rights  of  other  nations. 
The  only  sovereignty  which  we  ought  to  claim  is  sovereignty  regulated 
by  these  limitations.  It  is  exactly  analogous  to  the  liberty  that  we  enjoy 
as  individuals,  which  is  liberty  curtailed  and  regulated  by  law  in  order 
that  other  citizens  may  enjoy  the  same  liberty.  It  is  an  exercise  of 
rights  on  my  part  consistent  with  the  exercise  of  the  same  rights  on 
the  part  of  every  other  man.  It  is  not  complete  liberty  of  action. 
Proper  national  sovereignty  is  similarly  restricted.  Now  the  League 
does  not  proceed  to  restrict  that  sovereignty  further  than,  through  the 


148  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Sovereignty  is  a  matter  of  definition.  The  League  does  not 
contemplate  the  slightest  interference  with  the  internal 
government  of  any  country.  The  League  does  not  propose 
to  interfere,  except  where  the  claims  of  right  of  one  country 

joint  compulsion  of  all  nations,  to  keep  a  would-be  outlaw  nation 
within  the  proper  existing  limitation. 

"  The  League  is  not  a  super-sovereign.  It  is  only  a  partnership.  Its 
power  is  in  only  a  partnership.  Its  power  is  in  joint  agreement  —  not 
in  the  establishment  of  government.  The  Senator's  objection  is  funda- 
mental. If  it  were  analyzed  and  logically  developed  it  would  be  seen 
to  be  a  reactionary  doctrine  that  belongs  to  the  German  view  of  the 
state  and  its  needs  and  rights.  It  is  not  consonant  with  any  hope  of 
settling  international  differences  other  than  by  the  power  of  the  sword. 
It  leads  directly  to  the  proposal  that  '  might  makes  right.'  It  is  based 
on  a  doctrine  of  supreme  national  selfishness.  It  is  the  pessimistic  and 
despairing  view  of  any  possibility  of  restricting  war.  It  contemplates 
with  entire  complacence  the  prospect  of  another  war  in  ten  or  twenty 
years  like  that  through  which  we  have  passed.  It  perverts  the  glorious 
idea  of  a  national  sovereignty  and  prevents  its  aiding  the  family  of 
nations.  It  perverts  our  grand  federal  constitution  rendering  helpless 
—  so  far  as  aiding  the  outside  world  is  concerned  —  a  nation  which, 
under  the  providence  of  .God,  has  become  the  world's  greatest  Power. 

"  Will  the  American  people  acquiesce  in  such  a  small  view  of  our 
responsibilities  toward  mankind  and  of  our  governmental  capacity  to 
be  helpful?  We  may  be  confident  they  will  not." — Address  at  Portland, 
Oregon,  Feb.  16,  1919. 

"And  then  'sovereignty' — what  is  sovereignty?  Well,  I  can  give 
you  the  German  view  and  I  can  give  you  the  American  view.  The  Ger- 
man view  is  that  sovereignty  is  the  power  to  overcome  the  sovereignty 
of  other  nations  by  force.  That  is  all.  What  is  the  American  idea 
of  sovereignty?  It  is  a  sovereignty  regulated  by  international  law  and 
international  morality  and  international  decency  and  international 
neighborly  feeling.  Do  we  wish  any  sovereignty  greater  than  that? 
Sovereignty  is  analogous  to  the  liberty  of  the  individual.  The  latter  is 
liberty  regulated  by  law  which  protects  that  liberty ;  and  sovereignty 
is  the  same  thing  applied  to  nations.  We  do  not  change  that  in  this 
League  of  Nations.  All  we  do  is  to  furnish  the  means  of  determining 
peaceably  and  justly  what  those  limitations  are,  and  provide  the  means 
of  maintaining  them.  Does  that  deprive  us  of  any  sovereignty?" — Ad- 
dress at  San  Francisco,  Feb.  19,  1919. 


THE    OBLIGATIONS    OF    VICTORY  149 

clash  with  the  claims  of  right  of  another.  To  submit  such 
claims  of  right  to  an  impartial  tribunal  no  more  interferes 
with  the  sovereignty  of  a  nation  than  the  submission  of  an 
individual  to  a  hearing  and  decree  of  court  interferes  with 
his  liberty.  The  League  is  merely  introducing,  into  the 
world's  sphere,  liberty  of  action  regulated  by  law  instead  of 
license  uncontrolled  except  by  the  greed  and  passion  of  the 
individual  nation. 

It  is  said  that  we  are  giving  up  our  right  to  make  war  or 
to  withhold  from  making  it.  We  can  not  take  away  from 
our  Congress  the  right  to  declare  war,  and  no  one  would 
wish  to  do  so.  But  that  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
enter  into  an  agreement  to  defend  the  impartial  judgments 
of  the  League  and  to  repress  palpable  violations  of  its 
covenants  by  those  who  have  entered  it.  The  question  must 
always  be  for  the  decision  of  Congress  whether  our  obliga- 
tions under  the  League  require  us  in  honor  to  make  war. 
\Ye  have  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  Cuba,  we  have  guar- 
anteed the  integrity  of  Panama.  Does  that  deprive  us  of 
sovereignty  ?  Yet  we  are  under  an  obligation  to  make  war 
if  another  country  attacks  them. 

The  fourth  of  the  President's  fourteen  points  contains 
the  provision  that  adequate  guaranties  must  be  given  and 
taken  that  national  armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest 
point  consistent  with  domestic  safety.  That  can  not  be 
done  immediately.  It  represents  an  aim  and  an  aspiration. 
\Ye  are  the  victors  in  this  war  which  grew  out  of  the  exten- 
sive armament  and  military  power  of  Germany.  It  will  be 
a  legitimate  condition  of  peace  exacted  by  the  victors  that 
Germany  shall  substantially  disarm  and  leave  the  Allied 
Powers  in  a  position  with  armament  sufficient  to  keep 
Germany  within  law  and  right.  How  far  disarmament  can 


I5O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

be  carried  must  be  determined  by  experience.  Disarma- 
ment will  be  accomplished  effectively  in  great  measure  by 
the  economic  pressure  that  will  be  felt  intensely  by  all  nations 
after  this  war,  by  such  mutual  covenants  and  general  super- 
vision of  an  international  council  as  experience  may  dictate, 
and  ultimately  by  a  sense  of  security  in  the  successful  opera- 
tion of  this  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

For  the  time  being  the  people  who  are  afraid  that  the 
United  States  will  make  itself  helpless  to  defend  its  rights 
against  unjust  aggression  are  unduly  exercised.  Any  prac- 
tical League  of  Nations  will  require  the  United  States  to 
maintain  a  potential  military  force  sufficient  to  comply 
promptly  with  its  obligations  to  contribute  to  an  interna- 
tional army  whenever  called  upon  for  League  purposes. 
Such  obligation  may  well  be  made  the  basis  and  reason  for 
universal  training  of  youth,  in  accord  with  the  Australian 
or  the  Swiss  system  —  a  system  that  trains  youths  for  a 
year  physically  and  mentally  and  gives  them  a  proper  sense 
of  duty  and  obligation  to  the  state.  There  may  be  a  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  whether  we  should  have  such  a  system ; 
but  there  is  nothing  in  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  and  its 
principles  which  prevents  its  adoption;  and  either  that  or 
some  other  means  of  maintaining  an  adequate  force  to  dis- 
charge our  obligations  under  a  League  must  be  found. 
While  we  should  lay  broad  the  foundations  for  a  League 
looking  as  far  into  the  future  as  we  may,  we  must  trust  to 
the  future  to  work  out  the  application  of  those  principles, 
to  amend  the  details  of  our  machinery  and  to  adapt  it  to 
the  lessons  of  experience.  We  know  that  the  real  hope  of 
reducing  armament  and  keeping  it  down  is  the  maintenance 
of  a  League  which  shall  insure  justice  and  apply  in  its  aid  the 
major  force  of  the  world.  As  the  operation  of  that  League 


THE  OBLIGATIONS  OF  VICTORY  151 

is  more  and  more  acquiesced  in,  the  possibility  of  the  safe 
reduction  of  armaments  in  all  countries  will  become  apparent 
to  all  and  will  be  realized. 

Another  question  that  has  agitated  a  good  many  people 
is  whether  we  should  admit  Germany  to  the  League.  That 
depends  upon  whether  Germany  makes  herself  fit  for  mem- 
bership in  the  League.  If  she  gets  rid  of  the  Hohenzollerns, 
if  she  establishes  a  real  popular  government,  if  she  shows  by 
her  national  policies  that  she  has  acted  on  the  lessons  which 
the  war  should  teach  her,  in  short  if  she  brings  forth  works 
meet  for  repentance,  then  of  course  we  ought  to  admit  her 
and  encourage  her  by  putting  her  on  an  equality  with  other 
nations  and  use  her  influence  and  power  to  make  the  League 
more  effective.  The  long-drawn-out  payment  of  indemni- 
ties will  keep  her  in  a  chastened  mood  and  will  keep  alive 
in  her  mind  the  evils  of  militarism. 

I  shall  not  now  discuss  the  difference  in  the  obligations  of 
the  members  of  such  a  League  as  between  the  Great  Powers 
and  the  lesser  Powers.  All  should  have  a  voice  in  the  gen- 
eral policy  of  the  League ;  but  it  is  well  worthy  of  considera- 
tion whether,  with  the  burden  of  enforcing  the  obligations 
of  the  League  by  military  force  which  the  greater  Powers 
must  carry,  they  should  not  have  the  larger  voice  in  executive 
control.  As  they  are  the  only  ones  likely  to  be  able  to 
create  the  major  force  of  the  world,  they  may  reasonably 
claim  a  right  to  more  administrative  power.  The  rights  of 
the  smaller  nations  will  be  protected  in  the  Congress,  in 
which  they  have  a  full  voice,  and  by  the  impartial  judgments 
of  the  judicial  tribunals  and  the  recommendations  of  the 
Commission  of  Conciliation.  There  is  not  the  slightest 
likelihood  that  the  mere  executive  control  by  the  larger 
Powers  would  lead  to  oppression  of  the  smaller  Powers  be- 


152  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

cause,  should  selfishness  disclose  itself  in  one  of  the  Great 
Powers,  we  could  be  confident  of  the  wish  of  the  other  Great 
Powers  to  repress  it. 

One  of  the  difficulties  in  the  maintenance  of  a  League  of 
all  nations  will  be  the  instability  of  the  governments  of  its 
members  if  the  League  embraces  all  nations.  On  the  whole, 
the  Greater  Powers  are  the  more  stable  and  the  more  respon- 
sible. It  is  well  therefore  that  upon  them  shall  fall  the  chief 
executive  responsibility.  While  the  principles  of  the 
League  would  prevent  interference  with  the  internal  govern- 
ments as  a  general  rule,  the  utter  instability  of  a  government 
might  authorize  an  attempt  to  stabilize  it.  That  this  can  be 
done  better  by  a  disinterested  League  than  by  a  single  nation 
goes  without  saying. 

The  possibilities  of  many-sided  world  benefit  from  a 
League  after  it  is  well  established  and  is  working  smoothly, 
it  is  hard  to  overestimate.  For  the  present,  as  the  result  of 
this  Congress  of  Nations  to  meet  and  settle  the  terms  of 
peace,  we  may  well  be  content  to  have  a  League  established 
on  broad  lines,  with  principles  firmly  and  clearly  stated,  and 
with  constructive  provisions  for  amendment  as  experience 
shall  indicate  their  necessity. 

I  verily  believe  we  are  in  sight  of  the  Promised  Land.  I 
hope  we  may  not  be  denied  its  enjoyment. 


WORKINGMEN  AND  THE  LEAGUE » 

The  pressing  imminence  of  the  issue  of  a  League  is  not 
as  fully  understood  in  this  country  as  it  is  in  Great  Britain, 

1  Extract  from  article  in  Public  Ledger  Nov.  13,  1918. 


A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS   OUR    NATIONAL    POLICY         153 

in  France  and  in  Italy.  The  movement  was  initiated  in  the 
United  States  in  1915  by  the  formation  of  the  American 
League  to  Enforce  Peace;  but  the  question  then  had  more 
or  less  of  an  academic  aspect  because  of  the  remoteness  of 
peace,  and,  indeed,  at  that  time,  for  us,  the  remoteness  of 
the  war.  Associations  were  subsequently  formed  in  Great 
Britain  and  in  France.  As  the  peoples  of  these  countries 
became  war-weary,  as  the  working  population  felt  the  suffer- 
ing and  dreadful  pinch  of  starvation  and  want,  their  souls 
were  gripped  with  a  determination  to  have  no  more  war. 
The  subject  was  given  world-wide  attention  through  the 
addresses  of  President  Wilson.  The  Socialists  had  always 
included  the  abolition  of  war  as  a  fundamental  plank  in  their 
platform.  While  the  great  majority  of  the  Socialists  and 
the  workingmen  in  the  allied  countries  admitted  the  necessity 
of  fighting  this  war  through,  they  made  a  peremptory  de- 
mand for  a  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace  after  this 
war  was  over  and  after  the  unconditional  surrender  of  mili- 
tarism. 

The  League  of  Nations,  therefore,  in  England,  France 
and  Italy  has  become  the  slogan  of  workingmen  and  Social- 
ists and  they  will  brook  no  hesitation  on  this  subject  by  the 
representatives  of  their  countries  in  the  Peace  Congress. 


A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  OUR  NATIONAL 
POLICY  * 

Speeches  are  made  from  time  to  time  in  the  Senate  on 
the  plan  of  a  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace.     Sena- 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  I,  1918. 


154  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

tors  Poindexter  and  Reed  have  pronounced  judgment  upon 
the  plan  as  dangerous  to  the  Republic  and  contrary  to  the 
established  traditions  of  the  nation.  With  deference,  this 
judgment  is  not  up  to  date.  It  fails  to  note  that  the  war, 
our  participation  and  avowed  purpose  in  it  and  the  treaty 
which  is  to  end  it  have  so  changed  our  relation  to  Europe 
and  the  world  that  such  traditions  have  ceased  to  be 
applicable.  These  traditions  were  shown  to  be  outworn  by 
the  fact  that  we  could  not  keep  out  of  the  war.  We  were 
driven  into  it  because  of  our  relations  as  close  neighbors 
to  the  European  belligerents.  Having  been  thus  driven 
into  war,  are  we  to  make  a  separate  peace  with  Germany, 
merely  securing  a  guaranty  from  her  that  in  the  future  we 
shall  be  immune,  as  a  neutral,  from  submarine  attack  upon 
our  commerce?  This  would  be  the  logical  outcome  of  the 
attitude  of  the  opposing  Senators.  Are  we  not  rather  to 
take  part  in  framing  the  articles  of  a  general  treaty  as  to 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland,  the  Trentino,  the  Czecho-Slavs,  the 
Jugo-Slavs,  Russia,  Armenia  and  in  respect  to  the  numerous 
other  questions  that  must  be  constructively  answered  in  the 
treaty? 

Certainly  the  American  people  have  no  doubt  that  we  are 
to  have  a  full  share  in  the  settlement  of  all  these  issues.  No 
other  inference  can  be  drawn  from  the  messages  of  the  Presi- 
dent, acquiesced  in  by  all.  If  we  sit  at  the  international 
council  table  and  make  this  general  treaty,  it  is  idle  to  talk 
of  our  taking  no  further  part  in  European  world  politics. 
If  we  enter  into  this  treaty  rearranging  the  map  of  Europe 
and  the  world  in  the  interest  of  the  rule  of,  by  and  for  the 
various  peoples  of  the  world,  and  to  secure  them  the  bless- 
ings of  permanent  peace,  we  have  got  to  see  it  through.  We 
can't  make  such  a  treaty  and  run  away  from  it  as  our 


A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS   OUR    NATIONAL   POLICY         155 

abandoned  child.  We  must  share,  with  those  with  whom  we 
act  in  making  it,  the  responsibility  of  securing  and  maintain- 
ing its  full  and  beneficent  operation.  If  we  make  a  treaty 
to  fill  the  outlines  of  President  Wilson's  message  of  January 
8,  as  amended  by  the  Allies,  we  shall  have  the  job  of  its 
execution  lasting  a  number  of  years.  It  will  not  execute 
itself.  • 

Wre  have  put  our  hand  to  the  plow  and  we  cannot  turn 
back.  The  opposing  Senators  do  not  see  the  problems  which 
confront  us. 

The  imagination  of  Senators  has  been  strained  to  conceive 
a  situation  in  which  the  United  States  shall  have  had  a  judg- 
ment against  her,  in  the  international  court,  of  vital  char- 
acter which  she  resists,  and  the  united  military  forces  of  the 
world  combine  to  destroy  her.  If  the  judgment  against  her 
is  just,  she  ought  to  obey  it.  If  it  is  not,  why  assume  that 
it  will  be  rendered  at  all  or  that,  if  rendered,  all  nations 
would  join  in  a  world  war  to  enforce  it?  Indeed,  may  not 
our  imagination,  if  we  let  it  run  riot,  as  easily  conceive  such 
a  union  of  military  forces  of  the  world  against  the  United 
States  without  a  league  and  its  machinery  as  with  them  ? 

Thus  far  the  opponents  of  the  League  on  the  Senate  floor 
have  been  from  both  parties.  If  President  Wilson  returns 
to  his  first  view  of  the  need  for  such  a  League  of  Nations  to 
Enforce  Peace  and  succeeds  in  securing  the  concurrence  of 
our  European  allies  in  this  view,  we  may  assume  that  the 
Democratic  party  will  support  him  in  his  policy.  The 
League  of  Nations  to  maintain  peace  will  likewise  have  the 
passionate  support  of  all  the  peoples  of  our  Allies  and  of 
neutral  nations.  It  will  have  the  earnest  support  of  organ- 


156       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ized  labor  in  this  country.  It  will  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  peace-loving  people  of  this  country,  who  are  vastly  in 
the  majority.  The  Republican  members  of  the  Senate  will 
do  well  to  consider  whether  it  would  be  wise  for  them  to 
furnish  to  Mr.  Wilson  and  the  Democratic  party  an  issue 
upon  which  the  Administration  would  be  most  likely  to  win, 
and  one  which  would  dwarf  all  others  upon  which  the 
Republicans  now  base  their  hope  of  success.  Of  course, 
this  is  no  reason  for  yielding  in  the  face  of  fundamental 
principle,  but  it  may  well  weigh  heavily  when  objection  to 
the  League  is  based  on  hypotheses,  strained  and  improbable. 


WHY  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  IS  NECESSARY  l 

My  feeling  about  the  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace 
is  that  the  stars  in  their  courses  are  fighting  to  make  it  inevit- 
able. 

We  are  in  a  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace,  we  have 
been  enforcing  peace,  and  we  are  in  a  place  where  we  cannot 
escape  it. 

We  went  into  this  war  because  we  were  driven  into  it. 
We  had  to  be  driven  because  of  the  Washington  policy  and 
entangling  alliance  doctrine ;  and  we  stayed  out  of  it  a  long 
time  after,  as  we  look  at  it  now,  we  ought  to  have  gone  in. 
We  were  forced  in  to  defend  our  rights  on  the  seas.  That 
was  why  those  men  who  feared  entangling  alliances  were 
willing  to  waive  their  objection  or  reached  the  conclusion 

1  Address  delivered  at  dinner  of  editors  and  publishers,  in  New  York, 
Dec.  6,  1918. 


WHY    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS   IS    NECESSARY          157 

that  we  were  not  departing  from  that  policy:  our  rights 
on  the  seas  had  really  been  invaded  by  murderous  submarine 
attacks  on  neutral  ships  and  on  enemy  merchant  ships,  bear- 
ing our  citizens.  And  they  had  a  right,  under  international 
law,  to  be  there. 


When  we  got  into  the  war  Mr.  Wilson  stated  —  and  I 
never  heard  any  objection  from  anybody  —  that  our  pur- 
pose in  this  war  was  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy. 
Not  the  United  States,  the  world.  It  was  to  suppress  mili- 
tarism. Where?  Not  in  the  United  States.  Not  in 
Europe.  In  the  world.  To  say  that  we  are  not  to  take 
our  part  in  world  politics  is  to  ignore  just  exactly  where 
we  are,  what  our  position  is  —  a  position  we  cannot  escape 
from. 

We  have  made  an  armistice,  we  have  imposed  terms  on 
Germany  with  respect  to  that  armistice;  but  we  made  that 
armistice  on  a  basis  of  a  treaty  which  was  to  deal  in  a 
general  way  with  fields  that  were  outlined  in  the  message  of 
January  8,  1918,  as  amended  by  the  Allies  before  the  armis- 
tice was  submitted  to  the  Germans.  One  amendment  refer- 
red to  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  the  Entente  Allies  reserving 
the  right  to  deal  with  that  subject  as  they  were  advised. 
The  other  concerned  the  meaning  of  the  word  "  restoration," 
which  was  made  entirely  free  from  doubt  with  reference  to 
indemnities. 

That  is  the  basis  of  the  treaty;  those  are  the  fields  to  be 
covered  in  the  treaty.  And  now  it  is  a  matter  of  good 
faith,  as  I  understand,  between  the  parties. 

How  are  you  going  to  regulate  the  question  of  how  much 
armament  each  nation  shall  have?  How  maintain  the  limit 


158       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

« 

fixed  upon?  Of  course,  everybody  understands  that  the 
armament  we  are  especially  interested  in  is  Germany's  arma- 
ment. We  are  going  to  see  to  it  that  that  is  only  such 
"  as  domestic  safety  shall  require." 

Are  we  just  going  to  leave  that  requirement  in  the  treaty 
and  make  no  provision  for  enforcing  it  or  maintaining  it? 
Is  that  the  way  we  are  to  deal  with  Germany  ?  Under  such 
conditions,  what  will  happen  if  Germany  unites  with  German 
Austria  to  make  a  very  considerable  power  and  retains  her 
military  spirit  ?  Shall  we  not  rather  create  an  agency  which 
shall  see  to  it  that  this  Covenant  is  effective? 

Then  there  is  Russia,  controlled  by  the  Bolsheviki.  I  do 
not  know  what  we  are  going  to  do  about  Russia.  I  know 
what  we  ought  to  have  done.  We  ought  to  have  sent  two 
hundred  thousand  men  in  there  originally,  and  with  addi- 
tional forces  from  our  Allies  we  could  have  stamped  out 
Bolshevism.  When  a  man  says  you  encumber  the  earth 
and  that  the  only  way  to  have  happiness  on  earth  is  to  kill 
you  —  the  only  way  you  can  deal  with  him  is  to  kill  him. 
That  is  all  there  is  about  it;  and  the  idea  of  dealing  with 
Bolshevism  in  any  other  way  is  an  iridescent  dream.  We 
will  have  to  stamp  it  out.  That  will  have  to  be  done  by 
the  Allies,  and  we  will  have  to  maintain  a  force  for  that 
purpose. 

The  countries  we  propose  to  set  up  have  got  to  be  held  in 
leading  strings.  You  cannot  do  that  except  by  a  League 
of  Nations  that  notifies  them  —  every  one  of  them :  '  This 
war  was  fought  for  your  liberty  and  that  democracy  might 
be  safe,  and  we  do  not  propose  to  have  you  start  a  conflagra- 
tion and  bring  about  another  war  that  we  have  sacrificed 


WHY    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS    IS    NECESSARY          159 

millions  and  billions  and  endured  all  sorts  of  suffering  to 
avoid." 

We  created  a  republic  in  Cuba.  We  surrounded  it  with 
all  possible  safeguards,  and  then  we  had  to  send  a  force 
down  there  to  compose  a  revolution  of  gentlemen  on  the 
outs  who  wanted  to  get  in  and  gentlemen  on  the  ins  who 
did  not  want  to  get  out.  That  is  the  trouble  we  will  find  in 
these  new  republics. 

I  say  this  with  deference,  but  if  there  is  not  a  League  of 
Nations  created  in  Paris  the  whole  thing  is  a  failure  —  and 
I  do  not  think  they  are  going  to  make  a  failure  at  Paris. 

It  is  perfectly  easy  to  suggest  objections  to  a  plan  like 
this.  Take  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  When 
it  was  adopted,  the  prophecies  in  respect  to  it  were  quite 
as  formidable  as  certain  distinguished  Senators  hold  the  dif- 
ficulties in  the  operation  of  the  League  to  be.  And  you  can 
imagine  cases  now  with  reference  to  the  operation  of  the 
Constitution  that  would  lead  to  such  a  disturbance  as  to  de- 
stroy the  Government.  We  had  one  but  survived  it.  We 
had  to  camp  outside  the  Constitution  until  we  did,  and  then 
we  got  back  under  it  again. 

In  the  disputed  election  between  Hayes  and  Tilden  we  had 
to  create  an  extra-constitutional  body  to  settle  that  question, 
but  we  were  self-governing  people  and  we  did  it. 

What  seems  to  me  important  is  to  get  nations  into  the 
habit  of  settling  their  differences  otherwise  than  by  war. 
You  can't  get  rid  of  war  until  some  substitute  is  offered 
to  prevent  injustice  and  to  enable  you  to  get  justice.  Of 
course,  we  have  produced  that  in  our  constitutional  system. 
Every  state  has  the  right  to  go  into  the  Supreme  Court  to 


l6o  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

ask  justice  against  every  other  state.  In  many  cases  there 
is  no  law  which  governs  the  behavior  of  states  except  inter- 
national law,  and  that  is  administered  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  in  such  cases. 

I  do  not  care  what  you  call  it,  you  have,  got  to  have  a 
court,  you  have  got  to  have  a  committee  of  conciliation, 
you  have  got  to  have  force,  you  have  got  to  fix  rules  of  inter- 
national law.  You  cannot  get  away  from  these. 


LESSER  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  l 

Subjects  for  consideration  by  the  conference  at  Versailles 
will  naturally  divide  themselves  into  two  great  classes. 
The  first  will  embrace  those  terms  exacted  of  Germany  and 
the  other  conquered  nations  to  prevent  them  from  again 
beginning  war  now  or  in  the  near  future ;  the  indemnities  to 
be  assessed  against  them  for  damage  inflicted  on  France, 
Belgium,  Serbia  and  the  other  Allies;  the  redistribution  of 
their  territories  and  carving  out  of  them  the  new  republics 
to  be  set  up ;  together  with  the  machinery  for  securing  those 
terms  and  their  maintenance.  The  second  class  of  subjects 
for  discussion  and  settlement  will  be  less  exigent  and  have 
more  of  a  world-wide  character.  Such  will  be  the  definition 
of  freedom  of  the  seas,  open  diplomacy,  the  prevention  of 
discriminating  economic  barriers  and  the  machinery  for  a 
general  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace. 

This  league  may  well  consist  of  only  the  Allied  nations, 
1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  9,  1918. 


LESSER    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS  l6l 

England,  France,  Italy,  Japan  and  the  United  States.  These 
are  now  the  only  "  great  "  Powers  for  practical  purposes. 
They  cannot  achieve  the  end  of  this  war  without  such  a 
league.  How,  if  at  all,  this  league  shall  be  expanded  to 
include  other  or  all  nations  may  be  properly  inquired  into  by 
a  Congress  of  Nations  of  the  World,  continuing  the  sessions 
of  the  Versailles  conference.  The  greater  league  would 
thus  be  a  growth  from  the  smaller  league  into  which  the 
Allied  Powers  will  find  themselves  forced  by  the  necessities 
of  the  situation.  This  is  the  best  method  of  developing 
political  institutions.  It  is  the  Anglo-Saxon  way.  They 
are  framed  and  set  in  operation  to  meet  immediate  needs 
and  then  are  expanded  as  their  adaptation  to  larger  useful- 
ness makes  itself  clear. 

A  question  as  to  the  first  or  smaller  league  will  at  once 
demand  answer  from  us.  That  is,  whether  we  shall  join  it. 
The  reactionaries,  of  whom  there  seem  to  be  several  in  our 
Senate,  will  insist  that  we  should  keep  our  skirts  clear  of  it 
and  leave  it  to  the  other  four  Great  Powers.  After  we  have 
signed  and  approved  the  treaty,  in  their  view,  we  should  rid 
ourselves  of  any  responsibility  for  its  enforcement  or  the 
maintenance  of  the  just,  equitable  and  democratic  status 
which  its  signatories  seek  to  establish.  This  is  the  counsel 
of  cowardice  and  atavism.  It  breaks  the  word  of  promise 
to  the  oppressed  peoples  of.  Europe.  It  would  take  out  of 
the  executive  council  of  such  a  league  the  only  member  of 
it  to  which  the  peoples  of  the  new  republics  and  the  rest  of 
Europe  would  look  with  confidence  for  purely  disinterested 
counsel  and  action.  After  our  magniloquent  declarations  of 
purpose  in  this  war,  after  our  high-sounding  announcement 
of  the  equitable  bases  of  settlement  of  the  war  upon  which 
the  armistice  and  the  treaty  to  follow  are  conditioned,  what 


1 62       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

a  lame  and  impotent  conclusion  it  would  be  for  our  President 
to  come  back  to  this  country,  leaving,  as  an  arbiter  of  half 
the  world,  a  League  of  Nations  in  which  we  were  to  have 
no  voice  and  over  whose  actions  we  were  to  have  no  con- 
trol! 

Could  we  thus  selfishly  retire  to  our  isolated  seclusion  and 
repudiate  the  responsibility  that  our  participation  in  the  war 
and  in  the  terms  of  peace  must  thrust  upon  us  as  the  most 
powerful  and  most  impartial  member  of  the  family  of  na- 
tions? It  is  inconceivable  that  President  Wilson,  after  what 
he  has  written  and  said  to  the  world,  would  consent  to  play 
such  a  humiliating  part.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  is  consistent 
with  himself,  if  he  stands  up  to  the  character  he  has  assumed 
before  to  the  plain  people  of  Europe  and  the  world,  and  signs 
a  treaty  by  which  the  United  States  becomes  a  responsible 
factor  in  the  world's  progress,  the  men  of  small  vision  in  the 
Senate  and  Congress  will  be  swept  from  their  opposition  by 
a  public  opinion  they  cannot  withstand. 

Such  a  general  league  must  always  be  of  the  highest 
benefit  to  every  small  nation.  It  would  offer  protection 
against  any  oppression  by  a  greater  nation,  and  it  would  give 
relief  from  the  burden  of  armament.  Full  reliance  could  be 
had  on  the  fairness  of  the  league,  because  a  conspiracy  by 
all  the  Great  Powers,  including  the  United  States,  to  oppress 
a  small  Power  is  unthinkable.  Therefore,  every  small 
nation  would  ultimately  seek  admission.  It  would  then 
willingly  submit  to  reasonable  restrictions  on  its  own  repre- 
sentative weight  in  the  league  to  which,  as  an  initiating  con- 
stituent member,  it  might  make  vociferous  objection. 


DISARMAMENT   OF    NATIONS  163 

DISARMAMENT  OF  NATIONS  AND  FREEDOM 

OF  THE  SEAS  l 

The  original  program  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
contained  no  clause  with  reference  to  disarmament  of 
nations.  This  was  not  because  the  projectors  of  the  league 
did  not  deem  disarmament  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the 
ultimate  maintenance  of  permanent  peace  but  because  they 
deemed  real  disarmament  possible  only  as  the  result  of  the 
successful  operation  of  the  league.  The  league  could  only 
serve  its  purpose  by  furnishing  to  the  nations  the  protection 
that  the  nations  secured  by  armament.  It  was  to  be  substi- 
tuted for  armament.  Until  it  proved  its  usefulness  as  such, 
the  armed  nations  could  not  be  expected  to  part  with  their 
own  insurance. 

In  a  league  of  nations  to  Enforce  the  Versailles  Treaty 
the  Allied  Powers  must  retain  armament  to  constitute  a 
police  force  to  secure  peace  between  the  new  nations  of 
Middle  and  Eastern  Europe  and  Asia  Minor.  This  will 
justify  the  United  States  in  maintaining  a  potential  army 
by  a  system  of  universal  training.  It  accords  with  Secretary 
Daniels'  recommendations  that  we  continue  the  peace  plan 
of  increasing  our  navy. 

As  the  smaller  league  of  peace  proves  its  adequate  pro- 
tection against  war  the  motive  of  economy  will  prompt  com- 
pliance with  Mr.  Wilson's  armament  clause  in  the  fourteen 
points  by  a  proportionate  decrease  in  all  armaments,  and  a 
mutual  agreement  will  become  possible  and  practical. 
Meantime  we  must  be  patient.  Reforms  of  this  kind  do 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  n,  1918. 


164  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

not  come  at  once  and  should  not  be  expected  to.  We  take 
an  important  step,  and  its  success  leads  to  another  forward 
movement. 

There  is  nothing  in  England's  position  respecting  her  fleet 
that  should  discourage  the  friends  of  the  League  of  Nations 
to  Enforce  Peace.  The  exaggerated  language  of  a  Winston 
Churchill  should  not  discourage  us.  It  is  the  language  of 
an  advocate  in  a  heated  political  campaign.  We  must  ad- 
mit the  justice  of  England's  position  —  that  she  cannot  give 
up  her  fleet  in  the  absence  of  the  test  of  a  new  league  of  na- 
tions. She  cannot  know  whether  the  League  will  be 
sufficient  protection  to  her  against  attack.  Her  isolated 
position  requires  her  to  protect  herself  against  starvation  in 
time  of  war.  She  is  dependent  on  other  countries  for  food 
and  raw  materials.  These  can  only  reach  her  by  the  sea. 
She  must  keep  open  the  access  by  sea  in  time  of  war.  Only 
by  her  fleet  can  she  do  this.  Not  until  the  operation  of  the 
League  of  Nations  demonstrates  that  this  danger  in  war  is 
minimized  can  she  be'  expected  to  reduce  her  fleet. 

So  far  as  freedom  of  the  seas  in  time  of  peace  is  con- 
cerned, wherever  the  British  flag  floats  there  is  and  always 
has  been  freedom  of  the  seas. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  THE  GERMAN 
COLONIES  1 

No  one  can  overestimate  the  weight  in  winning  this  war 
of  the  morale  of  the  Allies  born  of  the  righteousness  of  their 
cause.  They  said,  and  the  world  believed  them,  that  they 
were  engaged  in  this  war  for  no  selfish  purpose.  They  were 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  16,  1918. 


THE    LEAGUE    AND    THE    GERMAN    COLONIES  165 

enlisted  in  the  terrible  struggle  to  end  the  hideous  immorality 
and  unmorality  of  militarism,  to  restore  stolen  goods  and 
to  further  the  establishment  of  governments  in  accordance 
with  the  will  of  those  governed. 

France  sought  Alsace-Lorraine  as  a  measure  of  justice. 
Italy  sought  the  Trentino  and  Trieste  on  the  same  ground. 
The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  sought  the  acquisition 
of  no  new  territory.  Great  Britain  has  indicated  that  she 
does  not  desire  the  return  of  Helgoland,  that  island  off  the 
mouth  of  the  Elbe  which  Lord  Salisbury  sold  to  Germany 
and  which  has  proved  so  formidable  a  naval  outpost  of  the 
German  empire  in  this  war. 

The  question  as  to  the  German  colonies,  however,  has 
raised  a  doubt  among  some  whether  Great  Britain  will  adhere 
religiously  to  the  attitude  of  seeking  no  additional  territory. 
Germany  has  colonies  in  East  and  West  Africa  of  large 
extent.  She  has  a  colony  of  large  area  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Australia,  part  of  the  island  of  New  Guinea.  The 
Australians,  the  New  Zealanders  and  the  South  Africans 
among  the  English  colonists  object  to  the  return  of  these 
colonies  to  Germany,  because  Germany's  ownership  of  them 
has  been  a  threat  to  Australia  and  New  Zealand  and  has 
required  special  defenses  by  them. 

It  is  to  be  inferred  from  the  clearly  proved  outrageous 
treatment  by  Germany  of  her  colonists  that  the  Peace  Con- 
ference in  Versailles  will  conclude  that  none  of  her  colonies 
should  be  returned  to  Germany.  They  have  not  been  ad- 
ministered for  the  benefit  of  the  backward  peoples  in  the 
colonies.  The  treatment  of  these  peoples  is  of  a  piece  with 
the  atrocious  conduct  of  the  Germans  in  this  war. 

Under  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  fourteen  points, 
therefore,  the  only  question  which  the  conferees  can  take  up 


1 66      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

is  how  shall  these  colonies  be  administered.  That  they  are 
not  now  capable  of  self-government  goes  without  saying. 
The  Australians  and  New  Zealanders  would  doubtless  wish 
that  the  German  colony  in  New  Guinea  should  be  taken  over 
by  Great  Britain.  The  South  African  English  colonists  will 
probably  seek  the  same  result. 

It  would  be  too  bad  for  Britain  to  yield  to  the  urgings  of 
her  daughters  in  this  regard.  She  cannot  afford  to  do  it.  It 
will  arouse  at  once  the  attack  that  she  is  exhibiting  the  same 
land-grabbing  propensities  which  have  been  charged  to  her 
in  the  past. 

There  is  no  argument  making  more  strongly  for  the  estab- 
lishment and  maintenance  of  a  league  of  nations  in  connec- 
tion with  this  treaty  than  the  need  of  a  proper  method  of 
providing  for  these  German  colonies.  They  should  be 
governed  by  an  agency  of  the  league  of  nations  charged  with 
the  duty  of  educating  the  natives,  leading  them  on  in  the 
paths  of  civilization  and  extending  self-government  to  them 
as  rapidly  as  their  fitness  will  permit.  They  will  thus  prove 
to  the  world  the  equitable  and  just  motives  and  aims  of  the 
nations  who  frame  the  provisions  of  this  epoch-making 
treaty. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY  l 

The  earnest  effort  of  the  Jews  of  the  United  States  to 
induce  our  executive  to  remedy  the  intolerable  condition  of 
their  co-religionists  in  the  backward  countries  of  Europe  has 
often  been  met  and  defeated  by  the  argument  that  our 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  17,  1918. 


THE   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS   AND   RELIGIOUS    LIBERTY        167 

government  can  not  interfere  with  the  domestic  affairs  of 
another  nation.  This  argument  has  little  if  any  application 
to  the  present  situation.  There  is  much  evidence  accumulat- 
ing to  show  that  the  pogroms  and  abuses  of  the  Jews  con- 
tinue in  the  countries  where  they  have  heretofore  existed, 
and  that  the  chaotic  and  lawless  condition  in  these  countries 
has  offered  an  opportunity  for  the  cruel  gratification  of  race 
and  religious  prejudice.  On  the  whole,  it  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  the  people  of  the  Jewish  race  have  suffered  more 
in  this  war,  as  noncombatants,  than  any  other  people,  unless 
it  be  the  Serbians  and  the  Armenians. 

In  Poland  and  in  Galicia  the  true  story  of  their  agonies 
and  losses  is  heartrending.  The  five  nations  who  are  to 
draft  the  treaty  at  Versailles  are  setting  up  governments  in 
Poland,  in  the  Ukraine  and  in  the  Baltic  provinces.  In  all 
of  these  the  Jewish  population  is  a  substantial  percentage  of 
the  whole.  In  their  sad  story  we  find  the  Jews  in  the  Middle 
Ages  seeking  refuge  from  the  oppression  and  cruelty  of 
Western  Europe  and  rushing  to  the  great  empire  of  Poland, 
then  stretching  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,  to  take 
advantage  of  a  charter  of  religious  tolerance  and  oppor- 
tunity granted  by  one  of  the  liberal  Polish  kings.  The  irony 
of  fate,  however,  ended  the  Polish  kingdom  and  a  large  part 
of  it  was  turned  over  to  Russia,  which  ground  the  Jews 
under  its  tyrannous  heel.  This  is  why  half  of  the  thirteen 
millions  of  Jews  living  in  the  world  were  at  the  beginning 
of  this  war  to  be  found  in  the  Russian  pale  in  which  Jews 
were  permitted  to  live,  to  which  they  were  limited,  and  which 
was  practically  coterminous  with  the  territory  which  Russia 
had  taken  from  old  Poland. 

One  of  the  great  projects  of  this  Congress  of  Powers  at 
Versailles  is  to  set  up  independent  governments  in  these  ter- 


1 68       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ritories  of  the  Russian  Jewish  pale.  We  shall  be  derelict  in 
our  duty  if  we  do  not  require,  as  part  of  the  fundamental 
law  of  these  new  republics,  that  the  Jews  shall  have  as  great 
religious  freedom  as  they  have  in  the  United  States.  But 
we  must  do  more.  We  must  have  a  league  of  nations  to 
see  to  it  that  such  fundamental  law  exacted  by  the  treaty  shall 
be  enforced.  We  find  full  precedent  for  such  a  provision 
in  the  law  in  the  treaty  made  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  in 
which  Bulgaria  and  Rumania  were  established  as  independ- 
ent countries.  Rumania,  which  had  long  been  a  heinous 
sinner  against  the  Jews,  was  forced  by  the  Berlin  Congress 
to  accept,  as  part  of  its  constitution,  a  declaration  that  there 
should  be  complete  religious  freedom  and  that  no  citizen 
should  be  discriminated  against  on  account  of  his  religion 
in  any  respect.  The  Rumanian  government  had  the 
audacity,  after  incorporating  the  guaranty  in  its  fundamental 
law,  to  declare  and  hold  that  Jews  who  had  lived  in  Rumania 
for  two  or  three  hundred  years,  father  and  son,  were  aliens. 
In  this  way  the  protection  of  the  Jews  provided  for  in  the 
treaty  of  Berlin  was  denied,  and  this  was  after  Rumania  had 
secured  recognition  as  a  government  on  an  additional 
promise  of  fair  treatment  of  the  Jews. 

Let  us  have  no  farcical  result  in  working  out  this  treaty  of 
Versailles.  Could  we  find  a  stronger  argument  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  our  league  of  nations  than  this  ignominious  fail- 
ure of  that  congress  of  1879,  under  the  presidency  of  Bis- 
marck, to  carry  out  its  declared  purpose?  If  there  be  any 
people  who  should  be  earnestly  in  favor  of  a  league  of  na- 
tions as  the  outgrowth  and  the  condition  of  this  treaty  now 
being  framed  at  Versailles  the  Jews  are  that  people. 


PRESIDENT    WILSON    AND   THE   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        169 

PRESIDENT  WILSON  AND  THE  LEAGUE  OF 
NATIONS  1 

President  Wilson  says  that  the  statement  of  the  Chicago 
Tribune  that,  before  sailing,  he  approved  the  plan  of  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  is  untrue  and  that  he  never  directly 
or  indirectly  indorsed  the  plan.  It  is  not  believed  that  any 
one,  for  the  American  League,  ever  claimed  that  he  did. 
From  what  he  has  said,  however,  he  has  given  the  world 
reason  to  believe  that  he  favored  action  by  a  league  of 
nations  to  achieve  results  only  to  be  brought  about  along 
the  lines  of  the  American  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  He 
has,  because  of  his  addresses  and  messages  on  the  subject, 
come  to  be  regarded  as  the  foremost  champion  of  a  league 
of  nations  to  maintain  peace  after  this  war.  It  is  the  con- 
fident belief  of  the  people  of  France  that  he  has  attended  the 
conference  in  order  to  secure  such  a  league  which  prompts 
their  enthusiastic  and  affectionate  acclaim.  He  will  do  well 
to  bear  this  in  mind.  He  must  not  give  the  word  of  promise 
to  the  ear  and  break  it  to  the  hope.  He  has  spoken  so  much 
on  the  objects  of  this  war,  he  has  laid  down  in  a  didactic 
form  so  many  principles  in  their  application  to  all  the  peoples 
in  the  sphere  of  the  war,  he  has  pictured  with  such  eloquence 
the  idealistic  results  for  the  freedom,  justice  and  peace  of  the 
large  and  small  nations  affected  by  the  war,  that  if  he  now 
fails  to  propose  and  secure  in  the  treaty  practical  machinery 
for  a  real  league  of  nations,  which  shall  enforce  peace,  he 
will  properly  be  held  responsible  for  a  lame  and  impotent 
conclusion  before  the  world  and  its  expectant  peoples. 

Mr.  Wilson  is  master  of  an  inspiring  style  of  promise,  in 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  23,  1918. 


I7O      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

which  he  encourages  hopes  and  ideals  and  awakens  the 
enthusiasm  of  popular  expectancy  without  committing  him- 
self to  constructive  suggestions  for  a  definite  method  of 
achievement.  In  dealing  with  the  peoples  of  the  world,  who 
are  looking  to  him  as  a  savior  from  future  war  and  a  pre- 
server of  peace  and  democracy,  this  habit  of  mind  and 
expression  is  now  to  be  subjected  to  the  severest  test  in  his 
career.  He  has  in  his  keeping  not  alone  his  own  reputation 
for  good  faith,  but  that  of  the  great  people  for  whom  he  is 
the  spokesman. 

Let  us  see  what  this  League  of  Nations,  whose  formation, 
he  says,  is  absolutely  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  is.  Let  us  study  it  from  his  speeches. 

On  May  27,  1916,  Mr.  Wilson  delivered  a  written  address 
at  the  dinner  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  in  Washington. 
He  expressly  declined  to  discuss  the  program  of  the  League, 
whose  guest  he  was,  but  he  clearly  specified  certain  objects 
and  laid  down  principles  of  international  action  which  ac- 
corded with  the  objects  and  principles  of  the  league.  He 
said  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  wish  "  a  universal 
association  of  the  nations  to  maintain  an  inviolate  security  of 
the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  common  and  unhindered  use 
of  all  nations  of  the  world  and  to  prevent  any  war  begun 
either  contrary  to  treaty  covenants  or  without  warning  and 
full  submission  of  the  causes  to  the  opinion  of  the  world  — 
a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity  and  political  inde- 
pendence." He  further  said  at  this  dinner  that  "  the  world 
was  even  then  upon  the  eve  of  a  great  consummation,  when 
some  common  force  will  be  brought  into  existence  which 
shall  safeguard  right  as  the  first  and  most  fundamental 
interest  of  all  peoples  and  all  governments,  when  coercion 
shall  be  summoned  not  to  the  service  of  political  ambition 


PRESIDENT    WILSON    AND   THE   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        17! 

or  selfish  hostility,  but  to  the  service  of  a  common  order,  a 
common  justice  and  a  common  peace." 

He  delivered  these  words  to  a  society  whose  plan  included 
for  its  proposed  league  of  nations  a  congress  of  Powers 
to  improve  international  law,  an  international  court  and  an 
international  council  of  conciliation,  to  which  all  interna- 
tional differences  were  to  be  submitted,  and,  finally,  a  com- 
mon and  combined  police  force  of  the  nations  together  with 
combined  economic  boycott  to  prevent  the  advent  of  war 
before  there  has  been  full  submission  of  the  dispute  to  such 
tribunals.  It  was  impossible  for  those  who  heard  the  Presi- 
dent against  this  background  to  escape  the  conviction  that 
he  was  in  general  and  almost  specific  accord  not  only  with 
the  purposes  but  with  the  method  of  the  league.  How  could 
the  just  results  which  he  sought  be  obtained  without  interna- 
tional tribunals  ?  How  could  a  league  of  nations  act  through 
a  common  force  without  obligation  of  its  members  to  respond 
with  contributors  to  such  a  common  force  when  war  was 
begun  without  submission? 

Since  that  speech  much  has  happened.  But  the  President 
has  continued  to  refer  to  a  league  of  nations  and  to  the 
major  force  of  the  world  as  a  means  of  securing  peace  and 
justice. 

In  the  fourteen  points  of  the  message  of  January  8,  1918, 
we  find  references  to  a  League  of  Nations  and  its  guarantee 
as  follows: 

In  the  second  point  it  is  said  that  the  high  seas  may  be 
closed  only  "  by  international  action  for  the  enforcement  of 
international  covenants." 

In  the  third  point  establishment  of  equality  of  trade  con- 
ditions is  to  be  required  "  among  all  nations  consenting 
to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  mainte- 
nance." 


172      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

In  the  fourth  point  adequate  guarantees  are  to  be  "  given 
and  taken  that  national  armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the 
lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety." 

In  the  eleventh  point  it  is  provided  that  "  international 
guarantees  of  the  political  and  economic  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  States  should  be 
entered  into." 

By  the  twelfth  it  is  enjoined  that  "  the  Dardanelles  should 
be  permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and 
commerce  of  all  nations  under  international  guarantees." 

In  the  thirteenth  point  it  is  required  that  Poland  shall  be 
secured  "  a  free  passage  to  the  seas,"  and  her  "  political  and 
economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity  should  be 
guaranteed  by  international  covenants." 

In  the  fourteenth  point  it  is  said  that  a  "  general  associa- 
tion of  nations  must  be  formed  under  specific  covenants  for 
the  purpose  of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
to  great  and  small  States  alike." 

In  his  address  of  September  27,  1918,  he  said:  "There 
can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or  special  covenants  and  un- 
derstandings within  the  general  and  common  family  of  the 
League  of  Nations." 

"  There  can  be  no  special,  selfish  economic  combinations 
within  the  League  and  no  employment  of  any  form  of 
economic  boycott  or  exclusion,  except  as  the  power  of 
economic  penalty  by  exclusion  from  the  markets  of  the 
world  may  be  vested  in  the  League  of  Nations  itself  as  a 
means  of  discipline  and  control." 

He  signaled  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war 
by  his  message  of  April  2,  1917,  in  which  he  said  we  were 
to  fight  "  for  a  universal  dominion  of  right  by  such  concert 


PRESIDENT    WILSON    AND    THE    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS         173 

of  free  peoples  as  shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations 
and  make  this  world  itself  at  last  free." 

Other  passages  of  similar  import  might  be  cited,  but  these 
are  enough  to  show  that  those  who  read  them  had  a  right  to 
believe  the  President  was  committing  himself  to  a  league 
of  nations,  bound  by  covenants  of  its  members  to  maintain 
justice,  freedom  and  peace  among  nations  large  and  small 
and  to  do  this  by  force;  i.  e.,  by  the  combined  armies  and 
navies  of  the  members  of  the  League.  The  maintenance  of 
justice  necessarily  carries  with  it  the  conception  of  a  court 
to  administer  it :  to  hear  the  differences  submitted,  pronounce 
judgment  and  enforce  it  through  the  executive  agencies  of 
the  League. 

This  is  the  general  plan  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 
Mr.  Wilson's  plan  is  more  ambitious  in  that  the  members 
of  the  League  are  mutually  to  guarantee  the  political  and 
territorial  integrity  of  all  the  signatories  of  the  treaty.  By 
this  the  United  States  would  bind  itself  to  preserve  by  arms 
the  boundaries  and  independence  of  Poland,  of  the  Balkans, 
of  the  Czecho-Slavs  and  all  the  new  republics  to  be  born  of 
this  treaty,  as  Great  Britain  did  those  of  Belgium. 

We  cannot  suppose  that,  after  giving  these  assurances  to 
the  peoples  of  Europe,  President  Wilson  will  be  content  with 
a  treaty  of  mere  good  intentions  and  with  declarations  obli- 
gating no  nation  to  do  anything  to  maintain  justice,  freedom 
and  peace,  but  leaving  it  to  the  uncertain  moral  sanction  of 
the  conscience  of  each  nation  to  find  out  what  justice  is  and 
then  to  do  it. 


174  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

SENATOR  LODGE  ON  THE  LEAGUE  OF 
NATIONS  l 

Senator  Lodge's  speech  in  the  senate  on  the  twenty-first 
of  this  month  was  the  best  yet  made  on  the  aims  of  the  Allies 
and  the  elements  of  a  satisfactory  treaty  of  peace.  It  was 
comprehensive  and  accurate,  lucid  and  forcible,  felicitous  in 
phrase  and  elevated  in  tone.  It  was  in  the  senator's  best 
style,  and  that  is  a  high  standard. 

Its  great  merit  is  in  its  broad  vision  of  the  real  purposes  of 
the  United  States  and  her  present  obligation.  The  senator 
summarizes  certain  objections  to  the  general  League  of  Na- 
tions. These  are,  as  lawyers  would  say,  obiter  dicta  in  this 
speech,  because  he  now  asks  a  postponement  of  that  subject 
matter,  not  its  rejection  on  its  merits. 

There  are  those  who  minimize  the  burden  the  United 
States  should  assume  in  execution  of  this  peace;  they  deny 
that  she  should  share  it  with  her  Allies.  Mr.  Lodge  is  not 
one  of  those.  He  is  not  a  little  American.  He  does  not 
recur  to  the  farewell  address  of  Washington  and  the  phrase, 
"  entangling  alliances,"  enjoined  by  Jefferson  in  order  to 
employ  them  narrowly  to  limit  the  responsibilities  of  the 
United  States,  now  that  it  has  become  the  most  powerful 
nation  in  the  world. 

* 

In  his  address  he  said : 

"  We  went  to  war  to  save  civilization.  For  this  mighty 
purpose  we  have  sacrificed  thousands  of  American  lives  and 
spent  billions  of  American  treasure.  We  cannot,  therefore, 
leave  the  work  half  done.  We  are  as  much  bound,  not 
merely  by  interests  and  every  consideration  for  a  safe  future, 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Dec.  30,  1918. 


SENATOR   LODGE   ON    THE    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        175 

but  by  honor  and  self-respect,  to  see  that  the  terms  of  peace 
are  carried  out,  as  we  were  to  fulfill  our  great  determination 
that  the  armies  of  Germany  should  be  defeated  in  the  field. 
We  cannot  halt  or  turn  back  now.  We  must  do  our  share 
to  carry  out  the  peace  as  we  have  done  our  share  to  win  the 
war,  of  which  the  peace  is  an  integral  part.  We  must  do 
our  share  in  the  occupation  of  German  territory  which  will 
be  held  as  security  for  the  indemnities  to  be  paid  by  Germany. 
We  cannot  escape  doing  our  part  in  aiding  the  peoples  to 
whom  we  have  helped  to  give  freedom  and  independence  in 
establishing  themselves  with  ordered  governments,  for  in 
no  other  way  can  we  erect  the  barriers  which  are  essential  to 
prevent  another  outbreak  by  Germany  upon  the  world.  We 
cannot  leave  the  Jugo-Slavs,  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  the 
Poles,  the  Lithuanians  and  the  other  states  which  we  hope  to 
see  formed  and  marching  upon  the  path  of  progress  and  de- 
velopment, unaided  and  alone.'' 

He  says  that  the  United  States  is  obliged  to  aid  Russia  in 
rising  from  the  chaos  and  disorder  which  has  come  upon  her 
to  the  place  which  she  ought  to  occupy  in  the  family  of  na- 
tions; that  the  object  of  the  Russian  Bolsheviki  has  been  to 
destroy  their  fellow  citizens  and  every  element  which  was 
necessary  to  a  social  fabric  under  which  men  could  live  and 
prosper  while  they  themselves  profit  in  money  and  in  power 
from  the  ruin  they  have  wrought;  that  they  indulged  in 
murder  and  massacre,  destroyed  property  and  all  the  instru- 
ments of  industry,  and  the  unhappy  and  ignorant  people  of 
Russia,  in  whose  name  they  undertook  to  act,  are  to-day  suf- 
fering from  famine  and  disease,  and  are  in  a  worse  condition 
than  they  were  in  the  days  of  the  Romanoffs;  that  if  Russian 
anarchy  should  be  permitted  to  spread  through  western  civil- 
ization, that  civilization  would  fall;  that  we  cannot  leave 


1/6  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Russia  lying  helpless  and  breathing  out  infection  on  the 
world ;  and  that  it  would  be  discreditable  to  the  United  States 
if  we  failed  to  recognize  our  duty  to  her. 

The  Senator's  speech  was  delivered  to  establish  the  neces- 
sity for  postponing  the  consideration  by  the  conference  of 
five  of  the  fourteen  points  of  the  President's  message  of 
January  8,  referring  to  secret  diplomacy,  to  freedom  of  navi- 
gation and  the  seas,  to  the  removal  of  economic  barriers,  to 
the  reduction  of  armament,  and  to  the  central  League  of 
Nations. 

It  must  be  admitted  the  Senator's  argument  for  a  post- 
ponement of  these  questions  to  an  adjourned  conference  has 
weight.  It  may  be  that  in  the  immediate  settlement  of  them 
is  to  be  found  a  means  of  solving  difficulties  in  agreement 
upon  specific  terms  of  peace,  of  which  neither  the  Senator 
nor  we  are  advised. 

A  stipulation  that  the  five  Allies  dictating  this  treaty 
should  not  make  any  treaty  as  between  themselves  incon- 
sistent with  the  purpose  of  the  great  treaty  and  should  make 
no  secret  treaties  at  all,  may  well  strengthen  mutual  con- 
fidence in  the  good  faith  of  all  in  the  main  treaty. 

The  general  reduction  of  armaments  of  all  nations  does 
not  immediately  concern  the  peace  in  the  sphere  of  war,  pro- 
vided Germany's  teeth  are  effectively  drawn. 

The  provision  against  economic  barriers  is  a  general 
question  of  world  trade,  the  immediate  settlement  of  which 
does  not,  on  the  surface,  seem  essential  to  the  adjustment  of 
the  purposes  of  the  nations  in  winning  this  war.  The  sub- 
currents  of  selfish  purpose  in  respect  to  trade,  however,  may 
require  a  preliminary  settlement  of  such  a  general  principle 
as  the  best  basis  for  adjusting  special  interests. 

The  freedom  of  the  seas  in  time  of  war  is  a  very  general 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  177 

issue,  postponement  of  which  to  the  adjourned  conference 
would  hardly  interfere  with  a  satisfactory  peace  settlement 
for  the  present. 

What  should  be  emphasized,  however,  and  what  Senator 
Lodge  brings  out  with   force  of  argument  that  cannot  be 
met,  is  the  fact  that  we  now  have  a  league  of  nations  — 
the  United   States,   England,   France,   Italy  and  Japan  - 
whose  obligations  in  respect  to  securing  the  results  of  the 
war  in  Europe  are  equal.     They  are  dictating  this  peace. 
The  treaty  will  not  enforce  itself. 

Unless  we  stamp  out  the  poisonous  infection  of  Russian 
Bolshevism  and  prevent  its  spread  throughout  the  countries 
of  Europe,  we  shall  only  substitute  anarchy,  chaos  and 
plundering,  murderous  violence  for  imperial  despotism. 

We  can  only  achieve  these  results  by  continuance  of  this 
existing  league  of  Great  Powers.  Of  this  Senator  Lodge's 
great  address  is  a  demonstration.* 


THE  LEAGUE :  WHY  AND  HOW  l 

It  is  possible  that  we  need  not  include  all  the  nations  in 
the  League  in  order  to  perform  the  task  that  we  have  set 
for  ourselves  ;  but  it  is  essential  that  we  should  have  a  league 
of  the  Great  Nations  to  enforce  peace,  if  the  treaty  of  peace 
is  to  accomplish  any  of  the  objects  that  we  and  the  Allies 
have  had  in  the  war. 

1  Address   delivered   at   Montclair,   N.   J.,   Dec.   30,   1918,   under  the 
auspices  of  the  College  Women's  Club. 


178       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Now,  the  expression  league  of  nations  is  used  to  indicate 
something,  and  I  think  it  is  just  as  well  to  define  it  so  that 
we  may  know  what  we  are  talking  about.  Of  course  it 
serves  some  purposes  to  have  a  slogan  which  you  do  not 
have  to  define.  It  gives  you  an  opportunity  to  make  a  cam- 
paign without  reference  to  details.  You  shout  it  to  the 
crowd,  and  when  anybody  presents  objections  you  can  say 
that  that  is  not  the  kind  of  a  league  of  nations  you  favor. 
Therefore  I  think  it  best  to  define  what  we  mean.  I  say 
we;  I  mean  a  party  of  dreamers,  mayhap,  who  got  together, 
after  the  war  began,  to  formulate  something.  Way  back  in 
an  administration  that  is  now  forgotten  —  I  did  not  wish 
to  bring  it  up  again,  but  I  only  refer  to  it  as  a  reminiscence 
and  a  date  —  treaties  of  peace  were  negotiated  with  Eng- 
land and  with  France  by  the  United  States.  They  provided 
for  arbitration  of  all  justiciable  issues  between  the  contract- 
ing parties.  We  thought  we  had  made  a  good  deal  of  pro- 
gress in  negotiating  and  signing  those  treaties,  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  and  the  Ambassadors  who  signed  were 
photographed  and  there  was  a  general  feeling  that  something 
had  been  done  that  was  of  historical  interest.  Well,  that 
is  the  only  interest  it  has  now ;  because  when  they  got  to  the 
Senate,  that  august  body  truncated  them  and  amended  them 
and  qualified  them  in  such  a  way  that  their  own  father  could 
not  recognize  them. 

There  was  no  danger  of  war  between  the  United  States 
and  either  France  or  England;  we  had  proven  the  lack  of 
danger  by  a  hundred  years  of  peace.  And  since  the  treaties 
had  really  been  framed  as  models,  when  they  came  back  thus 
crippled  and  maimed,  they  were  not  very  useful.  So  I  put 
them  on  the  shelf  and  let  the  dust  accumulate  on  them  in 
the  hope  that  the  Senators  might  change  their  minds,  or 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  179 

that  the  people  might  change  the  Senate ;  instead  of  which 
they  changed  me.  Now  those  treaties  were  an  improvement 
on  previous  treaties.  The  previous  treaties,  of  which  there 
were  many  (there  is  no  trouble  in  getting  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration; you  can  get  them  by  the  bushel  when  they  do  not 
clinch  anything),  had  provided  that  the  contracting  nations 
would  arbitrate  every  question  except  one  that  concerned 
vital  interests,  honor  or  territorial  integrity,  leaving  it,  of 
course,  to  either  party  to  determine  what  concerned  its  vital 
interests  or  its  honor.  Well,  as  no  nation  would  ever  go 
to  war  for  anything  but  what  did,  in  its  opinion,  concern  its 
vital  interests  or  its  honor,  the  treaties  ought  to  have  read, 
and  properly  and  freely  rendered  did  read,  "  we  agree  to 
arbitrate  every  question  which  is  not  likely  to  lead  to  war." 
Therefore  the  assistance  such  treaties  gave  in  the  matter  of 
peace  was  not  perceptible. 

So  we  adopted  this  form  by  which  we  agreed  to  arbitrate 
every  justiciable  question.  It  is  necessary  to  know  what 
justiciable  means.  Old  Noah  Webster  said  that  the  word 
had  become  obsolete.  Well,  since  his  time  it  has  been 
revived,  notably  in  the  decisions  and  opinions  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  It  is  used  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  by  Chief  Justice 
Fuller  and  by  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  and  it  means  a  contro- 
versy that  can  be  settled  in  court  on  principles  of  law;  one 
capable  of  settlement  by  the  disposition  of  justice. 

Those  of  us  who  have  been  engaged  in  promoting  the 
settlement  of  difficulties  by  arbitration  were  of  course  over- 
come with  disappointment  when  the  war  broke  out.  We 
knew  that  armament  was  heavy ;  but  we  thought  it  would  be 
a  brake  on  the  people,  who  must  realize  from  the  armament 
itself  first,  how  destructive  war  would  be,  and  second,  how 


l8o       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

enormously  expensive  it  would  be.  Nevertheless,  within 
a  week  after  the  first  of  August,  1914,  Europe  was  at  war. 
And  then  those  of  us  who  had  suffered  this  disappointment 
gathered  ourselves  together  to  see  if  we  could  not  get  some 
plan  to  discourage  war,  some  plan  which  we  could  induce  the 
nations  to  adopt  after  this  war  was  over,  after  this  dreadful 
destruction  had  come  to  an  end,  and  when  men  would  be 
longing  for  some  means  of  promoting  and  making  peace 
permanent.  We  met  at  the  Century  Club  and  afterwards  at 
the  Independence  Hall,  and  organized  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace. 

When  the  war  began  the  people  of  this  country  were  anxious 
to  keep  out  of  it.  The  President's  proclamation  of  neu- 
trality was  received  by  them  with  approval.  We  did  not 
realize  then  what  was  at  stake.  We  thought  we  could  be 
neutral  and  keep  within  the  lines  of  international  law  and 
avoid  being  drawn  into  the  struggle.  We  were  neutral  and 
we  did  keep  within  the  lines  of  international  law;  but  we 
found  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  the 
struggle.  Of  course  we  say  we  were  drawn  into  it,  as  we 
were,  by  the  blindness  and  cruelty  of  Germany's  submarine 
policy.  But  what  did  that  grow  out  of?  It  grew  out  of 
the  circumstance  that  in  war,  as  it  is  now  carried  on,  it  is 
impossible  for  a  nation,  which  furnishes  to  the  world  what 
we  furnish,  to  remain  neutral.  We  were  the  market  to 
which  all  the  nations  engaged  in  this  war  resorted  for  food, 
munitions  and  war  equipment.  Until  the  British  navy 
swept  the  German  navy  from  the  seas,  we  furnished  to  both 
sides  with  impartiality  what  they  came  to  buy.  The 
fortunes  of  war  having  limited  us  to  the  Allies  as  our 
customers,  that  which  was  inevitable  came  about :  Germany 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  181 

came  to  realize  that  our  resources  were  going  to  enable  the 
Allies  to  win  the  war.  We  were  within  our  rights  under 
international  law  in  doing  what  we  did.  But  it  was  found 
that  we  were  so  close  to  Europe,  so  much  involved  by  our 
trade  with  all  of  Europe,  that  it  was  practically  impossible 
for  us  to  exercise  our  rights  as  international  tradesmen  with- 
out in  effect  so  strengthening  one  side  that  that  side  was 
bound  to  look  upon  us  as  the  means  by  which  they  could 
carry  on  the  war ;  and  its  enemy  was  bound  to  take  the  same 
view.  Accordingly  Germany  determined  to  resort  to  the 
murderous  policy  of  the  submarines,  in  which  she  was  will- 
ing to  sacrifice  the  rights  of  innocent  noncombatants  and 
citizens  of  the  United  States  in  order  to  frighten  us  out  of 
exercising  our  international  rights  upon  the  seas.  That  is 
what  drove  us  into  the  war;  and  any  future  European  war 
will  probably  bring  about  the  same  result.  It  shows  how 
deeply  interested  we  are,  even  from  a  selfish  standpoint,  in 
suppressing  European  war  or  war  anywhere  that  is  likely 
to  spread.  The  world  is  now  so  closely  knit  together, 
oceans  to-day  being  means  of  union  rather  than  of  separa- 
tion, that  in  future  wars  there  will  be  no  great  neutral. 

When  we  got  into  this  war  we  found  that  its  issues  were 
infinitely  greater  than  that  which  drove  us  in.  Our  vision 
broadened.  We  discovered  that  our  purposes  in  the  war 
must  be  as  broad  as  the  purpose  of  the  enemy  we  were 
fighting,  that  we  must  utterly  crush  him  in  order  to  cure  his 
lust  for  power  and  to  defeat  that  which  was  divulged  as  no 
less  than  a  purpose  to  rule  the  world.  Germany  had,  for 
forty  years,  been  preparing  for  this  war.  Bismarck  had 
taught  her  the  value  of  military  force.  By  wonderful  suc- 
cesses in  three  wars,  in  each  of  which  Germany,  or  Prussia, 
acquired  territory  and  by  all  of  which  Germany  was  solidi- 


1 82       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

fied,  the  German  people  became  convinced  that  they  were 
supermen,  became  convinced  that  they  had  learned  the  secret 
of  applying  scientific  principles  to  the  military  art.  They 
were  taught  in  their  schools  that  the  highest  development  of 
national  greatness  was  military  force.  They  were  taught  to 
worship  the  supremacy  of  the  German  State.  Having  ap- 
plied this  system  of  efficiency  and  thoroughness  and  these 
scientific  principles  to  the  military  art,  they  proceeded  to 
extend  them  to  every  field  of  human  activity.  That 
thoroughness,  that  system,  that  efficiency,  which  they  called 
"  kultur,"  enabled  them  to  win  in  agriculture,  manufacture, 
business,  transportation,  and  every  field  of  applied  science. 
It  also  added  to  the  size  of  their  heads,  already  enlarged 
by  military  successes.  They  prospered  under  that  false  and 
wicked  philosophy.  Materialism  forced  itself  into  their 
schools  and  dominated  their  general  view ;  and  while  grow- 
ing ever  more  materialistic  they  began  to  use  the  conception 
of  God  as  a  partner  in  the  enterprise.  They  said  that  He 
needed  them  in  supporting  His  philosophy,  that  it  was  their 
design,  under  His  direction,  to  spread  this  kultur  by  force 
in  order  to  help  Him  make  civilization  a  success.  No  con- 
sideration of  decency,  humanity,  honor  or  morality  must  be 
allowed  to  interfere.  That  was  the  doctrine;  you  can  see 
it  in  the  lectures  from  their  university  platforms.  The 
whole  people  were  saturated  with  this  dreadful  principle, 
namely,  that  the  victories  of  the  state  must  be  achieved  at  all 
hazards  and  without  regard  to  those  ordinary  considera- 
tions that  restrain  individuals  in  society.  And  that  led  to 
their  atrocious  conduct  of  the  war.  They  became  obsessed 
with  a  madness.  When  we  got  into  the  war  we  began  to 
realize  —  what  our  Allies  had  realized  before  —  that  the 
only  thing  that  could  rid  the  world  of  this  danger  was  com- 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  183 

plete  defeat  of  the  German  people.  We  were  righting  the 
German  people,  not  the  Hohenzollerns  alone;  for  until  we 
cured  the  German  people  of  this  obsession,  until  we  cured 
them  of  this  disease  which  was  in  their  heads,  we  had  not 
achieved  the  purposes  of  the  war  that  had  forced  itself  on 
us.  We  could  only  do  this  by  a  surgical  operation  on  their 
heads  to  be  performed  with  a  club.  We  have  been  using 
that  club  and  now  we  have  got  to  keep  our  grip  on  it  for 
some  time  until  they  show,  by  bringing  forth  works  meet  for 
repentance,  that  the  cure  has  been  effected. 

That  is  the  purpose  of  the  war.  How  are  we  going  to 
achieve  it?  We  have  got  through  the  first  act,  a  very  im- 
portant one;  but  others  remain.  The  armistice  was  made 
as  the  basis  of  a  future  treaty  which  was  to  cover  the  sub- 
ject matter  and  to  achieve  the  purposes  outlined  in  President 
Wilson's  message  of  January  8,  1918,  as  modified  and  quali- 
fied by  the  Allies'  insistence  upon  indemnities  and  by  the 
refusal  on  their  part  to  yield  to  the  clause  with  respect  to 
freedom  of  the  seas,  which  they  said  was  too  indefinite. 

We  shall  have  to  use  some  agency  like  the  League  of 
Nations  in  dealing  with  Constantinople,  which  will  have  to 
be  internationalized,  because  the  Bosporus,  the  Dardanelles, 
and  the  Sea  of  Marmora  constitute  a  throat  through  which 
the  countries  on  the  Black  Sea  obtain  access  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean, Constantinople  must  therefore  not  be  presided  over 
by  any  nation  having  a  selfish  motive  to  close  that  passage. 

Then  we  come  to  Russia,  what  are  we  going  to  do  about 
Russia?  Russia  had  the  Romanoffs,  but  as  between  a  one 
man  despot  and  a  mob  I  prefer  the  one  man.  The  Bol- 
sheviki  are  the  lowest  proletarians  led  by  a  few  professionals 
and  if  you  can  get  a  worse  combination  than  that,  I  do  not 


184       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

know  what  it  is.  They  proceed  on  the  theory  that  anybody 
with  thrift,  anybody  with  enterprise,  anybody  who  dresses 
well  and  tries  to  help  his  family  to  a  higher  level,  is  an  enemy 
of  society.  In  order  to  be  rid  of  them  they  get  the  country 
into  a  condition  where  there  is  not  enough  food  to  go  round, 
divide  the  people  into  classes  —  the  rich,  or  rather  those  who 
were  rich,  the  bourgeoisie,  the  intellectuals  and  the  pro- 
letariat —  feed  the  lowest  element  of  the  proletariat,  starve 
the  other  classes,  and  then,  if  the  latter  do  not  disappear 
rapidly  enough,  imprison  the  leaders  and  shoot  them  en 
masse  without  trial.  This  is  simple,  if  it  does  not  commend 
itself  in  any  other  way;  and  that  minority —  for  they  are  a 
minority  of  the  proletariat  —  will  ultimately  become  a  ma- 
jority if  they  just  keep  it  up.  The  Bolsheviki  are,  in  fact, 
deadly  enemies  of  society.  They  are  not  democrats;  they 
are  not  republicans;  they  are  not  in  favor  of  popular  rule. 
They  called  a  constituent  assembly  and  then  drove  the  dele- 
gates out  of  the  assembly  chamber.  On  what  ground?  On 
the  ground  that  a  majority  of  those  elected  were  bourgeoisie ; 
they  were  respectable;  and  they  could  not  brook  having  a 
respectable  majority  in  power.  Therefore  they  took  forcible 
possession  of  the  country  and  through  the  Soviet  they  are 
maintaining  a  tyranny  the  like  of  which  has  never  been  seen 
in  history.  They  have  far  exceeded  the  tyranny  of  the 
French  Revolution,  without  any  justification.  Unless  we 
suppress  that,  unless  those  nations  that  are  responsible  for 
this  loosening  of  the  social  ties  see  to  it  that  that  poison  is 
stamped  out,  they  have  not  done  their  work,  they  have  not 
achieved  their  purpose.  We  must  (when  I  say  we,  I  mean 
the  Allies),  by  some  means,  and  force  is  the  only  means,  give 
to  these  poor  people  of  Russia  an  opportunity  themselves  to 
set  up  government  by  majority ;  and  we  cannot  do  that  unless 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  185 

we  maintain  a  combined  force  of  the  Allies.  That  is  an 
essential  part  of  it,  and  that  is  one  of  the  provisions  of  our 
League. 

Then  there  are  half  a  dozen  republics,  perhaps  more, 
which  we  are  to  launch.  Their  peoples  have  not  had  any 
experience  in  self-government.  Self-government,  which  has 
been  defined  by  President  Wilson  as  character,  is  a  great 
boon  to  people  who  are  able  to  practice  it.  It  needs  train- 
ing, self-restraint.  We  do  not  realize  that  in  this  country. 
We  seem  to  think  that  it  is  a  panacea  which  we  can  apply 
to  the  troubles  of  Hottentots  or  anybody  else.  The  same  is 
true  of  our  idea  of  liberty.  We  talk  about  liberty,  but  we 
really  don't  understand  its  value,  because  it  comes  to  us  as 
the  air  we  breathe.  It  is  hard  to  make  people  understand 
the  benefits  which  they  are  enjoying  under  this  government 
and  to  realize  that  our  liberty  has  been  the  result  of  sacrifices 
and  blood  and  struggle  for  a  thousand  years  by  our  Anglo- 
Saxon  ancestors.  And  so  it  is  with  self-government.  We 
had  to  take  our  liberty  by  forcibly  separating  ourselves  from 
England  ;  but  she  had  herself  enabled  us  to  learn  self-govern- 
ment even  before  we  separated.  This  country  has  since  be- 
come the  great  exemplar  of  self-government  by  the  power 
of  popular  self-restraint.  At  no  time  is  this  self-restraint 
more  in  evidence  than  in  the  period  between  the  presidential 
conventions  and  the  second  day  after  the  election.  Each 
party  holds  a  convention  and  makes  a  platform.  The  plat- 
form explains  with  elaborate  detail,  with  eloquence  and  with 
perfect  fairness,  what  a  horrible  thing  it  will  be  to  let  in  the 
other  party  or  to  continue  the  other  party  in  power.  Candi- 
dates are  nominated  and  subjected  to  a  scrutiny  which  be- 
littles the  power  of  the  microscope.  I  know  something 


l86      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

about  it.  And  then  the  orators,  the  torch-light  procession, 
and  the  party  activity!  The  visitor  from  Mars,  interested 
only  in  the  developments  attending  these  great  mass  meet- 
ings and  heated  discussions,  says :  "  Well,  I  will  stay  here 
until  the  election,  because,  with  all  this  feeling,  with  people 
dividing  into  such  equal  forces  and  determined  to  win,  there 
is  certain  to  be  an  explosion  then."  The  election  comes 
and  it  is  as  quiet  as  a  May  morning.  Each  voter,  man  or 
woman,  goes  into  the  booth  and  votes  as  he  or  she  wishes, 
or  he  votes  as  she  wishes  or  she  votes  as  he  wishes.  The 
votes  are  counted  and  the  result  is  announced,  perhaps  that 
night,  perhaps  the  next  day  or  the  next  afternoon.  But 
when  the  result  is  known,  every  man  and  woman  is  aware 
who  it  is  that  is  certain,  if  he  lives,  to  carry  on  and  guide 
the  destinies  of  this  country  in  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government.  Everybody  acquiesces,  and  men,  women  and 
children  follow  the  pursuits  of  the  day  as  usual.  Now,  that 
is  self-government.  The  minority  acquiesce.  They  may 
think  of  the  next  'election,  but  they  make  no  trouble. 
Why?  Because  they  realize  that  the  majority,  when  they 
come  into  power,  will  administer  the  government  as  a  trust 
for  all  the  people,  and  that  the  rights  of  all  will  be  preserved 
equally.  That  is  what  makes  self-government  possible.  In 
Central  America  you  find  a  very  different  state  of  affairs. 
There,  whenever  they  have  an  election,  the  minority  take  to 
the  woods,  with  their  guns,  and  try  to  shoot  themselves  into 
a  majority.  Those  are  the  two  extremes.  But  any  people, 
who  have  not  had  the  training  in  popular  self-restraint  that 
we  have  had  —  this  understanding  of  the  responsibility  of 
the  majority  for  all  the  people  —  are  likely  to  stumble  and 
fall.  We  have  tried  it  in  the  Philippines  and  in  Cuba.  We 
gave  Cuba  self-government.  After  three  years  they  had  an 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  187 

election  which  caused  a  revolution.  Mr.  Roosevelt  sent  me 
down  there  to  stop  it  and  launch  the  Republic  once  more. 
Well,  I  could  not  stop  it  except  by  sending  for  the  army  and 
navy  of  the  United  States.  That  step  had  a  wholesome, 
conciliating,  quieting  effect.  We  were  not  called  upon  to 
fight.  We  took  over  the  island  and  held  it  for  two  years. 
We  passed  a  lot  of  good  statutes,  among  them  an  election 
law,  held  a  fair  election  under  it  and  then  turned  over  the 
government  to  those  elected.  We  had  launched  her  once 
more.  If  she  ever  requires  it,  we  will  do  the  same  thing  over 
again  and  launch  her  again,  and  then  again,  until  she  gets 
strong  enough  —  I  hope  she  is  now  —  to  stand  alone.  And 
now,  instead  of  setting  up  one  Cuba  we  are  setting  up  half 
a  dozen.  We  are  carving  them  out  of  the  dominion  of  the 
empires  that  we  have  been  engaged  in  fighting.  We  are 
putting  them  where  the  racial  resentment,  combined  with 
memory  of  the  tyranny  practiced,  will  prompt  them  to  be  im- 
patient and  headstrong  in  dealing  with  those  empires.  And 
the  people  of  those  empires  will  harbor  the  resentment  which 
always  comes  against  persons  that  have  broken  away  from 
one's  control.  We  are  setting  up  these  governments  for  two 
reasons:  first,  because  we  are  in  favor  of  giving  people  a 
chance  to  choose  their  own  government ;  and  second,  because 
we  are  hemming  in  Germany,  taking  away  the  territories  she 
ought  not  to  have  so  that  she  may  never  again  raise  her  head 
in  pursuit  of  world  power. 

In  order  to  do  this  we  have  got  to  arrange  the  machinery 
that  shall  maintain  peace.  The  old  powerful  empires  were 
much  more  likely  to  maintain  peace  than  are  these  numerous 
new  governments  left  to  themselves.  Unless  we  exercise 
the  power  of  the  father  over  these  new  children  of  ours  they 
will  prove  unruly  and  bring  about  the  very  war  that  we  are 


1 88  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

trying  to  prevent  by  creating  them.  I  do  not  know  any 
mathematical  demonstration  that  is  clearer  than  that.  The 
danger  is  that  these  nations  do  not  know  their  rights.  They 
have  the  frailties  of  human  nature,  and  it  is  an  unaccustomed 
business  for  them.  They  are  ambitious.  Each  one  is  deal- 
ing, without  experience,  with  liberty  and  independence  and 
self -development.  Our  liberty  is  liberty  regulated  by  law. 
And  when  you  say  liberty  regulated  by  law,  you  mean  liberty 
regulated  and  limited  by  the  rights  of  others  so  that  all  may 
enjoy  the  same  liberty  and  equal  rights.  Just  so  nations 
must  have  independence  limited  and  regulated  by  law  —  by 
international  law ;  and  we  have  got  to  devise  and  maintain 
the  machinery  that  shall  make  it  possible. 

This  treaty  is  going  to  be  as  long  as  the  moral  law. 
There  never  was  a  treaty  so  complicated  as  this  will  be. 
No  matter  what  the  character  of  the  contract,  even  though 
drawn  by  the  ablest  lawyer  who  ever  drew  a  contract,  if  it 
has  many  provisions,  if  it  is  complicated,  it  will  need  inter- 
pretation in  application.  But  how  interpret  a  contract 
authoritatively?  That  is  a  justiciable  matter.  That  is  what 
we  have  courts  for ;  and  it  is  impossible  for  this  treaty  to  be 
executed  unless  you  have  a  court,  appointed  by  the  same 
power  that  made  the  treaty,  to  interpret  the  treaty.  It  will 
be  especially  needed  when  the  new  events  arise  that  are 
certain  to  arise  in  the  lives  of  these  new  nations.  If  you 
know  any  way  by  which  those  questions  can  be  satisfactorily 
decided  other  than  by  a  court  with  authority  to  decide  them,  I 
shall  be  glad  to  hear  of  it.  And  there  you  have  the  first 
plank  in  the  platform  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

Next,  there  will  be  questions  of  policy  which  do  not  come 
under  the  head  of  justiciable  questions.  You  have  got  to 
have  somebody  representing  the  League  to  negotiate  and  ad- 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  189 

just  compromises  of  that  kind.  This  League  that  is  meeting 
in  Paris  is  a  ponderous  body.  Premiers  and  Presidents 
cannot  be  there  all  the  time.  They  have  got  to  leave  an 
agency  there  and  that  agency  must  represent  the  League  in 
the  matter  of  settling  differences  which  arise  between  the 
nations  they  are  creating  and  the  nations  out  of  which  they 
are  created.  And  so  you  have  the  second  provision  as  to 
a  commission  of  conciliation.  These  new  nations  are  going 
to  manifest  all  the  faults  and  the  weaknesses  of  children. 
It  is  inevitable.  And  the  thing  that  makes  children  better 
and  leads  them  on  is  discipline.  You  do  not  always  have  to 
use  the  broad  hand,  but  it  is  helpful  to  have  it  in  the  family. 
Therefore  we  need  a  combined  force,  which  can  be  counted 
on  when  needed,  to  convince  these  creations  of  this  treaty, 
these  governments,  and  these  people,  that  there  is  a  power 
having  the  means  of  enforcing  the  judgments  and  the  com- 
promises that  will  be  reached  under  the  court  or  the  com- 
mission. This  is  the  third  or  force  plank  of  the  League 
platform. 

Then  the  Congress  of  Powers  is  bound  to  enlarge  and,  in 
a  way,  codify  and  make  more  definite  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law,  and  this  is  the  fourth  plank  of  the  platform  of 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

Now,  having  that  League  before  us  as  a  necessity,  the 
question  arises,  shall  we  go  on  to  the  larger  League? 
Shall  we  invite  in  the  other  nations  of  the  world  to  form  a 
league  that  shall  assume  the  responsibility  of  this  treaty  and 
also  endeavor  to  make  war  less  probable  in  the  world  at 
large?  Shall  we  introduce  a  league  which  shall  work  not 
only  to  keep  peace  in  that  sphere  but  also  to  keep  peace  be- 
tween the  very  Powers  that  make  this  league,  and  between  all 
the  other  Powers  of  the  world?  The  question  whether  that 


I9O      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

shall  be  done  now  or  later  is  a  question  that  can  be  de- 
termined on  the  ground.  Even  if  it  is  not  determined 
now,  the  step  that  is  taken  by  creating  this  smaller  league 
to  achieve  its  purpose  of  maintaining  peace,  where  peace 
is  more  doubtful  and  where  the  problems  are  so  much 
more  difficult  than  in  a  normal  world  at  peace,  will  be  a  long 
step  towards  the  possibility  of  a  general  League  of  Nations. 
Heretofore  this  has  been  an  academic  question.  People 
have  been  interested  in  its  discussion,  but  the  war  seemed 
remote  and  peace  seemed  remote.  Now  the  question  is  live ; 
it  is  before  us ;  since  the  President  will  bring  back  with  him 
this  treaty  with  a  provision  for  a  league  of  nations  in  it. 

If  the  President  does  come  home  with  a  treaty  like  this, 
then  it  behooves  us  all  to  unite  in  support  of  it;  if  there  be 
difficulties  in  it,  to  suggest  how  the  difficulties  may  be  over- 
come; but  to  appreciate  the  purposes  of  that  League,  to  ap- 
preciate the  fact  that  the  world  is  longing  for  it  and  the 
oppressed  and  suffering  peoples  of  the  Allies  are  longing  for 
the  machinery  that  shall  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  dread 
disaster  through  which  they  have  passed.  We  should  look 
at  it  from  a  progressive  standpoint,  should  realize  that  some- 
thing has  happened  since  the  war  began,  that  the  assumption 
that  everything  which  has  occurred  in  the  past  is  going  to 
recur,  that  there  is  no  hope  of  change,  is  the  doctrine  of 
pessimism  and  fatalism.  This  war  has  been  fundamental  in 
its  character.  It  has  shaken  the  foundations  of  society. 
And  people  who  look  forward,  who  look  for  better  things, 
are  not  discouraged  because  something  like  that  which  is 
now  proposed  has  been  tried  before  and  failed.  They  refuse 
to  assume  that  it  will  therefore  fail  again.  Progress  is  not 
made  without  some  risk.  We  never  enter  into  new  experi- 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  191 

ments  without  realizing  that  there  may  be  a  failure.  But 
is  that  a  reason  why  we  should  not  go  forward  ?  Eloquence 
is  all  right,  platforms  are  all  right,  declarations  of  ideals  are 
all -right,  provided  they  are  accompanied  by  willingness  to 
make  sacrifices  and  run  risks  to  accomplish  the  ideals.  But 
they  must  not  be  treated  as  things  of  substance,  their  mere 
declaration  an  end  in  itself,  imposing  no  obligations  on  those 
who  have  uttered  them  to  go  on  and  do  the  things  they  extol. 
I  have  heard  it  said  that  this  League  of  Nations  takes 
away  sovereignty.  Now,  if  we  say  to  a  nation  we  are  going 
to  keep  you  within  the  bounds  of  international  law  by  this 
organization,  do  we  limit  its  independence  any  more  than 
we  limit  our  own  independence  under  a  system  of  laws  that 
are  enacted  for  the  benefit  of  society  and  for  our  own  bene- 
fit? Every  time  we  make  a  treaty  by  which  we  bind  our- 
selves to  do  anything  we  limit  our  sovereignty.  Sovereignty 
is  only  a  matter  of  definition  and  degree.  The  question  is: 
how  far  are  we  willing  to  go  in  yielding  that  entire  freedom 
of  action  and  that  license  to  wage  war  for  aggressive  and 
selfish  purposes.  We  need  not  be  frightened  by  a  definition. 
We  agree  to  arbitrate;  we  agree  to  abide  the  result  of  an 
arbitration.  That  limits  our  sovereignty,  does  it  not? 
Well,  is  that  so  heinous?  We  have  agreed  not  to  put  war- 
ships on  our  great  lakes.  That  is  a  limitation  of  our  sov- 
ereignty, is  it  not?  If  we  were  a  jingo  nation  which  in- 
sisted on  doing  everything  it  wanted  to  do,  right  or  wrong, 
we  ought  to  be  able  to  put  men  of  war  on  that  water  bound- 
ary; but  we  have  agreed  not  to.  Are  we  ashamed  of  that 
limitation  on  our  sovereignty?  Are  we  not  on  the  contrary, 
proud  of  it?  We  know  that  England  and  the  United  States 
will  never  get  into  a  war.  Everybody  knows  that ;  we  have 
got  the  habit  of  arbitrating.  It  took  us  fifty  years  to  get  it 


192       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

and  then  we  had  each  to  lose  a  case.  England  lost  the  Ala- 
bama Claim  and  we  lost  that  Fisheries  Case.  They  said  we 
had  stolen  five  millions  worth  of  fish  and  apparently  they 
proved  it.  They  got  a  judgment  and  we  paid  it  just  as  they 
paid  the  judgment  against  them.  Well,  that  limited  our 
sovereignty.  Was  it  so  disgraceful?  We  learned  to  play 
the  game.  You  can't  go  into  an  arbitration  and  play  it  on 
the  theory  of  heads  I  win,  tails  you  lose ;  that  unless  you  do 
win  you  won't  play.  You  have  got  to  be  good  losers. 
When  we  go  on  and  say  that  we  are  going  to  have  this  great 
court  lay  down  the  law  and  that  we  are  going  to  enforce 
the  judgment,  of  course  that  interferes  with  our  freedom  of 
action  —  to  the  extent  that  we  cannot  escape  execution  of 
the  judgment  —  exactly  as  a  man's  freedom  is  limited  when 
he  agrees  to  pay  a  thousand  dollars  and  does  not  pay  it  and 
his  creditor  comes  into  court  and  gets  a  judgment  under 
which  an  execution  is  levied  on  his  property. 

Now  I  am  ready  to  answer  any  questions  concerning  the 
League  that  may  occur  to  the  audience. 

A  VOICE:  I  would  like  to  have  you  state,  if  you  will, 
what  membership  you  would  begin  with,  and  what  limita- 
tions, if  any,  you  would  impose  upon  it. 

MR.  TAFT:  That  is  a  very  apt  question.  I  think  it  is 
wise  to  begin  with  the  Great  Powers.  When  you  organize 
a  club  and  you  want  clubable  members  you  make  your  se- 
lections with  care.  There  are  a  lot  of  nations  that  are  ir- 
responsible. If  you  call  them  all  into  a  convention  at  once, 
they  will  insist  on  having  equal  voice  with  the  most  re- 
sponsible and  powerful  nations,  and  I  am  not  in  favor  of 
that.  I  am  in  favor  of  a  practical  arrangement;  and  this 
peace  creates  the  opportunity  for  it.  These  five  nations  are 
an  initiating  nucleus  that  is  most  valuable  in  creating  a 


THE  LEAGUE:  WHY  AND  HOW  193 

real  league  of  all  nations  which  are  responsible  nations. 
If  we  call  a  convention  of  all  then  every  one  will  want  to 
be  heard  and  they  will  object  if  they  are  not  given  full 
representation.  Now  you  have  got  to  make  a  practical  ar- 
rangement. Every  nation  ought  to  be  heard  in  a  congress 
that  lays  down  the  rules  of  law.  What  the  proportion  of 
representation  should  be  is  a  matter  of  expediency  and  jus- 
tice. You  cannot  fix  it  according  to  population  alone,  be- 
cause China  would  then  have  four  times  as  many  votes  as 
the  United  States.  There  ought  to  be  a  proportionate  rep- 
resentation on  some  fixed  basis,  depending  on  importance  and 
power,  and  perhaps  on  the  average  intelligence  of  the  people ; 
but  you  can  fix  that  when  you  have  a  managing  commit- 
tee that  passes  on  qualifications  for  admission.  Such  a 
league  is  going  to  be  a  great  boon  for  the  small  nations. 
It  is  going  to  give  them  protection;  and  therefore  it  is  go- 
ing to  be  such  an  advantage  that  they  will  be  glad  to 
come  in  under  reasonable  conditions.  But  if  you  consult 
them  all  at  once  they  will  not  be  able  to  agree.  We  have 
had  experience  in  that  matter.  In  arranging  the  framework 
of  an  international  court  of  admiralty  prize,  a  court  to 
deal  with  captures  at  sea,  we  were  able  to  agree  upon  the 
membership  because  there  were  a  lot  of  nations  which  had 
no  navies  and  no  merchantmen  and  which  were  therefore 
not  concerned  about  naval  prizes.  But  just  as  soon  as  we 
tried  to  establish  a  world-court,  passing  on  general  disputes 
between  nations,  then  every  nation  wanted  a  judge  on  that 
court.  That  would  have  made  the  court  worse  than  a  town 
meeting,  and  it  became  impossible. 

I  am  not  in  favor  of  letting  in  Germany  for  a  long  time. 
She  must  show  herself  worthy.     She  is  a  criminal  before 


194      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  bar  of  justice.  When  you  arrest  a  criminal  and  find  a 
pistol  on  him  you  take  it  away.  That  is  why,  in  this  matter 
of  reduction  of  armament,  we  have  the  right  to  say  to 
Germany,  "  we  will  draw  your  teeth,"  and  that  is  what  we 
have  been  doing.  I  do  not  know  whether  you  share  my 
feeling,  but  nothing  has  occurred  since  the  armistice  that 
has  given  me  more  satisfaction  than  the  delivery  of  those 
great  war  vessels  at  the  Firth  of  Forth,  and  of  those  sub- 
marines at  the  mouth  of  the  Thames.  The  punishment  was 
richly  deserved. 


FROM  AN  ARTICLE  IN  THE  PUBLIC  LEDGER, 
JAN.   i,  1919 

The  League  of  Nations,  to  be  useful,  must  command  the 
respect  of  the  world  as  upholding  right  and  justice.  The 
United  States  is  the  least  interested  of  all  the  nations  of  the 
League  in  the  terms  of  peace  from  a  selfish  standpoint.  Our 
membership  in  it  is,  therefore,  of  the  highest  value.  It  will 
give  confidence  to  the  peoples  of  Europe  in  the  purity  and 
sincerity  of  the  League's  intentions  to  secure  the  good  of  all. 
President  Wilson's  trip  has  shown  clearly  the  weight  the 
United  States  has  in  this  respect.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  he  is  stronger  to-day  with  the  people  of  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Italy  than  are  the  respective  Premiers  of  these 
countries.  The  longing  of  these  peoples  for  a  league  of 
nations  to  maintain  peace  and  his  championing  of  such  a 
league  have  had  much  to  do  with  bringing  about  this  result. 
It  has  secured  the  support  of  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau 
for  the  League.  This  phase  of  the  situation  imposes  the 


REPRESENTATION    IN    THE    LEAGUE  195 

heaviest  obligation  on  the  United  States  to  retain  an  active 
part  in  the  execution  of  all  the  provisions  of  the  treaty. 


REPRESENTATION  IN  THE  LEAGUE ' 

An  objection  made  to  the  general  idea  of  a  League  of 
Nations  is  the  impossibility  of  adjusting  properly  and  satis- 
factorily the  representation  of  the  small  and  large  nations  in 
the  governmental  agencies  of  the  League.  Every  one  is 
aware  of  this  difficulty.  It  was  one  upon  which  the  proposal 
for  a  world  court  halted  before  the  war.  The  Study  Com- 
mittee of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  believes  the  solution 
is  to  be  found  in  giving  representation,  where  representation 
is  necessary,  according  to  responsibility. 

The  functions  of  the  League  may  conveniently  be  divided 
into  the  legislative,  the  judicial,  the  mediating  and  the  execu- 
tive. The  congress  of  all  the  world  Powers,  great  and 
small,  will  consider  and  determine  general  principles  of  inter- 
national law  and  policy  for  the  guidance  of  the  judicial  and 
executive  branches.  It  may  well  codify  international  law 
and  give  it  that  definite  legislative  sanction  the  absence  of 
which  has  led  some  jurists  to  deny  that  it  is  law  at  all.  In 
such  a  congress  the  nations  should  have  representation  in 
accord  with  their  world  importance,  measured  by  power, 
population  and  responsible  character. 

The  great  advantage  of  having  a  small  league  of  the 
great  Powers  formed  first  for  the  immediate  necessities  of 
maintaining  the  terms  of  this  peace  and  constituting  the 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Jan.  3,  1919. 


196       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

initiating  nucleus  of  a  larger  world  league  is  that  the  small 
league  could  work  out  the  equitable  representation  of  the 
smaller  nations  as  they  apply  for  admission.  The  protection 
the  greater  league  will  assure  them  will  induce  them  to  seek 
the  boon  of  membership. 

The  great  Powers  of  the  small  league  as  the  trustees  for 
all,  made  so  by  circumstances,  may  then  fairly  adjust  the 
representation  which  each  incoming  member  of  the  great 
league  should  have. 

The  judicial  branch  or  court  of  the  League  should  not  be 
a  representative  body  at  all.  It  should  be  a  tribunal  made 
up  of  great  international  jurists,  selected  for  their  high 
character,  judicial  and  impartial  bent  of  mind,  their  learning 
in  jurisprudence  and  their  ability.  They  should  be  perma- 
nent judges,  made  independent  in  tenure  and  compensation. 
Citizenship  in  countries  parties  to  the  controversy  should 
disqualify  members  of  the  court  in  the  particular  case.  They 
should  have  jurisdiction  only  to  hear  pure  questions  of  law 
and  fact. 

No  political  question  should  come  before  them.  They 
should  interpret  treaties  and  declare  and  apply  the  inter- 
national law  as  now  established  or  as  qualified  and  enacted 
by  the  congress  of  Powers.  The  difficulty  as  to  representa- 
tion should  not,  therefore,  arise  as  to  the  constitution  of  the 
court.  Of  course,  to  give  confidence  in  its  broad  view  of  the 
world  law,  care  should  be  taken  to  select  judges  from  dif- 
ferent countries  with  different  systems  of  law,  and  thus  give 
the  tribunal  a  world  character. 

The  commission  of  conciliation,  which  is  a  negotiating, 
mediating  body,  should  have  the  representative  feature. 
The  small  nations  are  too  many  to  have  members  of  it 
permanently ;  but  every  nation  having  a  real  interest  in  the 


REPRESENTATION    IN    THE   LEAGUE  197 

issue  to  be  settled  should  be  represented  on  it  for  the  time 
being,  and  its  representative  should  take  part  in  the  media- 
tion, hearing  and  recommendation  of  settlement. 

In  its  practical  working  the  great  Powers  will  furnish  the 
police  force  of  the  League,  and  their  representatives  should 
exercise  the  executive  function.  The  safety  and  security  of 
the  lesser  nations  who  cannot  be  expected  to  share  the  burden 
of  military  contribution  will  be  found  in  the  judgments  of  the 
impartial  international  court,  in  the  recommendation  of  the 
commission  of  conciliation  and  the  principles  of  international 
justice  ordained  in  a  congress  of  the  world's  nations.  More- 
over, without  representatives  in  the  executive,  they  may  well 
confide  in  the  friendly  and  just  attitude  of  the  united  execu- 
tive council  of  great  Powers  in  carrying  out  the  judgments 
of  the  League  court  and  in  dealing  with  the  compromises 
recommended  by  the  League  commission  of  conciliation. 
The  great  Powers  in  the  executive  council  will  have  no  united 
interest  adverse  to  small  nations  as  a  group  or  individually. 
On  the  contrary,  they  will  watch  one  another  in  dealing  with 
every  small  nation.  The  resultant  action  will  be  dictated  by 
the  common  purpose  of  the  League. 

We  are  not  now  considering  the  representation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  branches  of  the  League.  As  one  of  the 
great  Powers,  it  will  have  an  influential  voice  in  all  of  them. 
We  are  only  suggesting  a  method  of  giving  the  small  nations 
the  protection  they  should  have  and  a  representation  when 
practical  and  needed. 


198  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

CRITICISM  SHOULD  BE  CONSTRUCTIVE » 

Objections  to  a  general  League  of  Nations  are  numerous. 
Senator  Borah  makes  merry  over  it.  The  funny  column  of 
the  Evening  Sun  is  filled  with  hypotheses  of  its  operation  and 
its  absurd  results.  Mr.  Lodge  and  Mr.  Knox  treat  the  pro- 
posal with  more  deference.  Mr.  Lodge  in  a  speech  at  the 
dinner  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  in  May,  1916,  advo- 
cated the  use  of  force  to  support  an  international  tribunal's 
judgment.  Since  that  time  he  has  changed  his  mind,  but  in 
his  last  speech  he  appreciates  the  seriousness  of  the  proposal 
sufficiently  to  discuss  in  more  detail  the  plan  of  the  League. 
Mr.  Knox  has  favored  treaties  of  universal  arbitration  of 
justiciable  questions  and  therefore  has  also  a  past  to  observe. 

The  force  and  weight  of  objections  to  the  League  should 
be  gathered  first  from  the  attitude  of  mind  of  the  objector. 
If  he  is  content  to  dispose  of  the  matter  on  the  ground  that 
the  idea  is  an  old  one  and  has  never  been  realized,  we  are 
not  likely  to  have  useful  help  from  him.  One  who  does 
not  hope  that  the  great  war  has  changed  the  feeling  of  the 
peoples  of  the  world  toward  war  so  that  they  are  willing  to 
bind  themselves  to  a  world  policy  of  peace  as  they  never 
were  before  will  certainly  not  entertain  the  plea  of  the 
League  with  patience.  He  must  be  waked  up  before  he  will 
give  it  his  consideration.  One  who  has  no  sense  of  respon- 
sibility about  future  world  peace,  but  is  anxious  to  return  to 
domestic  business  and  politics,  is  equally  beyond  reach. 

It  is  only  from  those  who  appreciate  our  great  oppor- 
tunity in  the  dreadful  results  of  this  war  to  arouse  all  peoples 
to  the  wisdom  of  uniting  the  major  force  of  the  world  to 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Jan.  5,  1919. 


CRITICISM    SHOULD    BE    CONSTRUCTIVE  199 

prevent  their  recurrence  that  we  can  have  sympathetic  dis- 
cussion and  constructive  thought.  The  proposal  of  a  league 
of  nations  should  not  be  flouted  because  the  members  of  the 
Senate  are  justifiably  indignant  over  the  way  in  which  the 
President  has  ignored  them  and  ignored  Congress  in  this 
matter.  When  he  returns  with  a  treaty  providing  for  some 
kind  of  a  league  of  nations  to  maintain  peace,  the  people 
are  unlikely  to  be  interested  in  the  personal  soreness  of  the 
Senate  or  to  accept  that  as  any  factor  in  judging  the  treaty. 
The  Democrats  of  the  Senate,  with  only  one  or  two  excep- 
tions, will  approve  what  the  President  submits.  If  the 
Republicans  who  object  to  the  League  are  numerous  enough 
to  defeat  the  treaty  they  will  have  to  decide  whether  their 
objection  is  really  so  weighty  and  sincere  that  they  wish  to 
furnish  it  as  an  issue  to  the  President  and  his  party  in  the 
next  campaign.  The  pressure  of  the  popular  desire  will  be 
to  have  immediate  peace.  The  party  which  delays  that  must 
have  a  strong  case. 

The  League  of  Nations  is  very  strong  with  the  peoples  of 
Europe.  It  is  growing  stronger  here.  Organized  labor  has 
approved  it.  It  is  going  to  attract  the  mass  of  wage-earners 
and  the  plain  people  as  it  has  abroad.  With  the  President 
and  the  Democratic  party  behind  it,  Republican  objectors 
who  manifest  no  constructive  desire  to  create  machinery  to 
keep  the  peace,  but  depend  wholly  as  of  old  on  armament 
and  troops  to  settle  difficulties,  will  not  be  heard  with  favor. 
The  contemptuous  skepticism  of  the  Senate  cloakroom,  the 
cheap  sarcasms  of  "  the  old  diplomatic  and  senatorial  band," 
the  manifest  spirit  of  "  how  not  to  do  it,"  will  be  very  poor 
weapons  with  which  to  combat  an  idealistic  campaign  for  a 
definite  plan  for  permanent  peace  and  democracy. 

The  next  presidential  campaign  promises  well    for  the 


2OO       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

Republican  party  if  that  party,  through  its  congressional 
representatives,  does  nothing  to  change  the  present  trend. 
But  if  enough  Republican  senators  attempt  to  defeat  or  hold 
up  the  treaty  of  peace  because  it  makes  the  United  States  a 
member  of  a  League  of  Nations  to  maintain  peace  they  will 
seriously  endanger  the  chance  of  Republican  success. 

The  Senators  who  discuss  any  plan  for  a  League  should 
show  their  interest,  not  by  knocking  it  out  with  one  blow, 
but  by  suggesting  changes  in  it  which  would  be  more  prac- 
tical than  the  ideals  proposed  and  would  still  serve  the  gen- 
eral purpose.  They  should  make  their  consideration  hope- 
ful and  optimistic  by  searching  for  alternative  details  of 
method  which  might  avoid  the  objections  they  conceive.  If 
any  of  the  critics  of  the  League  in  the  Senate,  or  out  of  it, 
have  given  such  evidence  of  their  sympathetic  interest  in 
the  project  and  its  purpose,  it  has  not  been  brought  to  our 
knowledge.  The  whole  tone  of  the  objectors  has  been 
pessimistic.  Running  through  all  their  attacks  is  the  cynical 
assumption  that  the  great  war  has  made  no  difference  in  the 
attitude  and  duty  of  the  peoples  of  the  world  toward  war 
and  peace,  except  that  for  the  time  it  has  injured  the  power 
of  Germany  to  make  further  trouble.  They,  in  effect,  ad- 
vocate the  retirement  of  the  United  States  to  its  shell  of 
isolation,  to  reappear  again  only  when  the  war-making 
proclivities  of  any  nation,  Germany,  or  any  other  country, 
shall  threaten  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  This  is 
the  gospel  of  despair  and  national  selfishness. 

The  possibility  of  a  breach  of  national  faith  may  be 
pointed  out  as  a  weakness  of  the  League.  If  so,  it  is 
inherent  in  every  treaty,  the  value  and  utility  of  which  must 
ultimately  rest  in  the  honor  of  the  nations  making  it.  The 
more  responsible  the  nations  the  greater  their  power  of  per- 


ROOSEVELT  S    CONTRIBUTION    TO    LEAGUE  2OI 

formance,  the  keener  their  appreciation  of  their  honor,  the 
clearer  their  perception  of  the  value  to  themselves  and  the 
world  of  maintaining  the  treaty,  the  greater  the  certainty 
that  the  treaty  will  live  and  effect  its  purpose. 


ROOSEVELT'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  LEAGUE 
OF  NATIONS  1 

The  last  editorial  of  Colonel  Roosevelt  on  the  League  of 
Nations,  posthumously  published,  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant he  ever  wrote.  It  is  important  in  its  useful  sug- 
gestions and  limitations  as  well  as  in  the  spirit  of  construc- 
tive statesmanship  which  prompted  it  and  shines  through  it. 

The  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  is  not  a  new  one,  as 
Senator  Knox  pointed  out  in  his  Senate  speech.  Among 
others,  Sully,  the  great  minister  of  France,  proposed  it. 
Tennyson  with  his  poetic  vision  and  pen  fixed  it  forever  in 
memory.  In  more  recent  times  Theodore  Roosevelt,  in  his 
speech  accepting  the  Nobel  peace  prize,  revived  the  thought 
and  gave  it  more  definite  character  by  emphasizing  the 
feature  of  an  international  police  force  which  could  impose 
international  justice. 

During  the  war,  men  of  action,  intensely  absorbed  in  the 
great  and  critical  task  of  developing  all  the  energies  of  the 
Allies  to  win  in  a  contest  so  fraught  with  the  fate  of  the 
world,  found  it  difficult  to  be  patient  with  the  discussion  of 
a  plan  for  peace  which  could  only  be  realized  after  the  war 
was  won,  and  under  which  they  saw  lurking  a  tendency  to 
a  peace  by  negotiation  and  without  victory.  Roosevelt, 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger,  Jan.  15,  1919. 


2O2  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  shared  this  feeling.  As 
might  be  expected,  it  found  freer  expression  from  the  Ameri- 
can leader,  in  his  unofficial  status,  than  from  the  other  two. 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  nature  recoiled  from  association  with 
an  idea  he  found  supported  by  men  without  a  country  who 
exalt  internationalism  and  deprecate  nationalism.  With 
them  the  League  of  Nations  seems  to  mean  the  dilution  of 
that  intense  and  moving  love  of  country,  the  source  of  all 
real  effective  progress,  into  a  nervous,  colorless,  flabby  and 
transcendental  brotherhood  of  man.  Universal  brotherhood 
should,  of  course,  be  an  increasing  influence  in  the  world 
and  is,  but  it  will  never  be  useful  if  it  means  the  loss  of 
patriotism.  The  relation  of  one  to  the  other  should  be  as 
love  of  home  and  family  is  to  the  love  of  country.  The  one 
strengthens  the  other.  The  emasculated  supporters  of  inter- 
nationalism as  an  antidote  for  love  of  country  are  inclined 
to  regard  the  home  and  family  as  reactionary.  Those  insti- 
tutions find  no  sympathetic  protection  among  the  Bolsheviki, 
foreign  or  domestic.  . 

Moreover,  men  of  the  dynamic  type,  like  Roosevelt,  had  a 
suspicion  that  all  pacifists  were  pressing  a  league  of  nations 
as  a  stalking  horse  for  compromising  the  vital  principles  at 
stake  in  the  war.  Hence  their  coldness  toward  the  subject 
and  their  criticism  of  any  definite  plan.  But  proceeding  in 
due  order,  these  men  of  action  now  find  themselves  con- 
fronted by  a  situation  that  demands  an  organization  of  world 
force  to  secure  the  just  fruits  of  the  war.  Now  they  look 
upon  a  league  of  the  Great  Powers,  who  won  the  war,  as  an 
existing  fact,  and  they  face  the  problem  of  how  the  mani- 
fold and  complicated  purposes  of  the  treaty,  after  they  have 
been  defined  and  the  treaty  signed,  shall  be  effectively  car- 
ried out  and  maintained.  As  practical  men  they  now  take 


ROOSEVELT'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  LEAGUE          203 

up  the  League  of  Nations  and  study  it  in  the  earnest  desire 
to  make  it  work. 

In  this  way  Theodore  Roosevelt,  having  long  ago  pro- 
posed a  league  in  his  Nobel  prize  address,  was  brought 
around  by  logic  of  events  to  a  sincere  effort  to  frame  a  plan 
which  would  avoid  the  numerous  objections  that  have  been 
suggested  by  himself  and  others  and  still  make  progress 
toward  the  ideal  he  held  out  at  Christiania.  He  studied  all 
the  plans  proposed,  considered  their  possible  weaknesses  and 
defects  and  busied  his  ingenious  mind  with  finding  alterna- 
tives which  would  be  practical  and  still  achieve  the  main 
purpose.  He  had  in  his  mind  the  thought  that  under  the 
general  obligations  of  the  League,  when  force  had  to  be 
threatened  or  used,  a  great  Power  like  the  United  States 
should  act  as  a  policeman  in  the  western  hemisphere,  while 
the  great  Powers  of  Europe  should  in  the  first  instance  keep 
the  peace  of  the  world  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Eastern  Europe. 

It  was  clearer  to  him  than  it  seems  to  be  to  others  who 
do  not  see  the  real  need  of  a  league  and  who  are  not  so 
anxious,  therefore,  to  make  it  useful  to  the  world,  that  the 
European  nations  will  only  be  too  glad  to  recognize  our 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  policy  in  the  interest  of  world  peace. 
Why  should  they  not,  when  the  principles  and  operation  of 
the  League  are  really  directed  to  the  creation  of  a  Monroe 
Doctrine  of  the  world? 

What  Colonel  Roosevelt  always  insisted  on  was  that  the 
United  States  should  not  promise  in  a  treaty  to  do  things 
which  it  could  not  or  would  not  perform.  Certainly,  every 
one  must  sympathize  with  this  common-sense  restriction 
upon  unwise  and  transcendental  enthusiasm.  He  feared 
there  were  issues  not  to  be  settled  on  principles  of  law  and 
thus  called  non justiciable,  which  might,  nevertheless,  be  sub- 


2O4      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

mitted  to  a  court  and  decided  against  the  will  of  a  party  to 
the  treaty.  His  suggestion  is  that  each  nation  might  state 
those  issues  and  after  discussion  have  them  specifically  in- 
corporated in  the  treaty  as  nonjusticiable. 

He  feared,  too,  that  the  United  States  might  be  committed 
to  an  obligation  not  to  maintain  military  preparedness 
sufficient  to  protect  itself  against  unjust  aggression.  He 
protested  against  reduction  of  armament  which  was  on  the 
theory  that  the  League  of  Nations  would  form  a  substitute 
for  reasonable  defense,  at  least  until  its  efficacy  for  such  a 
purpose  had  been  fully  demonstrated  by  actual  test  of  time. 
Certainly,  many  who  earnestly  support  a  League  concur 
in  such  a  view  and  believe  with  him  that  universal  military 
training  of  the  Swiss  type  may  well  be  instituted  in  this 
country,  both  as  an  insurance  against  unjust  aggression  and 
as  a  proper  preparation  for  such  contribution  to  the  world's 
police  force  as  the  United  States  may  be  called  upon  to  make. 
Incidentally  it  will  constitute  an  important  factor  in  the  edu- 
cation of  our  youth  in  the  duties  of  life. 

For  these  reasons  the  proponents  of  the  League  of  Nations 
to  enforce  peace  may  rejoice  in  this  posthumous  aid  that 
Theodore  Roosevelt  gives  to  the  League.  He  has  the  great- 
est personal  following  in  this  country,  and  his  words  go  far. 

His  attitude  toward  the  problems  involved  in  the  League 
may  well  furnish  an  example  to  the  doubters  and  opponents. 
Let  them  treat  the  League  as  something  in  its  purpose  to  be 
desired,  and  let  them  lend  their  thoughts  not  to  devising 
and  imaging  objections  but  to  finding  alternative  substitutes 
in  its  structure  which  will  not  be  subject  to  their  own  objec- 
tions. 


WHAT    IT    MEANS    AND    WHY    IT    MUST    BE  205 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  WHAT  IT  MEANS 
AND  WHY  IT  MUST  BE  » 

The  original  program  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  z 
adopted  at  Philadelphia  June  17,  1915,  was  enlarged  and 
made  more  ambitious  at  a  meeting  of  the  governing  body 
of  the  League  on  November  24,  1918.  It  then  declared 
that  the  initiating  nucleus  of  the  membership  of  the  League 
should  be  the  nations  associated  as  belligerents  in  winning  the 
war. 

It  declared  further: 

First,  that  the  judgments  of  the  international  court  on 
justiciable  questions  should  be  enforced ; 

Second,  that  the  League  should  determine  what  action,  if 
any,  should  be  taken  in  respect  to  recommendations  of  the 
Council  of  Conciliation  in  which  the  parties  concerned  did 
not  acquiesce ; 

Third,  that  provision  should  be  made  for  an  administra- 
tive organization  of  the  League  to  conduct  affairs  of  common 
interest  and  for  the  protection  and  care  of  backward  regions 
and  international  places  and  other  matters  jointly  adminis- 
tered before  and  during  the  war,  and  that  such  administra- 
tive organization  should  be  so  framed  as  to  insure  stability 
and  progress,  preventing  defeat  of  the  forces  of  healthy 
growth  and  changes,  and  providing  a  way  by  which  progress 
could  be  secured  and  the  needed  change  effected  without 
recourse  to  war ; 

Fourth,  that  a  representative  Congress  of  Nations  should 
formulate  and  codify  rules  of  international  law,  inspect  the 

1  An  address  delivered  before  the   National  Geographic   Society,  in 
Washington,  D.  C.,  January  17,  1919. 

2  The  Program  is  printed  in  full  on  page  I. 


2OO  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

work  of  the  League's  administrative  bodies,  and  consider 
any  matter  affecting  the  tranquillity  of  the  world  or  the 
progress  or  the  betterment  of  human  relations ; 

Fifth,  that  the  League  should  have  an  executive  council  to 
speak  with  authority  in  the  name  of  the  nations  represented 
and  to  act  in  case  the  peace  of  the  world  is  endangered. 

It  further  declared  that  the  representation  of  the  different 
nations  in  the  organs  of  the  League  should  be  in  proportion 
to  the  responsibilities  and  obligations  that  they  assume,  and 
that  rules  of  international  law  should  not  be  defeated  for 
lack  of  unanimity. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  American  association  has  be- 
come more  ambitious  in  its  aims  since  its  first  declarations. 
Under  the  first  declaration  it  did  not  propose  to  enforce 
judgments  of  the  court  or  in  any  way  to  deal  with  the  recom- 
mendations of  compromise,  the  exercise  of  force  by  the 
League  being  directed  only  against  a  nation  beginning  war 
before  submission  to % the  Court  or  the  Council. 

In  England,  after  the  organization  of  the  American 
League,  a  British  League  of  Free  Nations  Association  was 
formed,  proposing  a  Court  and  a  Commission  of  Concilia- 
tion, the  use  of  force  to  execute  the  decisions  of  the  Court, 
and  the  joint  suppression,  by  all  means  at  their  disposal, 
of  any  attempt  by  any  State  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the 
world  by  acts  of  war.1 

1  The  first  important  group  formed  in  England  for  advancing  the 
idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  was  the  Bryce  group.  Others  which  fol- 
lowed were  the  League  of  Nations  Society,  the  Fabian  Society  group 
and  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control.  The  London  International  Allied 
Labor  and  Socialist  Conference  Feb.  22,  1918,  likewise  put  out  a  most 
important  program.  Following  the  formation  of  the  League  of  Free 
Nations  Association,  to  which  Mr.  Taft  refers,  that  body  and  the 
League  of  Nations  Society  merged  into  the  League  of  Nations  Union. 
[Editor]. 


WHAT    IT    MEANS    AND    WHY    IT    MUST    BE  2OJ 

It  looked  to  the  immediate  organization  of  a  League  of 
Great  Britain  and  her  then  allies,  with  a  view  to  the  ultimate 
formation  of  a  League  of  Nations  on  a  wider  basis,  includ- 
ing states  then  neutral  or  hostile.  It  excluded  the  German 
peoples  until  they  should  bring  forth  works  meet  for  repent- 
ance and  become  a  democracy. 

It  contained  a  provision  for  action  by  the  League  as  trustee 
and  guardian  of  uncivilized  races  and  undeveloped  terri- 
tories. It  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  national  armaments 
an  international  force  to  guarantee  order  in  the  world,  and 
proposed  a  further  function  for  the  Council  of  the  League 
in  supervising,  limiting,  and  controlling  the  military  and 
naval  forces  and  the  armament  industries  of  the  world. 

Late  in  1918  a  French  Association  for  the  Society  of  Na- 
tions *  recommended  that  the  Society  of  Nations  should  be 
open  to  every  nation  who  would  agree  to  respect  the  right 
of  peoples  to  determine  their  own  destiny,  and  to  resort  only 
to  judicial  solutions  for  the  settlement  of  their  disputes;  that 
the  use  of  force  be  reserved  exclusively  to  the  international 
society  itself  as  the  supreme  sanction  in  case  one  of  the 
member  states  should  resist  its  decisions;  that  the  Allies 
should  form  their  association  immediately  and  should  work 
it  out  as  completely  as  possible  in  the  direction  of  sanctions 
of  every  kind  —  moral,  judicial,  economic,  and  in  the  last 
resort  military  —  as  well  as  in  that  of  promulgating  gen- 
eral rules  of  law. 

The  French  Society  further  provided  that  the  Society  of 
Nations  thus  immediately  formed  should  control  and  con- 
duct the  negotiations  for  the  coming  peace. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  League  of  Nations,  as  con- 

1  In  France  we  had,  antedating  the  French  Association  for  the 
Society  of  Nations,  two  very  active  groups,  The  League  of  the  Rights 
of  Man  and  League  for  a  Society  of  Nations.  [Editor]. 


2O8       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ceived  by  its  proponents  in  three  of  the  four  great  nations 
that  have  won  this  war,  has  substantially  the  same  structure. 
It  includes  a  court  to  decide  justiciable  questions,  a  Council 
of  Conciliation  to  consider  other  or  non justiciable  questions 
and  to  recommend  a  compromise.  It  calls  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  combined  economic  and  military  forces  of  the 
world  to  enforce  the  judgments  of  the  courts,  and  to  deal 
with  a  defiance  of  the  recommendations  of  the  mediating 
council  as  the  executive  body  of  the  League  shall  deem  wise. 

The  American,  English,  and  French  plans  all  show  a  pur- 
pose to  create  a  smaller  League  of  the  allied  nations  fighting 
this  war,  who  are,  so  to  speak,  to  be  charter  members  of  a 
larger  League,  which  they  are  to  form  by  inviting  other 
nations  into  it  as  they  show  themselves  fitted  to  exercise  the 
privileges  of  the  League,  to  enjoy  its  protection  and  to  meet 
their  obligations  as  members.  The  American  plan  refers  to 
these  allied  nations  who  won  the  war  as  the  initiating  nucleus 
of  the  larger  League.  ' 

Each  plan  looks  to  the  enforcement  of  judgments  and 
leaves  open  to  the  League  the  question  of  what  shall  be  done 
with  reference  to  compromises  recommended  and  not 
acquiesced  in.  Each  one  looks  to  a  congress  of  nations  to 
declare  and  codify  international  law. 

One  of  them  provides  for  the  reduction  of  armament ; 
the  others  omit  it.  It  does  not  appear  in  the  American  plan. 
I  may  say  that  this  was  not  because  the  ultimate  reduction 
of  armament  was  not  regarded  as  important,  but  because  it 
was  thought  that  this  feature  of  a  League  of  Nations  might 
meet  serious  objection  until  the  League  should  be  shown  to 
be  an  effective  substitute  for  the  insurance  which  reasonable 


WHAT    IT    MEANS    AND    WHY    IT    MUST    BE  2CX) 

preparation  for  self-defense  gives  against  unjust   foreign 
aggression. 

What  are  the  objections  to  a  League  of  Nations  developed 
in  this  way  and  thus  constituted  ?  The  first  and  chief  objec- 
tion is  that  the  United  States  ought  not  to  bind  itself  to  make 
war  upon  the  decree  of  an  executive  council  in  which  it  has 
but  one  vote  out  of  four  or  five. 

What  authority  and  duty  does  the  executive  council  have 
in  the  League?  It  will  be  its  duty  to  see  that  judgments  are 
executed. 

Why  should  we  object  if  called  upon  to  declare  war  and 
make  our  contribution  to  the  police  force  to  maintain  peace 
by  enforcing  a  judgment  of  an  impartial  court?  Such  a 
judgment  is  not  the  result  of  the  vote  of  other  powers  than 
our  own.  It  is  merely  a  decision  on  principles  of  inter- 
national law  as  between  two  contending  nations. 

We  have  heard  a  great  deal  during  this  campaign  of  inter- 
national justice.  Why  should  we  favor  international  justice 
and  then  refuse  to  furnish  the  machinery  by  which  that  jus- 
tice can  be  declared  and  enforced?  What  risk  do  we  run? 

With  reference  to  the  enforcement  of  recommendations 
of  compromise,  the  executive  council  should  consider 
whether  it  is  a  case  in  which  peace  would  be  promoted  more 
by  economic  or  military  enforcement  than  merely  by  inter- 
national public  opinion. 

If,  in  such  a  case,  it  is  thought  that  a  majority  of  the 
executive  council  should  not  control  the  right  to  call  for 
military  execution  of  the  compromise,  such  action  might  be 
limited  to  a  unanimous  decision  of  the  executive  council. 


2IO       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

This  would  prevent  the  imposition  of  the  burden  of  war,  by 
the  determination  of  the  League  members,  upon  any  nation 
without  its  consent.  Or  the  enforcement  of  such  a  com- 
promise, if  determined  on  by  a  majority  of  the  executive 
council,  might  be  left  to  that  majority. 

Senator  Knox  seems  to  anticipate  that  the  United  States 
will  be  drawn  into  war  against  its  will  by  a  majority  vote  of 
a  convention  of  heterogeneous  nations. 

No  such  result  could  follow  from  the  organization  of  a 
League  as  indicated  above.  The  assumption  that  the  votes 
of  Haiti,  or  San  Salvador,  or  Uruguay  could  create  a  ma- 
jority forcing  the  United  States  into  a  war  against  its  interest 
and  will,  under  a  practical  League  of  Nations,  is  wholly 
unfounded.  It  would  be  left  to  the  vote  of  an  executive 
council  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  even  then  the  United 
States,  under  the  modifications  above  suggested,  could  not 
be  drawn  into  war  against  its  will. 

Objectors  who  rely  on  the  Constitution  seem  to  assume 
that  the  League  plans  contemplate  a  permanent  international 
police  force,  constantly  under  command  of  a  Marshal  Foch, 
who  may  order  the  international  army  to  enforce  a  judgment 
or  a  compromise  without  the  preliminaries  of  declarations 
of  war  by  the  League  members.  This  is  wholly  unwar- 
ranted and  no  plan  justifies  it.  When  force  has  to  be  used, 
war  will  be  begun  and  carried  on  jointly  in  the  usual  way. 


LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  PRESIDENT 
WILSON'S  ADVISERS  l 

The  reports  of  correspondents  to  whom  has  been  attrib- 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Jan.  20,  1919. 


LEAGUE   AND    PRESIDENT    WILSONS    ADVISERS         211 

uted  the  privilege  of  peeping  into  the  presidential  mind  give 
rise  to  some  concern  among  the  sincere  advocates  of  a 
League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace.  The  failure  of  the 
President  to  indicate  any  definite  structure  for  the  League, 
as  the  champion  of  which  he  is  now  hailed  by  the  world  with 
such  acclaim,  creates  an  uneasy  suspicion  that  he  has  not 
thought  out  any  definite  plan  of  his  own.  In  his  frequent 
references  to  the  League,  he  has  stated  what  it  will  not  be 
rather  than  what  it  will  be.  His  attitude  is  that  of  one  seek- 
ing a  plan  which  will  encounter  no  objections  either  in  the 
congress  at  Paris  or  in  the  congress  at  Washington.  In 
the  formulation  of  a  new  political  institution  the  sincere  and 
successful  builder  works  by  the  affirmative  method  primarily. 
He  has  before  him  always  the  object  to  be  achieved,  and  he 
frames  the  cooperating  parts  of  his  plan  with  that  first  in 
view.  He  should  be  trying  to  do  something.  He  should  not 
be  trying  merely  to  fulfill  a  promise  to  do  something  by  com- 
ing as  near  to  it  as  he  can  without  meeting  criticism.  No 
reform  worth  having  was  ever  put  through  without  a  fight. 
Faith  not  only  in  the  value  of  the  ideal  but  faith  in  a  prac- 
tical plan  needed  to  realize  the  ideal  is  required  to  bring  real 
results. 

The  element  of  the  plan  of  a  present  League  of  Nations, 
which  must  distinguish  it  from  past  efforts  to  secure  peace 
by  agreement  of  nations,  is  the  organization  of  the  forces  of 
lawful  nations  to  compel  justice  from  lawless  nations.  The 
President  loves  to  dwell  on  the  moral  sanction  of  justice 
which  is  to  prevail  after  this  war.  Let  us  agree  with  him 
that  it  will  be  stronger  than  before  the  war  and  that  in  and 
of  itself  it  will  help  to  make  war  less  probable.  But  if  that 
is  the  only  sanction  the  League  of  Nations  is  going  to  furnish 
for  the  judgments  of  its  court  and  for  the  suppression  of 


212  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

lawless  violence  by  recalcitrant  nations,  it  will  be  a  failure 
and  a  laughing  stock  —  at  least  the  influence  of  such  moral 
force  will  be  as  great  without  the  League  as  with  it. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  the  President,  with  his  apparent  lack 
of  any  definite  plan  for  a  league  should  not  be  able  to  find 
a  single  earnest  supporter  of  a  real  league  of  nations  to 
secure  peace  in  the  commission  which  he  has  taken  with 
him. 

Secretary  Lansing  has  heretofore  always  been  opposed  to 
a  league  of  nations  to  enforce  peace.  His  confidential  ad- 
viser, James  Brown  Scott,  has  always  opposed  it  and  vigor- 
ously urged  merely  an  international  court,  whose  judgments 
are  to  be  enforced  by  the  obligations  of  honor  and  moral 
suasion.  Mr.  White  has  had  the  traditional  attitude  of  the 
old  diplomatic  hand  toward  such  an  innovation.  Few  know, 
if  any,  what  Mr.  House's  real  attitude  is  or  that  of  General 
Bliss.  The  commission  is  now  engaged  in  examining  forty 
different  plans,  we  are  told,  with  the  hope,  by  the  selective 
method,  of  hitting  upon  something  as  innocuous  to  Senate 
predilections  as  possible.  A  reported  interview  with  Mr. 
White  makes  conformity  to  the  Senate's  views  his  objective. 
Has  the  cold  attitude  of  the  commission  toward  an  effective 
league  been  changed  by  the  eagerness  of  the  common  peoples 
of  the  Allies  for  it  and  by  the  enthusiasm  with  which  the 
President's  eloquent  periods  concerning  the  League  have  been 
greeted?  Let  us  hope  so. 

Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau  are  practical  men.  They 
have  declared  for  a  league.  They  will  wish  to  create  some- 
thing which  will  be  a  real  instrument  to  do  the  things  that 
have  to  be  done  by  the  treaty.  They  have  men  about  them, 
Lord  Robert  Cecil,  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  and  others,  who,  as 
earnest  advocates  of  a  league,  have  been  framing  plans  and 


'    THE   LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS    IS    HERE"  213 

studying  details  under  the  official  authority  of  their  respec- 
tive governments.  May  we  not  hope  that  in  this  way  there 
will  be  offered  to  the  President  by  Great  Britain  and  France 
the  constitution  of  a  league  which  will  have  vigor  and  clinch- 
ing efficacy  and  which,  after  full  consideration  and  needed 
qualification,  he  will  accept?  A  mere  reliance  on  moral 
force  and  good  intentions  to  maintain  peace  among  the  new 
and  old  nations  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  to  resist 
and  suppress  the  pacifistic  ideals  of  the  Bolsheviki,  and  the 
massacres  and  destruction  wrought  by  them,  will  make  the 
congress  a  dangerous  and  discouraging  farce.  It  will  be 
retreat  and  not  advance. 


"  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  IS  HERE  " l 

The  expression  at  the  Peace  Conference  of  President 
Poincare  and  Premier  Clemenceau  in  reference  to  the 
League  of  Nations  and  the  published  rules  of  the  Congress 
are  reassuring  to  those  who  look  to  the  growth  of  an  effec- 
tive and  real  league  out  of  the  situation.  The  French 
leaders  see  clearly,  and  say  with  emphasis,  that  we  have  a 
league  of  nations  now,  and  that  it  must  be  maintained  in 
order  to  achieve  the  purpose  of  the  war.  The  circumstances 
of  the  struggle  forced  the  Allies  into  an  interallied  council 
and  then  into  a  common  command  of  the  armies  under  Foch. 
But  for  that  the  war  might  not  have  been  won. 

The  rules  of  the  Congress  recognize  that  the  five  great 
nations,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  are  the  ones  which  have  an  interest  in  all  the 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger,  Jan.  23,  1919. 


214       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

questions  coming  before  the  Congress  as  guardians  of  the 
welfare  of  the  world,  made  so  by  the  logic  of  their  winning 
the  war.  They  are  thus  established  as  the  initiating  nucleus 
of  a  world  union,  as  the  charter  members  of  a  league  of 
nations. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  League  of  Nations  is  the  first 
subject  to  be  considered  by  the  Congress.  This  seems  to  be 
at  variance  with  the  views  of  James  M.  Beck  and  Senators 
Lodge  and  Knox.  Mr.  Beck  argues  that,  as  our  fathers 
waited  five  years  after  winning  independence  before  mak- 
ing a  constitution,  the  nations  ought  to  be  equally  deliberate 
in  discussing  and  framing  a  constitution  for  the  world. 
Most  people  agree,  after  reading  the  description  by  Hamilton 
and  Madison  of  conditions  existing  in  the  interval  between 
our  independence  and  the  convention  of  1787,  that  it  would 
have  been  much  better  if  the  convention  could  have  been 
called  earlier.  Of  course  it  may  be  said  that  the  bad  state 
of  affairs  during  the  interval  was  necessary  to  bring  the 
people  to  see  the  necessity  for  a  stronger  government.  But 
surely  Mr.  Beck  would  not  wish  a  recurrence  of  the  quarrels 
of  nations  and  another  war  to  convince  the  peoples  of  the 
world  of  the  necessity  and  advantage  of  world  unity  to  sup- 
press war  and  maintain  peace.  It  is  now,  just  after  this 
horrible  war  when  its  agonies,  its  sufferings,  its  lessons,  its 
inhuman  character,  all  are  fresh  in  the  minds  of  men,  that 
they  will  be  willing  to  go  farther  in  making  the  needed  and 
proper  concessions  involved  in  a  useful  and  real  league  of 
nations.  Delay  will  dull  their  eagerness  to  adopt  the  ma- 
chinery essential  to  organized  protection  against  war. 

But  another  fact  which  Mr.  Beck  and  Mr.  Knox  seem  to 
ignore  is  that  a  treaty  of  peace  cannot  be  made  at  Paris,  by 
which  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  secured  and  maintained 


THE    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS    IS    HERE  215 

without  a  league  of  nations.  These  gentlemen  may  well 
be  challenged  to  tell  us  what  arrangements  they  would  sug- 
gest to  the  five  nations  engaged  in  forming  this  treaty  for 
peace  and  in  making  it  work,  unless  it  be  a  continuing  league 
of  those  five  nations  to  maintain  it. 

How  can  the  objects  and  purposes  of  the  fourteen  points, 
especially  those  directed  to  rearranging  the  map  of  Eastern 
and  Central  Europe  and  Asia  Minor,  be  achieved  and  carried 
to  peaceful  realization  except  through  a  league  of  nations 
embracing  the  five  great  powers?  No  one  opposed  to  the 
league  of  nations  idea  has  essayed  to  answer  this  very 
practical  question.  The  Paris  conference  is  confronted  with 
it  and  must  answer  it  suggestively  by  making  the  League  of 
Nations  the  first  subject  for  discussion.  Premier  Clemen- 
ceau  said: 

"  The  League  of  Nations  is  here.  It  is  for  you  to  make 
it  live."  Senator  Lodge  in  his  speech  fully  recognized  the 
existence  of  the  League  of  great  nations  in  the  war  and  the 
necessity  for  its  continuance.  Indeed  it  is  probable  that  if 
Senator  Knox  and  Mr.  Beck  were  cross-examined,  their  ad- 
missions would  show  them  to  be  not  very  far  removed  from 
the  view  that  something  substantially  equivalent  to  a  league 
of  great  nations  must  be  definitely  formed  by  this  Congress 
with  agreed-upon  means  of  enforcing  the  stipulated  peace. 

The  Associated  Press  informs  us  that  a  league  of  nations 
is  in  the  forming,  but  that  the  super-sovereignty  of  an  inter- 
national police  force  is  to  be  rejected  as  part  of  it.  This 
negation  is  not  very  helpful.  Except  in  Tennyson's  poetic 
vision  and  in  the  plans  of  impracticables,  no  such  suggestion 
as  super-sovereignty  has  been  advanced. 

Most  opponents  of  the  League  idea  have  assumed  that  the 


2l6       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

so-called  international  police  is  to  be  a  permanent  body  under 
an  international  commander  and  subject  to  orders  without 
invoking  consent  of  the  nations  contributing  to  the  force. 
This  is  a  misconception.  A  potential  international  police 
force  will  be  erected  by  an  agreement  of  the  Great  Nations 
to  furnish  forces  when  necessary  to  accomplish  a  legitimate 
purpose  of  the  League.  In  most  instances,  no  actual  force 
will  need  to  be  raised.  The  existence  of  an  agreement  and 
confidence  that  the  nations  will  comply  with  it  is  all  that  will 
be  needed.  Nations  who  have  judgments  against  them  in  a 
court  of  the  nations  will  generally  perform  them.  It  will 
only  be  where  defiances  of  such  judgments  will  lead  to  a 
dangerous  war  that  the  League  force  need  be  raised. 

Of  course,  during  the  interval  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  the  possibility  of  differences  and  the  danger  of  Bol- 
shevism may  require  a  retention  of  some  of  the  war  army 
strength  of  the  Allies  to  see  the  treaty  through  to  its  effective 
execution.  But  after  the  return  of  normal  times  the 
strength  of  the  League  to  secure  compliance  with  the  treaty 
obligations  and  justice  will  not  be  in  its  serried  columns,  but 
in  its  potential  power  under  the  joint  agreement. 

In  the  convenient  division  of  the  world  into  zones,  in 
which  the  respective  Great  Powers  shall  undertake  the 
responsibility  of  seeing  to  it  that  members  of  the  League 
conform  to  the  rules  laid  down  by  the  treaty,  it  will  be 
unnecessary  for  any  nation  to  send  forces  to  a  distant 
quarter.  The  United  States  can  properly  take  care  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  need  not  maintain  in  normal  times 
a  military  establishment  more  extensive  than  she  ought  to 
maintain  for  domestic  use  and  the  proper  maintenance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  without  such  a  league.  They  may  be 
well  supplied,  not  by  a  professional  army,  but  by  a  system 


THE  LEAGUE'S  "BITE"  217 

of  universal  training  on  democratic  principles  like  that  in 
Switzerland  or  New  Zealand.  If  this  be  conscription,  its 
opponents  may  make  the  most  of  it.  It  will  help  our  boys 
in  discipline  of  character  and  in  a  most  useful  educational 
way.  It  will  provide  for  the  prompt  display  of  democratic 
power  to  achieve  justice.  The  picture  painted  by  Senator 
Borah  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  needed  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  League  is  the  result  of  a  lively  imagination,  but 
does  not  find  support  in  the  real  need  of  the  League. 

After  the  League  of  the  Great  Powers  has  been  estab- 
lished for  the  purpose  of  executing  the  plans  of  the  new 
treaty,  it  will  be  time  enough  to  take  in  all  other  responsible 
Powers.  The  lesser  League  will  grow  naturally  into  a 
larger  League.  Experience  will  test  the  practical  character 
of  the  lesser  League  and  in  this  wise  and  in  due  course  the 
world  League  will  come  into  being.  But  meanwhile  as  a 
necessary  condition  precedent  to  the  success  of  the  treaty 
of  peace,  it  must  provide  for  a  League  of  the  Great  Nations. 


THE  LEAGUE'S  "  BITE  "l 

Those  who  are  looking  for  something  real  in  a  league  of 
Nations  to  preserve  peace,  in  creating  sanctions  for  inter- 
national law,  justice  and  equity,  may  well  feel  concerned 
over  the  developments  in  Paris.  Such  persons  have  based 
their  hopes  on  the  psychological  effect  of  the  horrors  of  the 
war  upon  all  nations,  which  should  make  them  willing  to 
concede  much  to  achieve  the  main  object  of  the  war.  They 
have  counted  on  securing  a  covenant  between  the  members 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger,  Jan.  29,  1919. 


2l8  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

of  the  League  to  unite,  whenever  necessity  may  arise,  with 
the  powerful  members  of  the  League  to  compel  compliance 
with  judgments  of  the  League  and  to  suppress  recalcitrant 
members  faithless  to  the  principles  of  the  League  and  to  their 
obligations.  They  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  so  doing,  in 
view  of  President  Wilson's  words,  as  follows: 

"  I  pray  God  that  if  this  contest  have  no  other  result,  it 
will  at  least  have  the  result  of  creating  an  international 
tribunal  and  producing  some  sort  of  joint  guaranty  of  peace 
on  the  part  of  the  great  nations  of  the  world."  ..."  Now, 
let  us  suppose  that  we  have  formed  a  family  of  nations  and 
that  family  of  nations  says :  '  The  world  is  not  going  to 
have  any  more  wars  of  this  sort  without  at  least  first  going 
through  certain  processes  to  show  whether  there  is  any- 
thing in  the  case  or  not.'  If  you  say,  *  We  shall  not  have 
any  war,'  you  have  got  to  have  the  force  to  make  the  '  shall ' 
bite.  And  the  rest  of  the  world,  if  America  takes  part  in 
this  thing,  will  have  the  right  to  expect  from  her  that  she  can 
contribute  her  elemeht  of  force  to  the  general  understanding. 
Surely  that  is  not  a  militaristic  idea.  That  is  a  very  prac- 
tical ideal." 

The  indorsement  of  these  views  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was 
as  follows: 

"  The  best  security  for  peace  will  be  that  nations  will  band 
themselves  together  to  punish  the  peace-breaker." 

Mr.  Asquith's  comment  on  the  President's  views  was  as 
follows : 

"  The  President  held  out  to  his  hearers  the  prospect  of  an 
era  when  the  civilization  of  mankind,  banded  together  for  the 
purpose,  will  make  it  their  joint  and  several  duty  to  repress 
by  their  united  authority  and,  if  need  be,  by  their  combined 
naval  and  military  forces,  any  wanton  or  aggressive  invasion 


THE    LEAGUES        BITE 

of  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  a  fine  ideal,  which  must 
arouse  all  our  sympathies." 

From  these  statements  of  this  ideal  it  is  a  descending 
climax  now  to  hear  that  no  member  of  the  League  is  to  bind 
itself  to  unite  its  forces  with  any  other  in  enforcing  the 
judgments  of  the  league  court  or  in  punishing  the  peace- 
breaker.  We  are  now  to  depend  on  moral  force  or  the  exer- 
cise of  an  economic  boycott,  it  may  be,  and  on  the  general 
public  opinion  of  the  world.  If  a  nation  which  is  interested 
in  a  judgment  in  its  behalf  desires,  it  is  to  be  given  the  right 
to  go  to  war  to  enforce  it.  We  have  still  the  wonderful 
and  eloquent  preaching  of  the  ideal  of  a  League  of  Nations 
while  we  see  its  strength  and  "  bite,"  to  use  Mr.  Wilson's 
expression,  fading  into  merely  moral  aspirations  and  moral 
sanctions. 

This  is  doubtless  in  part  due  to  the  difficulties  that  the 
nations  now  sitting  around  the  council  board  in  Paris  are 
having  in  maintaining  their  armies.  After  four  years  of 
war  the  pressure  of  the  men  engaged  in  it  to  be  released  from 
their  military  duty  is  so  strong  that  the  nations  cannot  resist 
it.  That  is  probably  the  explanation  of  the  very  weak  policy 
adopted  in  respect  to  the  Bolsheviki.  The  Congress  cer- 
tainly would  not  have  run  the  risk  of  exposing  its  members 
to  just  criticism  had  they  not  felt  deeply  the  difficulty  con- 
fronting them  in  sending  an  adequate  force  to  Russia  to 
stamp  out  the  contagion,  to  rescue  the  Czecho-Slavs  and  to 
give  Russia  a  chance.  The  error  that  our  administration 
made  during  the  war  was  in  resisting  the  urgent  appeal  of 
our  Allies  to  send  a  large  force  into  Russia,  through 
Vladivostok  and  Archangel,  to  create  an  eastern  front. 
Such  a  force  would  have  largely  obviated  the  Bolsheviki 
complication.  The  Czecho-Slovaks,  whom  we  have 


22O  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

promised  to  help,  are  in  a  perilous  situation,  while  our  own 
little  handful  of  men  are  fighting  an  aimless  fight  against 
great  odds  near  Archangel. 

Should  they  who  have  expected  real  "  bite,"  to  repeat  Mr. 
Wilson's  expression,  in  the  League  of  Nations,  be  dis- 
couraged? Institutions  like  the  League  of  Nations,  which 
represent  an  advance  in  civilization,  are  created  by  the 
necessity  of  the  situation. 

It  is,  of  course,  difficult  to  comment  on  plans  for  the 
League  as  they  are  outlined  in  the  cabled  reports  of  cor- 
respondents. They  seem  to  be  anxious  to  convince  every- 
body that,  while  the  League  of  Nations  is  a  beautiful  idea 
and  inspires  emotion  when  urged  as  President  Wilson  urged 
it  in  the  congress  at  Saturday's  session,  nevertheless,  its 
covenants  are  not  going  to  involve  any  trouble  or  obliga- 
tion or  burden  for  the  United  States,  but  will  permit  com- 
plete freedom  of  action  or  withholding  of  action  when  war 
shall  come  again. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil  is  reported  to  have  suggested  a  court 
to  which  all  justiciable  questions  are  to  be  submitted,  while 
nonjusticiable  questions  leading  to  trouble  are  to  go  to  a 
council  of  conciliation.  This  is  accompanied,  however,  by 
the  notable  proviso  that  every  nation  may  determine  for 
itself  whether  the  question  threatening  war  is  justiciable  or 
not.  This  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  every  nation  may 
keep  out  of  the  court  of  the  League  if  it  chooses,  no  matter 
what  the  issue.  The  court  is  thus  to  be  constituted  to  decide 
questions  which  both  quarreling  nations  are  willing  to  sub- 
mit to  it.  It  is  thus  as  effective  as  the  present  voluntary 
arbitration  of  the  Hague  tribunal  and  no  more.  If,  now, 
every  proposal  with  anything  of  a  "  bite  "  in  it  is  to  be 


THE    LEAGUE   AND    THE   GERMAN    COLONIES  221 

weakened  to  ineffectiveness,  the  common  peoples  of  France, 
England,  Italy  and  the  United  States,  who  have  been  look- 
ing upon  the  League  as  a  real  machine,  with  the  "  bite  "  in 
it  to  prevent  future  wars,  may  well  feel  that  there  has  been 
much  thundering  in  the  index  about  the  League  of  Nations 
without  tangible  result.  If  the  League  is  only  to  be  an 
agreement  to  confer  over  any  breach  of  peace  by  the  nations, 
and  will  not  even  bind  nations  to  submit  legal  differences 
to  a  court,  the  man  in  the  street  will  not  put  much  faith  in 
fine  words  in  the  future. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  THE  GERMAN 
COLONIES  » 

It  was  to  be  expected  that  selfish  desire  to  take  advantage 
of  the  victory  over  Germany  would  appear  in  the  congress 
at  Paris ;  but  it  should  not  be  gratified.  The  strength  of  the 
Allies  was  in  the  justice  of  their  cause.  German  lies  and 
propaganda  concealed  the  facts  and  at  first  misled  many. 
As  the  war  progressed,  Germany's  sole  responsibility  for  the 
war  and  the  grinning  skeleton  of  her  vicious  purposes  were 
revealed.  They  were  confirmed  by  her  atrocious  conduct  of 
the  war.  The  claim  of  the  Allies  that  theirs  was  only  a  de- 
fensive struggle  to  save  the  world  from  the  German  monster 
of  militarism,  in  which  they  were  prompted  by  no  spirit  of 
conquest  or  self-aggrandizement,  gained  credence  among  all 
nations.  Declarations  of  war  against  Germany  as  the  enemy 
of  mankind  followed  from  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  Her 
isolation  from  all  the  world  save  from  her  allies,  who  were 
under  her  iron  heel,  became  a  greater  and  greater  factor  in 
lowering  the  morale  of  her  people.  The  material  influence 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Feb.  3,  1919. 


222  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

of  the  moral  righteousness  of  the  cause  of  the  Allies  is  one 
of  the  inspiring  circumstances  in  the  history  of  the  Great 
War. 

This  feature  of  the  victory  should  not  be  allowed  to  lose 
its  beneficent  force  by  a  yielding  to  selfish  claims  of  partici- 
pants in  the  peace  pact.  The  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  France  or  even  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  neighboring  Saar 
district  is  only  justice.  The  German  outrageous  destruction 
of  the  mines  at  Lens  and  elsewhere  makes  the  transfer  of  the 
Saar  district  only  an  equitable  indemnity.  The  same  view 
justifies  the  delivery  to  Italy  of  Italia  Irridenta.  But  no 
such  principle  applies  in  respect  to  the  German  colonies. 

All  will  applaud  and  support  the  conclusion  that  Germany 
has  forfeited  ownership  of  her  colonies.  She  has  grossly 
mistreated  the  backward  peoples  living  in  them,  and  in  whose 
interest  they  should  be  administered.  How  are  they  to  be 
governed?  It  is  agreed  that  their  peoples  are  now  incap- 
able of  self-government;  that  to  attempt  to  extend  it  to  them 
would  be  only  less  hurtful  to  them  than  German  domination. 
Who  then  shall  govern  them?  As  a  member  of  the  confer- 
ence, Australia  asks  the  transfer  of  the  South  Pacific  colonies 
to  it  or  to  Great  Britain,  while  British  South  Africa  presses 
for  British  control  over  the  former  German  dependencies 
in  her  neighborhood. 

These  pretensions  are  advanced  on  two  grounds.  First, 
that  in  the  past  the  proximity  of  German  possessions  has 
been  a  continual  threat  to  them,  and,  second,  that  their  sacri- 
fices in  the  war  entitle  them  to  take  these  territories  over  as 
an  indemnity.  As  to  the  first,  the  exclusion  of  German 
control  should  remove  any  danger.  As  to  the  second,  it  is 
contrary  to  principles  upon  which,  under  the  armistice  terms, 
the  treaty  was  to  be  framed.  It  involves  in  its  essence  the 


THE    LEAGUE   AND    THE   GERMAN    COLONIES  223 

proposal  that  these  countries  and  their  backward  peoples  are 
to  be  traded  as  a  commodity  to  compensate  the  two  British 
dominions  for  sacrifices  in  war.  They  are  thus  to  be  treated 
as  something  of  value  belonging  to  Germany  and  are  to  be 
used  as  a  substitute  for  money  indemnity. 

President  Wilson  insists  that  they  should  be  administered 
by  the  League  of  Nations  for  the  benefit  of  their  peoples.  In 
this  he  is  clearly  right.  Where  his  proposal  lacks  strength, 
however,  is  in  his  suggestion  that  the  League  shall 
administer  them  through  the  British  dominions  as  "  manda- 
tories." Theoretically  this  means  that  the  League  -shall 
supervise  while  the  respective  dominions  actually  govern. 
Previous  experience  shows  that  such  arrangements  are  a 
source  of  much  friction  and  interfere  with  effectiveness. 
The  Algeciras  method  of  dealing  writh  Tangier  and  Morocco 
was  like  this  and  was  not  satisfactory.  Moreover,  the  deal- 
ing by  Australia  and  by  South  Africa  with  native  races  is 
not  likely  to  be  as  just  and  equitable  as  that  of  their  mother 
country. 

Why  should  not  the  League  itself  establish  and  maintain 
a  proper  government  of  these  countries?  We  could  be  in 
this  way  much  more  certain  of  right  treatment  of  the  back- 
ward peoples  than  under  the  "  mandatories."  No  danger 
to  their  British  colonial  neighbors  could  arise  from  a  govern- 
ment of  the  League. 

Why  then  does  Mr.  Wilson  suggest  this  plan  which  really 
hides  territorial  acquisition  and  complete  possession  and  con- 
trol under  a  thin  cloak  of  League  supervision?  It  is 
because  he  has  not  given  any  life  to  his  ideal  of  a  league. 
If  he  gave  it  flesh  and  bones  in  real  and  definite  machinery 
and  power,  the  purpose  he  has  as  to  these  German  colonies 
might  be  successfully  worked  out.  As  it  is,  these  colonies 


224       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

will  in  fact  meet  the  fate  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  under 
Austria,  which  was  complete  absorption.  It  would  seem  to 
be  better  for  the  backward  peoples  who  are  the  wards  of  the 
Peace  Congress  to  give  them  directly  and  openly  to  Great 
Britain,  who  will  govern  them  more  sympathetically  and 
wisely  than  will  her  own  colonial  daughters. 

The  President  is  being  further  embarrassed  by  the  pro- 
posal that  the  United  States  shall  administer  Constantinople. 
Palestine  and  Armenia  as  a  mandatory  of  the  League.  He 
does  not  wish  to  entangle  the  United  States  in  the  compli- 
cations of  the  near  Eastern  question,  and  no  wonder !  Had 
he  and  his  colleagues  planned  a  real  League  of  Nations  and 
not  a  mere  figure  of  rhetoric,  or  noble  conception  without 
body,  the  international  agency  to  discharge  this  important 
function  would  be  at  hand. 

Will  not  these  troublesome  experiences  with  the  very  first 
problems,  simpler  indeed  than  many  yet  to  come,  convince 
the  Congress  that  a  real  league  of  nations  with  a  "  bite  "  in 
it  is  indispensable  in  achieving  their  purpose  ? 

Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  the  history  of  the  framing  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  may  repeat  itself  in 
the  present  Congress  and  the  proposed  League  of  Nations? 
When  the  members  of  the  convention  met  there  were  no 
definite  plans  of  government  except  one  which  Hamilton  had 
formulated  and  which  was  not  adopted.  Few  thought  they 
would  be  successful  in  framing  a  real  nation.  Hamilton 
and  a  few  other  constructive  statesmen  were  the  only  ones 
who  were  not  faint-hearted.  As  their  deliberations  pro- 
ceeded, as  the  necessities  of  the  situation  developed,  proposals 
which  at  first  were  thought  to  be  chimerical  and  impossible 
seemed  to  become  more  practical  and  necessary,  and  out  of 
it  all  we  got  our  wonderful  fundamental  instrument  of 


FROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    THE   ATLANTIC    CONGRESS        225 

government.     May  not  the  League  in  the  same  way  become 
a  living  thing? 


FROM  AN  ADDRESS  AT  THE  ATLANTIC  CON- 
GRESS FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  NEW 
YORK,  FEBRUARY  5,  1919. 

You  will  only  get  the  ideal  court  when  the  members  are 
independent,  their  only  qualifications  being  their  probity, 
their  ability,  their  learning  and  their  experience. 

They  will  not  represent  anybody,  but  simple  justice,  on 
that  court.  They  are  to  apply  pure  principles  of  law  and 
exercise  their  acumen  to  determine  facts  impartially  in  the 
disposition  of  the  legal  questions  which  come  before  them. 
Therefore  it  is  not  representative.  But,  appointees  should 
be  distributed  with  reference  to  bringing  in  knowledge  of 
all  law  throughout  the  world,  just  as  our  own  Supreme 
Court  is  distributed,  not  by  any  law,  but  through  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Executive,  so  that  the  different  parts  of  the 
country,  with  different  methods  of  administration  of  law, 
may  be  brought  in. 


IRELAND  AND  THE  LEAGUE  * 

The  resolution  proposed  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives to  urge  upon  the  President  in  Paris  that  he  take  steps 
to  secure  a  government  in  Ireland  independent  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  Great  Britain  is  ill-timed.  It  can  only  embarrass 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Feb.  13,  1919. 


226  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 

him  in  securing  an  agreement  between  the  Great  Powers 
who  are  dictating  the  terms  of  peace  to  Germany  and  rear- 
ranging the  map  of  Middle  and  Eastern  Europe. 

The  relation  of  Ireland  to  Great  Britain  is  a  British 
domestic  question,  and  cannot  properly  be  made  other  by 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States.  Hope  of  a  satis- 
factory peace  in  which  the  whole  world  is  interested  would 
have  to  be  abandoned  if  the  Great  Powers  were  to  look 
into  and  discuss  the  internal  affairs  of  one  another.  The 
relations  of  the  government  of  France  to  Algiers,  to  Tunis, 
to  Morocco  and  her  African  interests,  the  relation  of  Japan 
to  Formosa,  that  of  the  United  States  to  the  Philippines, 
to  the  Indian  tribes  or  to  the  colored  voters  of  the  States  of 
the  South,  might  all  be  thus  added  to  the  bewildering  issues 
that  now  claim  the  attention  of  the  delegates  at  the  Paris 
conference.  This  treaty  is  to  close  the  war  with  Germany 
and  her  Allies,  and  England's  relation  to  Ireland  is  not 
germane  to  that  war  and  has  no  connection  with  it. 

Irishmen  must  know  that  the  wrongs  of  Ireland  in  the 
past  have  sunk  deep  in  the  minds  and  memories  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Whenever  there  has  been  a 
movement  to  remedy  these  wrongs,  whenever  the  issue  of 
home  rule  has  been  raised,  it  has  awakened  the  strongest 
sympathy  in  the  hearts  and  souls  of  Americans,  whether  of 
Irish  blood  or  not.  Americans  have  had  immense  satis- 
faction in  learning  that  the  land  laws  of  Ireland  have  been 
so  improved  and  changed  that  now  there  is  a  large  increase 
in  the  number  of  small  farms  owned  in  fee  simple  by  the 
farmers. 

Sir  Horace  Plunkett,  an  Irishman,  has  led  Irish  farmers 
into  associations  by  which  they  have  learned  to  improve  their 
agriculture  and  dairy  farming,  to  unite  in  the  disposition 


IRELAND   AND    THE   LEAGUE  227 

of  their  product  and  get  rid  of  the  heavy  toll  of  the  middle- 
men, so  that  to-day  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  rural  Ire- 
land is  in  better  economic  condition  than  any  other  agri- 
cultural part  of  the  British  Islands.  This  has  been  directly 
due  to  the  legislation  of  Parliament,  the  leadership  of  such 
men  as  Plunkett,  and  the  capacity  for  organization  developed 
among  the  farmers. 

The  political  blundering  of  the  English  government  and 
what,  to  many  of  us,  seems  the  unreasonable  obstinacy  of  the 
Protestant  half  of  Ulster  have  prevented  that  home  rule  to 
which  most  Americans  believe  that  Ireland  is  entitled.  If 
she  could  have  been  made  a  Dominion  like  Canada,  with 
hardly  more  than  nominal  union  to  Great  Britiain,  except  in 
international  matters,  Ireland  would  certainly  have  been 
satisfied  before  Sinn  Feinism  was  fanned  into  flame  by  the 
delay  in  home  rule. 

Self-determination  is  not  a  certain  solvent  of  political 
difficulty.  Self-determination  means  a  rule  of  the  majority; 
but  the  question  what  the  unit  shall  be,  of  which  the  majority 
is  to  rule,  still  remains.  This  is  affected  by  considerations 
of  geography,  language,  race,  religion  and  other  factors  of 
solidarity  or  variety  in  the  mental  attitudes  of  the  people  con- 
cerned. Geography  forbids  a  separation  of  Ulster  from  Ire- 
land, especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Ulster  has  been  repre- 
sented in  Parliament  by  half  home  rule  and  half  unionist 
members  of  Parliament.  On  the  other  hand,  the  geographi- 
cal relation  of  Ireland  to  Great  Britain  makes  the  former  a 
necessary  outpost  against  hostile  attack,  while  the  difference 
in  race  and  the  traditional  lack  of  sympathy  justify  the  great- 
est autonomy  in  Ireland  consistent  with  British  protection. 

It  is  remarkable  that  Great  Britain,  which  has  been  won- 
derfully successful  in  dealing  with  colonial  dependencies  of 


228       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

all  kinds,  should  have  been  so  unsuccessful  in  Ireland.  This 
has  been  true,  even  since  her  statesmen  have  been  sincerely 
and  earnestly  anxious  to  be  just  to  Ireland,  and  to  eliminate 
completely  from  her  Irish  policy  the  motive  which  so  long 
disgraced  it,  that  of  exploiting  Ireland  and  her  people  for 
the  profit  of  England.  In  Irish  affairs,  English  statesmen 
are  always  a  length  behind.  They  are  always  willing  to  give, 
when  it  is  too  late,  that  which  would  have  satisfied  Irishmen 
at  an  earlier  stage. 

Whatever  the  merits  of  the  issue  now,  it  is  not  within  the 
field  of  jurisdiction  of  the  Paris  conference,  and  those  who 
press  it  there,  whatever  their  motive,  are  not  helping  the 
successful  outcome  of  that  fateful  congress.  Pressure  for 
the  proposed  resolution  is  due,  first,  to  the  sincere  sentiment 
for  it  of  men  of  Irish  blood  in  this  country;  second,  to  the 
desire  of  reckless  politicians  to  win  political  support  by  its 
advocacy,  and,  third,  to  the  timidity  of  others  who,  though 
really  opposed  to  it  as  unwise,  are  afraid  of  the  personal 
political  consequences' of  their  opposition.  Nor  should  we 
omit  from  the  elements  pressing  for  its  adoption  a  class  of 
persons  anxious  to  make  the  conference  at  Paris  a  failure. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  resolution  will  be  tabled. 


THE  GREAT  COVENANT  OF  PARIS  l 

The  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  of  which  this  is  a  congress 
called  for  Oregon,  Washington  and  Idaho,  is  a  voluntary 
association  of  men  and  women  of  the  United  States  organ- 
ized early  in  1915  to  spread  propaganda  in  favor  of  a  plan 

1  Address  at  Portland,  Oregon,  Feb.  16,  1919. 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS 

for  world  cooperation  to  maintain  peace,  by  enforced  settle- 
ment of  differences  likely  to  lead  to  war,  on  principles  of 
justice  and  fairness.  Its  promoters  had  long  been  interested 
in  promoting  arbitration  between  nations.  They  thought 
that  the  end  of  this  world-destructive  war  would  find  the 
peoples  of  the  various  countries  in  a  frame  of  mind  in  which 
they  would  gladly  accept  any  reasonable  international  co- 
operation to  prevent  war.  Accordingly  the  League  adopted 
a  platform  in  which  it  recommended  that  the  United  States 
enter  a  League  of  Nations,  in  which  the  members  of  the 
League  should  stipulate  that  all  differences  arising  between 
them  of  a  justiciable  character  should  be  submitted  to  a 
court  and  those  of  a  non-justiciable  character  to  a  council 
of  conciliation;  that  every  member  of  the  League  should 
agree  to  refrain  from  going  to  war  until  after  judgment  by 
the  court  or  recommendation  by  the  council  of  conciliation, 
and  that  any  member  who  violated  this  obligation  by  attack- 
ing any  other  member  should  be  overwhelmed  by  the 
economic  pressure  of  all  the  members  of  the  League  and  the 
joint  military  forces  of  the  League,  if  need  be.  Similar 
associations  were  formed  in  England  and  France,  with 
similar  platforms,  except  that  they  provided  for  a  forcible 
execution  of  the  judgments  and  a  dealing  with  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  councils  of  conciliation  by  the  League. 

There  has  been  until  now  no  means  of  knowing  exactly 
what  is  meant  by  a  league  of  nations  except  by  reference 
to  the  platforms  of  these  voluntary  associations.  The 
governments  of  England  and  France  created  commissions 
for  the  special  purpose  of  studying  the  proper  framework 
of  a  league  of  nations,  but  the  result  of  their  studies  was 
not  given  to  the  public.  Our  government  had  declined  to 
create  such  a  commission.  On  Friday  last,  however,  the 


230       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

committee  to  whom  the  great  Paris  congress  had  delegated 
the  work  of  preparing  a  plan  for  a  league  of  nations,  of 
which  President  Wilson  was  the  chairman,  made  a  report 
which  was  concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  all  of  the 
fourteen  nations  at  the  conference.  Now  therefore  we  have 
an  authoritative  statement  of  the  constitution  of  a  league  of 
nations  and  an  official  basis  for  its  discussion. 

This  constitution  is  indeed  wider  in  the  scope  of  its  pur- 
pose than  was  the  platform  of  our  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 
The  platform  of  our  League  was  a  mere  skeleton.  It  had 
prepared  a  tentative  draft  of  a  treaty  to  give  it  body  and 
constructive  details,  but  that  tentative  draft  was  never  given 
to  the  public,  because  it  was  thought  wiser  by  governmental 
authority  to  withhold  it.  The  sole  object  of  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace  platform  was  to  promote  peace  and  avoid  war 
by  instrumentalities  for  administering  justice  between  na- 
tions and  by  enforcing  submission  to  such  instrumental- 
ities. It  did  not  even  contain  a  provision  with  respect  to 
the  limitation  of  armament.  The  purpose  of  the  constitu- 
tion reported  at  Paris,  which  we  may  properly  call  "  the  great 
covenant  of  Paris,"  is  much  wider.  It  is  to  organize  a  real 
and  permanent  league,  whose  first  object  is  to  provide  for 
the  just  settlement  of  differences  between  nations  and  the 
prevention  of  war,  and  for  this  purpose  to  limit  armaments. 
Its  second  object  is  to  exercise  executive  functions  in  the 
administration  of  international  trusts  like  the  government  of 
backward  peoples  whom  this  war  has  released  from  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Germans  and  the  other  Central  Powers. 
Its  third  object  is  to  promote  cooperation  between  the  na- 
tions, with  a  view  to  the  betterment  of  the  condition  of  labor 
in  all  the  nations  and  for  joint  action  in  respect  to  other  use- 
ful matters  now  dealt  with  by  international  bureaus,  like  the 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS  23! 

postal  union.  This  provides  a  constant  series  of  functions 
for  the  League  to  perform  and  gives  it  substance. 

The  League  is  to  be  formed  by  a  covenant  which  recites 
in  its  preamble  its  general  purpose,  and  then  states  in  twenty- 
six  different  articles  the  agreements  included  in  the  covenant. 

The  present  membership  of  the  League  is  to  consist  of 
the  fourteen  nations  who  are  to  be  signatories  to  the  covenant 
and  to  sign  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  most  numerous  acting 
governmental  branch  of  the  League  is  a  body  of  delegates  to 
meet  once  a  year  or  oftener  if  necessary,  to  consist  of  at  least 
one  representative  and  not  more  than  three  from  each  nation, 
with  but  one  vote  for  each  state.  This  body  of  delegates  is 
to  pass  upon  the  question  of  membership  of  other  nations 
applying  to  be  admitted.  Before  a  nation  shall  be  admitted 
it  must  show  itself  able  and  willing  to  conform  to  the  cove- 
nant and  must  receive  the  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  members 
of  the  League.  This  is  drawn  to  keep  Germany  out  until 
she  is  fit.  The  body  of  delegates  also  has  the  function  of 
taking  the  place  of  the  executive  council  as  a  tribunal  of 
conciliation  and  compromise  when  either  party  to  the  con- 
troversy demands  it.  The  most  important  agency  of  the 
League  is  the  executive  council,  which  consists  of  representa- 
tives of  the  five  Great  Powers  and  of  four  other  members 
to  be  selected  by  the  body  of  delegates.  This  council  has 
numerous  executive  duties  for  the  League  and  in  most 
respects  is  the  League,  and  it  performs  an  important  function 
in  mediation  and  settlement  of  differences.  There  is  a 
permanent  secretariat  of  the  League,  which  is  to  be  estab- 
lished at  the  seat  of  the  League,  there  to  perform  the  duties 
indicated  by  its  name.  A  permanent  military  commission  is 
to  advise  the  council  on  questions  of  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment and  upon  military  and  naval  matters.  The  League  is 


232       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

given  a  definite  diplomatic  status  by  securing  to  its  repre- 
sentatives the  immunity  and  privileges  of  ambassadors  and 
extra-territorial ity  for  the  buildings  and  home  in  which  it 
has  its  headquarters. 

States  members  of  the  League,  having  a  difference,  may 
submit  it  by  agreement  to  arbitration.  The  members  of 
the  League  covenant  that  if  they  become  parties  to  an  arbi- 
tration they  will  abide  the  award  of  the  arbitrators.  If 
either  party  objects  to  arbitration,  then  the  difference  is  to 
be  submitted  to  the  executive  council  for  mediation  or  recom- 
mendation. If  the  council  succeeds  in  securing  an  agree- 
ment it  is  to  be  published.  If  not,  then  the  council  may 
report  a  recommendation.  If  it  is  unanimous,  excluding 
representatives  of  interested  parties,  then  the  council  must 
take  measures  to  carry  the  recommendation  into  effect. 
Should  the  executive  council  divide,  the  majority  is  required 
to  publish  its  recommendations  with  reasons  and  the  minority 
may  do  so,  without  further  action. 

Every  member  of 'the  League  agrees  not  to  resort  to 
any  war  until  three  months  after  the  difference  between  it 
and  its  opponent  has  been  submitted  to  arbitration  and  an 
award  made,  or  to  the  executive  council  and  a  recommenda- 
tion made,  and  not  then  if  the  party  against  whom  war  is 
threatened  complies  with  the  award  or  the  recommendation. 
If  any  member  of  the  League  begins  war  prematurely  and  in 
violation  of  its  agreement,  such  breach  of  its  covenant  is  an 
act  of  war  against  all  other  members  of  the  League  and  is 
to  be  met  by  universal  boycott  of  all  the  members  of  the 
League  against  the  recalcitrant  member.  Not  only  is  this 
boycott  to  be  conducted  by  members  of  the  League,  but  they 
are  required  to  prevent  non-members  of  the  League  also 
from  having  any  commercial  or  personal  relations  with  the 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS  233 

outlaw  member  and  its  nationals  or  citizens.  The  boycott 
is  to  include  a  complete  severance  of  all  trade,  financial  and 
personal  relations  between  the  citizens  of  the  respective 
countries,  and  a  sundering  of  all  diplomatic  and  consular 
relations.  The  executive  council  is  to  recommend  to  the 
members  of  the  League  the  effective  military  or  naval  forces 
which  they  should  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces 
of  the  League  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League.  The  members  of  the  League  are  to  divide  the  loss 
incident  to  the  boycott  falling  on  some  members  and  not  on 
others,  and  mutually  to  support  one  another  in  resisting  any 
special  measure  of  hostility  brought  by  the  outlaw  state 
against  any  one  or  more  of  them.  The  League  members 
are  bound  to  afford  passage  through  their  territory  for  the 
force  of  any  member  or  members  who  are  cooperating  to 
protect  the  covenants  of  the  League.  The  participation  in 
the  boycott  is  obligatory  upon  all  members  of  the  League. 
The  contribution  of  needed  military  force  from  the  several 
members  of  the  League,  while  fixed  by  the  council,  is  not 
obligatory.  The  result  is,  however,  to  create  a  state  of  war 
between  the  recalcitrant  member  and  all  the  members  of 
the  League  at  their  option,  much  like  that  existing  between 
certain  South  American  countries  and  Germany  during  the 
late  war. 

The  Paris  Covenant  does  not  immediately  provide  a 
permanent  international  court.  It  directs  that  the  executive 
council  shall  formulate  plans  for  its  establishment,  and  that, 
when  established,  it  shall  be  competent  to  determine  any 
matter  which  the  parties  recognize  as  proper  to  submit  to  it. 
Its  jurisdiction,  therefore,  even  when  created,  will  be  de- 
pendent on  the  voluntary  submission  by  the  parties. 

When  a  difference  arises  between  a  non-member  and  a 


234       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

member  or  between  two  non-members,  they  are  to  be  invited 
to  accept  temporary  membership  of  the  League  for  the  pur- 
pose of  settling  the  dispute,  in  accordance  with  the  proced- 
ure just  described.  If  the  non-member  refuses  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  the  League,  it  is  to  be  treated  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League  would  be  treated  which  violated  its 
covenant.  This  attitude  toward  non-members  is  in  pur- 
suance of  a  declaration  of  the  constitution  that  the  League 
is  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  universal  peace  and  holds 
any  threatened  breach  of  it  as  a  matter  of  its  concern  as  to 
which  it  may  take  action. 

Three  classes  of  countries  with  peoples  not  ready  for 
self-government  are  committed  to  the  trusteeship  of  the 
League,  which  administers  them  through  competent  govern- 
ments as  mandatories  of  the  League. 

A  permanent  mandatory  commission  is  established, 
which  is  to  require  annual  reports  of  the  mandatories  and 
to  see  that  the  restrictions  contained  in  the  constitution  or  in 
the  special  charters  which  are  issued  by  the  executive  council 
to  mandatories  have  been  observed. 

Amendments  to  the  covenant  are  to  be  made  only  upon  a 
unanimous  vote  of  the  executive  council  and  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  the  delegates. 

This  summary  of  the  constitution  of  the  League  shows 
very  clearly  that  the  nations  that  agreed  to  it  intended  to 
give  the  League  real  power.  This  power  rests  on  the  cove- 
nants of  the  members  of  the  League  and  on  their  agreed 
cooperation  in  the  universal  boycott  and  in  their  voluntary 
cooperation  by  the  use  of  military  force  to  punish  any  cove- 
nant-breaking member. 

This  Paris  covenant  has  been  made  by  the  five  nations 
who  are  to  prescribe  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  It 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS  235 

has  been  made  in  view  of  the  necessities  of  that  treaty  and 
the  machinery  required  for  its  execution.  This  is  a  very 
fortunate  circumstance  in  the  creation  of  the  League  and  its 
growth  into  a  League  of  all  Nations.  A  convention  of  all 
the  nations  would  never  have  agreed  on  anything  as  prac- 
tical as  this.  Though  the  ultimate  object  of  the  League  is 
the  protection  of  the  interest  of  weaker  nations,  such  nations 
are  most  likely  to  be  obstructive  in  their  insistence  upon 
excessive  representation.  This  League  is  growing  up  as  an 
institution  forced  by  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  It  is 
a  wholesome  and  natural  process  in  the  establishment  of 
needed  and  permanent  institutions.  Out  of  a  clear  sky  in 
normal  times  it  would  be  a  matter  of  the  utmost  difficulty  to 
form  such  a  League  of  Nations.  Here  the  condition  which 
confronts  the  world  and  those  responsible  for  its  welfare 
calls  for  immediate  action.  Out  of  that  immediate  action 
comes  this  League,  adapted  to  present  uses  and  admirably 
available  as  a  foundation  for  a  world  league. 

On  the  whole,  the  short  program  of  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace,  adopted  in  June,  1915,  differs  but  little  from 
the  nub  of  this,  except  that  military  contribution  is  not 
expressly  obligatory  and  that  in  this  either  party  to  a  differ- 
ence may  avoid  a  court  and  an  award  and  seek  a  council  of 
conciliation  in  the  executive  body  of  the  League  where 
unanimity  of  recommendation  is  required.  The  proposal 
to  use  compulsion  to  secure  submission  rather  than  execu- 
tion of  judgment  or  recommendation  came  from  the  pro- 
gram of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  and  was  adopted  by 
General  Smuts  in  a  remarkable  brochure  submitted  by  him 
December  1 6,  1918.  It  is  understood  that  the  President  was 
much  impressed  with  the  paper  of  General  Smuts  and  with 
his  plan  as  well.  We  may  be  certain  the  constitution  as 


236       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

now  adopted  was  largely  taken  from  his  recommendation. 
He  argued  for  the  joint  obligation  of  League  members  to 
use  force,  which  was  only  partly  adopted,  as  I  have  pointed 
out.  He,  too,  recommended  required  submission  of  the 
justiciable  questions  to  a  court  and  of  non justiciable 
questions  to  a  conciliation  council  as  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  had  done.  But  the  Smuts  plan  was  much  more  com- 
prehensive than  that  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  From 
that  plan  came  the  mandatory  system  of  administering 
backward  countries  and  internationalizing  cities  as  wards  of 
the  League  through  competent  and  existing  governments  as 
agents  answerable  to  the  League.  From  that  plan  came  the 
union  of  all  present  international  bureaus  under  the  League, 
as  well  as  the  permanent  secretariat.  He  advocated  inter- 
national labor  reforms  through  the  League,  and  this  function 
is  left  to  be  developed  under  the  League.  He,  too,  brought 
non-members  of  the  League  under  its  influence  and  action. 

The  giving  to  the  Great  Powers  five  votes  in  an  executive 
council  of  nine  is  one  of  the  most  imp;  riant  features  of  the 
constitution  and  is  indispensable  to  any  practical  working 
of  it.  They  are  the  responsible  members  who  are  to  do  the 
work.  The  minor  states  of  the  League  enjoy  its  protection, 
but  will  not  be  willing  to  expend  money  or  effort  in  main- 
taining its  authority.  They  should  not  be  permitted  to 
arrogate  to  themselves  equal  authority  with  the  Great  Powers 
and  thus  seriously  interfere  with  the  League's  efficient 
operations.  This  is  a  sufficient  safeguard  against  a  too  early 
admission  of  Germany. 

The  treaty  of  peace  to  be  framed  is  to  deal  with  Middle 
and  Eastern  Europe,  the  Near  East  and  the  German  colonies. 
The  plan  is  to  create  ten  or  a  dozen  new  states,  more  than 
half  of  them  independent  republics  and  the  remainder  under 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS  237 

some  sort  of  suzerainty  of  the  League.  These  new  states 
are  to  be  founded  not  only  in  the  interest  of  the  peoples  who 
form  them,  but  also  to  constitute  bulwarks  against  a  revival 
of  German  power.  Finland,  the  Baltic  provinces,  Poland, 
the  Czecho-Slovak  state,  the  Ukraine,  the  Jugo-Slav  state 
are  all  to  be  republics  to  curb  and  make  impossible  a  revival 
of  Germany's  dream  of  Middle  Europe  and  of  an  empire 
reaching  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  gulf.  They  are  to 
prevent  the  extension  of  Germany's  influence  in  Russia, 
where  her  commercial  schemes  have  had  in  the  past  a  con- 
trolling influence.  These  new  nations  must  be  rendered 
stable  and  must  be  kept  at  peace  with  each  other  and  at 
peace  with  the  countries  out  of  which  they  have  been  carved. 
They  will  cherish  resentments  against  their  former  owners 
because  of  the  oppression  which  they  suffered  at  their  hands 
and  the  latter  will  feel  bitter  toward  them  because  their  inde- 
pendent existence  will  remind  them  of  their  deserved  humi- 
liation and  defeat.  Moreover,  their  peoples  have  never  been 
used  to  self-government  and  we  must  expect  internal  dis- 
orders, due  to  that  lack  of  self-restraint  that  practice  in  self- 
government  gives.  They  are  to  be  six  or  seven  Cubas  and 
must  remain  under  the  kindly  assistance  of  the  nations  who 
dictate  this  peace  until  their  stability  is  secured. 

The  League  of  Nations  which  existed  during  the  war, 
and  by  which  the  war  was  won,  continues  in  the  conference 
at  Paris  and  must  be  continued,  after  the  signing  of  the 
treaty,  with  machinery  to  secure  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
the  myriad  questions  and  differences  that  will  arise  between 
the  new  countries  and  the  old  in  the  ultimate  establishment 
of  their  relations.  The  fixing  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
boundaries  in  the  Balkans,  always  a  most  difficult  question, 
and  the  determination  of  the  rights  of  new  neighbors  will  be 


238  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

a  continuous  source  of  adjudication  and  adjustment  if  peace 
is  to  be  enjoyed  instead  of  a  continual  state  of  war.  In 
responding  to  these  necessities  this  League  has  been  con- 
stituted. No  one  could  look  into  the  problems  before  the 
nations  conferring  at  Paris  without  realizing  that  a  league 
with  judicial  and  adjustment  machinery  and  provision  for 
the  enforcement  of  judgments  and  settlements  was  an  abso- 
lute requirement.  As  the  conferees  proceed  to  consider  the 
details  of  the  treaty  and  the  need  for  speedy  and  in  forced 
settlements  and  measures  repressive  of  war,  they  may  con- 
clude that  the  provisions  contained  in  this  constitution  are 
not  fully  adapted  to  the  present  needs.  If  so,  special  articles 
can  be  added  to  the  constitution  to  meet  such  exigencies. 
Indeed  one  may  reasonably  predict  that  within  the  elastic 
provisions  of  this  constitution  new  means  will  be  developed 
to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  the  League  as  a  peacemaker. 

On  the  whole,  we  should  thank  God  that  such  a  great 
advance  toward  the  suppression  of  war  and  the  promotion 
of  permanent  peace  has  been  make  as  in  the  agreement  upon 
this  constitution,  with  every  reasonable  prospect  of  its  em- 
bodiment into  the  permanent  treaty  at  Paris.  Is  it  possible 
that  such  a  vital  feature  of  the  treaty,  upon  which  fourteen 
states  through  their  representatives  at  Paris  agree,  is  to  be 
defeated  by  the  lack  of  the  necessary  two-thirds  vote  in  our 
Senate?  I  cannot  think  so.  When  President  Wilson 
returns  to  present  the  result  of  his  visit  to  Europe  it  must 
be  that  the  American  people  will  welcome  him  with  approval 
and  congratulations  upon  the  success  of  the  congress  in 
which  he  has  taken  so  prominent  a  part. 

In  the  President's  addresses  and  messages  during  the 
war  and  since,  he  has  promised  to  the  long-harassed  peoples 
of  the  Allied  nations  that  the  United  States  would  press  for 


THE    GREAT    COVENANT    OF    PARIS  239 

a  League  of  Nations  which  should  secure  permanent  peace 
when  this  war  ended.  Thus  he  revived  the  morale  of  the 
war-weary  soldiers  and  workers  of  our  Allies.  These 
promises  were  not  repudiated  by  any  American  when  they 
were  made.  They  were  echoed  in  all  the  appeals  to  the 
American  people  and  they  found  ready  response  among  them 
and  no  protest.  The  nation  is  thus  pledged  to  the  idea  of 
a  League  of  Nations  to  render  peace  permanent.  Good 
faith  requires  that  what  other  nations  are  willing  to  under- 
go to  secure  the  peace  of  the  world  we  should  ourselves  be 
willing  to  undergo. 

Only  now,  after  the  reaction  that  the  end  of  the  war 
brings  and  after  impatience  at  the  delays  in  reaching  peace 
conditions,  do  we  hear  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  the  criti- 
cisms of  the  President's  promise  of  a  league  of  nations. 
If  uttered  during  the  war  they  would  have  been  out  of  tune 
with  the  overflowing  spirit  of  the  American  people  and  their 
determination  to  win  this  war  and  end  the  possibility  of  any 
such  war  in  the  future.  Now  for  the  first  time  do  we  hear 
the  claim  that  we  did  not  go  into  this  war  for  the  benefit  of 
the  world,  but  for  our  own  selfish  purposes. 

Senator  Poindexter  attacks  the  eighth  article  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  League  on  disarmament  as  follows: 

"  The  provision  is  unconstitutional  and  an  impairment 
of  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  this  country." 

Congress  under  the  constitution  determines  what  our 
armament  shall  be;  and  therefore,  even  if  we  made  an  agree- 
ment, Congress  would  retain  the  constitutional  power  of 
violating  that  agreement  and  increasing  the  armament  be- 
yond the  limit  set ;  but  that  does  not  prevent  the  treaty-mak- 
ing power  from  entering  into  the  obligation.  It  is  not  a 
transfer  of  sovereignty  —  it  is  only  an  agreement  to  limit 


240  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

our  fortifications  and  our  means  of  attack  in  consideration 
of  other  nations  doing  the  same  thing.  The  most  famous 
agreement  that  we  have  made  on  this  point  is  the  agreement 
we  have  with  Great  Britain,  by  which  we  bind  ourselves  not 
to  fortify  the  water  boundary  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States,  or  to  place  war  vessels  on  the  lakes.  That 
agreement  is  of  one  hundred  years'  standing,  and  has  been 
praised  by  every  statesman  who  has  referred  to  it.  It  was 
first  made  by  correspondence  between  two  secretaries  of  state 
and  afterwards  was  embodied  in  a  treaty.  Does  Senator 
Poindexter  claim  that  this  was  unconstitutional  and 
destroyed  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States?  The  Sena- 
tor says  we  cannot  agree  with  another  nation  to  take  over 
and  govern  the  exclusive  right  of  manufacturing  munitions 
and  instruments  of  war.  Why  not,  if  other  nations  agree 
to  do  the  same  thing  and  to  limit  their  production  in  the 
same  way  ?  The  trouble  with  Senator  Poindexter's  concep- 
tion of  this  government  is  that  it  hasn't  the  powers  of  other 
great  nations  to  help  along  the  world  by  a  joint  agreement 
that  shall  prevent  the  dangerous  increase  of  armament  on 
the  part  of  any  nation.  In  assuming  to  exalt  the  sovereignty 
of  the  nation  as  above  everything,  he  falls  into  the  error  of 
minimizing  its  power  to  do  anything  to  help  the  preservation 
of  peace. 

Senator  Poindexter  objects  to  article  XVIII,  in  which 
the  League  is  to  supervise  the  traffic  of  arms  in  countries 
where  it  is  deemed  necessary,  for  the  public  welfare,  to  re- 
strict the  traffic.  No  one  who  is  not  a  searcher  for  objec- 
tions could  apply  that  article  to  the  United  States.  It  of 
course  refers  to  countries  of  backward  peoples  who  cannot  be 
trusted  with  firearms,  and  whose  use  of  them  the  world  may 
well  restrict  to  maintain  its  safety. 


TO    BUSINESS    MEN  24! 

The  most  extreme  position  of  Senator  Poindexter  is 
that  the  United  States  cannot  consent  to  arbitration  of  issues 
between  it  and  other  countries  because  it  might  affect  the 
vital  interests  of  the  nation.  There  have  been  scores  of 
arbitrations  between  the  United  States  and  other  countries, 
many  of  them  of  very  great  concern.  The  question  of  the 
payment  of  the  Alabama  claims  related  to  a  principle  of 
international  law  and  international  safety  that  was  of 
the  highest  importance.  The  arbitration  of  the  Alaskan 
boundary  was  another.  The  arbitration  of  our  rights  in  the 
Bering  Sea  and  in  the  seal  herd  of  the  Pribilof  islands  was 
another.  On  this  arbitration  we  submitted  to  the  decision 
of  an  impartial  tribunal  the  question  whether  we  had  the 
rights  or  not  which  we  claimed.  The  assumption  that  either 
the  court  of  arbitration  or  the  executive  council  of  the 
League  by  unanimous  judgment  would  seek  to  take  away 
the  sovereignty  or  the  liberty  or  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  is  utterly  gratuitous.  It  is  so  extreme  a  view 
that  it  ought  not  to  be  given  any  weight  as  an  objection  to 
machinery  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  differences  by 
decision  of  international  courts. 


TO  BUSINESS  MEN  l 

We  have  been  discussing  the  question  for  four  years  as 
to  how  the  world  could  make  anything  out  of  this  war  that 
would  be  useful  for  its  further  progress.  Four  years  ago 
we  adopted  a  plan  in  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  which 

1  Address  before  the  Commonwealth  Club  of  California,  at  San 
Francisco,  Feb.  19,  1919. 


242       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

provided  for  the  cooperation  of  nations  in  attempting  to  stop 
the  spread  of  war.  We  thought  that  if  there  was  anything 
silly,  anything  cruel,  it  was  war,  and  that  the  nations  could 
not  be  said  to  be  forward-looking  or  intelligent  or  business- 
like, or  even  to  have  common  sense,  if  they  permitted  the 
condition  of  affairs  to  continue  which  made  possible  such  a 
war  as  we  have  just  had.  That  was  an  academic  question 
when  we  raised  it  —  academic  in  the  sense  that  people  were 
thinking  rather  of  how  the  war  could  be  ended  than  what 
we  should  do  after  it  ended. 

Then  we  got  into  the  war  ourselves.  We  were  a  long 
time  in  getting  in.  As  we  look  back  upon  it  now,  I  think 
we  regret  that  we  did  not  get  in  earlier.  I  am  offering  no 
criticism  that  we  did  not,  because  our  hindsight  is  always 
a  great  deal  better  than  our  foresight ;  but  what  I  would  like 
to  say  to  you  gentlemen,  business  men  of  San  Francisco,  is 
this:  use  your  foresight  now  rather  than  your  hindsight 
hereafter  in  respect  to  this  particular  question  that  we  are 
bringing  before  you.  'I  do  not  want  you  to  be  in  the  attitude 
of  the  man  who  rides  with  his  back  to  the  engine  and  does 
not  see  anything  until  he  gets  by  it.  And  that  is  what  you 
are  likely  to  do  unless  you  take  this  thing  to  heart  and  under- 
stand what  the  necessity  of  it  is  and  what  it  means. 

If,  in  ten  or  twenty  years,  we  are  called  into  another  war, 
that  war  will  be  world  suicide.  The  instrumentalities  now 
capable  of  being  used  in  war  are  far  more  destructive  than 
they  were  when  this  war  began;  we  have  discovered 
explosives  and  poisonous  gases  which  can  destroy  a  whole 
community. 

Are  we  going  deliberately  to  allow  that  condition  to  con- 
tinue which  will  make  such  a  war  possible?  Are  we  going 
to  sit  down  here  in  San  Francisco  and  think  that  we  are  so 


TO    BUSINESS    MEN  243 

many  thousand  miles  away  from  Paris  that  we  are  not  con- 
cerned in  that  matter? 

That  is  what  we  thought  for  three  years  of  this  war,  and 
then  we  were  drawn  into  it.  And  even  when  we  were  drawn 
into  it  we  did  not  realize  it :  it  was  still  remote.  I  know 
what  I  am  talking  about.  I  was  going  around  the  country. 
Those  in  Washington  and  those  in  responsible  positions 
began  to  realize  what  it  meant.  But  it  was  a  long  time 
before  the  real  spirit  of  earnestness  entered  into  the  people 
of  the  United  States;  and  it  spread  west  with  a  good  deal 
of  slowness.  Finally  it  became  the  solidest  public  opinion 
that  America  ever  had. 

Now  comes  the  reaction  from  the  efforts  made  to  win 
the  war  and  we  are  looking  around  to  get  on  a  peace  basis. 
We  feel  that  the  war  is  over  and  that  Germany,  under  this 
armistice,  cannot  again  come  to  the  front  as  it  did.  There- 
fore we  will  let  the  world  wag  as  it  will  and  we  will  not 
concern  ourselves  about  finishing  a  task  in  such  a  way  as  to 
make  another  war  impossible. 

I  want  to  stir  you  up,  men  of  business !  The  labor  men 
are  getting  stirred  up;  they  are  receiving  communications 
from  their  brethren  over  there  and  they  are  beginning  to 
understand  it.  Now,  I  want  you  to  study  this  thing,  and 
take  it  to  your  hearts  and  souls,  and  understand  that  no 
one  has  a  deeper  interest  in  getting  this  League  of  Nations 
than  you  have. 

The  American  people  are  intelligent,  but  the  difficulty  is  to 
challenge  their  attention.  They  have  got  their  minds  on 
something  else.  That  something  else  is  the  question  of 
domestic  readjustment,  and  this  deliberation  at  Paris  and  the 
telegrams  concerning  it,  though  they  fill  the  front  page  of 
the  newspapers,  do  not  bring  home  to  you  the  issues  that 


244       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

are  in  Paris.  The  question  is  whether  you  are  up  to  date; 
whether  you  sympathize  with  the  forward-looking  men  that 
are  trying  to  take  a  great  step  forward  in  civilization  and  end 
war  or  make  it  so  remotely  possible  that  you  can  say  that 
the  prospect  is  that  it  is  ended;  whether  you  are  going  to 
agree  with  men  who  believe  that  the  sovereignty  and  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  lend  themselves  to  going  for- 
ward with  other  nations,  or  whether  you  agree  that  they  are 
to  be  perverted  to  defeat  the  plans  of  the  world  framed  to 
benefit  mankind. 

Is  it  possible  that  we  cannot  agree  to  settle  our  differ- 
ences peaceably  and  refrain  from  appealing  to  the  arbitra- 
ment of  war,  which  seldom  results  in  justice  but  always  in 
the  victory  of  the  strongest?  Sometimes  the  strongest  is 
right ;  sometimes  it  is  wrong.  Now  let  us  adopt  some  means 
of  settling  differences  that  shall  lean  on  justice  as  a  guide, 
and  not  on  force. 

Our  President,  representing  this  country,  and  the  thirteen 
nations  there  in  Paris  have  agreed  upon  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. 

I  wish  you  would  study  that  covenant ;  I  wish  you  would 
work  out  what  it  means.  It  is  a  well-conceived  plan.  It 
does  not  involve  as  much  compulsory  force  as  our  League 
to  Enforce  Peace  has  recommended,  but  it  comes  very  near 
it ;  and  it  carries  with  it  an  arrangement  for  amendment  and 
for  an  elasticity  that,  as  experience  goes  on,  will  enable  the 
League  to  adopt  other  methods. 

Those  nations  that  are  gathered  at  Paris  are  in  the 
presence  of  a  very  serious  problem.  Study  it;  analyze  it; 
see  whether  they  can  get  along  without  a  League;  see 
whether  they  can  get  along  without  the  instrumentality  for 
deciding  questions  justly  by  a  tribunal  of  judges ;  see  whether 


TO    BUSINESS    MEN  245 

they  can  get  along  without  a  council  of  conciliation  to  adjust 
and  readjust  matters  between  the  many  new  states  there 
created. 

We  are  interested  in  that  problem.  Our  soldiers  are  over 
there  to  see  that  this  peace  is  carried  through.  We  are 
going  to  be  involved  in  any  mix-up  that  comes  from  an 
attempt  to  settle  this  war  without  having  the  instrumentality 
for  making  that  settlement  effective.  It  is  not  a  remote 
thing.  It  is  at  your  door.  We  have  got  the  responsibility 
for  this  peace  along  with  all  the  other  nations.  These 
nations  have  realized  that  responsibility  and  have  established 
the  League  of  Nations,  founded  now  with  fourteen  mem- 
bers, with  a  view  of  enlarging  it  afterwards  and  letting  in 
others  as  they  shall  show  themselves  fit. 

The  covenant  provides  a  way  for  the  nations  constantly 
to  confer,  to  get  closer  together,  to  bring  about  a  better 
understanding  and  to  resort  to  joint  action,  when  necessary, 
to  secure  justice. 

Can  we  avoid  that  ?  Are  we  going  to  retire  into  our  shells 
and  say,  "  We  are  all  right ;  we  have  resources  within  our- 
selves ;  we  can  live  against  the  boycott ;  we  can  go  on  chasing 
the  dollar  comfortably  and  keep  our  people  prosperous. 
What  is  the  use?  Why  should  we  bother  ourselves  about 
other  nations  ?  "  That  is  what  we  thought  before  this  war, 
but  we  thought  wrong. 

Now,  merely  on  selfish  grounds,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
disasters  that  may  come  to  us  in  another  war,  we  ought  to 
do  everything  \ve  can  in  the  way  of  reasonable  contribution 
to  the  general  safety  —  and,  certainly,  all  that  is  asked  of  us 
here  is  reasonable  contribution.  We  are  asked  to  join  in 
a  boycott,  to  unite  with  the  other  members  of  the  League  to 


246  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

say  to  any  outlaw  or  recalcitrant  nation  that  threatens  to 
bring  on  war,  "  When  you  do,  we  will  suspend  all  contracts 
and  the  payment  of  all  monies  which  may  be  owing  to  your 
citizens;  all  the  food,  all  the  products,  manufactures  and  raw 
materials,  we  are  sending  you  will  be  stopped.  We  will 
withdraw  our  ambassadors  and  consular  agents."  And 
when  all  the  world  says  that  to  a  nation,  that  nation  will 
occupy  a  position  grand  and  gloomy,  but  peculiar. 

We  agree  among  ourselves  that  if  there  is  any  special  loss 
to  individual  nations,  all  the  other  nations  of  the  League  will 
share  that  loss.  The  boycott  may  prove  to  be  expensive. 
It  may  prove  troublesome  to  some  of  our  merchants  who 
have  dealings  with  the  outlaw  nation.  But  we  can  indem- 
nify them,  and  doubtless  the  country  would  be  entirely  will- 
ing to  do  so. 

So  far  as  forcing  this  country  into  war  is  concerned,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  constitution  of  the  League  that  does  this. 
Such  a  provision  is  found  in  the  program  of  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace,  and  I'should  be  glad  to  have  it  in  the  cove- 
nant. France  wanted  it.  She  is  at  the  point  of  danger 
and  she  thinks  she  needs  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
other  nations  to  come  to  her  assistance ;  but  the  other  nations 
did  not  agree  to  go  so  far.  All  they  did  was  to  provide  that 
the  executive  council  should  recommend  the  number  of 
forces  that  each  country  should  contribute  to  make  the 
League  effective,  and  any  neighbor  of  the  outlaw  nation 
is  bound  to  allow  the  League's  soldiers  to  go  over  its  terri- 
tory. The  agreement  does  unite  us  with  other  nations;  it 
does  say  that  we  shall  live  up  to  our  ideals  in  dealing  justly 
with  other  nations  and  respect  their  sovereignty ;  but  that  is 
all  it  entails. 

We  are  told  in  a  set  of  lurid  speeches  that  we  are  sur- 


FROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    SAN    FRANCISCO  247 

rendering  our  sovereignty  and  violating  the  Constitution. 
My  friends,  I  recommend  you  to  read  the  speeches  that  were 
made  after  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  was 
framed,  the  speeches  of  George  Mason  and  Patrick  Henry 
and  Samuel  Adams,  and  of  all  those  patriots  who  were 
vociferous  in  denunciation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  You  will  find  nothing  in  the  present  speeches  in 
the  Senate  more  startling. 

Accompanying  a  forward  movement  there  are  always 
some  who  are  looking  backward.  You  always  have  those 
who  see  the  difficulties  without  seeing  the  advantages.  In 
the  enthusiasm  of  debate  they  exaggerate  difficulties; 
whereas,  after  the  thing  is  done,  they  are  very  willing  to  for- 
get it,  and  others  have  not  time  to  look  back  to  see  how 
lacking  in  foresight  these  men  were. 


FROM  AN  ADDRESS  AT  SAN  FRANCISCO, 
FEBRUARY  19,  1919 

In  addition  to  its  functions  in  respect  to  peace  and  war 
and  the  administration  of  territories  containing  backward 
peoples  formerly  administered  by  the  defeated  Central 
Powers,  there  are  to  be  gathered,  to  act  under  the  auspices 
of  the  League,  all  existing  international  bureaus  like  the 
postal  union  and  all  future  international  bureaus,  including 
a  new  international  bureau  of  labor  under  which  it  is  pro- 
posed that,  by  international  agreement,  more  humane  con- 
ditions in  respect  to  labor  of  men,  women  and  children  may 
be  effected. 

They  give  the  Paris  covenant  wider  scope  and  are  greatly 


248  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

to  be  commended.  They  give  the  League  substance  and 
constant  operation  in  some  of  its  functions  which  will  greatly 
promote  the  unity  of  nations.  Out  of  this  nucleus  will  come 
closer  understanding  and  greater  mutual  interest  suggesting 
new  fields  of  international  action  for  the  betterment  of  man- 
kind. 

The  administration  of  the  German  colonies  with  back- 
ward peoples  in  Africa  and  in  the  Pacific  and  the 
government  of  countries  like  Palestine,  Syria,  Armenia, 
Mesopotamia  and  the  Caucasus,  not  yet  ready  for  self- 
government,  is  a  problem  forced  upon  the  League  because 
these  countries  cannot  be  trusted  to  the  suzerainty  or  govern- 
ment of  the  defeated  Powers.  Their  previous  conduct 
toward  them  has  forfeited  all  right,  if  any  ever  existed,  to 
have  them  restored. 

We  agree  to  limit  our  armament  in  consideration  of  the 
other  parties  to  this  treaty  limiting  their  armament,  thus 
reducing  the  necessity  for  our  maintaining  an  armament 
beyond  that  stipulated.  The  limitation  upon  our  armament 
is  not  arbitrarily  fixed  by  somebody  else.  It  is  to  be  fixed 
upon  the  recommendation  of  the  executive  council  and 
agreed  to  by  us.  As  our  armament  potentially  threatens 
the  other  countries  if  used  in  a  sinister  way,  so  their  arma- 
ment potentially  threatens  us,  and  so  by  joint  agreement  we 
reduce  the  mutual  threat  by  common  proportionate  reduc- 
tion. To  hold  this  beyond  our  power  would  be  to  hold  that 
there  is  no  possibility  of  curbing  competitive  armament, 
which,  if  it  is  to  go  on  —  and  it  will  go  on  unless  restrained 
—  will  invite  world  suicide. 


FROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    SALT    LAKE    CITY  249 

FROM  AN  ADDRESS  AT  SALT  LAKE  CITY, 
FEBRUARY  22,   1919 

When  they  object  to  certain  features  of  this  covenant  let 
them  tell  us  what  they  would  substitute  for  them  in  order  to. 
accomplish  the  same  purpose.  Have  you  heard  any  con- 
structive suggestions  from  them?  They  do  not  enter  into 
the  consideration  of  this  League  in  the  proper  spirit.  The 
President  has  been  struggling  over  there,  with  his  colleagues 
in  that  conference,  to  work  out  the  most  difficult  problem 
that  has  ever  been  presented  to  a  congress.  They  have 
criticized  him  for  going  over.  I  am  glad  he  went,  because 
he  got  into  the  atmosphere  of  the  conference,  and  there  on 
the  ground  it  was  brought  home  to  him  what  a  tremendous 
problem  it  is  for  those  nations,  in  conference,  to  settle ;  and 
there  he  learned,  as  he  never  had  before,  the  necessity  for  a 
league  of  nations. 

Why  should  we  enter  into  the  League?  Well,  I  want  to 
give  you  three  commanding  reasons :  In  the  first  place,  we 
fought  this  war  to  secure  permanent  peace.  That  is  what 
we  promised  our  people  when  we  came  here  and  elsewhere, 
through  our  speakers,  pleading  for  the  Liberty  Loan.  They 
offered  to  you  what?  They  offered  to  you  the  prospect  of 
victory;  and  with  the  victory  the  defeat  of  militarism;  and 
with  the  defeat  of  militarism,  safety  for  democracy;  and  as 
a  basis  for  safety  for  democracy,  permanent  peace.  Those 
were  the  great  objects  proclaimed  when  we  roused  our 
people  to  action.  Those  were  the  objects  proclaimed  to 
our  boys  as  they  went  over:  "  Go,"  we  said;  "  we  follow 
you  with  our  hearts ;  we  offer  to  make  every  necessary  sacri- 
fice because  the  struggle  is  worthy  of  every  sacrifice." 

Did  we  mean  that,  or  didn't  we  mean  it?     That  is  the 


250      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

question.  If  we  meant  it,  are  we  going  to  abandon  the  task 
and  run  away  just  at  the  moment  when  we  can  clinch  it? 
Are  we  going  to  say  to  other  nations :  "  No,  we  will  not  run 
any  further  risk.  We  have  done  all  we  ought  to  do.  We 
will  let  you  try  to  maintain  the  peace  without  us."  Is  that 
what  we  promised  when  we  went  in  ?  Is  that  what  we  gave 
those  peoples  to  expect  when  we  sent  the  messages  of  our 
President  across  the  seas?  What  did  those  messages  con- 
tain? They  contained  a  promise  that  we  would  fight  this 
war  through  to  victory,  to  the  defeat  of  militarism,  to 
making  the  world  safe  for  democracy,  to  permanent  peace. 
By  what  —  by  what,  my  friends?  By  a  league  of  nations. 
That  is  what  we  said.  That  is  what  the  President  said ;  and 
he  said  it  in  a  number  of  notes.  The  premiers  on  the  other 
side  said,  "  We  agree  to  a  league  of  nations."  Now,  what 
was  the  effect  of  those  promises?  It  was  to  stiffen  the 
morale  of  the  plain  people  of  those  countries.  At  other 
conventions  we  have  had  present,  as  speakers,  members  of 
labor  commissions  and  socialist  commissions  that  were  sent 
over  by  our  government  to  talk  with  labor  and  socialist 
groups  on  the  other  side.  What  for  ?  To  offset  the  insid- 
ious conspiracies  of  German  socialist  and  labor  groups, 
aimed  to  defeat,  to  destroy  the  morale  of  those  suffering 
peoples  in  France  and  Italy  and  England,  who  had  been 
three  long  years  in  the  war  with  the  end  nowhere  in  sight. 
When  we  came  in  with  the  promise  of  an  army,  their  morale 
improved ;  though  when  our  soldiers  failed  to  come  soon  in 
great  numbers,  it  began  to  weaken  again.  Then  we  followed 
with  a  promise  to  send  more,  and  with  the  promise  that  we 
would  give  them  a  league  of  nations  in  order  to  make  the 
peace  permanent  when  it  was  won.  These  labor  delegates 
testified  to  us  that  what  maintained  the  morale  of  those 


FROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    SALT    LAKE    CITY  25! 

people  to  fight  the  war  through  —  soldiers,  working  men. 
all  —  was  the  promise  of  a  league  of  nations  in  which  the 
United  States  would  take  part.  No  one,  at  that  time,  when 
the  President  was  promising  this  league  of  natoins,  no  one 
said  nay,  in  the  Senate  or  elsewhere.  Why  not?  Because 
the  spirit  of  the  people  was  aroused.  They  were  willing  to 
go  the  whole  length  in  order  to  achieve  this  purpose;  and 
there  could  not  be  a  higher  or  a  more  glorious  purpose.  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  we  did  not  enter  this  war  with  the 
idea  that  our  interests  were  affected;  but  I  do  say  there 
never  was  a  war  fought  through  in  which  a  nation  was  less 
motived  by  desire  for  gain  of  power,  for  gain  of  money, 
for  gain  of  territory,  for  the  acquisition  of  anything  1 
permanent  peace,  than  this  war. 

Some  say :  "  Let  them  have  a  league  of  European  na- 
tions and  leave  the  United  States  out."  That  is  a  great 
mistake.  Who  would  constitute  such  a  league?  England, 
France  and  Italy  —  three  nations.  You  would  have  an 
Entente  Alliance;  that  is  all  —  a  balance  of  power  with  all 
the  disappointing  results  that  we  have  had  in  previous  bal- 
ances of  power.  The  United  States  is  indispensable  to 
make  that  league  go  as  a  general  league  of  nations,  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  the  most  disinterested  member,  the  purest 
type  of  democracy,  and  its  presence  in  the  League  will 
repudiate  and  refute  any  suggestion  that  it  is  an  intrigue  for 
autocratic  action.  Our  presence  will  give  to  the  League  a 
potential  strength  and  prestige  which  it  will  not  have  without 
us.  So  it  is  our  duty  to  join,  if  we  want  to  see  the  thing 
through,  if  we  want  to  be  square  with  those  who  fought 
this  war  for  three  years  for  us.  We  did  not  know  they  were 
fighting  the  war  for  us;  but  we  found  it  out.  They  made 
enormous  sacrifices  before  we  went  in.  Are  we  going  to 


252       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

say  to  them  now  :  "  We  will  not  help  further ;  our  Consti- 
tution forbids;  our  policy  against  entangling  alliances  for- 
bids. Oh,  yes,  we  want  to  help  you,  but  really,  .  .  ."? 
How  do  you  like  that?  How  would  you  like  to  play  that 
role  in  a  partnership  ?  I  say  that  the  men  who  advocate  our 
staying  out  of  the  League  by  reason  of  a  policy  against 
entangling  alliances  laid  down  by  Washington,  for  a  small 
nation  struggling  for  existence,  whereas  to-day  we  are  one 
of  the  most  powerful  nations  in  the  world  —  I  say  that 
these  men  belittle  the  United  States  and  its  people. 

It  is  alleged  that  our  entry  into  a  league  of  nations  would 
imperil  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Now,  what  is  the  origin 
and  nature  of  this  doctrine?  It  was  announced  in  a  mes- 
sage of  President  Monroe  to  Congress  in  1823  under  the 
following  circumstances.  Many  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
had,  from  time  to  time,  declared  their  independence  and  the 
United  States  had  recognized  them  as  independent  govern- 
ments. The  Holy  'Alliance,  formed  to  perpetuate  the 
"  Divine  Right  of  Kings,"  and  consisting  of  Russia,  Austria 
and  Prussia,  had  threatened  to  help  Spain  recover  these 
colonies.  Mr.  Canning,  the  British  foreign  minister,  had 
urged  upon  our  minister  at  London,  Mr.  Rush,  the  necessity 
for  action  to  prevent  this  step  and  proposed  that  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  unite  in  a  protest  against  any  such 
attempt.  Thomas  Jefferson  and  James  Madison,  both  of 
whom  were  consulted  by  Mr.  Monroe,  thought  the  suggestion 
of  Great  Britain  should  be  accepted  and  that  there  should  be 
such  an  agreement  to  prevent  the  Holy  Alliance  from  inter- 
fering with  governments  in  this  hemisphere.  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  was  Secretary  of  State,  opposed  the  suggestion 
of  a  joint  declaration.  He  felt  that  we  should  make  the 


FROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    SALT    LAKE    CITY  ^53 

announcement  alone,  and  his  view  prevailed.  The  message, 
probably  drafted  by  Adams,  opposed  any  extension  of  the 
monarchical  system  by  interference  with  independent  repub- 
lics on  this  side  of  the  water,  and,  having  in  mind  Russia's 
attempt  to  push  down  her  boundary  in  the  old  territory  of 
Oregon,  asserted  that  there  was  no  longer  room  for  future 
colonization  by  European  governments  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  *  That  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  originally 
proclaimed.  Later,  on,  occasion  gave  rise  to  the  extension 
of  the  doctrine  in  two  instances.  On  one  occasion  some 
filibusters,  who  had  gotten  temporary  control  of  Yucatan, 
offered  to  sell  it  to  President  Polk.  When  he  said  to  them 
"  I  do  not  want  Yucatan,"  they  threatened  to  sell  it  to 
France  or  England.  To  this  threat  Polk  responded,  "  No, 
you  will  not;  we  will  not  permit  it."  It  was  Polk  who  in- 
troduced that  new  feature  of  the  Doctrine.  Again,  in  my 
administration,  a  resolution  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  de- 
manding to  know  the  circumstances  under  which  certain 
lands  on  the  shores  of  Magdalena  Bay  in  Southern  Califor- 

1  The  language  of  Monroe's  message  is : 

"The  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle 
in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved, 
that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintained,  are  henceforth  not  to  be 
considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European  power. 

"  We  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their 
system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any 
.European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But 
with  the  governments  who  have  declared  their  independence  and 
maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration 
and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  inter- 
position for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other 
manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light  than 
as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United 
States." 


254      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ma  were  being  taken  over  by  a  syndicate.  It  was  reported 
that  the  Japanese  were  trying  to  get  a  base  there.  On  inves- 
tigation the  State  Department  found  the  facts  to  be  the  fol- 
lowing. A  syndicate,  which  had  acquired  some  thousands 
of  acres  on  Magdalena  Bay  as  an  investment,  were  disap- 
pointed in  their  venture  and  attempted  to  unload.  The  at- 
torney, in  whose  hands  they  had  placed  the  matter,  tried 
unsuccessfully  to  sell  the  property  to  a  Japanese  company, 
and  thereupon  told  the  "  cock  and  bull  "  story  about  a  Jap- 
anese corporation  trying  to  acquire  the  land  with  a  view  to 
turning  it  over  to  the  Japanese  Government.  But  the  Senate 
passed  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  outside  nations  could 
not  be  allowed  to  acquire  strategic  points  near  the  United 
States  and  thus  endanger  its  interests.  I  do  not  object  to 
this  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  On  the  contrary 
I  think  it  is  a  good  thing.  But  the  spirit  of  the  League 
covenant  would  prevent  that  sort  of  transaction;  though,  if 
we  desire  our  view  of  the  matter  to  be  doubly  fortified,  I 
have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  we  could  get  it  specifically 
recognized  in  the  covenant. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  never  been  violated,  except 
when  France,  under  Napoleon  III,  seized  Mexico.  That 
trespass  was  shortlived;  for  when  we  got  through  with  the 
Civil  War  and  sent  Sheridan  to  the  border,  France  with- 
drew. The  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  so  far  as  it  forbids  the 
overthrow  of  independent  governments,  is  in  accord  with  the 
principles  of  any  league  of  nations  thus  far  proposed.  It 
is  covered  over  as  with  a  blanket  by  Article  X  of  the  present 
covenant.  Therefore,  if  any  government  did  attempt  to 
come  over  here  to  violate  it  —  and  when  you  are  in  the 
Senate  you  just  see  them  coming  —  we  could,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  League,  summon  the  united  forces  of  the 


1-ROM    AN    ADDRESS    AT    SALT    LAKE    CITY  255 

League  to  prevent  it.  We  would  not  be  compelled  to  act 
as  the  sole  policeman  of  this  hemisphere,  as  we  are  now 
under  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Instead  of  the  doctrine  being 
imperiled,  it  is  strengthened.  Its  violation  would,  in  every 
case  except  that  of  the  sale  of  territory,  be  a  direct  violation 
of  the  legal  rights  of  one  of  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere 
and  would  be  a  case  for  the  League  Court,  brought  by  the 
assailed  nation  against  its  assailant.  The  judgment  would 
be  one  which  the  United  States  would  probably  be  delegated 
to  enforce,  acting  exactly  as  it  does  in  enforcing  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  independently. 

President  Wilson  said  that  a  league  of  nations  would 
extend  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  world.  Now,  if  it  is 
extended  to  the  world,  I  presume  it  would  remain  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  The  object  of  such  extension  of  the 
doctrine  would  be  to  prevent  the  very  thing  which  the  United 
States  resents,  namely,  the  overthrow  of  weaker  nations  by 
force,  and  that  is  what  all  this  machinery  is  provided  for. 
The  language  of  Article  X  is :  "  The  members  of  the 
League  undertake  to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external 
aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  existing  political 
independence  of  all  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of 
any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of 
such  aggression,  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by 
which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled." 

This  is  a  declaration  against  the  disturbers  of  political 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  everywhere.  I  can- 
not read  it  in  any  other  way.  If  that  be  so,  the  League  and 
the  United  States  will  be  maintaining  the  same  thing,  and 
signing  the  treaty  will  only  give  to  the  United  States  the 
protection  of  the  League  in  its  traditional  attitude. 

When  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  declared  by  the  United 


'256  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

States,  many  American  statesmen  thought  that  it  would 
certainly  involve  us  in  constant  wars.  For  nearly  a  century, 
however,  it  has  been  peacefully  and  successfully  maintained. 
Not  a  shot  has  been  fired  by  the  United  States,  not  a  soldier 
of  the  United  States  has  been  killed  or  injured  in  support 
of  it.  Its  mere  announcement,  coupled  with  our  known 
determination  to  enforce  it,  has  dispensed  with  the  necessity 
for  the  exercise  of  force. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that,  under  the  League  covenant, 
the  armies  of  the  United  States  are  to  be  called  into  distant 
countries.  We  must  expect  the  Executive  Council  to  be 
reasonable  in  its  recommendations  in  this  respect  not  only 
because  it  will  wish  to  be  just  but  because  it  will  want  to 
act  promptly  in  suppressing  disturbance  and  the  threat  of 
war,  and  it  can  do  this  best  by  calling  upon  nations  which 
are  close  at  hand  and  which  can  do  the  work  of  the  League 
most  conveniently  and  economically.  Moreover,  with  the 
unanimity  required  of  the  Council  by  a  proper  construction 
of  the  covenant,  the  presence  of  our  representative  in  that 
Council  will  naturally  make  certain  only  a  proper  assign- 
ment of  the  League's  work  to  the  United  States.  The  as- 
sumption that  membership  in  the  League  will  involve  us 
in  frequent  wars  is  directly  contrary  to  its  purpose  and 
natural  operation.  Its  potential  primitive  force  will  prevent 
the  coming  of  war. 

Finally  comes  the  question,  my  friends,  whether  we  are 
willing  to  run  the  risk  involved  in  joining  the  League. 
How  much  risk  is  there?  I  have  tried  to  show  that  the 
risk  is  the  danger  of  a  boycott,  the  cost  of  a  boycott,  divided 
up  between  all  the  nations  of  the  League,  the  risk  involved 
in  consenting  to  limit  armament,  after  we  have  learned 
and  consented  to  that  limit,  and  the  agreement  to  pay  the 


BARRIER    TO    ANY    GREAT    WARS    IN    FUTURE  257 

expenses  of  a  secretariat  of  the  League  jointly  with  other 
nations.  As  a  consideration,  we  secure  the  strength  of  the 
union  of  nations  in  common  action  and  a  common  purpose 
to  suppress  war  and  make  peace  permanent. 

I  appeal  to  the  women  who  hear  me:  Do  they  want 
war  again  ?  Are  they  not  willing  that  we  should  make  con- 
cessions now  in  order  that  we  may  avoid  war  ten  and  twenty 
years  hence?  Do  they  wish  their  children  and  their  grand- 
children subjected  to  the  suffering  that  we  have  seen  Eng- 
land and  France  and  Italy  undergo?  It  not  this  the  time 
when  enduring  peace  is  to  be  born  —  when  everybody  is 
impressed  with  the  dreadful  character  of  war,  and  the  ne- 
cessity for  avoiding  it,  when  all  the  nations  are  willing  to 
make  concessions?  Isn't  now  the  time  to  take  our  share 
of  the  responsibility  and  say  to  our  brothers :  "  We  realize 
that  the  sea  no  longer  separates  us  but  is  become  a  bond  of 
union.  We  know  that  if  a  war  comes  to  you,  our  neighbor, 
it  will  come  to  us,  and  we  are  ready  to  stand  with  you 
in  order  to  keep  off  that  scourge  of  nations.  In  the  love 
of  our  brother  we  will  do  our  share  as  men  and  women  con- 
scious of  the  responsibility  to  help  along  mankind,  a  re- 
sponsibility which  God  has  given  this  nation  in  giving  it 
great  power." 


LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AS  BARRIER  TO  ANY 
GREAT  WARS  IN  FUTURE  1 

The  practical  working  of  this  covenant  will  be  to  suppress 
and  avoid  most  wars.     Of  course,  hypotheses  can  be  imag- 

1  Address  at  the  National  Congress  for  a  League  of  Nations  at  the 
Odeon,  St.  Louis,  Feb.  25,  1919. 


258      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ined  that  will  break  down  any  constitution,  even  that  of  the 
United  States,  or  any  plan  of  the  kind  I  have  described;  but 
this  plan  has  a  real  bite  in  it,  a  real  mutual  obligation  for 
union  of  the  lawful  economic  and  military  forces  of  the 
world  to  police  the  world  and  prevent  the  recurrence  of 
such  another  awful  war  as  that  from  which  we  have  just 
emerged.  I  have  said  "  from  which  we  have  just  emerged." 
That  is  a  wrong  term  to  use.  I  should  use  the  expression 
"  which  we  are  now  trying  to  end  in  such  a  way  as  to  achieve 
its  purpose  and  make  the  peace  a  stable  and  permanent  one." 

You  have  heard  Mr.  Morgenthau  describe,  with  trenchant 
accuracy,  the  conditions  that  now  prevail  in  the  sphere  of 
war  in  Europe,  and  the  danger  there  is  from  the  spread  of 
Bolshevism  and  from  a  reaction  to  autocracy  as  a  desperate 
antidote  for  Bolshevism.  Some  who  oppose  the  covenant 
most  are  blind  to  the  critical  conditions  now  existing  in 
Europe,  are  blind  to  the  absolute  necessity  for  a  league  such 
as  this  covenant  creates. 

.  .  .  From  time  immemorial  a  most  frequent  subject 
matter  of  treaties  is  an  agreement  to  submit  differences 
to  arbitration.  The  earliest  treaties  made  by  the  United 
States  with  England  and  the  Barbary  States,  and  with  other 
countries,  contained  a  clause  providing  for  such  arbitration. 

Since  that  time  we  have  had  numbers  of  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration, among  them  general  treaties  of  arbitration.  These 
latter  excepted  some  classes  of  questions,  it  is  true,  but  they 
were  general  treaties,  notwithstanding,  in  that  the  character 
of  the  differences  could  not  be  anticipated.  Not  by  the 
\vildest  stretch  of  the  imagination  can  such  an  agreement  be 
construed  to  be  a  delegation  of  governmental  powers  or  a 
parting  with  sovereignty.  It  is  no  more  a  curtailment  of 
sovereignty  than  is  the  obligation  of  a  man  to  abide  the  judg- 


BARRIER    TO    ANY    GREAT    WARS    IN    FUTURE  259 

ment  of  an  impartial  court,  or  the  award  of  an  agreed 
arbitration,  an  infringement  on  his  liberty  secured  by  the 
constitution. 

.  .  .  This  covenant  does  not  create  a  super-sovereignty  — 
it  is  only  a  loose  obligation  among  the  nations  of  the  world 
by  which  they  agree  to  unite  together  in  a  policy  of  sub- 
mitting their  differences  to  arbitration  and  mediation,  to 
withhold  war  until  those  efforts  have  proved  unsuccess- 
ful and  to  boycott  any  nation  which  violates  the  covenant 
to  comply  with  this  obligation.  It  provides  a  method  for 
reaching  an  agreement  as  to  a  limit  of  armament  and  an  obli- 
gation to  keep  within  that  limit  of  armament  until  condi- 
tions shall  require  a  change  by  a  new  agreement.  The 
agreement  on  the  part  of  one  balances  the  agreement  on 
the  part  of  others  in  securing  a  general  reduction  of  arma- 
ment. It  does  not  impair  our  just  sovereignty  in  the  slight- 
est —  it  is  only  an  arrangement  for  the  maintenance  of  our 
sovereignty  within  its  proper  limits :  to  wit,  a  sovereignty 
regulated  by  international  law  and  international  morality 
and  international  justice,  with  a  somewhat  rude  machinery 
created  by  the  agreement  of  nations  to  prevent  one  sov- 
ereignty from  being  used  to  impose  its  unjust  will  on  other 
sovereignties.  Certainly  we,  with  our  national  ideals,  can 
have  no  desire  to  secure  any  greater  sovereignty  than  this. 

The  argument  that  to  enter  this  covenant  is  a  departure 
from  the  time-honored  policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alli- 
ances with  Europe  is  an  argument  that  is  blind  to  the 
changed  circumstances  in  our  present  situation.  The  war 
itself  ended  that  policy.  Res  ipsa  loquitur.  We  attempted 
to  carry  it  out.  We  stayed  out  of  the  war  three  years 
when  we  ought  to  have  been  in  it,  as  we  now  see. 

We  were  driven  into  it  because,  with  the  dependence  of  all 


260       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  world  upon  our  resources  of  food,  raw  material  and 
manufacture,  with  our  closeness,  under  modern  conditions 
of  transportation  and  communication,  to  Europe,  it  was  im- 
possible for  us  to  maintain  the  theory  of  an  isolation  that 
did  not  in  fact  exist.  It  will  be  equally  impossible  for  us 
to  keep  out  of  another  general  European  war.  We  are, 
therefore,  just  as  much  interested  in  stopping  such  a  war 
as  if  we  were  in  Europe.  This  war  was  our  war.  The 
settlement  of  the  war  is  our  settlement.  The  maintenance  of 
the  terms  of  that  settlement  is  our  business,  as  it  is  the 
business  of  the  other  nations.  To  say  that  we  should  avoid 
it  is  to  say  that  we  should  be  recreant  to  our  duty  to  our- 
selves and  to  the  world  and  blind  to  the  progress  of  events. 
To  say  that  it  mixes  us  up  with  kings  is  amusing  when 
we  consider  the  dominance  of  democracy  in  Europe. 

The  superlative  expressions  contained  in  the  denunciations 
of  Mr.  Fess  and  Mr  Reed  and  Mr.  Borah  and  Mr.  Poin- 
dexter  as  to  the  dangerous  working  of  this  covenant  find 
no  basis  in  a  clear  understanding  of  its  provisions.  The 
contention  that  we  are  to  be  bound  by  the  decision  of  the 
Executive  Council  on  a  critical  issue  of  war  or  peace,  of 
arbitration  or  no  arbitration,  of  limit  of  armament  or  no 
armament,  finds  no  justification  in  the  covenant  itself. 

The  Executive  Council  is  an  executive  body  only  to  recom- 
mend measures  to  be  adopted  by  the  nations  in  the  matter 
of  the  reduction  of  armament  and  in  the  matter  of  the  fur- 
nishing of  military  forces  and  in  other  lines  of  action. 
The  obligation  is  upon  the  governments  through  their  usual 
constitutional  agencies  (which,  in  our  case,  is  Congress) 
to  perform  the  obligations  they  have  assumed.  Our  obli- 
gations are:  first,  to  submit  differences  to  arbitration  or 
mediation;  second,  not  to  make  war  until  three  months 


BARRIER    TO    ANY    GREAT    WARS    IN    FUTURE  26l 

after  an  award  or  a  report  of  a  proper  settlement  and  not 
then  if  the  losing  nation  complies ;  third,  to  lay  an  embargo 
or  boycott  against  a  covenant-breaking  nation;  fourth,  to 
keep  within  an  armament  Congress  agrees  to.  These  are 
the  "  bite  "  of  the  League. 

The  fundamental  weakness  of  the  attitude  of  Senator 
Poindexter  and  Senator  Reed  and  Senator  Borah  is  that 
they  confine  their  arguments  to  pointing  out  the  dangers  of 
this  Covenant  to  the  United  States,  which,  as  I  think  I  have 
shown,  are  comparatively  slight,  while  they  utterly  fail  to 
tender  any  constructive  suggestions  to  the  conference  for  a 
method  by  which  peace  can  be  maintained  and  the  just  re- 
sults of  the  war  can  be  secured.  They  are  merely  destruc- 
tive critics  and  are  not  in  search  of  a  solution  of  the  diffi- 
culty that  we,  in  common  with  the  other  nations  at  the  Paris 
conference,  have  to  meet  and  solve.  Such  criticisms  are  not 
helpful.  They  are  apparently  prompted  by  a  desire  to  find 
fault  rather  than  by  the  duty  of  suggesting  a  remedy. 

General  Smuts,  who  recommended  the  system  of  manda- 
tories, thought  that  the  League  itself  could  not  get  up  an 
organization  sufficiently  effective  to  conduct  these  govern- 
ments, that  therefore  it  ought  to  employ  competent  govern- 
ments as  agencies  to  carry  on  the  governments  of  these 
dependencies  for  the  benefits  of  the  people  in  them  and 
that  they  should  make  a  report  of  their  trusteeship  at  the 
end  of  each  year.  In  his  opinion  the  principles  should  be 
laid  down  in  the  treaty  or  be  contained  in  a  charter  granted 
by  the  Executive  Council,  so  as  to  make  a  rule  of  conduct 
for  the  agencies  acting  as  mandatories. 

Now,  there  is  nothing  in  the  League  that  requires  any  gov- 
ernment to  accept  the  position  of  a  mandatory.  The  South 
Sea  colonies  and  the  Pacific  colonies  of  Germany  will  doubt- 


262      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

less  come  under  England  or  under  Australia.  There  are 
some  Northern  islands,  perhaps,  that  may  come  under  Japan 
as  a  mandatory.  Then  Palestine  and  Armenia  and  Con- 
stantinople may  come  under  some  other  government.  They 
would  be  glad  to  have  the  United  States  take  that,  but 
you  will  remember  that  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States  said  in  the  Council,  that  this  was  impossible,  that 
they  could  not  agree  to  it. 

Now,  if  they  took  that  attitude  in  the  Council,  how  un- 
reasonable it  is  to  contend  that  they  would  have  consented 
to  a  league  which  obliged  a  member  to  accept  a  mandate 
of  this  character.  You  will  find  nothing  compulsory  in 
this  provision  of  the  League. 


THE  PARIS  COVENANT  FOR  A  LEAGUE 
OF  NATIONS  1 

We  are  here  to-night  in  sight  of  a  league  of  peace,  of 
what  I  have  ever  regarded  as  the  "  promised  land."  Such 
a  war  as  the  last  is  a  hideous  blot  on  our  Christian  civili- 
zation. The  inconsistency  is  as  foul  as  was  slavery  under 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  If  Christian  nations 
cannot  now  be  brought  into  a  united  effort  to  suppress  a  re- 
currence of  such  a  contest  it  will  be  a  shame  to  modern 
society. 

During  my  administration  I  attempted  to  secure  treaties 
of  universal  arbitration  between  this  country  and  France 
and  England,  by  which  all  issues  depending  for  their  set- 

1  Address  delivered  at  the  Metropolitan  Opera  House  on  March  4, 
1919. 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        263 

tlement  upon  legal  principles  were  to  be  submitted  to  an 
international  court  for  final  decision.  These  treaties  were 
emasculated  by  the  Senate,  yielding  to  the  spirit  which  pro- 
ceeds, unconsciously  doubtless,  but  truly,  from  the  conviction 
that  the  only  thing  that  will  secure  to  a  nation  the  justice  it 
wishes  to  secure  is  force;  that  agreements  between  nations 
to  settle  controversies  justly  and  peaceably  should  never  be 
given  any  weight  in  national  policy ;  that  in  dealing  between 
civilized  nations  we  must  assume  that  each  nation  is 
conspiring  to  deprive  us  of  our  independence  and  our 
prosperity;  that  there  is  no  impartial  tribunal  to  which 
we  can  entrust  the  decison  of  any  question  vitally  affect- 
ing our  interests  or  our  honor,  and  that  we  can  afford  to 
make  no  agreement  from  which  we  may  not  immediately 
withdraw,  and  whose  temporary  operation  to  our  detriment 
may  not  be  expressly  a  ground  for  ending  it.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  despair.  It  leads  necessarily  to  the  conclusion 
that  our  only  recourse  to  avoid  war  is  competitive  armament, 
with  its  dreadful  burdens  and  its  constant  temptation  to 
resort  to  the  war  it  seeks  to  avoid. 

The  most  important  covenant  with  reference  to  peace  and 
war  in  the  constitution  of  the  League  is  that  looking  to  a 
reduction  of  armament  by  all  nations.  The  Executive 
Council,  consisting  of  representatives  of  the  United  States, 
the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  and  of  four  other 
nations  to  be  selected  by  the  body  of  delegates,  is  to  con- 
sider how  much  the  armaments  of  the  nations  should  be 
reduced,  having  regard  to  the  safety  of  each  of  the  nations 
and  their  obligations  under  the  League.  Having  reached  a 
conclusion  as  to  the  proportionate  limits  of  each  nation's 
armament,  it  submits  its  conclusion  to  each  nation,  which 
may  or  may  not  agree  to  the  limit  thus  recommended;  but 


264      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

when  an  agreement  is  reached  it  covenants  to  keep  within 
that  limit  until,  by  application  to  the  Executive  Council,  the 
limit  may  be  raised.  In  other  words,  each  nation  agrees 
to  its  own  limitation.  Having  so  agreed,  it  must  keep 
within  it. 

Our  Constitution  contains  no  inhibition,  express  or  im- 
plied, against  making  such  an  agreement.  On  the  contrary, 
for  one  hundred  years  we  have  maintained  an  agreement 
to  limit  armaments  between  this  country  and  Canada.  The 
evil  of  competition  in  armament  as  between  us  has  been 
avoided  by  abstaining  from  armament  altogether.  Could 
there  be  a  more  complete  precedent  for  this  provision  of  the 
Paris  Covenant? 

The  importance  of  providing  for  a  reduction  of  armament 
every  one  recognizes.  It  is  affirmed  in  the  newly  proposed 
Senate  resolution.  Can  we  not  trust  our  Congress  to  fix  a 
limitation  which  is  safe  for  the  country  and  to  stick  to  it? 
If  we  cannot,  no  country  can.  Yet  all  the  rest  are  anxious 
to  do  this  and  they  are  far  more  exposed  than  we. 

The  character  of  this  obligation  is  affected  by  the  time 
during  which  the  covenants  of  the  League  remain  binding. 
There  is  no  stipulation  as  to  how  long  this  is.  In  my  judg- 
ment there  should  be  a  period  of  ten  years  or  a  permis- 
sion for  any  member  of  the  League  to  withdraw  from  the 
covenant  by  giving  a  reasonable  notice  of  one  or  two  years 
of  its  intention  to  do  so. 

The  members  of  the  League  and  the  non-members  are  re- 
quired, the  former  by  their  covenant,  the  latter  by  an  en- 
forced obligation,  to  submit  all  differences  between  them, 
not  capable  of  being  settled  by  negotiation,  to  arbitration 
before  a  tribunal  composed  as  the  parties  may  agree.  They 
are  required  to  covenant  to  abide  the  award.  Should  either 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS        265 

party  deem  the  question  one  not  proper  for  arbitration, 
then  it  is  to  be  taken  up  by  the  Executive  Council  of  the 
League.  The  Executive  Council  mediates  between  the  par- 
ties and  secures  a  voluntary  settlement  of  the  question  if 
possible.  If  it  fails,  it  makes  a  report.  If  the  report  is 
unanimous,  the  Executive  Council  is  to  recommend  what 
shall  be  done  to  carry  into  effect  its  recommendation.  If 
there  is  a  dissenting  vote,  then  the  majority  report  is  pub- 
lished, and  also  the  minority  report,  if  desired,  and  no 
further  action  is  taken.  If  either  party  or  the  Executive 
Council  itself  desires,  the  mediating  function  is  to  be  dis- 
charged by  the  Body  of  Delegates  in  which  every  member 
of  the  League  has  one  vote.  There  is  no  direction  as  to 
what  shall  be  done  with  reference  to  the  recommendation 
of  proper  measures  to  be  taken,  and  the  whole  matter  is 
then  left  for  such  further  action  as  the  members  of  the 
League  agree  upon.  There  is  no  covenant  by  the  defeated 
party  that  it  will  comply  with  the  unanimous  report  of  the 
Executive  Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

And  right  here  I  wish  to  take  up  the  objection  made  to 
the  League  that  under  this  machinery  we  might  be  compelled 
to  receive  immigrants  contrary  to  our  national  desire  from 
Japan  or  China.  We  could  and  would  refuse  to  submit 
the  issue  to  arbitration.  It  would  then  go  to  mediation. 
In  my  judgment  the  Council,  as  a  mediating  body,  should 
not  take  jurisdiction  to  consider  such  a  difference.  Im- 
migration by  international  law  is  a  domestic  question  com- 
pletely within  the  control  of  the  Government  into  which  im- 
migration is  sought,  unless  the  question  of  immigration  is 
the  subject  of  treaty  stipulation  between  two  countries. 
If,  however,  it  be  said  that  there  is  no  limitation,  in  the 
Covenant,  of  the  differences  to  be  mediated,  clearly  we  would 


266       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

run  no  risk  of  receiving  from  the  large  body  of  delegates 
of  all  the  members  of  the  League  a  unanimous  report  recom- 
mending a  settlement  by  which  Japanese  immigrants  shall 
be  admitted  to  our  shores,  or  Japanese  applicants  be  ad- 
mitted to  citizenship,  against  our  protest.  But  were  it 
made,  we  are  under  no  covenant  to  obey  such  recommenda- 
tion. If  it  could  be  imagined  that  all  of  the  other  nations 
of  the  world  would  thus  unite  their  military  forces  to  com- 
pel us  to  receive  Japanese  immigrants  under  the  covenant, 
why  would  they  not  do  so  without  the  covenant? 

These  articles  compelling  submission  of  differences  either 
to  arbitration  or  mediation  are  not  complete  machinery  for 
settlement  by  peaceable  means  of  all  issues  arising  between 
nations.  But  they  are  a  substantial  step  forward.  They 
constitute  an  unambitious  plan  to  settle  as  many  ques- 
tions as  possible  by  arbitration  or  mediation.  They  illus- 
trate the  spirit  of  those  who  drafted  this  covenant  and  their 
sensible  desire  not  to  attempt  more  till  after  actual  experi- 
ence. 

The  next  covenant  is  that  the  nations  shall  not  begin  war 
until  three  months  after  the  arbitration  award  or  the  recom- 
mendation of  compromise,  and  not  then  if  the  defendant 
nation  against  whom  the  award  or  recommendation  has 
been  made  shall  comply  with  it.  This  is  the  great  restraint 
of  war  imposed  by  the  Covenant  upon  members  of  the 
League  and  non-members.  It  is  said  that  this  would  pre- 
vent our  resistance  to  a  border  raid  of  Mexico  or  self-de- 
fense against  any  invasion  —  a  most  extreme  construction. 
If  a  nation  refuses  submission  at  all,  as  it  does  when  it 
begins  an  attack,  the  nation  attacked  is  released  instanter 
from  its  obligation  to  submit  and  is  restored  to  the  com- 
plete power  of  self-defense.  Had  this  objection  not  been 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS        267 

raised  in  the  Senate  one  would  not  have  deemed  it  neces- 
sary to  answer  so  unwarranted  a  suggestion. 

If  the  defendant  nation  does  not  comply  with  the  award 
or  unanimous  report,  then  the  plaintiff  nation  can  begin 
war  and  carry  out  such  complete  remedy  as  the  circum- 
stances enable  it  to  do.  But  if  the  defendant  nation  does 
comply  with  the  award  or  unanimous  report,  then  the  plain- 
tiff nation  must  be  content  with  such  compliance.  It  runs 
the  risk  of  not  getting  all  that  it  thought  it  ought  to  have 
or  might  have  by  war,  but  as  it  is  asking  affirmative  relief 
it  must  be  seeking  some  less  vital  interest  than  its  political 
independence  or  territoral  integrity,  and  the  limitation  is 
not  one  which  can  be  dangerous  to  its  sovereignty. 

The  third  covenant,  the  penalizing  covenant,  is  that  if  a 
nation  begins  war  in  violation  of  its  covenant,  then  ipso 
facto  that  is  an  act  of  war  against  every  member  of  the 
League  and  the  members  of  the  League  are  required  definitely 
and  distinctly  to  levy  a  boycott  on  the  covenant-breaking 
nation  and  to  cut  off  all  commercial,  trade,  financial,  per- 
sonal and  official  relations  between  them  and  their  citizens 
and  it  and  its  citizens.  Indeed,  the  boycott  is  compound 
or  secondary  in  that  it  is  directed  against  any  non-members 
of  the  League  continuing  to  deal  with  the  outlaw  nation. 
This  is  an  obligation  operative  at  once  on  each  member  of 
the  League.  With  us  the  Executive  Council  would  report 
the  violation  of  the  covenant  to  the  President  and  it  would 
be  reported  to  Congress.  Congress  would  then,  by  reason 
of  the  covenant  of  the  League,  be  under  a  legal  and  moral 
obligation  to  levy  an  embargo  and  prevent  all  intercourse 
of  every  kind  between  this  nation  and  the  covenant-break- 
ing nation. 

The  extent  of  this  penalty  and  its  heavy,  withering  effect, 


268       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

when  the  hostile  action  includes  all  members  of  the  League 
as  well  as  all  non-members,  may  be  easily  appreciated.  The 
prospect  of  such  an  isolation  would  be  likely  to  frighten 
any  member  of  the  League  from  a  reckless  violation  of  its 
covenant  not  to  begin  war.  It  is  inconceivable  that  any 
small  nation,  dependent  as  it  must  be  on  larger  nations  for  its 
trade  and  sustenance,  indeed  for  its  food  and  raw  material, 
would  for  a  moment  court  such  a  destructive  ostracism  as 
this  would  be. 

Other  covenants  of  the  penalizing  article  impose  on  the 
members  of  the  League  the  duty  of  sharing  the  expense  of  a 
boycott  with  any  nation  upon  which  it  has  fallen  with  un- 
even weight  and  of  supporting  such  a  nation  in  its  resistance 
to  any  special  measure  directed  against  it  by  the  outlaw 
nation.  But  there  is  no  specific  requirement  as  to  the 
character  of  the  support  beyond  the  obligation  of  the  boy- 
cott, the  contribution  of  expenses  and  the  obligation  of 
each  member  of  the  League  to  permit  the  passage  through 
its  territory  of  forces  of  other  members  of  the  League  co- 
operating with  military  forces  against  the  outlaw  nation. 

If,  however,  the  boycott  does  not  prove  sufficient,  then 
the  Executive  Council  is  to  recommend  the  number  of  the 
military  and  naval  forces  to  be  contributed  by  the  members 
of  the  League  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League  in 
such  a  case.  There  is  no  specific  covenant  by  which  they 
agree  to  furnish  a  definite  force,  or,  indeed,  any  force  at 
all,  to  a  league  army.  The  use  of  the  word  "  recommend  " 
in  describing  the  function  of  the  Executive  Council  shows 
that  the  question  whether  such  forces  shall  be  contributed 
and  what  shall  be  their  amount  must  ultimately  address 
itself  to  the  members  of  the  League  severally  for  their  sev- 
eral decision  and  action.  There  is  this  radical  and  impor- 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS        269 

tant  difference,  therefore,  between  the  obligation  to  lay  a 
boycott  and  the  obligation  to  furnish  military  force,  and 
doubtless  this  distinction  was  insisted  upon  and  reached  by 
a  compromise.  The  term  "  recommendation  "  cannot  be 
interpreted  to  impose  any  imperative  obligation  on  those 
to  whom  the  recommendation  is  directed. 

By  Article  X,  the  high  contracting  parties  undertake  to  re- 
spect and  preserve  against  external  aggression  the  political 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  every  member  of 
the  League,  and  when  these  are  attacked  or  threatened  the 
Executive  Council  is  to  advise  as  to  the  proper  means  to 
fulfill  this  obligation.  The  same  acts  or  series  of  acts 
which  make  Article  X  applicable  will  be  a  breach  of  the 
covenant  which  creates  an  outlaw  nation  under  Article  XVI, 
so  that  all  nations  must  begin  a  boycott  against  any  nation 
thus  breaking  the  territorial  integrity  or  overthrowing  the 
independence  of  a  member  of  the  League.  Indeed  Article  X 
will  usually  not  be  applicable  until  a  war  shall  be  fought  to 
the  point  of  disclosing  its  specific  purpose.  Action  under  it 
will  usually  take  the  form  of  preventing,  in  a  treaty  of 
peace,  the  appropriation  of  territory  or  the  interference 
with  the  sovereignty  of  the  attacked  and  defeated  nation. 
We  have  seen  this  in  the  construction  put  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  Secretary  Seward  and  President  Roosevelt. 
The  former,  when  Spain  attacked  Chili  and  that  country 
appealed  to  the  United  States  to  protect  it,  advised  Spain 
that  under  our  policy  we  would  not  interfere  to  prevent  the 
punishment  by  war  of  an  American  nation  by  a  non-Ameri- 
can nation,  provided  it  did  not  extend  to  a  permanent  de- 
privation of  its  territory  or  an  overthrow  of  its  sovereignty. 
President  Roosevelt,  in  the  Venezuelan  matter,  also  an- 
nounced that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  prevent  nations 


2/O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

from  proceeding  by  force  to  collect  their  debts  provided 
oppressive  measures  were  not  used  which  would  deprive  the 
nation  of  its  independence  or  territorial  integrity.  This 
furnishes  an  analogy  for  the  proper  construction  of 
Article  X. 

The  fact  that  the  Executive  Council  is  to  advise  what 
means  shall  be  taken  to  fulfill  the  obligation  shows  that 
they  are  to  be  such  as  each  nation  shall  deem  proper  and 
fair  under  the  circumstances.  Remoteness  from  the  seat  of 
trouble  and  the  fact  that  the  nearer  presence  of  other  nations 
should  induce  them  to  furnish  the  requisite  military  force 
would  naturally  be  included  among  the  factors  considered. 
It  thus  seems  to  me  clear  that  the  question,  both  under 
Article  XVIII,  and  under  Article  X,  as  to  whether  the 
United  States  shall  declare  war  and  what  forces  it  shall 
furnish,  are  remitted  to  the  voluntary  action  of  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States  under  the  Constitution,  regard 
being  had  to  the  matter  of  a  fair  division  between  all  the 
nations  of  the  burden  to  be  borne  under  the  League  and 
the  proper  means  to  be  adopted,  whether  the  enjoined  and 
inevitable  boycott  alone,  or  the  advance  of  loans  of  money, 
or  the  declaration  of  war  and  the  use  of  military  force. 
This  is  as  it  should  be.  It  fixes  the  obligation  of  action 
in  such  a  way  that  American  nations  will  attend  to  America, 
European  nations  will  attend  to  Europe,  and  Asiatic  nations 
to  Asia,  unless  all  deem  the  situation  so  threatening  to  the 
world  and  to  their  own  interests  that  they  should  take  a 
more  active  part.  It  seems  to  me  that  appropriate  words 
might  be  added  to  the  pact  which  would  show  distinctly 
this  distribution  of  obligation.  This  would  relieve  those 
anxious  to  exclude  European  or  Asiatic  nations  from  for- 
cible intervention  in  issues  between  American  nations  until 


THE   PARIS    COVENANT    FOR   A   LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS       271 

requested  to  intervene  by  the  United  States,  or  by  an  exe- 
cutive council  of  the  American  nations  formed  for  the 
purpose. 

Objection  is  made  that  Great  Britain  might  have  more 
representatives  in  the  Executive  Council  than  other  coun- 
tries. This  is  an  error.  The  British  Empire,  which,  of 
course,  includes  its  dominions,  is  limited  to  one  delegate  in 
the  Executive  Council.  As  regards  the  other  central  organ, 
known  as  the  Body  of  Delegates,  provision  is  made  by 
which,  upon  a  two-thirds  vote  of  that  body,  new  members 
may  be  admitted  who  are  independent  states  or  are  self-gov- 
erning dominions  or  colonies.  Under  this  Canada  and 
Australia  and  South  Africa  might  be  allowed  to  send  dele- 
gates. I  presume,  too,  the  Philippines  might  be  admitted. 
But  the  function  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  is  not  one  which 
makes  membership  in  it  of  great  importance.  When  it  acts 
as  a  mediating  and  compromising  body,  its  reports  must  be 
unanimous  to  have  any  effect.  And  the  addition  of 
members  is  not  likely  to  create  greater  probability  of 
unanimity.  More  than  this,  the  large  number  of  countries 
who  will  become  members  will  minimize  any  increase  of 
British  influence  from  the  addition  of  such  dominions  and 
colonies,  which  are  really  admitted  because  they  have  dif- 
ferent interests  from  their  mother  country.  When  analyzed, 
the  suggestion  that  Great  Britain  will  have  any  greater 
power  than  other  member  nations  in  shaping  the  policy 
of  the  League  in  really  critical  matters  will  be  seen  to  have 
no  foundation  whatever. 

A  proposed  resolution  in  the  Senate  recites  that  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  form  now  offered 
should  not  be  accepted  by  the  United  States,  although  the 
sense  of  the  Senate  is  that  the  nations  of  the  world  should 


2/2      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

unite  to  promote  peace  and  general  disarmament.  The 
resolution  further  recites  that  the  efforts  of  the  United 
States  should  immediately  be  directed  to  the  utmost  expedi- 
tion of  the  urgent  business  of  negotiating  peace  terms  with 
Germany  satisfactory  to  the  United  States  and  the  nations 
with  whom  the  United  States  is  associated  in  the  war  against 
the  German  Government,  and  that  the  proposal  for  a  League 
of  Nations  to  insure  the  permanent  peace  of  the  world  should 
be  taken  up  for  careful  and  serious  consideration  later.  It 
is  said  that  this  resolution  will  be  supported  by  thirty-seven 
members  of  the  new  Senate,  and  thus  prevent  the  confirma- 
tion of  any  treaty  which  includes  the  present  proposed 
Covenant  of  Paris. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is  the  authority  under 
the  Federal  Constitution  which  initiates  the  form  of  treaties 
and  which  at  the  outset  determines  what  subject  matter  they 
shall  include.  Therefore,  if  it  shall  seem  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  and  to  those  acting  with  him  with 
similar  authority  for  other  nations,  that  a  treaty  of  peace 
cannot  be  concluded  except  with  a  covenant  providing  for 
a  league  of  nations,  in  substance  like  that  now  proposed, 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  proper  operation  and  effect- 
iveness of  the  treaty  itself,  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  fellow  delegates  to  the  Conference  to  insert 
such  a  covenant  in  the  treaty.  If  accordingly  such  a  cov- 
enant should  be  incorporated  in  a  Treaty  of  Peace,  signed 
by  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  and  should  be  brought 
back  by  the  President  and  submitted  by  him  to  the  Senate, 
the  question  which  will  address  itself  to  the  proponents  of 
this  Senate  resolution  will  be  not  whether  they  would  pre- 
fer to  consider  a  league  of  nations  after  a  Treaty  of  Peace 
but  whether  they  will  feel,  justified  in  defeating  or  post- 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS       273 

poning  a  treaty  because  it  contains  a  constitution  of  a  league 
of  nations  deemed  by  the  President  necessary  to  the  kind  of 
peace  which  all  seek. 

...  In  the  dark  background  is  the  threatening  specter 
of  Bolshevism,  hard,  cruel,  murderous,  uncompromising,  de- 
structive of  Christian  civilization,  militant  in  pressing  its 
hideous  doctrines  upon  other  peoples,  and  insidious  in  its 
propaganda  among  the  lowest  element  in  every  country. 
Confronted  with  the  chaos  and  the  explosive  dangers  of 
Bolshevism  throughout  all  the  countries  of  Europe,  a  League 
of  Nations  must  be  established  to  settle  controversies  peace- 
ably and  to  enforce  the  settlement 

Were  the  United  States  to  withdraw,  the  League  would  be 
nothing  but  a  return  to  the  system  of  alliances  and  the  bal- 
ance of  power.  We  would  witness  a  speedy  recurrence 
of  war  in  which  the  United  States  would  be  as  certainly 
involved  as  it  was  in  this  war.  New  inventions  for  the  de- 
struction of  men  and  peoples  would  finally  result  in  world 
suicide,  while  in  the  interval  there  would  be  a  story  of 
progressive  competition  in  armaments,  with  all  their  heavy 
burdens  upon  peoples  already  burdened  almost  to  the  point 
of  exhaustion.  With  such  a  prospect,  and  to  avoid  such 
results,  the  United  States  should  not  hesitate  to  take  its 
place  with  the  other  responsible  nations  of  the  world  and 
make  the  light  concessions  and  assume  the  light  burdens 
involved  in  membership  in  the  League. 

No  critic  of  the  League,  has  offered  a  single  constructive 
suggestion  to  meet  the  crisis  that  I  have  thus  summarily 
touched  upon.  The  resolution  of  the  Senate  does  not  sug- 
gest or  refer  in  any  way  to  machinery  by  which  the  func- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations  in  steadying  Europe  and 
maintaining  the  peace  agreed  upon  in  the  treaty  shall  be 


274       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

secured.  Well  may  the  President,  therefore,  decline  to 
comply  with  the  suggestions  of  the  proposed  resolution. 
Well  may  he  say  when  he  returns  with  the  treaty,  of  which 
the  covenant  shall  be  a  most  important  and  indispensable 
part,  "  If  you  would  postpone  peace,  if  you  would  defeat 
it,  you  can  refuse  to  ratify  the  treaty.  Amend  it  by  striking 
out  the  Covenant  and  you  will  leave  confusion  worse  con- 
founded, with  the  objects  of  the  war  unattained  and  sacri- 
ficed and  Europe  and  the  world  in  chaos." 

.  .  .  Whatever  nation  secures  the  control  of  the  seas  will 
make  the  United  States  its  ally,  no  matter  how  formal  and 
careful  its  neutrality,  because  it  will  be  the  sole  customer 
of  the  United  States  in  food,  raw  material  and  war  necessi- 
ties. Modern  war  is  carried  on  in  the  mines  and  the  work- 
shops and  on  the  farm,  as  well  as  in  the  trenches.  The 
former  are  indispensable  to  the  latter.  Hence  the  United 
States  will  certainly  be  drawn  in,  and  hence  its  interests  are 
inevitably  involved  in  the  preservation  of  European  peace. 
These  conditions  and 'circumstances  are  so  different  from 
those  in  Washington's  day  and  are  so  unlike  anything  which 
he  could  have  anticipated  that  no  words  of  his,  having 
relation  to  selfish,  offensive  and  defensive  alliances,  should 
be  given  any  application  to  the  present  international  status. 

Objection  is  made  that  the  Covenant  destroys  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  announced  and 
adopted  to  keep  European  monarchies  from  overthrowing 
the  independence  of,  and  fastening  their  system  upon,  gov- 
ernments in  this  hemisphere.  It  has  been  asserted  in  various 
forms,  some  of  them  extreme  —  I  presume  that  no  one  now 
would  attempt  to  sustain  the  declarations  of  Secretary  Olney 
in  his  correspondence  with  Lord  Salisbury.  But  all  will 
probably  agree  that  the  sum  and  substance  of  the  Monroe 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS       2/5 

Doctrine  is  that  we  do  not  propose  in  our  own  interest  to 
allow  European  nations  or  Asiatic  nations  to  acquire, 
beyond  what  they  now  have,  through  war  or  purchase  or 
intrigue,  territory,  political  power  or  strategical  opportunity 
from  the  countries  of  this  hemisphere.  Article  X  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  League  is  intended  to  secure  this  to  all 
signatory  nations,  except  that  it  does  not  forbid  purchase  of 
territory. 

In  recent  speeches  in  the  Senate  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
been  enlarged  beyond  what  can  be  justified.  Those  who 
seek  to  set  up  a  doctrine  which  would  make  the  Western 
hemisphere  a  preserve  in  which  we  may  impose  our  sov- 
ereign will  on  other  countries  in  what  we  suppose  to  be 
their  own  interest  —  because,  indeed,  we  have  done  that  in 
the  past  —  should  not  be  sustained.  Our  conquests  of 
Western  territory  made  for  civilization  have  increased  our 
own  usefulness  and  the  happiness  of  those  who  now  occupy 
that  territory.  But  we  have  reached  a  stage  in  history 
when  the  world's  progress  should  be  determined  and  se- 
cured under  just  and  peaceful  conditions,  and  attempted 
progress  through  conquest  by  powerful  nations  should  be 
prevented. 

To  suppose  that,  with  the  great  trade  relations  between 
North  America  and  Europe,  we  can  isolate  ourselves  is  to 
look  backward,  not  fonvard.  It  does  not  face  existing  con- 
ditions. 

The  European  nations  desire  our  entrance  into  this  League 
not  that  they  may  control  America  but  to  secure  our  aid  in 
controlling  Europe ;  and  I  venture  to  think  that  they  would 
be  relieved  if  the  primary  duty  of  keeping  peace  and  policing 
this  Western  hemisphere  were  relegated  to  us  and  our  West- 
ern colleagues.  I  object,  however,  to  such  a  reservation  as 


276  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

was  contained  in  the  Hague  Conference  against  entangling 
alliances,  because  the  recommendation  was  framed  before 
this  war  and  contained  provisions  as  to  the  so-called  policy 
against  entangling  alliances  that  are  inconsistent  with  the 
present  needs  of  this  nation  and  of  the  rest  of  the  world 
if  a  peaceful  future  is  to  be  secured  to  both.  I  would 
favor,  however,  a  recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as 
I  have  stated  it  above  by  specific  words  in  the  covenant, 
and  with  a  further  provision  that  the  settlement  of  purely 
American  questions  should  be  remitted  primarily  to  the 
American  nations,  with  machinery  like  that  of  the  present 
League,  and  that  European  nations  should  not  intervene  un- 
less requested  to  do  so  by  the  American  nations. 

Objection  is  made  to  this  League  on  constitutional 
grounds.  .  .  .  The  Supreme  Court  has  over  and  over  again, 
through  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  indicated  that  the 
United  States  was  a  sovereign  nation  capable  of  dealing  with 
other  nations  as  such,  and  seized  of  all  the  powers  inferable 
from  sovereignty.  It1  is  said  that  the  League  will  change  the 
form  of  our  government.  But  no  function  or  discretion 
which  it  now  exercises  is  taken  from  any  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. It  is  asserted  that  the  Covenant  delegates  to  an 
outside  tribunal,  viz.,  the  Executive  Council,  the  power  vested 
by  the  Constitution  in  Congress  or  the  Senate.  But  the 
Executive  Council  has  no  power  but  to  recommend  to  the 
nations  of  the  League  courses  which  those  nations  may  ac- 
cept or  reject,  save  in  the  matter  of  increasing  the  limit  of 
armament,  to  which,  after  full  consideration,  a  nation  shall 
have  consented.  In  our  case  it  would  be  Congress  that 
had  considered  and  consented  to  the  limitation.  Neither 
the  Executive  Council  nor  the  Body  of  Delegates,  in  the 
machinery  for  the  peaceful  settling  of  differences,  does 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS       277 

other  than  recommend  a  compromise  which  the  United 
States  does  not,  under  the  League,  covenant  to  obey.  In 
all  other  respects  these  bodies  are  mere  instruments  for 
conference  by  representatives  for  devising  plans  which  are 
submitted  to  the  various  governments  of  the  League  for  their 
voluntary  acceptance.  No  obligation  of  the  United  States 
under  the  League  is  fixed  by  action  of  either  the  Executive 
Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

Then  it  is  said  we  have  no  right  to  agree  to  levy  an  em- 
bargo and  a  boycott.  It  is  true  that  Congress  determines 
what  our  commercial  relations  shall  be  with  other  countries 
of  the  world.  It  is  true  that  if  a  boycott  is  to  be  levied 
Congress  must  levy  it  in  the  form  of  an  embargo,  as  that 
which  was  levied  by  Congress  in  Jefferson's  administration 
and  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court,  with  John  Marshall 
at  its  head.  It  is  also  true  that  Congress  might  repudiate 
the  obligation  entered  into  by  the  treaty-making  power 
and  refuse  to  levy  such  an  embargo.  But  none  of  these 
facts  would  invalidate  or  render  unconstitutional  a  treaty 
by  which  the  obligation  of  the  United  States  was  assumed. 

In  other  words,  the  essence  of  sovereign  power  is  that 
while  the  sovereign  may  make  a  contract  it  retains  the 
power  to  repudiate  it  if  it  chooses  to  dishonor  its  promises. 
That  does  not  render  null  the  original  obligation  or  lessen 
its  binding  moral  force.  The  nations  of  Europe  are  will- 
ing to  accept,  as  we  must  be  willing  to  accept  from  them, 
mutual  promises,  the  one  in  consideration  of  the  other,  in 
the  confidence  that  neither  will  refuse  to  comply  with  such 
promises  honorably  entered  into. 

Finally,  it  is  objected  that  we  have  no  right  to  agree  to 
arbitrate  issues  since  we  might,  by  arbitration,  lose  our  ter- 
ritorial integrity  or  political  independence.  This  is  a  mar- 


278       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

velous  stretch  of  imagination  by  the  distinguished  Senator 
who  made  it.  In  the  face  of  Article  X,  which  is  an  under- 
taking to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  in- 
dependence of  every  member  of  the  League,  how  could  a 
board  of  arbitration  possibly  reach  such  a  result?  More- 
over, we  are  not  compelled  to  arbitrate  a  dispute.  If  pre- 
ferred, we  can  throw  the  matter  into  mediation  and  con- 
ciliation, and  we  do  not  covenant  to  obey  the  recommenda- 
tion of  compromise  by  the  conciliating  body. 

We  have  agreed  in  treaties  to  arbitrate  classes  of  ques- 
tions long  before  the  questions  arise.  Now,  in  the  present 
treaty,  the  issue  to  be  arbitrated  would  have  to  be  formu- 
lated by  our  treaty-making  power  —  the  President  and  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States.  The  award  would  have  to  be 
executed  by  that  branch  of  the  government  which  executes 
awards,  generally  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  If 
it  involved  payment  of  money,  Congress  would  have  to  ap- 
propriate it.  If  it  involved  limitation  of  armament,  Con- 
gress would  have  to  limit  it.  If  it  involved  any  duty  with- 
in the  legislative  power  of  Congress  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, Congress  would  have  to  perform  it.  If  Congress  sees 
fit  to  comply  with  the  report  of  the  compromise  by  the  con- 
ciliating body,  Congress  will  have  to  make  such  compliance. 

The  Covenant  takes  away  the  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  only  as  any  contract  curtails  the  freedom  of  action 
which  an  individual  has  voluntarily  surrendered  for  the  pur- 
pose of  the  contract  and  to  obtain  the  benefit  of  it.  The 
Covenant  creates  no  super-sovereignty.  It  merely  creates 
contract  obligations.  It  binds  nations  to  stand  together 
to  secure  compliance  with  those  obligations.  That  is  all. 
This  does  not  differ  from  a  contract  between  two  nations. 
If  we  enter  into  an  important  contract  with  another  nation 


THE    PARIS    COVENANT    FOR    A    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS       2/9 

to  pay  money  or  to  do  things  of  vital  importance  and  we 
break  it,  then  we  expose  ourselves  to  the  just  effort  of 
that  nation  to  attempt  by  force  of  arms  to  compel  us  to  com- 
ply with  our  obligations.  This  covenant  is  only  a  limited 
and  loose  union  of  many  nations  to  do  the  same  thing. 
The  assertion  that  we  are  giving  up  our  sovereignty  carries 
us  logically  and  necessarily  to  the  absurd  result  that  we  can 
not  make  a  contract  to  do  anything  with  another  nation 
because  it  limits  our  freedom  of  action  as  a  sovereign. 

Sovereignty  is  freedom  of  action  of  nations.  It  is  exactly 
analogous  to  the  liberty  of  the  individual  regulated  by  law. 
The  sovereignty  that  we  should  insist  upon  and  the  only 
sovereignty  we  have  a  right  to  insist  upon  is  a  sovereignty 
regulated  by  international  law,  international  morality  and 
international  justice,  a  sovereignty  enjoying  the  sacred 
rights  which  sovereignties  of  other  nations  may  enjoy,  a 
sovereignty  consistent  with  the  enjoyment  of  the  same  sov- 
ereignty by  other  nations.  It  is  a  sovereignty  limited  by  the 
law  of  nations  and  limited  by  the  obligation  of  contracts 
fully  and  freely  entered  into  as  in  respect  to  matters  which 
are  usually  the  subject  of  contracts  between  nations. 

Those  persons  who  require  more  than  this  are  really  de- 
manding the  license  —  they  term  it  necessary  American  sov- 
ereignty —  to  trample  upon  all  tribunals  and  to  assert  their 
own  unregulated  desires.  That  is  not  in  accord  with  Ameri- 
can principles  nor  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

The  President  is  now  returning  to  Europe.  As  the  repre- 
sentative of  this  nation  he  has  joined  in  recommending, 
in  this  proposed  covenant,  a  league  of  nations  for  consid- 
eration and  adoption  by  the  conference.  He  returned  home 
to  discharge  other  executive  duties  and  this  has  given  him 
an  opportunity  to  follow  the  discussion  of  the  question 


2&>  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE  OF   NATIONS 

in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  and  elsewhere.  Some 
speeches,  notably  that  of  Senator  Lodge,  have  been  useful 
in  taking  up  the  League  Covenant,  article  by  article,  criticis- 
ing its  language  and  expressing  doubts  either  as  to  its  mean- 
ing or  as  to  its  wisdom. 

The  President  will  differ,  as  many  others  differ,  with 
Senator  Lodge  in  respect  to  many  of  the  criticisms,  but  in 
the  constructive  part  of  his  speech  he  will  find  useful  sug- 
gestions which  he  will  be  able  to  present  to  his  colleagues 
in  the  conference.  These  suggestions  should  prove 
especially  valuable  in  the  work  of  revising  the  form  of  the 
Covenant  and  in  making  changes,  to  which  the  conference 
may  readily  consent,  where  Senator  Lodge  and  other  critics 
have  misunderstood  the  purpose  and  meaning  of  the  words 
used. 

The  League  Covenant  should  be  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 
It  is  indispensable  if  the  war  is  to  accomplish  the  declared 
purpose  of  this  nation  and  of  the  world  and  if  it  is  to  bring 
the  promised  benefit  to  mankind.  We  know  the  President 
believes  this  and  will  insist  upon  including  the  Covenant. 
Our  profound  sympathy  in  his  purpose  and  our  prayers  for 
his  success  should  go  with  him  in  his  great  mission. 


ANSWER  TO  SENATOR  KNOX'S  INDICTMENT  1 

My  friend,  Senator  Knox,  has  presented  a  formidable  in- 
dictment against  the  proposed  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  A  number  of  his  colleagues  seem  to  have  accepted 
his  views  as  to  its  meaning.  He  says  that  it  is  unconstitu- 

1  Address  at  dinner  of  Economic  Club  of  New  York,  March  nth,  1919. 


ANSWER    TO    SENATOR    KNOX's    INDICTMENT  28l 

tional  in  that  it  turns  over  to  the  Executive  Council  of  the 
League  the  power  to  declare  and  make  war  for  us,  to  fix 
our  armament  and  to  involve  us  as  a  mandatory  in  all  sorts 
of  duties  in  the  management  of  backward  peoples.  He 
says  that  it  thus  transfers  the  sovereignty  of  this  nation  to 
the  governing  body  of  the  League,  which  he  asserts  the 
Executive  Council  to  be. 

When  Senator  Knox's  attack  upon  the  validity  of  the  Cov- 
enant is  analyzed,  it  will  be  seen  to  rest  on  an  assumption 
that  the  Executive  Council  is  given  executive  powers,  which 
is  unwarranted  by  the  text  of  the  instrument.  The  whole 
function  of  the  Executive  Council  is  to  be  the  medium 
through  which  the  League  members  are  to  exchange  views, 
the  advisory  board  to  consider  all  matters  arising  in  the 
field  of  the  League's  possible  action  and  to  advise  the 
members  as  to  what  they  ought,  by  joint  action,  to  do. 

The  Council  makes  few  if  any  orders  binding  on  the 
members  of  the  League.  After  a  member  of  the  League 
has  agreed  not  to  exceed  a  limit  of  armament,  the  Execu- 
tive Council  must  consent  to  raising  the  limit.  Where  the 
Executive  Council  acts  as  a  mediating  and  inquiring  body 
to  settle  differences  not  arbitrated,  its  unanimous  recom- 
mendation of  a  settlement  must  satisfy  the  nation  seeking 
relief,  if  the  defendant  nation  complies  with  the  recom- 
mendation. 

These  are  the  only  cases  in  which  the  United  States  as  a 
member  of  the  League  would  be  bound  by  action  of  the 
Executive  Council.  All  other  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  the  League  are  to  be  found  in  the  covenants  of 
the  League,  and  not  in  any  action  of  the  Executive  Council. 
When  this  is  understood  clearly,  the  whole  structure  of 
Senator  Knox's  indictment  falls. 


282       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

The  Executive  Council  is  a  most  necessary  and  useful 
body  for  coordinating  the  activities  of  the  League,  for 
initiating  consideration  by  the  members  of  the  League  of 
their  proper  joint  and  individual  action,  and  for  keeping 
all  advised  of  the  progress  of  events  in  the  field  of  the  League 
jurisdiction. 

It  is  impossible,  in  the  time  I  have,  to  follow  through 
Senator  Knox's  argument  in  all  the  Articles  of  the  League, 
but  his  treatment  of  Article  XVI  is  a  fair  illustration  of  the 
reasons  he  advances  for  ascribing  to  the  Executive  Council 
super-sovereign  power. 

Article  XVI  is  the  penalizing  section.  Whenever  a 
member  of  the  League  violates  its  covenant  not  to  make 
war  under  Article  XII,  it  is  an  act  of  war  against  the  other 
members  and  they  are  to  levy  a  boycott  against  the  outlaw 
nation.  There  is  in  the  Covenant  no  agreement  to  make 
war.  An  act  of  war  does  not  produce  a  state  of  war  unless 
the  nation  acted  against  chooses  to  declare  and  wage  war 
on  account  of  it.  The  Executive  Council  is  given  the  duty 
of  recommending  what  forces  should  be  furnished  by 
members  of  the  League  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League.  The  members  are  required  to  allow  military  forces 
of  a  member  of  the  League,  cooperating  to  protect  the 
covenants,  passage  through  their  territory. 

Of  this  article  Senator  Knox  says : 

"  If  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  breaks  its  cov- 
enant under  Article  XII,  then  we  must  fly  to  arms  to  pro- 
tect the  covenants."  Again  he  says  of  it:  "Whether  or 
not  we  participate,  and  the  amount  of  our  participation  in 
belligerent  operations,  is  determined  not  by  ourselves  but 
by  the  Executive  Council  in  which  we  have  seemingly,  at 
most,  but  one  voice  out  of  nine,  no  matter  what  we 


ANSWER   TO   SENATOR    KNOX's   INDICTMENT          283 

think  of  the  controversy,  no  matter  how  we  view  the  wisdom 
of  a  war  over  the  cause,  we  are  bound  to  go  to  war  when 
and  in  the  manner  the  Executive  Council  determines."  He 
asserts  that  the  power  of  the  Executive  Council  is  that  of 
"  recommending  what  effective  military  or  naval  forces  each 
member  of  the  League  shall  contribute  to  protect  the  cov- 
enants of  the  League,  not  only  against  League  members  but 
non-League  members:  that  is,  as  a  practical  matter,  the 
power  to  declare  war." 

I  submit  in  all  fairness  that  there  never  was  a  more  palp- 
able non  sequitur  than  this.  I  venture  to  think  that  were 
Senator  Knox  charged  as  Secretary  of  State  with  construing 
the  obligation  of  the  United  States  under  this  Covenant,  he 
would  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  summarily  reject  such 
a  construction. 

By  what  manner  of  reasoning  can  the  word  "  recom- 
mend "  be  converted  into  a  word  of  direction  or  command? 
Yet  upon  this  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  the  words 
"  recommend,"  "  advise  ''  and  words  of  like  import,  as  they 
occur  in  many  articles,  depends  his  whole  argument  as  to  the 
powers  of  the  Executive  Council  under  the  Covenant,  and 
their  super-sovereign  character. 

Senator  Knox  contends  that  the  plan  of  the  League  will 
create  two  Leagues  —  one  of  the  Allies  and  one  of  the  out- 
cast nations.  The  Covenant  provides  for  a  protocol  to  in- 
vite in  all  nations  responsible  and  fit  for  membership.  Cer- 
tainly Germany  and  the  other  enemy  countries  ought  not  now 
to  be  taken  in,  but  they  ought  to  be  kept  under  control.  The 
League  wishes  to  prevent  war  in  the  world  and  realizes,  of 
course,  that  excluded  nations  are  quite  as -likely  to  make  war 
as  their  own  members. 

The  Covenant  therefore  declares  the  concern  of  the  League 


284  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

in  threatened  war  between  nations  whether  members  or  not 
and  asserts  its  right  to  take  steps  to  prevent  it.  This  dec- 
laration is  made  as  the  justification  for  Article  XVII,  by 
which  a  nation  or  nations  not  members  of  the  League 
who  threaten  war  are  invited  to  become  temporary  mem- 
bers of  the  League  in  order  to  enable  them  to  settle  their 
disputes  peaceably  as  permanent  members  covenant  to  do. 
These  temporary  members  are  visited  with  the  same 
penalties  for  acts  which  would  be,  if  committed  by  per- 
manent members,  breaches  of  their  covenants  not  to  begin 
war.  Thus  the  scope  of  the  League's  action  is  extended  to 
all  nations. 

This  is  the  explanation  and  the  purport  of  Articles  XI 
and  XVII.  They  involve  the  whole  world  in  the  covenants 
of  the  League  not  to  make  war.  They  operate  to  defeat  the 
formation  and  warlike  organization  of  a  rival  league  of 
nations,  composed  of  countries  not  admitted  as  permanent 
members  to  this  league.  They  unite  the  rest  of  the  world 
against  such  nations  in  any  case  of  war  threatened  by  them. 

There  is  no  supreme  court  to  construe  this  Covenant  and 
bind  the  members,  and  each  nation,  in  determining  its  own 
obligations  and  action  under  it,  must  construe  it  for  itself. 
Our  duties  under  it  are  not  to  be  declared  and  enforced 
against  us  by  a  hostile  tribunal  or  by  one  actuated  by  dif- 
ferent principles  and  spirit  from  our  own.  Its  whole 
strength  is  to  rest  in  an  agreed  interpretation  by  all.  Its 
sanction  must  be  in  the  good  sense  of  the  covenanting  na- 
tions who  know  that,  in  order  that  it  may  hold  together  and 
serve  its  purpose,  they  must  all  be  reasonable  in  their  con- 
struction. What  rules  of  interpretation  should  and  must  we 
therefore  apply? 

The  President  and  Senate  are  to  ratify  this  Covenant  if  it 


ANSWER   TO   SENATOR   KNOX's   INDICTMENT          285 

be  ratified,  by  virtue  of  their  constitutional  power  to  make 
treaties.  This  power,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has  held,  en- 
ables them  to  bind  the  United  States  to  a  contract  with  an- 
other nation  on  any  subject  matter  usually  the  subject  matter 
of  treaties  between  nations,  subject  to  the  limitation  that 
the  treaty  may  not  change  the  form  of  government  of  the 
United  States,  and  may  not  part  with  territory  belonging  to 
a  State  of  the  United  States,  without  the  consent  of  the 
State.  The  making  of  war,  of  embargoes,  or  armament, 
and  of  arbitration  are  frequently  subject  matter  of  treaties. 
'  The  President  and  Senate  may  not,  however,  confer  on 
any  body,  constituted  by  a  league  of  nations,  the  power  and 
function  to  do  anything  for  the  United  States  which  is 
vested  by  the  Federal  Constitution  in  Congress,  the  treaty 
making  power  or  any  other  branch  of  the  United  States 
Government. 

It,  therefore,  follows  that  whenever  the  treaty-making 
power  binds  the  United  States  to  do  anything,  it  must  be 
done  by  the  branch  of  that  Government  vested  by  the  Con- 
stitution with  that  function.  A  treaty  may  bind  the  United 
States  to  make  or  not  make  war  in  any  specific  contingency; 
it  may  bind  the  United  States  to  levy  a  boycott,  to  limit  its 
armament  to  a  fixed  amount ;  it  may  bind  the  United  States 
to  submit  a  difference  or  a  class  of  differences  to  arbitration. 
But  the  only  way  in  which  the  United  States  can  perform 
the  agreement  is  for  Congress  to  fulfill  the  promise  to  de- 
clare and  make  war ;  for  Congress  to  perform  the  obligation 
to  levy  a  boycott;  for  Congress  to  fix  or  reduce  armament 
in  accord  with  the  contract;  and  for  the  President  and 
Senate,  as  the  treaty-making  power,  to  formulate  the  issues 
to  be  arbitrated  and  agree  with  the  opposing  nation  on  the 
character  of  the  court. 


286       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

When  the  treaty  provides  that  the  obligation  arises  upon  a 
breach  of  a  covenant,  and  does  not  make  the  question  of  the 
breach  conclusively  determinable  by  any  body  or  tribunal, 
then  it  is  for  Congress  itself  to  decide  in  good  faith  whether 
or  not  the  breach  of  the  Covenant  upon  which  the  obligation 
arises,  has  in  fact  occurred,  and  finding  that,  it  has  to  per- 
form the  obligation. 

These  plain  limitations  upon  the  Federal  treaty-making 
power  are  known  to  nations  of  this  conference,  and  any 
treaty  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  construed  in  the  light 
of  them.  Following  these  necessary  rules  of  construction, 
the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  entirely  and  easily  conform 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  They  lose  alto- 
gether that  threatening  and  dangerous  character  and  effect 
which  Senator  Knox  and  other  critics  would  attach  to  them. 
They  delegate  to  no  body  but  to  our  own  Federal  consti- 
tutional agencies  the  duty  of  deciding  in  good  faith  what 
our  obligations  under  the  Covenant  are,  when  they  become 
immediate,  the  appropriate  means  and  method  by  which  they 
are  to  be  performed,  and  the  performance  of  them. 

By  the  first  article  the  action  of  the  high  contracting  par- 
ties under  the  Covenant  are  to  be  "  effected  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  a  meeting  of  a  body  of  delegates  represent- 
ing the  high  contracting  parties,  of  meetings  at  more  fre- 
quent intervals  of  an  Executive  Council,  and  of  a  permanent 
international  secretariat." 

This  means  only  that  when  the  high  contracting  parties 
wish  to  take  joint  action,  it  is  to  be  taken  through  such 
meetings.  This  does  not  vest  these  bodies  with  power  ex- 
cept as  it  is  especially  described  in  the  succeeding  articles. 
The  unusual  phrase  "  effected  through  the  instrumentality 
of  meetings "  means  what  it  says.  It  does  not  confer 


ANSWER    TO    SENATOR    KNOX's    INDICTMENT  287 

authority  on  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil, but  only  designates  the  way  in  which  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  shall,  through  their  representatives,  express  their 
joint  agrement  and  take  action. 

On  this  head,  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  who  had  much  to  do  with 
formulating  the  Covenant,  made  an  illuminating  remark  in 
his  address  following  the  report  by  the  Committee  of  the 
Covenant  to  the  Conference.  He  said: 

"Secondly  —  We  have  laid  down  (and  this  is  the  very 
great  principle  of  the  delegates,  except  in  very  special  cases, 
and  for  very  special  reasons  which  are  set  out  in  the  Cov- 
enant) that  all  action  must  be  unanimously  agreed  to  in 
accordance  with  the  general  rule  that  governs  international 
relations.  That  this  will  to  some  extent,  in  appearance  at 
any  rate,  militate  against  the  rapidity  of  action  of  the  organs 
of  the  League  is  undoubted.  In  my  judgment,  that  de- 
fect is  far  more  than  compensated  by  the  confidence  that  it 
will  inspire  that  no  nation,  whether  small  or  great,  need 
fear  oppression  from  the  organs  of  the  League." 

This  interpretation  by  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
draftsmen  of  the  League  shows  that  all  its  language,  rea- 
sonably contrued,  delegates  no  power  to  these  bodies  to  act 
for  the  League  and  its  members  without  their  unanimous 
concurrence  unless  the  words  used  make  such  delegation 
clear. 

Senator  Knox  asserts  that,  as  the  recommendation  for  a 
reduction  of  armaments  will  be  made  with  the  consent  of 
our  representative  on  the  Council,  we  shall  be  in  honor 
bound  to  accept  the  limit  and  bind  ourselves.  It  is  difficult 
to  follow  this  reasoning.  The  body  which  is  to  accept  the 
limitation  is  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Why 
should  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  be  bound  by  a 


288      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

representative  selected  by  the  President  to  represent  the 
United  States  in  this  function,  in  respect  to  a  matter  of  great 
importance  under  the  control  of  Congress? 

That  the  United  States  should  recognize  the  wisdom  of  a 
reduction  of  armament,  under  a  world  plan  for  it,  seems 
manifest.  The  history  of  competitive  armaments,  with  its 
dreadful  sequel,  is  too  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  peoples 
of  the  world  for  them  not  to  recognize  the  wisdom  of  an 
agreed  reduction.  If  we  are  to  have  an  agreed  reduction, 
then  there  must  be  some  limit  to  which  the  governments 
agree  to  submit.  If  the  nations  of  Europe,  with  so  many 
dangerous  neighbors,  are  content  to  bind  themselves  to  a 
limitation,  why  should  we  hesitate  to  help  this  world  move- 
ment? There  is  not  the  slightest  probability  that  we  will 
wish  to  exceed  the  limit  proposed.  Our  national  failing  has 
been  not  to  maintain  enough  armament. 

Senator  Knox  objects  to  the  provision  that  no  treaties 
made  by  members  of 'the  League  shall  have  effect  until  after 
they  have  been  registered  in  the  office  of  the  League.  He 
says  this  is  contrary  to  the  Constitution,  because  treaties 
are  to  take  effect  when  ratified  by  the  Senate  and  proclaimed 
by  the  President. 

This  objection  is  not  very  formidable.  All  this  requires 
is  that  the  United  States  shall  provide,  in  every  one  of  its 
future  treaties,  that  the  treaty  shall  not  take  effect  until  it  is 
registered  in  the  Secretariat  of  the  League.  Certainly  an 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  and  the  nation 
with  whom  it  is  making  a  treaty  as  to  conditions  upon  which 
it  shall  take  effect  is  not  in  violation  of  the  constitutional 
requirements  to  which  Senator  Knox  refers. 


ANSWER    TO    SENATOR    KNOX's    INDICTMENT  289 

Senator  Knox  criticizes  the  League  because  it  recognizes 
the  possibility  of  war  and  proposes  to  use  war  to  end  war. 
Certainly  there  is  no  means  of  suppressing  lawless  violence 
but  by  lawful  force,  and  any  League  which  makes  no  provi- 
sion for  that  method,  and  fails  to  recognize  its  validity, 
would  be  futile.  He  points  out  that  the  plan  of  the  League 
is  not  war-proof,  and  that  war  may  come  in  spite  of  it. 
Then  he  describes  the  kind  of  league  which  he  would  frame, 
a  league  which  will  involve  the  United  States  in  quite  as 
many  wars  and  in  just  as  great  a  transfer  of  its  sovereignty 
as  he  charges  this  Covenant  with  doing. 

He  proposes  to  have  compulsory  arbitration,  before  an  in- 
ternational court,  of  international  differences,  including 
questions  of  policy.  His  court  would  not  settle  all  differ- 
ences likely  to  lead  to  war,  for  questions  of  policy  are  just 
as  likely  to  produce  war  as  questions  which  are  justiciable. 
Then  he  would  declare  war  a  crime  and  punish  any  nation 
engaged  in  it,  other  than  in  self-defense,  as  an  international 
criminal.  Would  not  punishing  a  nation  as  a  criminal  be 
likely  to  involve  war?  The  court  would  have  the  right  to 
call  on  powers  constituting  the  league  to  enforce  its  decrees 
and  awards  by  force  and  economic  pressure.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  conceive  a  league  more  completely  transferring 
sovereignty  to  an  outside  body  and  giving  it  power  to  in- 
volve us  in  war  than  the  plan  of  Senator  Knox.  It  is  far 
more  drastic  and  ambitious,  and  derogates  much  more 
from  national  control  than  anything  in  this  league.  In 
contrast  with  it,  the  present  league  is  modest. 

The  supporters  of  the  present  covenant  do  not  claim  it 
to  be  a  perfect  instrument.  It  does  not  profess  to  abolish 
war.  It  only  adopts  a  somewhat  crude  machinery  for  mak- 
ing war  improbable,  and  it  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  union 


TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

of  nations  by  which,  if  they  are  so  minded,  they  can  pro- 
tect themselves  against  the  recurrence  of  the  disaster  of 
such  a  war  as  that  with  which  Europe  has  been  devastated 
during  the  last  four  years.  Experience  under  the  League 
will  doubtless  suggest  many  improvements.  But  it  is  the 
first  step  that  counts.  Let  us  take  it  now  when  the  whole 
world  is  yearning  for  it. 


PARIS  COVENANT  HAS  TEETH  1 

Many  misconceptions  of  the  effect  of  the  Covenant  of 
Paris  have  been  set  afloat  by  broadside  denunciations  of  the 
•League  based  on  loose  constructions  of  it  entirely  unwar- 
ranted by  the  text.  The  attitude  of  those  who  favor  the 
Covenant  has  been  misconstrued,  increasing  the  confusion 
in  the  mind  of  the  public  in  respect  to  the  inestimable  value 
of  the  instrument  as  it  is.  Were  the  alternatives  presented 
to  me  of  adopting  the  Covenant  exactly  as  it  is,  or  of  post- 
poning the  coming  of  peace  and  continuing  the  state  of  war 
until  the  conference  could  reconvene  and  make  other  provi- 
sions for  peace,  I  should,  without  the  slightest  fear  as  to 
the  complete  safety  of  my  country  under  its  provisions, 
vote  for  it  as  the  greatest  step  in  recorded  history  in  the 
betterment  of  international  relations  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people  of  the  world  and  for  the  benefit  of  my  country. 

I  was  president  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  and 
continue  to  be.  Our  plan  was  somewhat  more  ambitious 
in  the  method  of  settling  differences  peaceably,  in  that  fewer 
might  escape  a  binding  peaceful  settlement.  The  proposed 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Mar.  16,  1919. 


PARIS    COVENANT    HAS   TEETH  2QI 

covenant,  however,  makes  provision  for  peaceful  settlement 
of  most  differences  Both  plans  include  a  definite  obliga- 
tion on  the  part  of  all  members  of  the  League  to  use 
economic  power  to  suppress  an  outlaw  nation  by  wither- 
ing world  ostracism.  Ours  also  provided  for  definite  con- 
tributions of  force  to  an  army  to  be  called  upon  if  the  boy- 
cott failed  to  effect  its  purpose.  The  present  covenant  does 
not,  in  my  judgment,  impose  such  a  definite  obligation  on 
the  members  of  the  League,  but  its  theory,  doubtless  sound, 
is  that  their  voluntary  action  in  their  own  interest  will  lead 
to  the  raising  of  sufficient  force  without  a  covenant.  The 
proposed  league  has  real  teeth  and  a  bite  to  it.  It  furnishes 
real  machinery  to  organize  the  power  of  the  peaceful  nations 
of  the  world  and  translate  it  into  economic  and  military 
action.  This,  by  its  very  existence  and  certainty,  will  keep 
nations  from  war,  will  force  them  to  the  acceptance  of  a 
peaceable  settlement,  and  will  dispense  with  the  necessity  for 
the  exercise  of  economic  pressure  or  force. 

Why,  then,  it  is  asked,  if  this  is  my  view,  have  I  ani- 
madverted upon  the  language  of  the  League  Covenant  and 
suggested  changes  ?  I  have  done  this  not  because  I  wished 
to  change  the  structure  of  the  League,  its  plan  of  action  or 
its  real  character.  I  have  done  it  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
moving objections  to  it  created  in  the  minds  of  conscientious 
Americans.  There  are  many  such  anxious  for  a  league  of 
nations,  anxious  to  make  this  peace  permanent,  whose  fears 
have  been  roused  by  suggested  constructions  of  the  Cov- 
enant which  its  language  does  not  justify.  These  fears  can, 
without  any  considerable  change  of  language  or  additions, 
be  removed. 

The  language  of  the  Covenant  is  in  diplomatic  phrases,  is 
verbose  and  not  direct.  When,  however,  we  examine  the 


292       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

important  treaties  of  history,  including  those  negotiated-  by 
our  own  country,  we  find  that  this  is  characteristic  of  most 
of  them.  They  are  not  drawn  with  the  concise,  direct  words 
of  a  business  contract,  nor  in  the  clear  style  of  a  domestic 
statute.  When  reduced  to  such  a  style,  the  Covenant  be- 
comes quite  clear  and  presents  to  me  no  danger  whatever 
of  involving  the  United  States  in  any  obligation  or  burden 
which  its  people  would  not  be,  and  ought  not  to  be,  glad  to 
bear  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  the  world  and 
their  own. 

Take,  for  instance,  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  spirit  and  effect  is  a  policy  of  the  United  States 
which  forbids  any  non-American  nation,  by  external  ag- 
gression, by  purchase  or  by  intrigue,  to  acquire  the  terri- 
tory in  whole  or  in  part,  or  the  governmental  power  in 
whole  or  in  part,  of  any  country  or  nation  in  this  Western 
Hemisphere.  So  far  as  external  aggression  is  concerned, 
the  policy  is  fully  covered  by  Article  X  of  the  Covenant, 
which  would  enable  tlie  United  States  to  use  the  whole  power 
of  the  League,  in  addition  to  its  own,  to  preserve  the  doc- 
trine. So  far  as  the  acquisition  of  such  territory  or  power 
by  purchase  or  intrigue  is  concerned,  the  United  States 
could  at  once  bring  the  matter  before  the  Body  of  Dele- 
gates, which  will  include  representatives  of  all  the  na- 
tions of  North,  South  and  Central  America.  Unless  the 
whole  Body  of  Delegates,  so  constituted,  unanimously  re- 
jects the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  is  completely 
at  liberty  to  proceed  to  enforce  it.  Can  it  be  supposed, 
by  the  wildest  flight  of  imagination,  that  such  a  unanimous 
report  could  be  obtained  from  a  body  including  representa- 
tives of  seventeen  or  eighteen  countries  of  this  Western 
Hemisphere?  Though  I  have  this  view,  I  am  entirely  will- 


PARIS    COVENANT    HAS    TEETH  293 

ing  to  see,  and  will  be  glad  to  see,  a  reservation  introduced 
into  the  Covenant  which  shall  be  more  explicit  and  more 
satisfying  to  those  whose  fears  are  roused. 

From  the  plan  of  the  Covenant,  from  the  language  of 
Lord  Robert  Cecil,  one  of  its  chief  draftsmen,  and  from  the 
general  rules  of  construction  of  international  agreements,  I 
think  that  the  action  of  the  executive  council,  unless  other- 
wise expressly  provided,  must  be  unanimous.  This  would 
necessitate  the  concurrence  of  a  representative  of  the  United 
States  in  such  recommendations  and  other  actions  as  it  may, 
in  the  course  of  its  duties  in  the  League,  have  to  take.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  Body  of  Delegates.  But  I  would  be 
entirely  willing  to  have  the  rule  of  unanimity  stated  ex- 
pressly ;  it  would  clarify  a  matter  which  troubles  many. 

Doubt  has  been  expressed  as  to  the  time  during  which  this 
Covenant  is  to  run.  There  is  now  no  express  limitation. 
I  would  be  glad  to  have  a  definite  time  limitation,  say  of 
ten  years,  for  the  League  as  a  whole,  and  perhaps  of  five 
years  for  the  obligation  to  restrict  armament  within  a  limit 
agreed  to  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  This 
would  relieve  many  who  reasonably  fear  perpetual  obliga- 
tions. My  own  view  is  that,  unless  this  be  done,  the  nations 
composing  the  League  will  construe  this  to  be  a  covenant 
from  which  any  one  of  them  may  withdraw  after  reasonable 
notice.  I  think  it  is  wiser  to  give  it  a  definite  term  than 
to  have  it  a  covenant  from  which  any  member  may  with- 
draw at  will. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  there  may  not  be  other  changes 
of  a  similar  character  that  would  aid  in  relieving  unfounded 
objections.  But  I  am  distinctly  opposed  to  a  revision  of 
the  form  of  the  League  so  as  to  change  its  nature.  This  is 
the  League  which,  as  amended  in  the  conference,  must  be 


294      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

adopted  unless  we  are  to  have  an  indefinite  postponement 
of  peace. 

The  suggestions  of  the  impossible  and  radically  different 
leagues  which  have  been  put  forward  as  a  better  solution 
than  tfie  present  one  will  not  be  particularly  relevant  or 
helpful.  To  provide  for  amendments  and  reservations, 
that  do  not  change  the  structure  of  the  League  and  its  es- 
sence and  do  satisfy  doubting,  conscientious  Americans  in 
respect  to  the  safety  of  the  United  States  in  the  obligations 
assumed,  is  a  high  and  important  duty  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  in  this  conference.  If  they  per- 
form it,  they  will  help  materially  to  secure  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty. 

Of  course  the  securing  of  amendments  after  fourteen  na- 
tions have  fought  their  way  by  earnest  discussion  to  an  agree- 
ment in  committee  is  not  free  from  difficulty.  European 
nations,  anxious  to  have  us  join  the  League,  will  consent 
to  reservations  and  limitations  as  to  strictly  American  ques- 
tions and  policies;  but  it  is  not  the  easiest  task  to  draw 
these  in  such  form  as  to  prevent  their  having  wider  effect. 
The  solution  of  this  problem  will  be  facilitated  by  a  con- 
sideration and  study  of  the  criticisms  which  are  construc- 
tively directed  to  rendering  this  league  unobjectionable, 
I  regret  to  say  that  many  of  the  speeches  are  so  far  afield 
and  so  entirely  unwarranted  by  the  present  language  of  the 
Covenant  that  they  are  not  helpful. 


TO    MAKE    PEACE    SECURE  295 

TO  MAKE  PEACE  SECURE  1 

I  favor  the  obligation  on  the  part  of  all  the  nations  to  use 
their  military  force  to  maintain  the  covenants  of  the  League. 
That  was  a  feature  of  the  plan  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.  I  do  not  think  it  is  clearly  set  forth  in  the  present 
Covenant.  The  nearer  it  comes  to  that  the  more  satisfactory 
it  is  to  me,  and  the  more  effective  that  League  will  become. 
The  burden  of  carrying  on  war,  which  has  been  held  up 
as  a  reason  for  not  entering  the  League,  is  one  entirely  re- 
moved by  the  certainty  of  cooperation  of  the  nations.  The 
usefulness  of  such  a  league  is  far  greater  in  its  warning 
and  restraining  effect  upon  reckless  nations  willing  to  begin 
war  than  even  in  its  actual  suppression  of  war.  It  is  vastly 
more  economical  on  our  part  to  agree  that,  should  occasion 
arise,  we  will  contribute  economic  and  military  pressure  to 
suppress  war  than  it  is  to  refuse  such  an  agreement  and 
then  be  drawn  into  a  war  like  the  one  we  have  just  passed 
through,  leaving  an  indebtedness  of  twenty-five  billions, 
a  war  that  would  have  been  avoided  by  the  knowledge  on 
the  part  of  Germany  and  Austria  that  aggression  would 
array  the  whole  world  against  them.  The  arguments  that 
Senator  Borah  advances  in  this  regard  are  arguments  that 
are  the  figments  of  his  imagination.  The  very  object  of 
the  League  is  to  prevent  war,  not  to  fight  little  wars,  and 
the  clearer  the  obligation  to  exert  economic  pressure  and 
military  force  against  the  aggressor,  the  greater  the  im- 
probability that  wars  will  come.  Instead  of  being  a  source 
of  increased  expense,  the  League  will  greatly  reduce  ex- 
penses to  the  government  of  the  United  Stats,  first,  in  re- 

1  From  an   Address   at  the  Methodist  Church  in  Augusta,  Georgia, 
March  23,  1919. 


296  TAFT    PAPERS   ON   LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

ducing  armaments,  and  second,  in  reducing  the  number  of 
the  wars  into  which  it  is  likely  to  be  drawn. 

If  the  provisions  I  have  mentioned  were  limited  to  the 
members  of  the  League  they  would  lack  comprehensiveness 
in  preserving  world  peace,  because  it  may  be  some  time  be- 
fore two-thirds  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  conclude 
that  it  is  wise  to  admit  to  permanent  membership  in  the 
League  countries  like  Germany,  Austria,  Turkey  or  Bul- 
garia, or  countries  with  no  sense  of  responsibility  and  so 
weak  in  police  power  and  self-restraint  as  not  to  be  able  to 
perform  the  covenants  of  the  League.  To  correct  what 
otherwise  would  be  a  defect  in  the  constitution  of  the  League, 
there  is  a  declaration  that  the  League  is  interested  in  war 
between  any  countries  whether  members  of  the  League  or 
not,  and  will  take  such  action  as  the  peace  of  the  world 
may  require  in  order  to  prevent  injury  from  such  a  war. 

The  four  great  steps  to  secure  peace  are,  first,  reduction 
of  armament;  second,  union  against  conquest  by  arms; 
third,  peaceful  settlements  of  differences  and  a  covenant 
not  to  begin  war  until  every  effort  has  been  made  to  secure 
such  peaceful  settlement,  together  with  a  world  boycott  of 
the  outlaw  nation  and  the  exercise  of  military  compulsion, 
if  necessary;  and  finally,  fourth,  the  inhibition  of  all  secret 
treaties  and  an  enforcement  of  open  diplomacy.  Nothing 
like  it  has  heretofore  been  attempted  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  The  problem  of  German  peace  has  forced  it. 

We  have  fourteen  nations,  seven  of  them  being  the  na- 
tions who  won  the  war  with  Germany,  agreeing  through 
their  representatives  at  Paris  upon  these  steps.  The  ques- 
tion now  is  whether  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  is  to 
destroy  the  possibility  of  this  advance  in  the  civilization  of 


TO    MAKE    PEACE    SECURE  297 

the  world  by  its  vote  against  the  action  of  the  President 
and  against  what  I  verily  believe  to  be  the  opinion  of  the 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  I  would  un- 
hesitatingly vote  for  the  Covenant  just  as  it  was  unanimously 
reported  by  the  committee  of  representatives  of  the  fourteen 
countries  engaged  in  drafting  the  treaty.  I  am  hopeful, 
however,  that  the  fears  of  some,  who  conscientiously  favor 
the  treaty,  as  to  certain  possibilities  of  danger  may  be  re- 
moved by  more  express  limitation.  The  treaty  is  in  process 
of  amendment  now  and  any  clarifying  amendments  should 
be  welcomed  in  order,  if  possible,  to  secure  ratification.  I 
believe  the  President  and  the  Commission  have  a  sense  of 
duty  in  this  regard  and  that  we  may  look  for  amendments  of 
this  character. 

What  are  the  objections  to  the  League?  They  are,  first, 
that  the  United  States  has  gotten  along  so  well  since  the 
beginning  without  being  drawn  into  the  politics  of  the  out- 
side world  that  it  ought  to  keep  out  of  them  and  ought  not 
to  involve  itself  in  a  league  of  nations.  This  opinion,  I  think 
we  may  say,  is  confined  to  a  small  body  of  persons  rep- 
resented by  Senators  Borah,  Reed  and  Poindexter.  If  there 
are  others  who  take  this  position  in  the  Senate,  their  names 
do  not  occur  to  me.  All  the  other  members  of  the  Senate 
who  have  objected  to  this  covenant  have  averred  that  they 
are  in  favor  of  a  league  of  nations  to  secure  peace.  If 
they  are,  they  are  in  favor  of  something  that  binds  the 
United  States  to  some  kind  of  an  obligation  to  help  in  the 
preservation  of  peace.  A  league  of  nations  means  some- 
thing that  binds  one  nation  to  another  in  respect  to  certain 
obligations.  That  is  the  etymological  derivation  of  the 
word  and  that  is  its  actual  meaning.  If  they  are  therefore 
in  favor  of  a  league  of  nations,  they  have,  by  that  fact,  ad- 


298  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

mitted  the  necessity  of  departing  from  the  traditional  policy 
of  the  United  States  to  enter  into  no  alliances  with  foreign 
nations,  because  a  league  is  an  alliance,  and,  as  a  league 
contains  obligations,  it  must  entangle  the  United  States  to 
the  extent  at  least  of  the  performance  of  those  obliga- 
tions. 

We  cannot  avoid  being  affected  by  international  quarrels 
in  Europe.  It  is  economical  for  us  to  unite  with  the  other 
countries  to  maintain  peace  instead  of  waiting  until  we  are 
driven  into  war  and  then  making  a  superhuman  effort  to 
defend  ourselves  against  a  war  that  has  meantime  grown 
into  enormous  proportions  because  of  our  failure,  and  that 
of  the  other  nations,  of  the  world  to  suppress  it  in  its  in- 
ception. 

The  Executive  Council  has  no  power  to  fix  the  obligation. 
It  does  not  determine  conclusively  for  any  member  of  the 
League  any  fact  upon  which  the  obligation  of  that  member 
becomes  immediate.  Jts  duties  are  executive  in  the  sense 
that  it  acquires  all  the  necessary  information,  follows 
closely  matters  with  which  the  League  has  to  do  and  takes 
action  in  the  sense  of  making  a  recommendation  to  the 
various  Powers  as  to  how  the  difficulties  shall  be  met.  It 
furnishes  a  means  by  which  the  Powers  confer  together 
in  order  that  they  may  agree  upon  joint  action;  but  in  no 
sense  is  any  power  delegated  to  it  to  declare  war,  to  wage 
war,  to  declare  a  boycott,  to  limit  armament  or  to  force 
arbitration. 

The  only  two  things  which  it  does,  things  that  can  be 
said  in  any  way  to  be  binding  on  nations,  are,  first,  not  to 
increase  the  limit  of  armament  to  which  a  nation  has  agreed 
to  confine  itself  after  full  consideration,  and,  second  (where 


TO    MAKE    PEACE    SECURE  299 

jurisdiction  is  not  taken  from  it  by  reference  to  the  Body 
of  Delegates)  if  it  can  act  unanimously,  to  make  a  report 
of  settlement  of  a  difficulty  such  that  if  the  defendant  nation 
complies  with  it,  the  plaintiff  nation  may  not  begin  war  to 
get  more.  It  may  propose  measures  to  the  members  of  the 
League  by  which  they  can  carry  out  its  recommendations  of 
settlement,  but  it  does  not  decide  upon  those  measures  and 
it  is  left  to  the  members  of  the  League  to  agree  whether 
they  desire  to  use  force  to  carry  out  recommendations  or 
not.  In  every  other  respect  its  action  is  advisory  and  of  a 
recommending  character. 

Still  less  can  there  be  said  to  be  sovereign  authority  dele- 
gated to  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The  Body  of  Delegates 
selects  the  four  countries  whose  representatives  are  to  enter 
the  Executive  Council.  It  elects,  by  two-thirds  vote,  new 
members  to  the  League  after  they  have  shown  themselves 
able  to  fulfill  the  covenants  of  the  League.  It  may  be  sub- 
stituted as  a  mediating  body  and  a  body  to  recommend  set- 
tlement in  place  of  the  Executive  Council.  It  may  also  ad- 
vise the  reconsideration  by  members  of  the  League  of  treaties 
which  have  become  inapplicable  to  international  conditions 
and  which  may  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world.  This  is 
all. 

It  is  impossible,  therefore,  for  one  looking  through  the 
Covenant,  without  a  determined  purpose  to  formulate  ob- 
jections to  it,  to  find  any  transfer  of  sovereignty  to  the 
Executive  Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The  whole 
theory  of  the  Covenant  is  that  the  nations  are  to  act  to- 
gether under  obligations  of  the  Covenant,  that  they  are  to 
come  to  an  agreement,  through  these  two  bodies,  but  that 
the  action  to  be  taken  is  to  be  determined  by  each  nation 
on  its  conscience  under  its  agreement,  and  that  when  the 


3OO  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF   NATIONS 

action  is  to  be  taken  it  is  to  be  taken  by  that  nation  in  ac- 
cord with  its  constitution. 


LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  HAS  NOT  DELAYED 
THE  PEACE ' 

The  project  of  the  League  of  Nations  has,  in  the  minds  of 
its  opponents,  to  bear  the  blame  for  many  things.  Ac- 
cording to  their  view,  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  League  of 
Nations,  peace  would  now  have  been  declared  and  every- 
thing would  be  smooth  and  easy  in  the  sphere  of  the  late 
war.  It  is  their  view  that  only  the  absurd  insistence  of 
idealists  has  postponed  the  settlement  needed  to  produce 
normal  times.  The  fact  is  entirely  otherwise.  The  League 
of  Nations  was  made  the  first  subject  of  consideration  by 
the  conference  because  it  could  be  more  promptly  and  easily 
disposed  of  than  other  issues  rearing  their  ugly  heads  among 
the  Allies.  These  latter  needed  earnest  and  painful  con- 
sideration in  confidential  interviews  between  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  leading  powers.  The  full  facts  were  not 
known  to  the  conference  and  the  issues  were  not  ready  for 
open  discussion. 

The  delay  in  fixing  the  terms  of  the  League  would  not 
have  happened  but  for  the  need  of  settling  the  other  ques- 
tions. One  of  the  most  troublesome  of  these  is  the  amount 
of  the  indemnities  which  France  and  Belgium  and  Italy  and 
England  and  Serbia  should  exact  from  the  Central  Powers. 
It  is  complicated  with  the  question  how  much  the  Central 
Powers  can  pay.  Each  premier  has  found  himself  em- 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Mar.  29,  1919. 


LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  HAS  NOT  DELAYED  PEACE    30! 

barrassed  by  promises  to  his  people  as  to  what  the  treaty 
must  contain.  In  this  regard,  each  one  has  found  that  his 
claims,  based  only  on  the  viewpoint  of  himself  and  his 
countrymen,  must  be  moderated. 

Another  burning  question  is  that  of  the  boundary  of 
Italy  on  the  Adriatic.  Italy  insists  on  having  Fiume  be- 
cause the  port  has  probably  a  majority  of  Italians  in  it. 
But  it  has  always  been  the  port  of  the  Slav  dependency 
of  Hungary  and  it  is  surrounded  by  a  country  with  which 
it  has  the  closest  business  connection,  a  country  which  is 
overwhelmingly  Slav. 

It  is  the  normal  and  appropriate  seaport  of  the  projected 
Jugo-Slav  State.  Sonnino,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  Italy,  is  reported  to  be  uncompromising  in  his  de- 
mand. Fiume  has  become  a  political  issue  in  Italy.  Or- 
lando, a  man  of  more  judicial  and  conciliatory  mind,  is  said 
to  be  embarrassed  by  Sonnino.  Both  are  affected  by  the 
fact  that  the  Italian  elections  are  near  at  hand. 

Then,  as  a  background  to  the  whole  settlement,  there  is 
the  question  of  the  defense  of  France  against  another  and 
sudden  attack  by  Germany.  Marshal  Foch  and  the  French 
military  strategists  see  no  complete  protection  unless  France, 
in  some  way,  controls  the  crossing  of  the  Rhine.  A  pro- 
posal which  has  received  great  support  in  the  French  papers 
and  which  has  been  urged  by  France  has  been  the  creation 
of  a  buffer  state  called  Rhineland.  The  objection  to  this 
is  that  Rhineland  is  really  German.  Its  separation  from 
Germany  is  not  within  the  basis  of  the  armistice.  It  has 
never  within  centuries  been  French.  Its  sympathies  would 
all  be  with  Germany.  It  would  create  a  new  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, with  the  boot  on  the  other  leg.  It  would  be  a  con- 
stant source  of  irritation  in  Germany  and  a  persistent  in- 


3O2  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

vitation  to  a  new  war  by  her  when  opportunity  offered. 

Lloyd  George  is  seeking  to  make  such  a  frontier  unneces- 
sary by  a  required  limitation  on  conscription  in  Germany 
and  an  agreed  limitation  of  armament  among  the  Allied 
Powers.  This,  of  course,  would  become  a  part  of 
the  machinery  of  the  League  of  Nations  for  securing  peace. 

The  question  of  Hungary,  which  is  now  being  made 
prominent  by  the  threat  of  Bolshevism  or  its  actual  appear- 
ance at  Budapest  and  in  the  surrounding  country,  is  also 
a  difficult  one.  Unscrupulous  leaders  of  Hungarian  politics 
seem  to  have  invited  Bolshevism  in  order  to  fight  a  settle- 
ment which  would  limit  Hungary  to  the  Magyar  country 
and  the  Danubian  plains.  The  Magyars  are  a  masterful 
race,  a  race  of  aristocrats,  who  have  arbitrarily  oppressed 
the  Slovaks  in  mountainous  northern  Hungary,  the 
Rumanians  in  Transylvania  and  indeed  the  Germans  where 
they  have  settled  within  the  Hungarian  kingdom.  As  they 
see  their  power  passing,  they  have  become  desperate  and 
war  threatens  again.' 

The  specter  of  Bolshevism  will  not  down.  To  charge  this 
to  delay  due  to  seeking  an  agreement  upon  the  League  of 
Nations  is  ridiculously  opposed  to  the  facts.  The  outbreak 
in  Hungary  only  demonstrates  the  necessity  for  a  strong, 
firm  league.  The  signing  of  a  treaty  which  formally  re- 
stores peace  with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  will  not 
give  us  peace  unless  there  is  guaranty  in  the  power  of 
the  united  Allies  to  compel  peace.  That  power  will  be  dis- 
solved unless  a  league  of  allies,  the  nucleus  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  shall  be  established,  not  only  to  suppress  im- 
mediate disorder,  but  also  to  settle  differences  (a  great 
number  of  which  will  at  once  arise  between  the  new  gov- 


'    OPEN   DIPLOMACY  "    SLOW  303 

ernments  established  and  the  old  ones  cut  down)   and  to 
enforce  the  settlements  peaceably  arrived  at. 

The  news  that  amendments  are  being  considered  in  the 
League  of  Nations  and  that  it  is  nearly  ready  for  incorpora- 
tion in  the  treaty  itself  demonstrates  that  it  has  not  inter- 
fered at  all  with  reaching  terms  of  peace  with  Germany. 
The  truth  is,  a  league  of  nations  is  necessary  to  a  satis- 
factory treaty.  It  helps  and  speeds  it. 


"  OPEN  DIPLOMACY  "  SLOW  1 

The  fluid  conditions  in  the  countries  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers lead  all  to  press  for  a  speedy  peace  treaty  that  shall 
stabilize  them.  But  this  very  fluidity  adds  to  the  com- 
plexity of  the  problem  and  delays  its  solution.  The  Allies 
are  also  embarrassed  by  the  unrest  of  their  troops,  who  re- 
garded the  armistice  as  the  end  of  the  war  and  wish  now 
to  be  released  and  to  go  home.  Yet  armies  of  occupation, 
and  perhaps  armies  for  further  campaigns,  are  necessary. 
Then,  between  the  seven  Powers  which  fought  the  war,  the 
peace  terms  are  not  easy  to  agree  upon  —  the  treatment 
Germany  is  to  receive,  the  amount  of  indemnity  -she  is  to 
pay,  the  restrictions,  if  any,  upon  her  competition  in  the 
world  trade  pending  the  slow  industrial  recovery  of  France 
and  Belgium,  the  balancing  considerations  of  the  heavy  in- 
demnity and  her  opportunity  for  freedom  in  trade  to  enable 
her  to  pay  it,  the  defensive  frontier  of  France,  the  Italian 
frontier  on  the  Adriatic  shore,  the  boundaries  of  the  new 
States,  the  definition  of  neighborhood  rights,  the  Balkan 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Apr.  5,  1919. 


304      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

boundaries,  the  autonomous  units  in  Asia  Minor,  the  dis- 
position of  the  German  colonies  —  all  involve  controversy, 
some  of  it  of  the  most  acute  and  irritating  character. 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  conference  was  delayed 
by  the  need  to  gather  together,  from  fourteen  nations  from 
all  over  the  world,  men  who  are  to  frame  the  treaty.  Special 
commissions  had  to  be  formed  to  get  at  the  facts.  Hear- 
ings had  to  be  held  for  claimants.  The  British  elections 
kept  Lloyd  George  at  home,  and  during  that  time  made  it 
impossible  for  him  to  join  in  those  confidential  interviews 
with  other  leaders  and  premiers  so  necessary  in  smoothing 
out  difficulties  and  reaching  understandings.  While  the 
making  of  the  terms  has  been  in  the  absence  of  the  defeated 
powers,  the  interests  of  the  conferees  themselves  are  often 
acutely  adverse.  Then,  too,  the  disinterested  attitude  of  the 
United  States  leads  its  representatives  to  consider  more  care- 
fully than  those  of  the  conferees  seeking  purely  selfish  ob- 
jects the  wisdom  of  restrictions  upon  Germany.  Too  great 
severity  may  defeat  its  own  purpose. 

The  treaty  is  being  negotiated  by  representatives  of  pop- 
ular constituencies  and  not  by  kings.  Explanation  is  easier 
to  one  man  than  to  a  people.  Room  has  to  be  given  for 
what  is  called  in  this  country  "buncombe."  A  show  of 
fight  must  be  made  on  hopeless  issues  for  home  consumption. 
"  Open  "  diplomacy  cannot  move  so  swiftly  as  the  old- 
fashioned  kind. 

Then,  there  is  a  more  substantial  reason  for  time  in  the 
deliberations:  the  negotiators  must  discuss  and  argue  all  of 
the  conflicting  issues  over  and  over  again  until  each  one  has 
deeply  impressed  on  him  the  real  point  of  view  of  every 
other.  This  often  takes  the  form  of  heated  criticism  and 
even  recrimination,  apparently  most  discouraging  to  a  pros- 


RUSSIA,    FRANCE,    DANZIG  305 

pect  of  agreement  but  necessary  to  clear  the  air.  Such  talk 
is  not  waste  of  time.  It  is  the  usual  and  the  only  way  to 
reach  a  compromise. 

The  armistice  in  our  Spanish  war  was  signed  on  the  I2th 
of  August,  1898,  and  the  treaty  of  Paris  was  not  signed  till 
December  12,  a  period  of  four  months.  This  was  in  con- 
nection with  a  war  which  had  only  begun  in  the  previous 
April.  And  it  was  a  peace  which  involved  the  settlement 
of  rather  simple  issues  between  only  two  nations. 

The  period  between  the  armistice  and  the  treaty  of  peace 
in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  was  about  the  same  and  there, 
also,  the  issues  were  simple  and  limited  to  two  countries. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  convened  to  arrange  the  map  of 
Europe  after  the  Napoleonic  wars,  took  a  year  for  its  delib- 
erations, and  the  conferees  had  only  kings  and  emperors 
to  satisfy.  We  see,  therefore,  that  the  delegates  now  at 
Paris  have  not  been  unreasonably  slow  in  their  work,  con- 
sidering the  great  detail  and  the  many  conflicting  interests 
they  have  to  settle  and  agree  upon. 


RUSSIA,  FRANCE,  DANZIG1 

One  may  admit  that  a  great  mistake  was  made  in  not 
sending  large  armies  to  Archangel  and  Vladivostok  to  es- 
tablish an  Eastern  front  in  Russia  during  the  war.  Had 
this  been  done,  Bolshevism  could  have  been  then  repressed 
and  an  opportunity  for  a  Russian  constituent  assembly  and 
popular  government  could  have  been  secured.  But  that  is 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Apr.  7,  1919. 


306  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

past  history  and  the  conference  at  Paris  is  dealing  with 
present  conditions.  One  of  these  is  the  difficulty  of  main- 
taining large  armies  at  this  juncture  to  enter  upon  a  mili- 
tary crusade  against  Bolshevism  in  Russia.  All  the  Allies 
hope  to  do  is  to  prevent  its  spread  into  other  countries.  It 
will  probably  burn  itself  out  in  Russia  because  of  its  un- 
fulfilled and  impossible  promises. 

The  issue  with  France  as  to  proper  provisions  for  her 
safety  is  not  by  any  means  so  clear  as  these  cocksure 
statesmen  and  correspondents  would  have  their  readers 
believe. 

The  razing  of  fortresses  on  the  German  front,  the  en- 
forced limit  of  German  armament,  the  restriction  upon  Ger- 
man conscription,  the  appropriation  of  the  German  navy, 
the  taking  over  of  German  guns  and  the  united  power  of 
the  League  of  Nations  to  defend  France  and  restrain  Ger- 
many will  in  the  long  run  be  far  better  protection  to  French 
territory  and  independence  than  what  France  now  seeks  at 
the  instance  of  her  military  strategists. 

The  hesitation  over  Danzig  is  regarded  as  another  damn- 
ing proof  of  a  weak  yielding  to  German  truculence.  Dan- 
zig is  a  German  city.  The  people  object  to  Polish  sov- 
ereignty. It  is  the  only  practical  port  of  access  to  the 
sea  for  Poland.  Can  it  be  made  a  free  port  for  full  use 
by  Poland  without  complete  sovereignty?  This  is  being 
argued  in  the  conference.  It  is  not  a  question  which  an- 
swers itself.  One  may  differ  with  the  statesmen,  corres- 
pondents and  critics  and  still  not  be  guilty  of  basely  betray- 
ing Poland  or  truckling  to  Germany.  A  similar  question 
is  presented,  as  to  Fiume,  between  the  Italians  and  the 
Jugo-Slavs. 


THE   ROUND   ROBIN  307 


THE  ROUND  ROBIN  l 

The  League  of  Nations  is  an  organization  which  cannot 
disclose  its  advantages  in  the  rapid  manner  an  army  or  a 
military  expedition  can.  Its  operation  is  bound  to  be  slow 
and  cumbersome  at  first.  Its  influence  on  its  members 
and  on  outside  nations  in  avoiding  war  and  promoting  jus- 
tice will  grow  as  the  real  strength  of  the  uniting  and  common 
covenants  comes  to  be  clearly  perceived.  Experience  under 
the  League  will  disclose  defects  and  suggest  useful  changes 
to  make  it  more  practical  and  effective.  But  the  agreement 
upon  a  covenant  providing  for  reduction  and  limitation  of 
armament,  for  union  of  nations  to  prevent  conquest,  for 
definite  postponement  of  war  till  after  every  opportunity 
for  peaceful  settlement  has  been  secured,  and  for  spreading 
international  agreements  on  the  table  before  the  world  is 
a  series  of  steps  forward  toward  permanent  peace  which 
only  "  ready  made  "  military  correspondents  can  belittle. 

If  the  cabled  information  as  to  the  character  of  the 
amendments  adopted  is  reliable,  we  may  now  confidently 
hope  that  the  Senators  who  signed  the  Round  Robin  will 
be  able  to  vote  for  the  League  as  it  is  amended  without 
being  embarrassed  in  any  degree  by  their  signatures  to  that 
document.  It  will  be  remembered  that  they  merely  said  that 
the  Covenant  in  its  then  form  was  unacceptable  to  them, 
which  of  course  does  not  prevent  their  consistently  sup- 
porting the  Covenant  as  at  present  amended.  The  further 
statement  in  the  Round  Robin  was  that  they  thought  the 
peace  treaty  ought  to  be  adopted  at  once  and  that  the  League 
should  be  postponed  for  further  consideration.  Of  course 

1  From  an  article  in  the  Public  Ledger  April  12,  1919. 


308  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

such  a  view,  which  rested  on  the  importance  of  having  peace 
come  at  once  without  delaying  it  for  the  sake  of  framing  a 
league  of  nations  covenant,  ceases  to  apply  when  the  peace 
treaty  has  been  signed,  with  the  League  of  Nations  Cov- 
enant as  a  part  of  it,  and  indeed  as  an  indispensable  con- 
dition to  its  effective  enforcement.  The  Round  Robin 
Senators  may  well  say  that  the  second  objection  is  removed, 
because  now  to  insist  upon  opposing  or  amending  the  League, 
which  is  web  and  woof  of  the  peace  treaty  submitted  to 
them,  is  to  postpone  peace  rather  than  to  expedite  it. 


GUARANTIES  OF  ART.  X  » 

It  has  been  suggested  that  this  Article  X  is  in  the  interest 
of  Great  Britain,  that  it  is  designed  to  preserve  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  her  far-flung  empire  through  the  aid  of 
the  United  States  and  pther  countries.  There  is  no  founda- 
tion for  such  a  suggestion.  Can  any  one  point  out  in  the 
history  of  the  last  fifty  years  any  war  against  Great  Britain 
by  a  foreign  country  to  take  away  territory  from  her  ?  No ; 
war  of  that  sort  is  not  ordinarily  begun  against  a  nation 
as  powerful  as  Great  Britain.  Wars  are  begun  as  Austria 
began  the  war  against  Servia,  namely,  because  Servia  was 
a  weak  nation  and  Austria  a  strong  one ;  and  this  guaranty 
is  for  the  benefit  of  the  weaker  nations  whom  it  is  to  our  in- 
terest to  protect  against  a  war  of  conquest  that  will  ulti- 
mately involve  the  world,  as  the  attack  upon  Servia  did. 

Another  objection  made  to  this  Article  is  that  if  Ireland 
were  to  rebel  against  England  and  seek  to  establish  her- 

1  From  an  address  at  Kansas  City,  April  19,  1919. 


RELIGIOUS   AND    RACIAL    FREEDOM  309 

self  as  an  independent  republic,  England  could  invite,  under 
this  Article  X,  the  other  nations  of  the  world  to  assist  her 
in  suppressing  the  rebellion.  This  is  utterly  unfounded,  be- 
cause Article  X  is  only  an  undertaking  to  preserve  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  against  external  aggres- 
sion. Nations  must  take  care  of  their  own  revolutions,  and, 
if  their  conduct  of  government  is  such  that  revolutions 
occur  and  new  nations  are  established  out  of  old  ones,  there 
is  nothing  in  Article  X  to  prevent  this  happening. 


RELIGIOUS  AND  RACIAL  FREEDOM  * 

News  comes  from  Paris  that  the  effort  of  a  committee 
of  the  Jews  to  secure,  in  the  constitution  of  the  League, 
a  declaration  in  favor  of  religious  tolerance  and  the  means 
of  securing  it  has  failed.  This  is  not  accurate.  There  is 
in  the  League  Covenant  a  provision  that  in  all  countries 
which  are  to  be  governed  by  a  mandatory  of  the  League, 
the  charter,  under  which  the  mandatory  acts,  shall  require 
protection  of  religious  freedom.  This  provision  will  apply 
in  Constantinople,  in  Palestine,  in  Syria,  in  Armenia,  in 
Mesopotamia  and  in  the  former  colonies  of  Germany  in 
Africa  and  the  Pacific. 

The  Executive  Council  may  add  to  such  general  provi- 
sions detailed  guaranties  and  machinery  to  make  the  general 
declaration  effective.  The  mandatories  have  to  render 
yearly  reports  of  their  stewardship,  so  that  violations  of 
such  guaranties  may  be  brought  before  the  organs  of  the 
League  for  remedy. 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Apr.  24,   1919. 


3IO  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

The  failure  of  the  application  for  a  general  declaration 
in  respect  to  freedom  of  religion  was  doubtless  due  to  the 
sensitiveness  of  the  British  colonies  and,  indeed,  of  the 
United  States,  toward  the  attempt  of  Japan  to  obtain  a 
declaration  in  favor  of  social  equality  and  against  racial 
discrimination  in  any  state  of  the  League.  The  American 
representatives  probably  felt  that  such  a  declaration,  however 
neutral  in  its  effect  in  this  country  because  our  Constitution 
secures  the  equal  protection  of  the  law  to  all,  would  be  suc- 
cessfully used  to  defeat  the  ratification  of  the  League  Cov- 
enant as  part  of  the  treaty.  They  were  therefore  obliged 
to  sacrifice  the  clause  securing  religious  tolerance. 

But  there  still  remains  an  opportunity  to  achieve  every 
useful  and  practical  end  in  regard  to  religious  freedom. 
There  exists  no  danger  of  pogroms  and  oppressive  laws 
against  the  Jews  in  the  United  States  or  Britain  or  France 
or  Italy.  It  exists  only  in  certain  states  like  Poland, 
Rumania,  the  Ukraine  and  possibly  in  the  Czecho-Slav  and 
Jugo-Slav  countries.  '  Of  these,  Rumania  is  the  chief  of- 
fender. Poland,  under  Paderewski,  also  shows  obduracy  in 
the  matter.  All  these  states  are,  so  to  speak,  children  of  the 
League;  they  may  well  be  required,  as  a  condition  of  their 
national  independence  and  the  protection  they  are  to  en- 
joy from  the  League,  to  give  pledges  against  racial  and 
religious  discrimination  in  their  laws  and  in  favor  of  com- 
plete religious  freedom.  Means  should  be  retained  by  the 
League  to  enforce  the  pledges. 

Pledges  were  required  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1879 
from  Bulgaria,  Servia  and  Rumania  that  their  fundamental 
laws  would  put  Jews  on  an  equality  with  all  other  citizens 
and  protect  them  in  the  exercise  of  their  religion.  Bulgaria 
and  Servia  faithfully  complied,  but  Rumania  deliberately 


SECRET    TREATY    PROVISIONS  3!  I 

and  dishonestly  evaded,  and  dishonored,  her  solemn  obliga- 
tion. If  now  she  is  to  receive  Transylvania  from  Hungary 
by  decree  of  the  League,  she  may  well  be  put  under  effective 
bond  to  give  to  her  Jewish  people  that  freedom  and  justice 
which  she  has  faithlessly  denied  to  them  for  forty  years. 
Poland,  too,  which  was  long  the  only  refuge  for  the  op- 
pressed and  unhappy  children  of  Israel,  should  be  made, 
as  the  price  of  her  restoration  to  nationality,  to  issue  a  new 
charter  of  religious  liberty  and  civic  equality  to  her  Jewish 
citizens. 

The  Jews  are  not  the  only  denomination  who  need  pro- 
tection. There  are  Unitarians  and  others  who,  in  some  of 
these  new  states,  have  suffered  for  their  faith.  It  will  be 
an  important  accomplishment  if  the  League  uses  its  power 
to  remove  this  last  vestige  of  medievalism. 


SECRET  TREATY  PROVISIONS  THAT  ARE  AT 

THE  ROOT  OF  THE  CRISIS  AT  THE 

PARIS  CONFERENCE1 

ITALIAN    CLAIMS   TO   FIUME   WOULD,   IF   GRANTED,    SOW   THE 

SEEDS  OF   TROUBLE  AND  DISCONTENT   AMONG   THE 

JUGO-SLAVS 

The  peace  treaty  with  Austria-Hungary  is  delayed  by  the 
controversy  over  the  disposition  of  the  port  of  Fiume,  near 
the  head  of  the  Adriatic.  When  the  war  broke  out  in  1914 
the  Entente  Allies  and  Germany  wooed  Italy  intensively  to 
induce  her  to  join  their  respective  sides.  The  obligations  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  had  not  been  made  public,  but  it  was 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger,  Apr.  25,  1919. 


312       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

understood  that  Italy  was  bound  to  lend  her  aid  to  Austria 
and  Germany  in  case  of  a  defensive  war.  Italy  positively 
insisted  that  this  was  not  such  a  war,  and  so  maintained 
her  neutrality  for  a  time.  Then  she  was  induced  by 
promises  of  the  Entente  Allies  (Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia)  to  declare  war  on  Austria  and  subsequently  on 
Germany.  Her  course  was  criticized  as  one  wholly  in- 
fluenced by  greed  of  territory.  The  treaty  by  which  she 
became  an  ally  of  France  and  Great  Britain  was  secret, 
but  enough  was  known  to  enable  Italy's  critics  to  aver  that 
it  was  the  consummation  of  a  successful  bid.  Italy's  de- 
fenders met  these  attacks  by  showing  that  she  was  entitled 
under  the  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  be  consulted  be- 
fore Austria  attacked  Serbia,  and  by  revealing  the  bad  faith 
of  Germany  and  Austria  in  Italy's  war  with  Turkey  and 
their  secret  aid  to  the  Sultan.  This  aroused  sympathy  with 
Italy,  and  it  was  assumed  that  the  heart  cry  of  the  Irre- 
dentists for  a  restoration  of  Italy's  territory  everywhere  had 
been  satisfied  by  an  agreement  that  Trentino  and  Trieste 
should  become  hers. 

It  now  appears  that  the  Dalmatian  coast  was  also  included 
in  territory  promised  to  Italy.  As  to  Fiume,  Italians  per- 
haps form  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  but  it  is,  and  has 
been  for  years,  a  Croatian  city.  It  is,  and  has  been  always, 
the  port  by  which  the  solidly  Slav  population  in  the  country 
behind  the  city  reach  the  sea. 

Italy  seeks  to  push  the  principle  of  self-determination  too 
far.  The  unit  of  population  in  which  the  majority  is  to 
determine  the  nation's  control  should  include  the  back 
country  with  which  the  port  is  united. 

Unless  some  explanation  is  given,  Italy's  insistence  will 
tend  to  revive  the  charge  that  greed  was  her  chief  motive 


ANALYSIS    OF    THE    LEAGUE    COVENANT    AS    AMENDED       313 

in  this  war.  Our  entrance  into  the  war  was  accompanied 
by  a  declaration  in  favor  of  only  just  restitution  of  ter- 
ritory and  upon  the  assumption,  often  stated,  that  it  was  not 
a  war  of  conquest  by  the  Allies.  The  terms  of  the  armistice 
followed  these  lines. 

If  the  facts  are  correctly  stated,  the  public  opinion  of  the 
United  States  and  the  disinterested  world  will  sustain  the 
President  in  resisting  Italy's  determination  to  take  over 
Fiume  and  close  Croatian  access  to  the  sea.  The  question 
is  one  of  Italian  politics.  Italy  has  taken  possession  of 
Fiume  with  the  strong  hand  of  conqueror  against  the 
Croatians.  Orlando  may  lose  power  in  the  Italian  Parlia- 
ment if  he  fails  to  stand  by  the  Italian  claim.  Sonnino, 
his  colleague  at  the  conference  and  his  associate  as  premier, 
is  rigid  and  uncompromising.  He  would  probably  resist 
Orlando  if  the  latter  yielded.  The  situation  is  therefore 
acute.  But  can  Italy  afford  to  break,  on  such  an  issue, 
with  the  conference?  One  would  think  not.  The  Presi- 
dent would  seem  to  be  clearly  right  in  maintaining  that  at 
least  Fiume  be  made  a  free  port  for  Croatia  as  Danzig  is 
to  be  for  Poland.  If  Italy's  wish  were  to  prevail,  the  set- 
tlement, with  palpable  injustice  in  it,  would  create  a  sense 
of  wrong  among  the  Jugo-Slavs  that  would  return  to  plague 
Italy  when  most  inconvenient. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  LEAGUE  COVENANT 
AS  AMENDED1 

The  amendments  to  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions adopted  in  Paris  on  Monday  will  bear  careful  study, 

1  Article  in  Public  Ledger  Apr.  30,  1919. 


314       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

and  perhaps  it  is  unwise  hastily  to  express  a  confident 
opinion.  But  several  readings  suggest  the  following  com- 
ment: 

In  the  first  place,  the  language  and  arrangement  of  the 
articles  have  been  greatly  improved.  The  use  of  different 
terms  to  mean  the  same  thing,  which  tended  to  prevent  an 
easy  reading  of  the  document,  has  been  largely  corrected. 
Provisions  having  immediate  relation  to  one  another  have 
been  assembled  where  they  belong,  avoiding  application  of 
them  to  subjects  or  countries  which  they  were  not  intended 
to  affect.  Then  names,  misleading  or  clumsy,  have  been 
changed.  The  Executive  Council,  which  was  and  is  not 
executive  but  advisory,  has  become  the  Council.  The  Body 
of  Delegates  has  become  the  Assembly,  a  much  more  suit- 
able term. 

Second,  rules  of  construction  that  ought  to  have  ob- 
tained in  interpreting  the  original  Covenant  are  now  made 
express  and  relieve  the  real  doubts  of  friends  and  supporters 
of  the  League.  The  most  important  of  these,  perhaps,  is 
the  privilege  specifically  reserved  to  any  member  of  the 
League  to  withdraw  from  it  after  two  years'  notice  and 
after  a  compliance  with  its  obligation  under  international 
law  and  under  the  League  Covenant  incurred  before  with- 
drawal. This  gives  any  nation  an  opportunity  to  test  the 
operation  of  the  League  and  its  usefulness  and  to  avoid 
undue  and  unreasonable  danger  or  burden  in  the  future 
which  actual  trial  may  develop.  Moreover,  taken  with  the 
power  of  amendment  which  can  be  effected  by  a  unanimous 
vote  of  the  nine  countries  whose  representatives  compose  the 
Council  and  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  League, 
there  is  ample  opportunity  for  such  a  country  as  the  United 
States  to  secure  a  revision  of  the  Covenant  and  a  reexami- 


ANALYSIS    OF    THE   LEAGUE    COVENANT    AS   AMENDED       315 

nation  of  the  status  of  the  states  composing  the  League 
after  peace  has  stabilized  conditions  and  has  shown  where 
changes  should  be  made.  We  are  so  important  a  member  of 
an  effective  world  league,  and  so  indispensable  to  its  suc- 
cessful working,  because  of  our  impartial  position  and 
world  power,  that  an  announcement  of  our  purpose  to  with- 
draw unless  amendments  were  made  would  be  most  per- 
suasive. In  this  view  Mr.  Root's  suggestion,  that  it  would 
be  well  to  reexamine  treaty  provisions  made  just  after  the 
war  in  the  light  of  the  test  of  five  years  or  more  of  peace, 
can  be  carried  out. 

The  second  change  of  the  same  character  is  the  provision 
that,  except  where  otherwise  specifically  provided,  the  action 
of  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  shall  be  by  unanimous  vote. 
The  original  covenant,  properly  interpreted,  meant  this,  but 
it  is  of  great  importance  to  remove  objections  of  those  who 
did  not  think  so.  There  are  some  who  believe  that  such 
required  unanimity  will  make  the  League  ineffective  and  that 
a  majority  would  have  sufficed.  But  progress  toward  com- 
plete international  cooperation  in  a  new  field  like  this  must 
be  gradual,  and  must,  for  the  present,  leave  safeguards 
to  nations  against  abuse  of  joint  power  which,  experience 
may  show,  can  be  dispensed  with  later.  The  required 
unanimity  in  the  action  of  the  Council  is  very  important  in 
the  answer  it  gives  to  the  claim  that  under  Articles  X  and 
XVI  the  United  States  may  be  required  to  send  expedi- 
tionary forces  into  distant  parts  of  the  world  to  defend 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  a  country  with  which  we 
have  no  relation  of  interest  or  to  suppress  remote  wars  not 
affecting  us.  Such  expeditions  are  to  be  planned  and  recom- 
mended by  the  Council,  and  the  plan  is  to  be  accepted  in 
the  discretion  of  the  countries  to  whom  the  recommendation 


316       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

is  addressed.  The  plan  would  certainly  mark  the  limit  of 
the  obligation  of  the  nations  to  whom  it  is  presented.  The 
United  States  will  have  a  representative  on  the  Council, 
whose  vote  must  approve  the  plan  before  its  presentation. 
Is  it  likely,  then,  that  the  plan  will  be  unreasonable  in  pro- 
posing an  undue  share  of  the  League's  work  to  the  United 
States?  May  we  not  be  sure  that  what  is  to  be  done  will 
be  apportioned  according  to  the  convenience  and  natural 
interest  of  the  members  of  the  League,  because  it  must  in  ef- 
fect be  by  mutual  agreement? 

It  is  now  made  clear  that  under  Article  VIII  the  limit 
of  armament  for  each  country,  under  a  general  plan  of 
reduction  proposed  by  the  Council,  is  only  to  be  adopted 
and  made  binding  as  a  covenant  for  each  member  of  the 
League  after  its  full  examination  and  acceptance  by  that 
member.  Moreover,  there  is  to  be  a  reexamination  of  the 
plan  and  the  limits  every  ten  years,  and  meantime  a  specific 
limit  may  be  increased  by  consent  of  the  Council. 

It  is  now  made  an  express  provision  that  only  nations  who 
choose  to  accept  the  duty  may  be  made  mandatories  of  the 
League.  This  removes  another  objection  that  was  strongly 
pressed.  We  do  not  have  to  take  charge  of  Constantinople 
or  Armenia  unless  we  choose  to  do  so. 

One  important  change  made  by  addition  is  the  result  of 
Mr.  Root's  constructive  criticism.  Mr.  Root  thought,  and 
all  who  supported  the  plan  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
agreed  with  him,  that  the  provision  for  arbitration  ought 
to  have  required  arbitration  in  justiciable  issues,  and  he  de- 
fined what  he  thought  was  clearly  within  the  meaning  of 
that  term.  By  the  present  Article  XIII  the  members  agree 
to  submit  to  arbitration  any  dispute  which  they  recognize  as 
suitable  for  arbitration.  The  Covenant  then  declares  dis- 


ANALYSIS    OF    THE    LEAGUE    COVENANT    AS   AMENDED       317 

putes  of  the  character  described  by  Mr.  Root,  and,  as  the 
writer  recollects,  in  Mr.  Root's  language,  to  be  suitable 
for  arbitration.  Disputes  as  to  interpretations  of  treaties, 
as  to  international  law,  as  to  facts  upon  which  its  applica- 
tion turns  and  damages  for  its  breach  are  all  declared  to  be 
arbitrable,  or,  in  other  words,  justiciable.  This  imposes  on 
members  of  the  League  having  a  dispute  the  duty  of  recog- 
nizing such  disputes  to  be  arbitrable  and  to  submit  them  to 
arbitration.  Can  this  duty  be  enforced  under  the  League? 
Practically  yes.  If  a  nation  declines  to  arbitrate  such  an 
issue,  it  goes  to  the  Council  or  Assembly,  with  interested 
members  excluded.  Such  body  will  at  once  recommend 
arbitration  or  will  refer  the  issue  to  an  international  court 
of  the  League,  as  it  may,  to  determine  whether  the  issue 
is  arbitrable  under  the  obligations  of  the  Covenant  and  will 
doubtless  follow  the  judicial  advice  thus  given.  As  this 
machinery  thus  works  out  indirectly  the  result  sought  for 
in  the  plan  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  an  amendment 
to  substitute  a  court  of  the  League  to  take  up  and  decide 
such  questions  directly  will  doubtless  approve  itself  to  the 
nations. 

Mr.  Root  was  anxious  that,  in  addition  to  the  declaration 
in  the  preamble,  there  should  be  practical  recognition  of 
international  law  as  a  guiding  star  of  the  League,  its  tri- 
bunals and  its  action.  In  the  addition  to  Article  XIII, 
which  we  have  been  discussing,  we  find  such  a  recognition 
in  the  present  Article  XIV  providing  for  a  permanent 
international  court  of  justice  which  is  competent  to  hear  and 
determine  any  dispute  of  international  character  submitted 
to  it  and  to  give  an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute 
or  question  referred  to  it  by  the  Council  or  Assembly. 

The  provision  for  mediation  and  recommendation  of  set- 


318       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tlement  in  the  first  report  of  the  Covenant,  which  met  Mr. 
Root's  unqualified  approval,  has  not  been  changed,  except 
that  the  unanimity  required  for  an  effective  recommendation 
by  the  Body  of  Delegates  is  now  made  unanimity  by  coun- 
tries represented  in  the  Council  and  a  majority  of  the  As- 
sembly, a  change  which  makes  for  effectiveness.  Another 
important  change  is  the  addition  of  Article  XXI,  as  fol- 
lows: 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity 
of  international  engagements,  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or 
regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  securing  the 
maintenance  of  peace 

This  meets  two  of  Mr.  Root's  criticisms  in  full.  First, 
it  removes  all  doubt  that  all  present  arbitration  treaties  are 
to  stand  and  bind  the  parties  to  them  whether  members  of 
the  League  or  not,  and  relieves  those  who  were  concerned 
lest  progress  toward  peace  by  arbitration  already  made 
might  be  lost. 

Second,  it  not  only  'enables  the  United  States  to  maintain 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  was  all  that  friends  of  that 
doctrine  asked,  but  it  recognizes  it  as  a  regional  understand- 
ing for  the  securing  of  international  peace.  Never  before 
in  our  history  has  the  world  set  its  approval  upon  the  doc- 
trine as  in  this  Covenant.  It  is  really  a  great  triumph  for 
the  supporters  of  the  doctrine.  It  is  not  only  a  reservation 
in  favor  of  the  United  States  asserting  it,  but  it  is  an  af- 
firmative declaration  of  its  conventional  character  and  of  its 
value  in  securing  international  peace. 

The  exclusion  of  immigration  and  tariff  and  other  in- 
ternal and  domestic  questions  is  secured  by  the  following: 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of  them  and 
is  found  by  the  Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by  inter- 


ANALYSIS    OF    THE    LEAGUE    COVENANT    AS    AMENDED      .319 

national  law  is  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the 
Council  shall  so  report  and  shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to 
its  settlement. 

If  anything  is  clearly  settled  in  international  law,  it  is  that, 
except  where  a  nation  limits  its  rights  by  treaty,  it  may 
impose  whatever  condition  it  chooses  upon  the  admission  of 
persons  or  things  into  its  territory.  Those  who  express 
alarm  lest  the  Council  should  reach  a  different  conclusion, 
in  spite  of  international  law,  can  hardly  be  aware  how 
jealous  all  countries  must  and  will  be  of  their  right  to  deter- 
mine methods  of  raising  taxes  and  protect  their  industries, 
and  how  strenuously  many  of  the  nations  will  insist  on  the 
right  to  exclude  persons  not  desirable  as  permanent  resi- 
dents. Indeed,  Japan  has  not  urged,  in  the  conference, 
the  view  that  immigration  was  anything  but  a  domestic  ques- 
tion, but  only  pressed  for  an  express  recognition  of  racial 
equality  in  the  treatment  of  foreign  persons  resident  in  each 
country.  Even  this  the  conference  did  not  deem  it  wise 
to  grant. 

Finally,  we  come  to  Article  X,  by  which  the  members  of 
the  League  undertake  to  respect  and  preserve  against  ex- 
ternal aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  in- 
dependence of  every  member.  Mr.  Root,  as  the  writer 
understands,  strongly  favors  this  article ;  but  he  thinks  there 
should  be  a  ree'xamination  of  the  arrangements  made  under 
the  influence  of  the  recent  war,  after  conditions  have  be- 
come stabilized  by  peace,  to  remedy  the  possible  mistakes 
made  and  to  avoid  too  great  rigidity.  How  this  can  be 
brought  about  indirectly  through  powers  of  amendment  and 
withdrawal  has  already  been  pointed  out. 

The  arguments  against  Article  X  which  have  been  most 
pressed  are  those  directed  to  showing  that  under  its  obli- 


32O       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

gallons  the  United  States  can  be  forced  into  many  wars 
and  burdensome  expeditions  to  protect  countries  in  which 
it  has  no  legitimate  interests.  This  objection  will  not  bear 
examination.  If  Germany  were  to  organize  another  con- 
spiracy against  the  world,  or  if  she  and  her  old  allies,  to- 
gether with  Russia,  were  to  organize  a  militant  campaign 
for  Bolshevism  against  the  world,  we  should  wish  to  do 
our  share  in  fighting  her,  and  in  doing  so  quickly.  If  a 
stronger  nation  were  to  attack  a  weaker  nation,  a  member 
of  the  League,  our  immediate  and  selfish  interest  in  the 
matter  would  be  determined  by  the  question  whether  it  would 
develop  into  a  world  war  and  so  drag  us  in.  But  we  are 
interested  as  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations  in  main- 
taining international  justice  in  the  interest  of  international 
peace  everywhere,  and  we  should  share  the  responsibility 
and  burden.  It  was  a  mixture  of  all  these  motives  which 
carried  us  into  this  war  and  we  accepted  as  a  slogan  the 
cry:  "  The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  We 
make  this  war  to  secure  the  liberty  and  independence  of 
nations  against  the  doctrine  that  '  might  makes  right.'  ' 
This  is  all  that  Article  X  proposes.  It  is  an  answer  to 
Germany's  assertion  of  her  right  of  conquest.  It  organizes 
the  powers  of  the  world  to  maintain  the  international  com- 
mandment, "  Thou  shall  not  steal." 

To  what  extent  will  it  involve  us  in  war?  Little,  if  any. 
In  the  first  place,  the  universal  boycott,  first  to  be  applied, 
will  impose  upon  most  nations  such  a  withering  isolation  and 
starvation  that  in  most  cases  it  will  be  effective.  In  the 
second  place,  we  will  not  be  drawn  into  any  war  in  which  it 
will  not  be  reasonable  and  convenient  for  us  to  render  ef- 
ficient aid,  because  the  plan  of  the  Council  must  be  approved 
by  our  representative,  as  already  explained. 


CORRESPONDENCE  32 1 

In  the  third  place,  the  threat  of  the  universal  boycott  and 
the  union  of  overwhelming  forces  of  the  members  of  the 
League,  if  need  be,  will  hold  every  nation  from  violating 
Article  X  and  Articles  XII,  XIII  and  XV,  unless  there  is  a 
world  conspiracy,  as  in  this  war,  in  which  case  the  earlier 
we  get  into  the  war  the  better. 

The  warning  effect  of  such  a  threat  from  a  combination 
of  nations,  like  those  in  the  League,  is  shown  conclusively 
in  the  maintenance  of  our  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  doctrine 
was  announced  in  1823.  Its  declaration  was  deprecated  by 
American  statesmen  because  it  would  involve  us  in  con- 
tinual friction  and  war.  It  was  directed  against  most 
powerful  European  nations.  Yet  we  have  maintained  it 
inviolate  without  firing  a  shot  or  losing  a  soldier  for  now 
near  a  century.  Article  X  merely  extends  the  same  pro- 
tection to  the  weaker  nations  of  the  world  which  we  gave 
to  the  weaker  nations  of  this  hemisphere  against  the  greed 
of  non- American  nations.  If  our  declaration  accomplished 
this  much,  how  much  more  can  we  count  upon  the  effective- 
ness of  the  declaration  of  a  powerful  world-league  of  nations 
as  a  restraint  upon  a  would-be  bully  and  robber  of  a  small 
nation ! 


CORRESPONDENCE 

The  following  correspondence  is  published  with  the  con- 
sent of  President  Wilson. 

Washington,  Tuesday,  March  18,  1919. 
Personal. 
Dear  Mr.  Tumulty: 

I  enclose  a  memorandum  note  to  the  President  that  is 


322  TAFT    PAPERS    ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

probably  superfluous,  but  may  contain  a  suggestion.  Do 
with  the  note  as  you  choose  —  for  the  next  ten  days,  the 
situation  in  Paris  will  be  crucial  and  critical. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 
Hon.  Joseph  P.  Tumulty, 
Secretary  to  the  President, 
The  White  House, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Washington,  D.  C. 
931  Southern  Building, 

March  18,  1919. 
Mr.  President: 

If  you  bring  back  the  treaty  with  the  League  of  Nations 
in  it,  make  more  specific  reservation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
fix  a  term  for  duration  of  the  League  and  the  limit  of  arma- 
ment, require  expressly  unanimity  of  action  in  Executive 
Council  and  Body  of  Delegates,  and  add  to  Article  XV  a 
provision  that,  where  .the  Executive  Council  of  the  Body 
of  Delegates  finds  the  difference  to  grow  out  of  an  exclu- 
sively domestic  policy,  it  shall  recommend  no  settlement, 
the  ground  will  be  completely  cut  from  under  the  opponents 
of  the  League  in  the  Senate.  Addition  to  Article  XV  will 
answer  objection  as  to  Japanese  immigration  as  well  as 
tariffs  under  Article  XXI.  Reservation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  might  be  as  follows: 

Any  American  State  or  States  may  protect  the  integrity 
of  American  territory  and  the  independence  of  the  govern- 
ment whose  territory  it  is,  whether  a  member  of  the  League 
or  not,  and  may,  in  the  interests  of  American  peace,  object 
to  and  prevent  the  further  transfer  of  American  territory 
or  sovereignty  to  any  European  or  non-American  power. 


CORRESPONDENCE  323 

Monroe  Doctrine  reservation  alone  would  probably  carry 
the  treaty  but  others  would  make  it  certain. 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 
Hon.  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States, 
Paris,  France.  Augusta,  Georgia. 

March  19,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  Tumulty: 

Gus  Karger  has  telegraphed  me  that  the  President  will 
welcome  any  suggestions,  and  the  sooner  the  better.  I  have 
thought  perhaps  it  might  help  more  if  I  was  somewhat  more 
specific  than  I  was  in  the  memorandum  note  I  sent  you  yester- 
day, and  I  therefore  enclose  another  memorandum  for 
such  action  as  you  deem  wise. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 
Hon.  Joseph  P.  Tumulty, 
Secretary  to  the  President, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Augusta,  Ga.,  March  I9th,  1919. 
Memorandum  for  the  President: 
From  William  H.  Taft. 

Duration  of  the  Covenant 

Add  to  the  Preamble  the  following: 

4<  from  the  obligations  of  which  any  member  of  the 
League  may  withdraw  after  July  I,  1929,  by  two  years' 
notice  in  writing,  duly  filed  with  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  League." 

Explanation. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  the  construction  put  upon  the  agree- 


324       TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

ment  would  be  what  I  understand  the  President  has  already 
said  it  should  be,  namely  that  any  nation  may  withdraw 
from  it  upon  reasonable  notice,  which  perhaps  would  be  a 
year.  I  think,  however,  it  might  strengthen  the  Covenant 
if  there  was  a  fixed  duration.  It  would  completely  remove 
the  objection  that  it  is  perpetual  in  its  operation. 

Duration  of  Armament  Limit 

Add  to  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  VIII,  the  following : 
"  At  the  end  of  every  five  years,  such  limits  of  armament 
for  the  several  governments  shall  be  reexamined  by  the  Exe- 
cutive Council,  and  agreed  upon  by  them  as  in  the  first  in- 
stance." 

Explanation 

The  duration  of  the  obligation  to  limit  armament,  which 
now  may  only  be  changed  by  consent  of  the  Executive 
Council,  has  come  in  for  criticism.  I  should  think  this 
might  be  thus  avoided,  without  in  any  way  injuring  the 
Covenant.  Perhaps  three  years  is  enough,  but  I  should 
think  five  years  would  be  better. 

Unanimous  action  of  the  Executive  Council  or  Body  of 
Delegates 

Insert  in  Article  IV,  after  the  first  paragraph,  the  follow- 
ing: 

"  Other  action  taken  or  recommendations  made  by  the 
Executive  Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  by  the 
unanimous  vote  of  the  countries  represented  by  the  members 
or  delegates,  unless  otherwise  specifically  stated." 

Explanation 

Great  objection  is  made  to  the  power  of  the  Executive 
Council  by  a  majority  of  the  members  and  the  Body  of 


CORRESPONDENCE  325 

Delegates  to  do  the  things  which  they  are  authorized  to  do 
in  the  Covenant.  In  view  of  the  specific  provision  that 
the  Executive  Council  and  the  Body  of  Delegates  may  act 
by  a  majority  of  its  members  as  to  their  procedure,  I  feel 
confident  that,  except  in  cases  where  otherwise  provided, 
both  bodies  can  only  act  by  unanimous  vote  of  the  countries 
represented.  If  that  be  the  right  construction,  then  there 
can  be  no  objection  to  have  it  specifically  stated,  and  it  will 
remove  emphatic  objection  already  made  on  this  ground. 
It  is  a  complete  safeguard  against  involving  the  United 
States  primarily  in  small  distant  wars  to  which  the  United 
States  has  no  immediate  relation,  for  the  reason  that  the 
plan  for  taking  care  of  such  a  war,  to  be  recommended  or 
advised  by  the  Executive  Council,  must  be  approved  by  a 
representative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Board. 
Add  to  Article  X. 

a.  "  A  state  or  states  of  America,  a  member  or  members 
of  the  League  and  competent  to  fulfil  this  obligation  in 
respect  to  American  territory  or  independence,  may,  in  event 
of  the  aggression  actual  or  threatened,  expressly  assume 
the  obligation  and  relieve  the  European  or  non-American 
members  of  the  League  from  it  until  they  shall  be  advised 
by  such  American  state  or  states  of  the  need   for  their 
aid." 

b.  "  Any  such  American  state  or  states  may  protect  the 
integrity  of  any  American  territory  and  the  sovereignty  of 
the  government  whose  territory  it  is,  whether  a  member 
of  the  League  or  not,  and  may,  in  the  interest  of  American 
peace,  object  to  and  prevent  the  further  transfer  of  Ameri- 
can territory  or  sovereignty  to  any  European  or  non-Ameri- 
can power." 


326  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

Explanation 

Objection  has  been  made  that,  under  Article  X,  European 
governments  would  come  to  America  with  force  and  be  con- 
cerned in  matters  from  which  heretofore  the  United  States 
has  excluded  them.  This  is  not  true,  because  Spain  fought 
Chili,  in  Seward's  time,  without  objection  from  the  United 
States,  and  so  Germany  and  England  instituted  a  blockade 
against  Venezuela  in  Roosevelt's  time,  This  fear  could  be 
removed,  however,  by  the  first  of  the  above  paragraphs. 

Paragraph  (b)  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  pure  and  simple. 
I  forwarded  this  in  my  first  memorandum. 

It  will  be  observed  that  Article  X  only  covers  the  integ- 
rity and  independence  of  members  of  the  League.  There 
may  be  some  American  countries  which  are  not  sufficiently 
responsible  to  make  it  wise  to  invite  them  into  the  League. 
This  second  paragraph  covers  them.  The  expression 
"  European  or  non-American  "  is  inserted  for  the  purpose  of 
indicating  that  Great  Britain,  though  it  has  American 
dominion,  is  not  to  acquire  further  territory  or  sovereignty. 

Japanese  Immigration  and  Tariffs 

Add  to  Article  XV: 

"If  the  difference  between  the  parties  shall  be  found  by 
this  Executive  Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates  to  be  a 
question  which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the  do- 
mestic jurisdiction  and  polity  of  one  of  the  parties,  it  shall 
so  report  and  not  recommend  a  settlement  of  the  dispute." 

Explanation 

Objection  is  made  to  Article  XV  that  under  its  terms  the 
United  States  would  be  bound  by  unanimous  recommenda- 
tion for  settlement  of  a  dispute  in  respect  to  any  issue  foreign 
or  domestic;  that  it  therefore  might  be  affected  seriously 


CORRESPONDENCE  327 

and  unjustly  by  recommendations  against  the  exclusion  of 
Japanese  or  Chinese,  or  by  recommendations  forbidding 
tariffs  on  importations.  In  my  judgment,  we  could  rely  on 
the  public  opinion  of  the  world,  evidenced  by  the  Body  of 
Delegates,  not  to  interfere  with  our  domestic  legislation  and 
action.  Nor  do  I  think  that  under  the  League  as  it  is,  we 
covenant  to  abide  by  a  unanimous  recommendation.  But  if 
there  is  a  specific  exception  made  in  respect  to  matters  com- 
pletely within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  and  legislation  of  a 
country,  the  whole  criticism  is  removed.  The  Republican 
Senators  are  trying  to  stir  up  anxiety  among  Republicans, 
lest  this  is  to  be  a  limitation  upon  our  tariff.  The  President 
has  already  specifically  met  the  objection  as  to  limitation 
upon  the  tariff  when  the  fourteen  points  were  under  discus- 
sion. Nevertheless,  in  respect  to  the  present  language  of 
the  Covenant,  it  would  help  much  to  meet  and  remove  ob- 
jections, and  cut  the  ground  under  Senatorial  obstruction. 
Prospect  of  Ratification 

My  impression  is  that  if  the  one  article  already  sent,  on 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  be  inserted  in  the  treaty,  sufficient 
Republicans  who  signed  the  Round  Robin  would  probably 
retreat  from  their  positions  and  vote  for  ratification  so  that 
it  would  carry.  If  the  other  suggestions  were  adopted,  I 
feel  confident  that  all  but  a  few  who  oppose  any  League  at 
all  would  be  driven  to  accept  them  and  to  stand  for  the 
League. 

TELEGRAM 

The  White  House,  Washington,  D.  C, 

March  22nd,  1919. 
Hon.  William  H.  Taft: 

Have    just    received     following     from    the     President. 


328      TAFT  PAPERS  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

"  Please  thankfully  acknowledge  to  Mr.  Taft  his  message 
and  say  that  I  hope  it  will  be  very  useful." 

J.  P.  TUMULTY. 

TELEGRAM 

Augusta,  Georgia, 

March  28,  1919. 
Hon.  Joseph  P.  Tumulty, 
White  House, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Venture  to  suggest  to  President  that  failure  to  reserve 
Monroe  Doctrine  more  specifically,  in  face  of  opposition  in 
conference,  will  give  great  weight  to  objection  that  League  as 
first  reported  endangers  Doctrine.  It  will  seriously  em- 
barrass advocates  of  League.  It  will  certainly  lead  to 
Senate  amendments  embodying  Doctrine  and  other  provi- 
sions in  form  less  likely  to  secure  subsequent  acquiescence  of 
other  nations  than  proper  reservation  now.  Deem  some 
kind  of  Monroe  Doctrjne  amendment  now  to  Article  Ten 
vital  to  acceptance  of  League  in  this  country.  I  say  this 
with  full  realization  that  complications  in  conference  are 
many  and  not  clearly  understood  here.  A  strong  and  suc- 
cessful stand  now  will  carry  the  League. 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 

The  White  House,  Washington,  D.  C., 

Mar.  31,  1919. 
Hon.  Wm.  H.  Taft, 
Dayton,  Ohio. 

The  President  has  asked  me  to  thank  you  for  your  cable- 
gram about  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

J.  P.  TUMULTY. 


CORRESPONDENCE  329 

New  York,  N.  Y., 

April  loth,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  Tumulty: 

We  are  very  much  troubled  over  the  report  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  amendment  to  the  Covenant  is  being  op- 
posed by  England  and  Japan.  Will  you  be  good  enough  to 
send  the  enclosed  to  the  President?  We  had  a  meeting  to- 
day of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  and  Dr.  Lowell  and  I,  at  the  instance  of  the  League, 
will  be  glad  to  have  this  matter  presented  directly  to  the 
President  by  cable. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 
Hon.  Joseph  P.  Tumulty, 
Secretary  to  the  President, 
The  White  House, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

New  York,  N.  Y., 

April  loth,  1919. 
The  President, 
Paris. 

Friends  of  Covenant  are  seriously  alarmed  over  report 
that  no  amendment  will  be  made  more  specifically  safeguard- 
ing Monroe  Doctrine.  At  full  meeting  of  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  with  thirty  members 
from  eighteen  States  present,  unanimous  opinion  that,  with- 
out such  amendment,  Republican  Senators  will  certainly 
defeat  ratification  of  treaty  because  public  opinion  will  sus- 
tain them.  With  such  amendment  treaty  will  be  promptly 
ratified.  f 

WILLIAM  H.  TAFT. 
A.  LAWRENCE  LOWELL. 


33O  TAFT    PAPERS   ON    LEAGUE   OF    NATIONS 

THE   WHITE    HOUSE 

Washington 

14  April,   1919. 
Dear  Mr.  Taft: 

I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note  of  the  tenth 
instant,  and  to  say  that  I  have  transmitted  to  the  President 
by  cable  the  message  enclosed. 

Sincerely  yours, 

J.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Secretary  to  the  President. 
Hon.  William  H.  Taft, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

WILLIAM  H.  TAFT 

WASHINGTON,    D.    C. 

May  5,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  Tumulty : 

I  am  very  much  troubled  that  this  conference  at  Paris  was 
unable  to  adopt  a  provision  in  favor  of  religious  freedom 
throughout  the  world.  >  There  is  no  necessity  for  such  a  reso- 
lution in  respect  to  the  allied  countries,  because  there  is  now 
religious  freedom  there.  The  acute  necessity  for  it  is  with 
respect  to  Poland,  Rumania,  and  those  other  new  States 
carved  out  of  Russia,  Austria  and  Germany.  I  would  like, 
therefore,  to  have  you  transmit  to  the  President,  as  coming 
from  me,  a  cable  message  of  the  following  purport : 

"  The  Tews  of  the  United  States  are  greatly  disturbed  over  re- 
liable reports  coming  to  them  of  continued  abuses  of  their  co- 
religionists in  Poland,  Rumania  and  in  the  new  Slav  States  created 
under  the  auspices  of  the  conference.  Is  it  not  possible  to  im- 
pose on  these  States,  as  a  condition  of  their  recognition  and 
membership  in  the  League,  the  maintainence  of  religious  free- 
dom under  their  respective  governments?  What  was  done  in  the 


CORRESPONDENCE  331 

Berlin  Conference  of  1879  ought  to  be  possible  in  the  more 
favorable  atmosphere  of  this  conference,  with  the  additional 
securities  of  performance  that  the  League  will  give." 

I  understand  that  unless  something  of  this  sort  is  done, 
there  will  be  a  strong  movement  among  the  Jews  to  attack 
the  League  and  I  do  not  need  to  tell  you  that  there  are  men  in 
the  Senate  who  will  seize  every  opportunity  of  this  kind  as 
an  instrument  to  defeat  its  ratification. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WILLIAM  H.  TAFT. 

Hon.  Jos.  P.  Tumulty, 

Secretary  to  the  President, 

The  White  House, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


THE   WHITE   HOUSE 

Washington, 

6  May  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  Taft: 

Let  me  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  fifth 
of  May  quoting  a  message  regarding  religious  freedom  which 
you  wish  me  to  transmit  to  the  President.  I  am  doing  so 
to-day  by  cable. 

Sincerely  yours, 

J.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Secretary  to  the  President. 
Hon.  William  H.  Taft, 
931  Southern  Building, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

PRINTED    IN    TH«    UNITED    8TAT18    OV   AMBBICA 


INDEX 


Adams,    John    Quincy,    reference 

to,  252 
Administrative     Organization     of 

League,  3 

Alabama  Claims,  40,  49,  192 
Alaskan  Boundary  Arbitration,  49, 

241 
Alsace-Lorraine,  reference  to,  85, 

132,  136,  165,  222 
Ammunition,  Supervision  of  trade 

in,  25 

Appeal  to  Business  Men,  241 
Appeal  to  Women,  257 
Arbitration       (see       "  Arbitration 

Treaties "       and       "  Concilia- 
tion"), 13,  191,  220,  232,  241, 

264,  316 

Concerning  Seal  Fisheries,  44 
With  Canada,  62 
Arbitration,    compulsory,   289 
Arbitration   Treaties,   39,   43,    178, 

262 
Arbitration  Treaties  of  the  United 

States,  54 
Armaments  — 
Limitation  of,  102,  109,  157,  298, 

324 

Reduction  of,   10,   116,   149,   178, 
208,  248,  263,  264,  288 

Armenia,    reference    to,    136,    143, 
154,  248 

Armenia  as  mandatory,  224 

Armenians,  167 

Armistice,  basis  of,   183 

Arms    (see  "  Munitions  ") 

Articles   of   Confederation,   refer- 
ence to,  29,  30 

Article   10  of   the  League  — 
Arguments     against     answered, 
319 


Article  10  of  the  League  —  confd. 

Discussion  of,  255,  269,  325 

Guaranties  of,  308 
Asquith,  Mr.,  quoted,  218 

Referred    to    as    favoring    the 

League,  98 

Assembly,  reference  to,  6,  7,  314 
Australian     System     of     Military 

Training         (see         "  Military 
Training  ") 


B 


Balkan   States,   reference   to,    136, 

143,  237 

Baltic  Provinces,  139,  143,  237 
Beck,  James  M.,  reference  to,  214, 

215 

Belgium,  invasion  of,  92 

Belgium's  Neutrality,  Violation  of 
obligation  to  protect,  89 

Bering  Sea  Controversy,  arbitra- 
tion of,  44,  64,  241 

Bernhardi,   reference   to,  87 

Bessarabia,    143 

Bethmann-Hollweg  referred  to  as 
favoring  League,  98 

Bismarck,  reference  to,  85,  86,  89, 
181 

Body  of  Delegates,  265,  271,  299 

Bohemia,  143 

Bolsheviki,  175,  183,  184,  213,  219 

Bolshevism,  158,  177,  273,  302,  305 

Bourgeois,  M.  Leon,  reference  to, 
212 

Borah,  Senator  — 
Objections    of    to    League    an- 
swered, 76 

Reference  to,  198,  217,  260,  295, 
297 

Bosnia,   reference  to,  224 
333 


334 


INDEX 


Boycott,  reference  to,  65,  219,  232, 

245,  267,  268,  321 
Objections  to  answered,  67 
Use  for  prevention  of  war,  105 
When  to  be  instituted,  i,  18 
Boxer  Affair,  reference  to,  122 
British  League  of   Free   Nations, 

206 

Briand,  M.,  referred  to  as  favor- 
ing the  League,  74,  98 
Bryan,  W.  J.,  answered  as  to  con- 
stitutionality of  plank  for  use 
of  military  forces,  57 
Debate  with  on  League  to  En- 
force Peace,  98-132 
Bryce,  Lord,  referred  to,  74 
Business  Men,  appeal  to,  241 


Canada  — 

Agreement  with  as  to  fortifica- 
tions, etc.,  XIV,  240,  264 

Arbitration  with,  62 

Our  relations  with,  40 
Caucasus,  the,  reference  to,  248 
Canning,  reference  to,  252, 
Cases  Cited  — 

Geoffrey  v.  Riggs,  54 

Hans  v.  Louisiana,  35 

Kansas  v.  Colorado,  36,  52 

Louisiana  v.  Texas,  38 

Missouri  v.  Illinois,  34 

Wisconsin   v.    The    Pelican   In- 
surance Co.,  37 
Cecil,  Lord  Robert, 

Quoted,  287 

Reference  to,  212,  220 
Children,  Traffic  in,  25 
Chinese,  Question  as  to  naturali- 
zation of,  63 
Civil  War,  Analogy  to  war  with 

Germany,  83 
Clemenceau  — 

Quoted,  215 

Reference  to,   194,  202,  212,  213 


Commission    on    Conciliation,    42, 
43,  50,  S3,  189,  196 

Compulsory  Military  Training,  123 

Conciliation,  Instances  of,  63,  64 

Conciliation,  Commission  of  (see 
"  Commission  on  Concilia- 
tion "  and  "  Council  of  Con- 
ciliation ") 

Confederations  of  small  States, 
example  of,  29 

Congress  of  Nations,  205 

Congress,  Power  to  declare  war 
(see  Treaty-making  power), 
68 

Conscription  law,  reference  to,  96 

Constantinople  as  mandatory,  224 

Constitution  of  United  States, 
framing  of,  224 

Constitutionality  of  Proposals  of 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
52 

Constitutionality  of  the  League, 
276 

Council  of  Conciliation,  100,  160, 
205 

Court  (see  "International 
Court ") 

Court  Decisions  (see  "  Cases 
Cited  ") 

Court  of  International  Justice,  14 

Covenant  of  Paris  (see  "  Paris 
Covenant ") 

Criticism  of  League,  should  be 
constructive,  198,  200 

Cuba  — 

Integrity  guaranteed,  149 
Our  relation  to,  72 
Reference  to,  159,  187 
Treaty  with,  59 

Czecho-Slovaks,  reference  to,  136, 

139,  175,  237 
Czecho-Slavs,  143,  154 
Czecho- Slavs,   in   Russia,   219 

D 

Dalmatian  Coast,  312 
Danzig,  306 


INDEX 


335 


Dardanelles,  183 

Delegates,    Body   of    (see   "  Body 

of  Delegates") 
Democrats,  Support  of  League  by, 

199 

Denmark  — 
Schleswig-Holstein  taken  from, 

85 

Disarmament,  149,  163,  239 

Disarmament  and  Freedom  of  the 
Seas,   163 

Disease,  Control  of,  26 

Disputes  — 

Cases  before  Court  to  determine 
disputes  between  States  un- 
der Articles  of  Confederation, 
30 

Procedure  for  settlement  of,  15, 
19 

Divine  Right  of  Kings,  142 

Draft,  reference  to,  96 


England,  Our  relations  with,  40 
England  and   Her  Navy,   164 
Entangling  Alliances  (see  "  Wash- 
ington's Advice  ") 
Economic  Barriers,  discussion  of, 

176 
Europe,  to  rearrange  map  of,  144, 

154 

Executive   Council  — 
Power  of,  209,  298 
Reference  to,  206,  260,  265,  276, 
281,  314 


Fess,   Mr.,   reference   to,  260 
Finland,  143,  237 
Fisheries  Case,  192 
Fiume,  reference  to,  301,  306,  311, 
Foch,  Marshal,  reference  to,  301 
Forf      (see   "Military   Force") 
Discussion  of,  XV,  103,  124,  160, 
189 


Necessary  for  effective  League, 

108 

Necessary  to  use  force  against 
force,  133 

Fourteen  Points,  reference  to,  139, 
142,  149,  155,  157,  163,  165, 
171,  176,  183,  215 

France,  War  of  1870,  85 

Freedom  of  the  Seas,  160,  163,  176 

French  Association  for  the  Soci- 
ety of  Nations,  207 


German  Colonies,  reference  to,  22, 

142,  164,  248 
German  Colonies  and  the  League, 

221 

German  efficiency,  182 
German   Militarism,   reference  to, 

81,  91,  94 

German  Preparedness  for  War,  87 
Germany,   157 
And    the    membership    in     the 

League,  151 

Essential    to   defeat,    132 
Growth  and  development  of,  85 
Hemming  in,  187 
Not  to  join  League  at  once,  193 
War  of  1870,  85 
Grant,  General,  quoted,  95 
Great   Britain,   Representation   of, 

271 

Greater  League,  101,  161 
Great  Powers  and  the  League,  151, 
161,  162,  177,  192,  195,  196,  197, 
202,  215,  216,  217 
Greece,  Leagues  of,  29 
Grey,  Lord  — 
In  favor  of  League,  74,  98 
Quoted,  79 


H 


Hague  Conference,  Second,  41 
Hague  Tribunal,  referred  to,  220 


336 


INDEX 


Hamilton,  reference  to,  224 
Hayes  and  Tilden  dispute,  159 
Henry,   Patrick,  reference  to,  247 
Herzegovinia,    reference    to,    224 
Holy  Alliance,  reference  to,  142 
Hughes,  Mr.,  referred  to  as  fav- 
oring  League,   99 
Hungary,  302 


Immigration,  318 
Indemnities,  300 
International  Bureau  of  Labor 

provided  for  in  League,  247 
International  Army,  Necessity  for, 

ISO 

International  Bureaus,  26 
International  Court,  50,  53,  61,  99, 

160,  188,  196,  205,  225,  317 
Supreme     Court    as    precedent 

for,  43 
International    Law,    50,    189,    195, 

205,  208 
Conferences  to  agree  upon,  42, 

44 

Definition  of,  61,  93,  125 
Method    for    formulating,    and 

codifying,  2,  3 

The  League  to  formulate  princi- 
ples of,  loo 

International    Police    (see   "  Mili- 
tary Police") 

International  Prize  Court,  56 
Internationalism,  Argument  as  to 

answered,   146 
Ireland  and  the  League,  225 
Isolation  inconceivable,   162 
Italy  and  Her  Entrance  into  the 
War,  311,  312 


Japanese,  Immigration  and  natu- 
ralization of,  49,  63,  266,  310, 
326 

Jay  Treaty,  54,  56 


Jefferson,  Thos.,  reference  to,  119, 

174,  252 
Jews    and    religious    liberty,    166, 

309,  330 
Jews    in    Rumania,    Poland,    etc., 

310 
Jugo  Slavs,  136,  139,  143,  154,  175, 

237 

Justiciable,  definition  of,   179 
Justiciable  questions,  I,  3,  33,  39, 

49,  53 


Kaiser,  reference  to,  140 
Kant,  reference  to,  113 
Knox,  Senator  — 

Answered,  280 

Discussion    of    plan    of   League 
proposed  by,  289 

Reference  to,  198,  201,  210,  214, 

215 

L 

Labor,   to   improve   conditions   as 

to  in  all  countries,  25 
Lansing,    Secretary,    reference  to, 

212 

Larger  League,  189 
League  — 

A  barrier  to  wars,  257 

Analogy   to   Domestic    Govern- 
ment, 78 

British,  206 

Constitutionality    of,    276,    277, 
280  ff 

Covenant,  As  amended,  Analysis 
of,  313 

English  plan  referred  to,  83 

Feasibility  of,  discussed,  78 

Functions  of,  195 

Fundamental  plan  of,  41  ff 

Greatest  step  in  history,  290 

Members  of,  27 

Objections  to,  297 

Reasons  for  entering,  249 

Withdrawal  from,  323 


INDEX 


337 


League   of    Nations    (sec   "  Paris 

Covenant"),  52 
Defined,  178 

League  to  Enforce  Peace  — 
Constitutionality    of    Proposals, 

52 

Planks  of  Platform,  188 
Platform  of,   I,  205 
Purposes  of,  74 
Steps  in  organization  of,  180 
Legislative  Body  of  League   (see 
"  Assembly "    and    "  Body    of 
Delegates  "),  3 
Lesser  League,  101,  160,  163,  195, 

208,  217 
Lesser    Powers    and   the   League, 

151 

Lincoln,  referred  to,  83 
Lithuanians,    175 
Lloyd  George  — 
Quoted,  115,  218 
Reference  to,  194,  202,  212,  302 
Lodge,  Senator  — 
Reference  to,  74,  198,  214 
Referred    to    as    favoring    the 

League,  99,   174 

Loughborough,    Lord    Chancellor, 
quoted,  56 

M 

Madison,  James,  reference  to,  252 
Mandatories,  22,  223,  224,  234,  262, 

309,  3i6 

Mason,  George,   reference  to,  247 
Members  of  League,  27 
Mesopotamia,   reference  to,  248 
Milyukoff,  quoted,    135 
Militarism,  94,   138,   142,   157,   165, 

221 

Military  Aid,  when  to  be  given,  18 
Military  Force  — 
Analogy  to  police  in  maintain- 
ing order,  106 
Discussion  of,  65,    100,    112 
Objections  to  answered,  57,  67 
When  to  be  used,  I,   18,  42,  45, 
48 


Military  Training,  Universal,  150, 

163,  204,  217 
Missouri  v.  Illinois,  34 
Monroe  Doctrine  — 
Interpretation   of,    269 
Message    of    President    Monroe 

enunciating,  253 

Reference   to   or   discussion   of, 
VII,  VIII,  22,  70,  77,  119,  203, 
216,  252,  254,  274,  275,  276,  292, 
322,  328,  329 
Reservation  as  to,  318 
Morgenthau,    Mr.,     reference    to, 

258 
Munitions,  manufacture  of,  n 


N 


Napoleon,  reference  to,  95,  103, 
141 

National  isolation  impossible  in 
the  future,  134 

Nationalism,  League  not  incon- 
sistent with,  146 

Naturalization,  63 

Neutrality  of  Belgium,  Violation 
of,  90 

New  Nations  or  Republics  to  be 
created,  X,  143,  145,  160,  185, 
187,  188,  236 

Non-Justiciable   Questions,   49 


O 


Objections    to    League,    198,    200, 

209,  249 
Answered: 

(1)  As  to  Boycott,  67 

(2)  As  to  Military  Force,  67 

(3)  As    to    Unconstitutional- 

ity  of,  68 
Olney,  former  Secretary  of  State, 

quoted,  57-58 
Opium,  Traffic  in,  25 
Oregon  Boundary  Dispute,  40 
Orlando,  reference  to,  313 


INDEX 


Paderewski,  reference  to,  310 
Palestine,  248 

As  Mandatory,  224 
Panama  — 
Independence  of,  guaranteed,  59» 

149 

Treaty  with,  58 

Panama  Canal,  reference  to,  72 
Paris     Covenant,     discussion     of, 

228,  233,  262,  290 
Peace  — 

Dangers  of   Premature,  81 
Not  delayed  by  League,  300 
Steps  to  secure,  296 
Peace  Offer,  Danger  of,  138 
Pennsylvania   v.    Connecticut,    un- 
der Articles  of  Confederation, 
30 
Platform        of        League        (see 

"  League  ") 

Discussion  of,  98,  107,  145 
Plunkett,    Sir    Horace,    reference 

to,  226 
Poincare,   President,  reference  to, 

213 

Poindexter,  Senator  — 
Answered,  147,  240 
Quoted,  239 

Reference  to,  154,  260,  297 
Pogroms,  reference  to,   167 
Poland,  143,  154,  237 
Poles,   175 

Police     (see    "  International    Po- 
lice ") 

Polk,   President,  quoted,  253 
Preparedness,       in       relation      to 

League,  80 
Presidential    Election,    description 

of,  185-186 

Pro-German  sentiment,  92,  97 
Purpose  of  United  States  in  the 
War,  133 

R 
Racial  Freedom,  309 


Reasons  for  entering  the  League, 
249 

Reed,  Senator,  reference  to,  154, 
260,  297 

Referendum,  discussion  of  use  be- 
fore declaring  war,  115 

Regional  Understandings,  Reser- 
vations as  to,  318 

Religious  Liberty,   166,  309,  330 

Republicans  and   the   League,    199 

Reptile  Fund,  reference  to  use  of 
to  bribe  the  press,  89 

Republics,  New  (see  "New  Re- 
publics ") 

Roosevelt,  Former  President,  re- 
ferred to,  75,  201,  202,  203 

Roosevelt  and  the  Japanese-Rus- 
sian War,  83 

Root,  Mr.,  reference  to,  315,  317, 

319 

Round  Robin,  the,  307 
Rumania,  143 

Rumania  and  the  Jews,    168,  310 
Russia  — 

Discussion  of  problems  of,   183 
Reference   to,  87,   91,    135,    136, 
143,  154,  175,  219,  305 
S 

Scott,  James  Brown,  reference  to, 

212 
Seal  Fisheries    (see  "  Bering  Sea 

Controversy  ") 
Secret  Treaties,  311 
Self -Determination,    136 
Self-Government,     definition     of, 

185 
Separate  Peace,  Logical  result  of 

those  opposing  League,  154 
Slovakia  (see  "  Czecho-Slavs  ") 
Smuts,  General,  reference  to,  235, 

261 

Saar  District,  222 
Small  Nations,  196,  197 

Protection  of  by  League,  193 
Smaller     League     (see     "Lesser 

League  ") 


INDEX 


339 


Socialists,   reference  to,   146,   153 

Sonnino,  reference  to,  301,  313 

Sovereignty,  discussion  of,  VIII, 
147,  148,  191,  279 

Submarine  Warfare,  reference  to 
use  of,  80,  89,  93,  94,  157,  180, 
181 

Sully,  reference  to,  201 

Super-sovereignty,  League  not  to 
establish,  XIV,  148,  215,  259 

Supreme  Court,  Analogy  to  inter- 
national tribunal,  32 

Swiss  System  of  Military  Train- 
ing (see  "Military  Train- 
ing ") 

Syria,  reference  to,  248 


Tariff,    Exclusion    from    League, 

3i8,  326 

Tennyson,  reference  to,  201 
Treaties  — 
Secret,  311 
To  be  registered  with  League, 

20 
Those  negotiated  by  Mr.  Bryan, 

in 

Treaty  of  Versailles  — 
Delay  in  making,  303 
Long  and  complicated,    188 
Treaty-making    Power,   discussion 

of,  53,  58,  68,  239,  285,  286 
Treaty  of   Peace  and  the  League 

of  Nations,  272,  280 
Trentino,    reference    to,    136,    154, 

165,  312 
Triple  Alliance,  reference  to,  104, 

312 
Triple  Entente,  reference  to,   104, 

312 

Turkey,  reference  to,  136,   143 
Turkish    Empire,    Disposition    of 

certain  communities,  23 

U 
Ukraine,  reference  to,  143,  237 


United  States  — 
Discussion    as    to    whether    the 
United  States  should  join  the 
League,  117 

Driven  to  the  war,  156 
Influence  in  League,   194 
Power,  wealth  and  growth  of, 

71  ff,  79 

Purpose  of  in  the  war,  133,  181 
Universal    Training    (see    "  Mili- 
tary Training  ") 


Victory,  Obligations  of,  141 
Victory  Program,  2 
Victory  with   Power,    132 
Viviani,  M.,  quoted,  135 


W 

War  — 

Delay  of  by  investigation,  ni 
Right   of    Congress   to   declare, 

149 

Washington's  advice  against  en- 
tangling Alliances,  Discussion 
of,  IX,  XII,  71  ff,  119,  132,  156, 
174,  274 

White,  Henry,  reference  to,  212 
Wilson,   President  — 
And    the    Fiume    Controversy, 

313 

Correspondence   with   in   refer- 
ence to  the  League,  321   ff 
Influence  in  Europe,  194 
Quoted,  79,  91,  134,  157,  218 
Reference  to,  74,   153,   154,   162, 

169,  211,  223,  230,  238,  255 
Referred    to    as     favoring    the 

League,  98 

Wilson,    Professor,  quoted,  70 
Women,  Appeal  to,  257 
Workingmen  and  the  League,  152 
World  Court,  discussion  of,  114 


340  INDEX 

World   Court   Congress,   Address  Z 

before,  28 

World  Politics,  134  Zeppelins,  reference  to  use  of,  89 

World  War,  Beginning  of,  87  Zones,    Division    of    world    into, 

216 


DATE  DUE 


PRINTED  INU.S. A. 


:  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 
II    I   II    II    III  I  II    I   III  II      II 


A     000  538  530     7 


